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HISTORY  
OF  
THE CAMPAIGN  
OF  
THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
UNDER JOHN POPE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL  
U. S. A.; LATE MAJOR-GENERAL  
U. S. VOLUNTEERS;  
FROM  
CEDAR MOUNTAIN TO ALEXANDRIA, 1862.

BY  
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BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. VOLUNTEERS.



BOSTON:  
HOUGHTON, OSGOOD AND COMPANY.  
*The Riverside Press, Cambridge.*  
1880.

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## PREFACE.

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THIS volume contains the entire history of the campaign of the "Army of Virginia," from the Rapidan to Alexandria, beginning with the close of the battle of Cedar Mountain. The work is complete in itself, and follows the plan of the "History of the Second Massachusetts Regiment" and the campaigns in which it took part, previously published at different periods in three parts.

It may not be out of place to explain that the present and previous histories were prepared by the author of the present volume at the request of the surviving officers of the Second Massachusetts Regiment of Infantry. It was intended to present and read, at the annual meeting of the officers, papers in which the more prominent events in their regimental history should be given. But after a first paper the subject overstepped all bounds and took the form of publications, in which have appeared, in Part I., the only authentic history of the organization of the Second Massachusetts Regiment of Infantry, with its service in Patterson's campaign in 1861; in Part II., the occupation of Harper's Ferry in Virginia, the left bank of the Potomac in Maryland, the battle of Ball's Bluff



and winter quarters in Frederick City in Maryland, in the winter of 1861-62; in Part III., a history of McClellan's reconnaissance and Banks's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, with his skirmishes and retreat; the battle of Winchester; the organization of the Army of Virginia; and the battle of Cedar Mountain.

In this history as in preceding ones I have endeavored to get at the truth and to withhold opinions where there were no facts to support them.

The matter relating to General Fitz-John Porter's conduct in this campaign, and to his subsequent trial and conviction under charges growing out of that conduct, was prepared for publication before the appointment by the President of a Board of Army Officers to examine the evidence in his case and to report upon it. The conclusions of the Board have been referred to as confirming the opinions expressed in the text.

It is to be regretted that perfectly reliable statements of the casualties in both armies cannot be obtained. By correspondence with surviving officers, generals and subalterns, by examining reports and official documents, and by a reference to the mass of papers in Washington, now being collected, and that have been gathered, as the records of the Great Rebellion, every effort has been made to procure them. In the search the surgeon-general's department has been appealed to; but from all sources there comes the same reply of the meagreness of Federal or Confederate reports of the losses in the second Bull Run or Manassas campaign. And this is easily accounted for when we consider the haste with which the Maryland

campaign followed. Neither time to report, nor opportunity to preserve notes from which accurate results might have been obtained, was afforded. In one division, whose losses are reported in the tables given in the Appendix, returns that would have enabled the assistant adjutant-general to make exact lists of casualties in his division during a bloody engagement on the 29th of August, were on the 30th thrown out of the headquarter's wagon and destroyed. General Hooker saw the wagon, seized it, and sent it to the front loaded with ammunition, for which at that time the need was more urgent than for the preservation of reports. It was by counting the number of muskets in the division after the fighting was over that an approximation to the losses was possible.<sup>1</sup>

The detailed list of casualties by regiments in the Confederate army I give from the official returns now on file among a mass of Confederate reports in the archives at Washington. It will be seen that both in the body of this work and in the Appendix officers are named as commanding divisions who are not so designated in the detailed list. It is hardly necessary to explain that the actual commander of a brigade or division in the field is often not recognized, because not the assigned commander of that brigade or division. Hence the same command may be confused under different names. To avoid such disorder, numerals were adopted in the Federal service at an early period of the war.

The lists of regiments and batteries of the Federal

<sup>1</sup> General Stevens's division.

army in the Appendix is not perfectly accurate and complete, and I regret it. I must appeal, however, for my own justification in this, as in other matters, to the stereotyped reply of general officers and custodians of official papers, "I do not believe the information you desire can ever be obtained."

At the hazard of being charged with repetition I have in some instances, in the tables in the Appendix, given figures which appear in the body of the work. It will be found that references from the aggregates give detailed losses that have before appeared, where the history of services rendered was related.

I desire to express my thanks for the especial search made for me among the public papers in Washington, and for the valuable information thus derived.

With such assistance I have closely approximated, though I have not realized in all cases perfect accuracy in the numbers engaged, and the losses suffered, by both armies in the campaign of the Army of Virginia.

The maps of the country, and of the battle-fields showing the location of the troops, I have constructed with great care and from the most authentic sources.

G. H. G.

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# THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

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## CHAPTER I.

### RAPIDAN TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

IN the night, on the 11th of August in the year 1862, General Jackson turned from his victorious battle-field of Cedar Mountain, and marched southward towards Gordonsville.

The present volume takes up the narrative of General Pope's campaign in Virginia from this period, and enters upon the Federal pursuit to the Rapidan River, at which place General Pope, resting his right on Robertson's River, drew up Sigel's corps on a cross road that led from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court House. His centre, commanded by McDowell, occupied both flanks of Cedar Mountain, while his left, under General Reno, who had marched from Falmouth with eight thousand men,\*and joined him on the 14th of August, Pope stationed near Racoon Ford, to cover the road from there to Stevensburg and Culpepper.

Though the front of the Federal army extended a distance of some seven miles, the line was a strong one, for the flanks rested on two rivers about one hundred yards in width, and the centre held a commanding position which covered the plain.<sup>1</sup>

The disposition of Pope's army and the numbers of

<sup>1</sup> Banks's corps at this time remained at Culpepper.

his troops were accurately known to General Jackson, on the 13th of August, through his chief engineer, who had gained an unobstructed view of Pope's exact location from the summit of Clark's Mountain, an elevated point three miles east of Rapidan Station.

This officer<sup>1</sup> reported that the main body of the Union army was encamped around the slopes of Garnett's and Slaughter's mountains; that one division<sup>2</sup> was one mile north of Culpepper Court House, on the Brandy Station road, and that a small force was located between Mitchell's Station and Lime Church. When Captain Boswell made his report to General Jackson he was directed to examine on the following day the most desirable route for turning the enemy's flank and reaching Warrenton, in Fauquier County. On the 14th this officer recommended that Jackson should march from his encampment west of Toddsburg, through Orange Court House, thence down the Fredericksburg plank-road to Dr. Terrell's, then to the left by Pisgah Church; cross the Rapidan at Sommerville's Ford, and thence by Lime Church, Stevensburg, Brandy Station, and Beverly Ford, to Warrenton. Jackson approved this plan. On the 15th of August he moved his command forward, passed Orange Court House, and encamped his three divisions, under Taliaferro, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, near Pisgah Church, where they awaited, until the 20th of August, the arrival of a portion of General Longstreet's command.<sup>3</sup>

While Jackson was thus making due preparation for his grand flank movement, the whole army of the Confederate General Lee was moving from Richmond to the Rapidan.

<sup>1</sup> Captain J. K. Boswell, chief engineer, second Confederate army corps.

<sup>2</sup> Banks's corps.

<sup>3</sup> Jackson's Official Report.

In a letter dated the 6th of August, General Halleck had expressed to McClellan his great regret that he had been compelled to order, on the 3d of August, the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac to Acquia Creek for a new base on the Rappahannock. Had Halleck delayed this letter until the 13th, he would have been spared the indulgence of grief, for on that date, as it appears from the history of the times, Lee became convinced that he could remove McClellan from the peninsula without Halleck's assistance, and that the best way to accomplish this result was to threaten Washington far more violently than McClellan had threatened Richmond.

Longstreet's corps commenced its march upon the 13th of August for Gordonsville, and the remainder of the troops followed in the same direction. D. H. Hill brought up the rear on the last of the month.

It was Lee's intention to cross the Rapidan and attack Pope at early dawn on the 18th, but delay on the part of some of his subordinates interfered with the completion of his plans, and he was obliged to postpone his movements until daylight of the 20th. His order of the 19th directed General Longstreet, commanding the right wing, to cross the Rapidan at Racoon Ford and move in the direction of Culpepper Court House. General Jackson, commanding the left wing, was to cross at Sommerville's Ford and move in the same direction, keeping on the left of Longstreet, while General Anderson, crossing at the same ford with Jackson, was to follow his route and act in reserve. The battalion of light artillery under Colonel S. D. Lee was ordered to take the same route, while the cavalry under Stuart was to pass at Morton's Ford, pursue the route by Stevensburg to Rappahannock Station, destroy the railroad bridge, cut the enemies communications and tele-

graph line, and operating towards Culpepper Court House, take position on General Longstreet's right. This movement for the destruction of the Federal army was intended to be speedy and to be sure. Only medical and ammunition wagons were to follow the Confederate army. Baggage and supply trains were to be parked on the south side of the Rapidan, in secure positions, so as not to embarrass the different roads. The troops were to carry three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. The movement was to be made at dawn. General Pope, fortunately for us all, was not ignorant of Lee's purposes. From the summit of ThorOUGHfare Mountain, from spies within Lee's army itself, and from bold movements of his cavalry far beyond his lines, Pope knew that Jackson had been reënforced by large numbers from Richmond, and he suspected on the morning of the 18th of August that nearly the whole of Lee's army was in his front. He learned from a spy that the enemy had concentrated his forces behind a ridge beyond the river, opposite his extreme left, that his artillery horses were harnessed, and that the troops were momentarily expecting orders to march down the river and cross at Racoon Ford to reach his rear.<sup>1</sup>

General Lee had communicated to his able and indefatigable leader, General Stuart, his plans for this surprise, and Stuart had made his preparations accordingly. To move Fitz-Hugh Lee's brigade of cavalry to the vicinity of Racoon Ford, and Hampton's brigade to the border of the space between the two armies, was but precautionary to the movement of Longstreet's infantry, then marching from Gordonsville. At Verdierville, about five miles south of the Rapidan, on the

<sup>1</sup> This information was communicated to Pope on the morning of the 18th of August.

evening of the 17th of August, General Stuart awaited impatiently the concentration of his cavalry in the vicinity of Raccoon Ford.

General Fitz-Hugh Lee was stationed on the extreme Confederate left. His march to join Stuart should have ended on the evening of the 17th ; but Stuart saw no signs of his coming. The few inhabitants who hailed the approach of Confederate soldiers with joy — for as yet they had hardly tasted of the horrors of war — had neither seen nor heard of the brigade. Night came and Stuart was impatient. He dispatched his Adjutant-General, Major Fitz Hugh, up the expected road ; then wrapping himself in his cloak he slept under the porch of a house by the roadside. At early dawn a sudden clatter of horsemen and wagons was heard. Stuart was aroused, and walking out bareheaded to the fence near by, he saw a column of troops coming from the very direction indicated for General Lee. Was this the Confederate cavalry ? The light was indistinct : it was impossible at a glance to ascertain. Stuart ordered two officers of his staff<sup>1</sup> to reconnoitre. In a moment they were fired on and rapidly pursued. The delusion was over. Stuart leaped upon his horse, and away he went, followed by two members of his staff, who kept the road while Stuart himself, pushing his horse over a high fence, escaped to a neighboring wood, from whence he saw the Union cavalry enter the house and leave with his hat and the cloak which had formed his bed. Major von Bocke, a bragging German on Stuart's staff, was pursued and fired on as long as he was in sight, under the impression, doubtless, that he was of some consequence.

Stuart's Adjutant-General had been captured by the Union cavalry the preceding evening while searching

<sup>1</sup> Captain Mosby and Lieutenant Gibson.



for Fitz-Hugh Lee. Upon his person was found an autograph letter from General Lee to Stuart, dated at Gordonsville, on the 15th of August, in which the plans of the Confederate commander were revealed.

It was the night of the 18th before the expected column arrived. Stuart was angry at the delay. Time did not mollify him. In his official report he charged Lee "with being a day behind his time," with not "appreciating punctuality," and with having turned back after starting in the right direction, to follow his wagons as far south as Louisa Court House, to which place they had been ordered for provisions. Lamentingly complaining, Stuart records that this failure to comply with his instructions caused the postponement for a day of the movement of the cavalry across the Rapidan, lost to him a fine opportunity to overhaul a body of the enemy's cavalry on a predatory excursion far beyond their lines; and that by the great *détour* the brigade had made, it was not in condition to move on the 19th upon a forced march to the enemy's rear.

It was clear enough now to the Federal commander that there was no time to lose. It was retreat or destruction. On the morning of the 18th Pope ordered his army to withdraw with all speed behind the Rappahannock.

At this time the Union army was greatly outnumbered by the enemy.

Save the eight thousand added by General Reno, Pope had received no reinforcements, and his army, made up of the corps of McDowell, Sigel, and Banks, was the same that he had commanded at Cedar Mountain. Pope's whole command at this time could not, with Reno's division, have exceeded forty-two thousand men, while the whole of Longstreet's corps (D. H. Hill excepted) added to the whole of Jackson's was not

less than sixty-three thousand five hundred<sup>1</sup> men, of all arms.

Without delay the retreat began. By rail and along the roadways, in cars and by baggage wagons from Mitchell's Station and from Culpepper, vast stores of subsistence, forage, and ammunition streamed out for the left bank of the Rappahannock. General Reno on the left took the road by Stevensburg to Kelly's Ford. Banks's and McDowell's corps were ordered to cross the river at the bridge of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and Sigel's corps was directed to the crossing of the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs, and thence down the river, to connect closely with McDowell's right. It was dark when the troops were put in motion. For a large part of the way the army was compelled to follow the trains. The march was slow and halts were frequent. It was a tedious and wearisome retreat, in which the cavalry at Racoon Ford and on Robertson's River covered our rear. At Culpepper Court House, where Banks's corps had remained since the battle of Cedar Mountain, we saw all day railway trains loading, wagons moving off, and sutlers in despair. At night we encamped one mile out from the town, to be ready for the morning. General Lee knew nothing of Pope's intentions, and seems to have seen nothing of the execution of his plans until it was too late to prevent them. The constant motion of trains towards the Rappahannock on the day and night of the 18th was probably unknown to Lee. His order of the 19th,<sup>2</sup> indeed, for a movement of his army on the morning of the 20th was for the express purpose of cutting off Pope's army before he could reach the

<sup>1</sup> In the total, General Anderson's command of seven thousand men is added.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix.

river,— a movement in which the cavalry were to take so important a part that Lee gave detailed instructions to his cavalry chief. His order to General Stuart, dated the 19th of August, speaks plainly of the destruction of the railroad bridge across the Rappahannock; orders him to operate back towards Culpepper Court House, “creating such confusion and consternation as he could,” and then to place himself on Longstreet’s right.<sup>1</sup> Pope’s flight was known to the Confederates on the 19th, but it was known too late to prevent or even to hinder it. It was seen from Clark’s Mountain by General Jackson’s chief engineer,<sup>2</sup> before whose gaze the Federal encampments faded from view like cloud shadows, while long lines of dust rising above the tree-tops left it no longer in doubt that Pope’s army had turned eastwardly for a new base of operations. By night of the 19th the whole army with its trains had safely crossed the Rappahannock, and was posted behind the river, with its left at Kelly’s Ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station. The movement of the Federal army was successful. It was made with deliberation and without loss or accident.

The Confederates were disappointed; many of them scolded bitterly. Rarely had a better opportunity offered for the destruction of an army. It was therefore to be expected that blame should fall upon some one, and at this time it fell upon Longstreet. His movements were said to have been unnecessarily deliberate.<sup>3</sup> The friends of Jackson claimed that he would have made that movement on the night of the 18th, for he showed that he always keenly estimated the

<sup>1</sup> Life of General R. E. Lee, by J. E. Cooke, page 112.

<sup>2</sup> Captain Boswell’s Report.

<sup>3</sup> Life of R. E. Lee, by Cooke, page 113.

value of time in all his strategic combinations.<sup>1</sup> It was then most fortunate that Jackson was not in command of the Confederate forces on the night of the 18th of August; for the superior force of the enemy must have overwhelmed us, if we could not have escaped, and an escape on that night was impossible.

On the morning of the 20th of August the Rappahannock flowed between the hostile armies. The Federal cavalry, charged with covering the columns of infantry and baggage, was still on the south side of the river, with the main command under General Bayard, who had been detained at Culpepper Court House until the early morning of the 20th. The cavalry that covered Sigel's column halted at two o'clock in the morning, a few miles from Hazel River, on the road to Sulphur Springs, crossed the Rappahannock at noon, burned the bridge behind them, and encamped near the infantry by nine o'clock at night.<sup>2</sup> And yet we are wrong in asserting that none but cavalry interposed between Pope and the Confederates. There was the impetuous Milroy, with his independent brigade attached to the first army corps, occupying the post of danger, the rear of his corps, who was so delayed by the column that he encamped at midnight of the 19th only four miles north of Culpepper, and did not reach Sigel's corps until five P. M. of the 20th. In five hours he had made but about thirteen and one half miles, and had seen, he says, "no signs of an enemy in his rear," — which may account for his very deliberate movements.<sup>3</sup> But the Confederates *were* in motion, and were pursu-

<sup>1</sup> Life of Jackson, by Dabney, vol. ii., p. 259.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, Col. M. R. Lloyd commanding Sixth Ohio Cavalry, Major Knox commanding Ninth Ohio Cavalry.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, Brigadier-General R. H. Milroy, first army corps, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 92.

ing rapidly. Stuart's cavalry took the advance. At about four o'clock in the morning of the 20th of August, under the faint gleams of a rising moon, Lee's and Robertson's brigades forded the Rapidan at two adjacent fords.<sup>1</sup> General Lee took the route by Madden, in the direction of Kelly's Ford. Longstreet moved his corps to Racoon Ford, and thence to Kelly's, on the Rappahannock. Jackson directed his column towards Sommerville's Ford, and a bivouac on the Brandy Station road, two miles beyond Stevensburg.

At an early hour, the heads of Lee's infantry columns plunged thigh-deep into the waters of the Rapidan. The exhilaration of the morning air and the freshness of the morning bath increased the enthusiasm of the troops. As the soldiers clambered up the banks of the river, and saw before them in the distance the hills which crowned the waters of the Rappahannock, they beheld with unshaken confidence the region from which they hoped to descend through the scattered fragments of the Federal Army of Virginia upon the Federal capital at Washington. The air resounded with their enthusiastic cheers. But as they toiled on through dust and through heat with rapid strides, and found none of Pope's infantry in their front, they settled down in a steady tramp for their bivouacs upon the Rappahannock. But how was it with the Confederate commander himself? for General Lee knew that his plans had miscarried, and that a stealthy movement to Pope's rear was now impossible. It is not improbable, however, that he still had hopes that the Federal commander, who had boastingly claimed that in the field of his military operations nothing but the backs of his enemies had ever been seen, and who in vainglorious tones promised to

<sup>1</sup> Tobacco Creek and Mitchell's, probably.

conduct Federal armies to none but offensive operations, might perhaps be persuaded to try the conclusions of an engagement before placing the Rappahannock between himself and his enemy. Fortunate indeed was it for us that pompous utterances and empty boasts were indulged in by Pope only in fair weather, when gentle breezes and quiet waters gave no token of a coming storm. In an angry ocean Pope was a different being. He was silent, even dependent at times, leaning on stronger men for counsel.

In the retreat of the Union army to the Rappahannock a series of minor cavalry engagements took place, one of which was at Brandy Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, where Stuart, accompanied by Robertson's brigade, found General Bayard with a force of Federal horsemen.

As instructed by McDowell, Bayard had halted here and had sent out strong parties on all the roads coming from the enemy's positions. Volumes of dust sweeping northward foretold the approach of the Confederate cavalry, and gave the Union commander ample time to draw up his forces in a thick wood near the railroad station, from which, for several hours, he kept at bay an entire regiment of the enemy.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates fired away all their ammunition, and retired for more. With a new supply the attack was renewed, but with no better assurances of success. In the mean time fresh Confederate forces had arrived, and with their arrival a new plan was conceived. The forest which held the Union cavalry was bounded on the west for two miles by the main road from Stevensburg to the railroad station. This road then crosses the rail, continues to the north and east for about a mile, where it intersects a by-road, which, running southerly, crosses the track

<sup>1</sup> The Seventh Virginia Cavalry, commanded by Colonel W. E. Jones.

and bounds the forest on the east. To the west, north, and east the land is clear. Under these circumstances it became an easy matter to envelop and capture a small force in the woods. With three regiments of cavalry<sup>1</sup> the enemy swept to the left of the main road, out into the open country around to the north and east of the forest, to gain the rear of the Union forces, while at the same time a Confederate regiment dashed boldly up the road to attack in front. The movement was successful. The Union force gave way, very gradually however, along the road toward the Rappahannock, occupying woods and hedge-rows, from behind which, with dismounted men, they kept up a galling fire.<sup>2</sup> But the Federal commander, not content with this mode of warfare, resolved to embrace the first opportunity to make a more determined stand. About midway between Brandy Station and the Rappahannock he selected a position and awaited the enemy. As General Stuart approached he saw before him on a ridge a Federal brigade of cavalry in solid columns of squadrons, covered with mounted skirmishers, and well deployed to the front. At the foot of the ridge the land was level, though cut up by intervening ditches. The Seventh Virginia Cavalry dashed forward up the road with an impetuosity which was serious. But the long-range rifles of the Federal soldiers brought them to a stand. Then Stuart sent in haste for Robertson's brigade. With the twelfth Virginia against the centre, the sixth and seventh upon the flanks, the Confederate cavalry in columns of fours was hurled in rapid succession upon the Union line. The contest, though brief, was severe; Bayard was outnumbered and overpowered; Confederate reinforcements were arriving. Two

<sup>1</sup> Sixth, twelfth, and seventeenth Virginia.

<sup>2</sup> Confession by Stuart, his Official Report.

regiments of General Fitz-Hugh Lee's brigade, with Pelham's battery of horse artillery, were seen approaching. The Federal commander with his single brigade retired, and Stuart, who had sent for these reenforcements to increase his already superior numbers, boasted, in his official report of the affray, that the "incentives and aspirations" of the Confederate horse were enough to make the Federals fly "before the clash of sabres could make havoc in their ranks."<sup>1</sup> Without further molestation Bayard's cavalry forded the river near Rappahannock Station, and Stuart followed closely upon the heels of the Federal rear guard of mounted skirmishers.

The hills that fall away to the ford were covered with timber. The last struggle of the Federal cavalry to retain possession of the right bank of the Rappahannock had been in plain sight of the whole Union army on the opposite side. Bayard's skirmishers came out of the woods in confusion. Now here and now there, some more adventurous horsemen would pull rein for a moment, halt, turn, and dash back into the forest, as if inspired to unusual effort in the presence of unusual observers. In this manner, a spirited rush was made up the hill by a company called the Harris Light Cavalry, who turned with loud cries from the river's bank and charged into the woods, only to fall back again, somewhat crestfallen, we thought, to take refuge behind the infantry and the batteries that lined our side of the Rappahannock. Save in this cavalry combat, the march of the Union army from the Rapidan to the left bank of the Rappahannock was unmolested. Pope had occupied the most advantageous positions to defend the

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report, General Robertson. He admits that Bayard had but a single brigade, and he claims to have led the charge against the centre of the Federal line.



most advantageous fords. McDowell's corps was massed at the Rappahannock railroad bridge and ford ; Sigel's corps was on its way down the river to prolong McDowell's right ; Banks's corps was in position at Norman's Ford, and Reno's division at Kelly's, on the left of the Federal line.

But Pope's plans for the future were not alone defensive ones. He intended to remain behind the barrier of the Rappahannock until his army was strengthened by McClellan's forces from the peninsula, when he hoped to give battle to the Confederates wherever they would stand and fight him. That a river flowing between hostile armies affords security against an attack in proportion to the difficulties to be overcome in crossing it, is one of the rudiments of military science. General Pope was learned in some things, and he must have known that the Rappahannock above the mouth of the Rapidan could not interpose a barrier to the enemy's movements. He knew that in the month of August that river dwindled into an insignificant stream, that it was fordable every few miles, and that it could not in itself impede the march of a determined foe. That Pope, behind such a river, in command of that army which had allowed Jackson to retire with impunity after defeating Banks at Cedar Mountain, should or could believe that General Lee would not dare to cross the river in his front, or that he would allow him to await without serious molestation the arrival of those troops which he had defeated on the peninsula under McClellan, must have seemed as improbable to Lee as that Pope should for a moment contemplate crossing the river to resume offensive operations. Yet it was true that Pope's military operations were conducted with this design. It was for this that the Rappahannock railway bridge had been saved and prepared for the

use of cavalry and artillery. It was for this that when the second brigade of Rickett's division stretched up the river, a trestle bridge was constructed during the night of the 20th, and it was that the bridge heads might be held by the Federal army that General Hart-suff with two regiments and a battery occupied two small hills that rise from one hundred and fifty to six hundred yards on the right bank of the Rappahannock.

The truth is that Halleck, from his secure seat in Washington, had urged Pope to believe in the possibility of great achievements in the field. Pope boasted with such vigor in his dispatches to Halleck that he absolutely forgot for a time the measure of disdain which General Lee, who had known him well in happier times in the Federal army, entertained for his military prowess, and he almost persuaded himself that the Confederate commander could be held on the right bank of the Rappahannock by a salutary dread of his valor. The effort made by Halleck to mould John Pope into a hero before the very eyes of those soldiers of the Army of Virginia who had known him for a month, and those soldiers of the Army of the Potomac who had not known him at all, was attended with very obvious consequences to General McClellan. It is incredible, but it is incontrovertible, that as Halleck used his position to elevate Pope, so he perverted all the powers of a commander-in-chief to cover with ignominy the then fallen chieftain of the Army of the Potomac. During the passage of McClellan's troops from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek and to Alexandria, to join Pope on the Rappahannock, General McClellan made constant appeals to Halleck to know what his relations with his old army were to be. But to all these appeals Halleck maintained an unseemly silence, or dispatched a curt reply. On the 18th of August, McClellan had

addressed a pathetic note to the commander-in-chief, in which he begged that a kind word might be uttered from Washington in praise of the conduct of his army at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House, on the Chickahominy in the seven days' fight and recent retreat. "I ask this," wrote McClellan, "because no one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself." But to even this request no reply was ever deigned by the grim chieftain who, while Pope was humbly requesting the Confederate General Jackson to allow him to bury his dead and succor his wounded upon the disastrous field of Cedar Mountain, hastened to proffer the thanks of the nation for the decisive victory Pope had won.

To unite two armies operating at distant points within a hostile territory is a delicate and a dangerous task ; much depends upon rapidity of movement ; and rapidity of movement, as well as enthusiastic endeavor by the commanders and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac in its union with the Army of Virginia, could have been better assured by expressions of sympathy with the misfortunes of that army, than by the indifference shown by a contemptuous silence. It became more and more evident to the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac that Halleck meant to use all his influence and his power to degrade their commander. He censured him with scolding letters and contemptible innuendoes for his delay ; although it is undisputed that hardly had Pope's army been pursued to the Rappahannock when steamers crowded with troops sailed from the Peninsula for Acquia Creek and for Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the 19th and on the 20th of August the entire corps of Fitz-John Porter sailed from Newport News. Heintzelman's corps followed, and disembarked at Alexandria. On the 20th, the whole of Reynolds's division was marching up the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg, to strengthen Pope's right.

McClellan used every means to dispatch his troops to Pope. But it was hardly the wisest method of securing for Pope their heartiest service, to treat with open contempt the commander whom the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac loved with a passionate fervor, and whose failure before Richmond they believed to be due to a meddlesome interference with the plans of their commander's campaign. Yet this was the course pursued by Halleck; for his morose and revengeful nature rejoiced much in the degradation of one who had been his chief, and who might in the near future be restored to his old rank. In all his dispatches, and in all his plans for his campaign, through days of toil and of ill temper, through nights of sleeplessness and of pain, to elevate Pope and to degrade McClellan was ever the bitter and the relentless pursuit of the general-in-chief of the armies of the Union.

Even the information which should have been given to enable McClellan to render efficient service for the success of Pope's operations was denied him.

In vain did General McClellan humble himself before his chief, and in words of humility beg of Halleck if he had leisure, and there was no objection, to please to communicate to him fully the state of affairs and his plans, for then he would be able to arrange details understandingly. He besought Halleck to tell him whether he should accompany his troops to Acquia Creek, or should first present himself in person in Washington. Then, as if not sufficiently humiliated, McClellan hastened to avert the wrath of Halleck's accusations of delay in forwarding troops to Pope, by assuring him that he had not lost an hour in sending forward his troops; that he would put his own headquarters on board ship early "to-morrow morning;" that he might leave at a moment's notice; that Franklin's corps was with him, and

that he would try to get off some of his troops "to-night."<sup>1</sup>

I think no one will affirm that the obsequious terms in which General McClellan in the hour of his adversity replied to the arrogant and curt dispatches of Halleck in the hour of his triumph pained the general-in-chief over much. Pope had already taken that step to the rear, in which, as he had informed his army when Lee was not at his front, there lurked disaster and shame. Pope was Halleck's fighting representative; his Richmond,—and there could not be two Richmonds in the field. Further retreat must be arrested. Without exposing his own person to the perils of gunpowder, to the fatigues of marches, to the ills of hunger, to the woes of a wasted land, or to the hell of a southern prison; this splenetic, this envious Halleck would rise to fame through a vicarious Pope. Pope must "fight like the devil,"<sup>2</sup> so Halleck wrote him, and thus the degradation and humiliation of McClellan would be complete. As we proceed we shall develop the means Halleck took to make it so.

At night-fall of the 20th of August there was quiet on the Rappahannock. During the whole day the Confederate army had moved in three long columns towards the fords. The morning's march was vigorous, and the columns were compact; but towards evening the order was loose, and there were many stragglers. Worn and jaded men moved slowly in rear of their companies, mingling in confusion with thousands of army wagons, whose drivers filled the air with shouts and with profanity. At length night came, and the hostile forces were at rest. On each side of the river two vast armies lined the woods or bivouacked in the

<sup>1</sup> Letter from McClellan to Halleck, August 21, 1862.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to Pope, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 220.

open fields ; camp-fires glimmered in the darkness, and thousands of muskets were stacked along the edge of the forests. Overpowered with fatigue, many wrapped themselves in their blankets and slept heavily in the chilling dews, while others, overpowered with hunger, flitted uneasily from camp to camp, hoping to share the roasting ear, or bit of ham, which some more fortunate comrade had secured. But at length the embers burned low, the fires paled, and the soldiers fell into a deep slumber, to awaken the next day, or the next, or on one yet more remote, — when, God only knew, but when there should come to thousands in blood and in agony a slumber from which on this earth there should be no awakening.

## CHAPTER II.

### GENERAL LEE APPROACHES THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

IN the morning of the 21st of August General Jackson marched his corps from its bivouac near the little hamlet of Stevensburg, across the railroad at Brandy Station, and approached the Rappahannock. At ten o'clock he had reached its bank one quarter of a mile south of Beverly Ford. In the advance was that famous Stonewall division, the outgrowth of the old Stonewall brigade that had won its baptismal name in 1861, on the old battle-field of Bull Run, but now so wasted in many fierce encounters that not only had its command fallen to a brigadier-general, but its brigades were commanded by those having the rank of colonels and majors only.<sup>1</sup>

When Jackson reached the river General Lee made feints of crossing at and in the vicinity of Rappahannock Station. First he threatened Beverly Ford. A

<sup>1</sup> The corps of Jackson consisted, at this time, of three divisions, as follows:—

Ewell's division: Lawton's, Early's, Trimble's, and Hays's brigades, the latter commanded by Colonel Forno, and batteries of Brown, Dement, Latimer, D'Aquin, and another. A. P. Hill's division: Branch's, Gregg's, Field's, Pender's, Archer's, and Thomas's brigades, and batteries of Braxton, Latham, Crenshaw, McIntosh, Davidson, and Pegram. Jackson's old division, commanded by Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro: Pender's brigade commanded by Colonel Baylor, Campbell's brigade commanded by Major Sedden, Taliaferro's brigade commanded by Colonel A. G. Taliaferro, and Stark's brigade; the batteries of this division were those of Brockenbrough, Wooding, Poague, Carpenter, Caskie, and Rains.

single regiment of Stuart's cavalry<sup>1</sup> dashed over, drove off a small body of Federal infantry, captured a few prisoners and a stack of fifty muskets, with the loss of a Confederate captain.<sup>2</sup> Jackson's leading brigade of infantry supported the cavalry, and a battery of long-range guns which moved up and answered the Federal artillery with success. This was the only effort made by Jackson with his fourteen brigades and seventeen batteries to attack Pope on the left bank of the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford. The impetuous Stuart urged Jackson to cross,<sup>3</sup> but General Jackson, better informed of Lee's purposes, replied by adding two pieces of artillery to his battery, that with much sound and confusion he might the more successfully deceive Pope.

In the mean time General McDowell took instant measures to punish this piece of Confederate temerity. King's division was dispatched to the ford. The Confederate cavalry commander saw the Federals approaching, and fled, yielding the small area of fields and forests which he had held for only two hours on our side of the river. The combat was continued, however, by the batteries of Taliaferro and King, and by skirmishers who opened from either side a deadly fire with long-range rifles.<sup>4</sup>

The same motives which restrained Jackson at Beverly Ford controlled him at the crossing near Rappahannock Station, though he must have been sorely

<sup>1</sup> First Virginia, Colonel Rosser.

<sup>2</sup> The Federal force consisted of a single regiment and a battery. They were drawn from the principal body of troops massed at the railroad bridge and ford. (McDowell's Official Report.)

<sup>3</sup> Stuart reported to Jackson that his cavalry under Colonel Rosser held enough of the opposite bank of the river "to make the crossing of our army practicable."

<sup>4</sup> See Official Reports of General McDowell and of Confederate officers Jackson, Taliaferro, Stuart, and J. K. Boswell, chief engineer to General Jackson; also Life of General R. E. Lee, by Cooke, page 113.



tempted, for his troops were fired upon as he approached, and he saw but a small Federal command under General Hartsuff on the bluffs on the south side of the river, only a few hundred yards above the railroad bridge. General Jackson's chief engineer was indeed eager to attack. He promised his chief success, as he unfolded a plan for driving the Federal detachment from its position. But Jackson was obdurate, for he said he knew it to be Lee's purpose to "seek a more favorable place to cross, higher up the river, and thus gain the enemy's rear."<sup>1</sup>

"Nevertheless, to deceive Pope, he made such demonstrations that the remaining regiments of Hartsuff's brigade, Thompson's Pennsylvania battery, and the rest of the sections of Mathews's battery were added to the Federal force on the south side of the river."<sup>2</sup>

On Pope's right, Sigel's infantry was moved up to strengthen King's division, and Sigel's cavalry, with its rarely fed and never unsaddled horses, feebly contributed to cover Pope's flanks.<sup>3</sup>

While these events were transpiring General Bayard, with a fair force of Federal cavalry, had crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, and met Longstreet's advance of three brigades of infantry<sup>4</sup> which had moved early in the morning from their bivouac, five miles from Kelly's Ford, to a small stream called Mountain Run, only two miles from the river. Here they saw the Federal cavalry advancing to meet them. The

<sup>1</sup> Life of Lee, by Cooke, page 113. Official Report of Captain J. K. Boswell, chief engineer to General Jackson.

<sup>2</sup> Jackson skirmished with this Federal body during the remainder of the day. (Official Report, General Ricketts, commanding division, McDowell's corps.)

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, Colonel Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry; the Lieutenant-Colonel, First Maryland Cavalry, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 137.

<sup>4</sup> Featherstone's, Pryor's, and Wilcox's, of D. R. Jones's division.

Confederate commander<sup>1</sup> posted two regiments of Featherstone's brigade on either side of the road, to the eastward of the run, and held the remaining regiments of that brigade, and all of Pryor's, in reserve. A thick forest covered the Confederate infantry, from which, however, in a brief period Wilcox advanced with skirmishers in front. With these the Union cavalry were soon engaged in an unimportant running fight, during which the former reached a fence, one thousand yards from the river, from which an open field gradually falling extended to the right bank of the Rappahannock. An unobstructed view of the plain of the river and of the high ground beyond, covered with the tents of the Federals, now opened to the Confederates. They did not seem to relish the picture; therefore with the main body they recrossed the mountain run, and halted more than two miles from the river. Yet there was a show of defense; for two companies of the sixteenth Mississippi, supported by the rest of the regiment and the twelfth Mississippi, remained on the eastern side of the stream. A few Federal skirmishers had followed the enemy with a laudable desire to gain an advantage; and no sooner did they discover these two companies than they surrounded them in a dashing charge, demanding their surrender. This invitation was cordially declined by the sons of the Confederacy, who, instead thereof, fired a volley and rapidly retreated. Nine horses killed and several saddles emptied were claimed as losses inflicted by the Confederates.<sup>2</sup>

The next scene in this warfare of skirmishers between the two armies soon followed. The ground was open on the left of the road, where there was growing

<sup>1</sup> General C. M. Wilcox.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, General C. M. Wilcox.

corn bounding an open field to the east. On the right there was a thick forest. In this corn-field the enemy placed the twelfth Mississippi, to meet the anticipated onset of Federal cavalry, — and not a moment too soon, for Bayard was upon them. There was time, however, to hurry up the sixteenth Mississippi before the Federal cavalry came down like an avalanche. The struggle was brief. A hot fire from two regiments of infantry broke up the cavalry, and they turned back in confusion,<sup>1</sup> with thirty horses riderless, and the whole command scattered for more than a mile.<sup>2</sup> And yet the Federal cavalry soon re-formed, and remained with closed columns in full view of at least two brigades of the Confederate infantry on the western side of Mountain Run. The numbers of the enemy's infantry, thus disclosed to General Bayard, convinced him that it would be imprudent to advance further upon Longstreet's corps so long as it was in position to meet his sabres with musketry. He determined, therefore, to follow as they retreated, and then only if an advantage were given him. The enemy seemed to have abandoned all hope of further results from the use of his infantry, so he brought up a battery of Parrott guns, the accuracy of whose fire gave such unalloyed pleasure that the Confederate general, in his report, found no word adequate to describe it, but "beautiful," although it is admitted that the fire was not effective enough to destroy or intimidate; for when near sunset this feeble demonstration upon Kelly's Ford had ceased, and the enemy actually engaged there were following the rear of their division then in motion for some point higher up the river, the Federal cavalry again appeared, and returned with four pieces of rifled cannon

<sup>1</sup> So the enemy reported.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, General C. M. Wilcox.

— the compliments they had received. But these the Confederates did not stop to acknowledge.

The result of this skirmish was conveyed to Halleck by General Pope as one in which "our cavalry regiments on the south side of the river charged over a regiment of rebel cavalry, dispersing and driving it into the woods, and capturing seventy head of beef cattle and seven horses."<sup>1</sup>

These combats gave Pope a confidence which he did not dream might be due to the forbearance of General Lee. It seems, however, to have occurred to him that Lee might cross the Rappahannock without exposing his troops to the heavy fire of artillery which could be poured into them from the advanced and commanding positions held by Union batteries. For it was apparent on the 21st of August that heavy columns of the enemy, with artillery and trains, were in motion up the river ;<sup>2</sup> and of course it was equally apparent that the Confederates were moving in pursuance of a plan. But General Pope was persuaded that in the feeble efforts at the ford, and in the moving columns along the river bank, there was evidence only of a repulsed foe threatening to renew baffled efforts which he would not seriously dare to press. Pope did not believe that Lee would make the attempt to cross at or in the vicinity of Sulphur Springs, and he sent Halleck a communication, in which he wrote that "although his right could be turned at considerable distance above him, it would require time, and would be, besides, a hazardous operation."<sup>3</sup>

Nor did Halleck, in conducting this campaign from

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 221. The Confederate loss was reported as two killed and twelve wounded. (Official Report of General C. M. Wilcox.)

<sup>2</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 220.

his headquarters in Washington, doubt that Pope's army, reaching for ten or a dozen miles northerly from Kelly's Ford, would make the operation of turning his right at a considerable distance above him so hazardous that Lee would not dare to undertake it. On the 21st of August General Halleck assured Pope that he should be so strongly reënforced if he would hold the line of the river two days longer, as not only to be secure, but to be able to resume offensive operations.<sup>1</sup> In exhorting his subordinate to make every effort to hold the Rappahannock,<sup>2</sup> he called upon him "to dispute every inch of ground till we can reënforce you. Forty-eight hours more," he wrote, "and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it."<sup>3</sup> But though General Pope could not on this day make up his mind that General Lee would march northward along the river to turn his flank, he could not account for the steady movement of troops from Kelly's Ford to Rappahannock Station on any other hypothesis. At one time he was in fear that a crossing at Norman's Ford would be attempted; and he sent there Gordon's brigade of Banks's corps to pass in the thick pines, unsheltered in a heavy storm, a wet, hungry, and uncomfortable night. He maintained also the angry artillery duel which had hardly faltered during the day, when Jackson was in front, and which, now that Longstreet was replacing Jackson's troops from Kelly's Ford to Rappahannock Station, was continued with renewed fury. When night came, there had been on either side many guns dismounted and many gunners dispersed: but we claimed the advantage.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 13.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to Pope, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 219.

<sup>3</sup> Halleck to Pope, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 220.

<sup>4</sup> See Hall's Battery, McDowell's Official Report.

The 22d of August was an eventful day upon the Rappahannock. The artillery roared incessantly; there were heavy skirmishes, and the ever-flowing stream of Confederates tending northward continued. The tenor of Pope's dispatches to Halleck, from the early forenoon until after nine o'clock at night, shows that he was at last convinced that the constant movement of the enemy to his right, seen and reported from the front of every corps, foreshadowed a crossing at Sulphur Springs and a movement upon Warrenton. He also knew and advised Halleck that Lee's whole army was in his front. And yet he was perplexed as to his course. When should he expect troops from Alexandria? He had not heard of the arrival of any from Fredericksburg or at the fords below, and he had withdrawn the whole of Reno's division from Kelly's Ford. He could not move against Sulphur Springs just now without exposing his rear to the heavy force in front of him, and having his communications with forces coming up the Rappahannock intercepted and most likely destroyed. He thought it would be well to bring Franklin's corps to Alexandria. These are some of the dispatches that he poured out during the day to Halleck. And yet he did not seem to feel assured that the enemy really contemplated turning his right, for he closed his dispatch with an assurance that he was ready to act when the enemy developed his plans.<sup>1</sup> But at nine o'clock he knew from his scouts that a large body of the enemy was moving up and across Hedgeman's River, on the Sperryville and Little Washington pike, towards Warrenton, and that it was crossing at Sulphur Springs. Advising Halleck thereof, he ventured to think that a brigade should be sent to guard the railroad bridge at Cedar Run, and that Heintzelman's corps should be hurried forward with all

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Halleck, 6.30 P. M., August 22d.

possible dispatch.<sup>1</sup> Fifteen minutes later Pope was again bewildered. That the enemy had crossed the river with an unknown force at Sulphur Springs, and on the road from Warrenton to Sperryville, was reported to him. It was thought the enemy was in heavy force at Rappahannock Ford and above. What should he do? If he moved to Sulphur Springs or towards Warrenton to attack, his rear would be entirely exposed. This plan, therefore, he rejected. One of two others was left: fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar Run, or cross the Rappahannock with his whole force and assail the enemy's flank and rear. His dispatch of this tenor to Halleck closed with an assurance that he must do the one or the other at daylight; which should it be? He inclined to the latter, but he did not wish to interfere, he wrote, with Halleck's plans.<sup>2</sup> It was eleven o'clock at night when Pope received from Halleck an approval of the plan of crossing to attack the enemy. It was a feeble approval, and it was feebly advised. Halleck thought the latter of Pope's two propositions the best; and that was all the comfort he gave him.

The march of General Jackson's troops, which had thus filled Pope with apprehension, was attended with a series of Federal assaults, some of which were extremely plucky and deserve mention. Early in the morning of the 22d, General Jackson withdrew his three Confederate divisions from near Beverly Ford, and continued his march in the order of Ewell's, Hill's, and Taliaferro's commands by farm-roads and over pathless fields to the Hazel River, a tributary of the Rappahannock, which he passed at Welford's Mills. As Jackson moved up the south side of the river, he saw a corresponding movement of the Federals on the north

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Halleck, nine P. M., August 22d.

<sup>2</sup> Pope to Halleck, 9.15 P. M., August 22d, Pope's Virginia Campaign.

side, and he became apprehensive of an attack upon his trains. The Confederate General Trimble was in the rear. About noon Trimble found that the Federals had thrown a force over the river, had surprised his trains, and captured some ambulances and mules. This attack was made by General Milroy, of Sigel's corps, who had been in bivouac on the night of the 21st, opposite Freeman's Ford.<sup>1</sup> During the morning of the 22d, Milroy found the Confederate batteries in position, and he engaged them with first one and then a second of his own. Later in the day the Confederate fire ceased, and Milroy then determined to cross the river to reconnoitre.

With one hundred and fifty cavalry and a company of sharp-shooters, he reached the summit of the hill occupied in the morning by numerous batteries, and discovered the greater part of the Confederate wagon trains with the rear guard moving in the direction of Sulphur Springs. The effect of Milroy's presence was magical. Confederate trains were hurried along with blows and oaths. Stragglers, too, were inspired with a new vitality. The wilted and jaded column showed vigor and fullness of life.

The enemy threw forward his rear guard; and Milroy met it with a company of skirmishers. On his left was a woody plat, and into this he entered, but from it quickly fled, outnumbered. Not, however, until the roar of a heavy fire of musketry from the same side of the river, on his left, announced that a more serious demonstration had been made by another detachment from Sigel's corps nearer Beverly Ford, did Milroy turn, recross, and join his corps.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The whole of Sigel's command — infantry, artillery, and cavalry — was in position on the Rappahannock from Freeman's Ford to Beverly Ford.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, R. H. Milroy, Brigadier-General commanding independent brigade, first army corps (Sigel's), Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 923.



The sound that Milroy had heard was the opening of a serious attack upon Jackson's rear, made by a brigade of infantry under command of Colonel Bohlen, of Sigel's corps. This force crossed between Beverly Ford and Freeman's in the afternoon, covered by guns numerous and well posted on the northern side. At first this Federal brigade made captures of wagons and ambulances, and created some considerable excitement among the Confederates. But the morning passed away without further offensive movements. General Trimble recaptured his ambulances and wagons, and contented himself with distributing the three regiments of his brigade throughout his train, with orders to act on the defensive. When Jackson's train and column were first attacked, Trimble was alone. Ewell, commanding the rear division, was five or six miles in advance, and the leading division of Longstreet's column the same distance in the rear. But at four P. M. General Hood, of Longstreet's corps, came up with his brigade, and Trimble determined, with this support, to attack the Federal force, whose exact position he had learned. With his skirmishers well in front, he advanced and met Bohlen's skirmishers in the woods. It was about the hour of sunset. There had been a heavy shower. The earth, the air, and the foliage were saturated with moisture. It was just when the darkness of the clouds had given way to the golden sunlight streaming out in all its splendor, that the firing of the skirmishers was heard by thousands of Pope's command. From the summit of the hill which crowns Beverly Ford on the northern side, many officers and men of the Second Massachusetts Infantry observed the smoke of this conflict arising above the tree-tops; heard the scattering fire of skirmishers swell into the unbroken roar of battalions, then die away into silence, but to be renewed

again in yet more awful reverberations; heard the Federal cries of exultation, answered by a Confederate yell of defiance, which rang in our ears above even the rising waves of musketry that followed it. Then the storm came; the Federal brigade was driven to the river, and pursued by the enemy, who continued their fire upon the unhappy wretches struggling to regain the shore. The commander of this ill-starred expedition lay dead upon the field; many pierced and shattered bodies were silent in the wood and on the plain, or rolling beneath the waters of the Rappahannock. The Confederates, while claiming to have captured one hundred Federals, admitted a loss in killed and wounded of forty-seven. As usual when victorious, and invariably when defeated, the Confederates declared that they were outnumbered. They placed the numbers of Colonel Bohlen's brigade in excess of their whole command by two or three to one, though there was not the least evidence to support this improbable statement. Sigel's brigades were small, and in this conflict there was but one of them; and there should always be deducted from the divisions of this corps, except at meal-times, a brigade at least of stragglers.

Moreover, the Confederates do not agree in their report. Trimble says Hood took no part in the contest, while Hood officially reports that when Trimble led off in the centre he put the Texas brigade of his division in on the right and Law's brigade in on the left, and the enemy were driven precipitately over the Rappahannock, with considerable loss, — not less, he thinks, than from two to three hundred. Thus Hood replies to and refutes Trimble.<sup>1</sup> The next crossing on this day, effected by the Union troops, was made at Fant's Ford

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Brigadier-General Hood's and Brigadier-General Trimble's battle with one brigade of Sigel's corps.

by General Schenck's division, on the right of Sigel's corps.

At this point heavy Federal batteries had been established, and there had been picket firing. At one o'clock P. M. a regiment of cavalry,<sup>1</sup> with one of infantry,<sup>2</sup> and one section of a mountain howitzer battery, the whole commanded by Colonel Lloyd, were directed to cross the river here, and destroy a stone house on the opposite bank. Under cover of artillery and infantry from General Stahl's brigade a crossing was effected. The enemy's pickets retired before the advance. A considerable force of cavalry and some infantry of the enemy were seen; but they fell back without resistance. Beyond the information that Jackson's march northward did not follow the bank of the river, this reconnaissance threw no light upon his plans, and was hardly worth the increased exhaustion which it brought upon Colonel Lloyd's jaded horses, summoned to this service, unsaddled and unfed, from the fatigues of the preceding day and night.<sup>3</sup>

On the right of Sigel's infantry Generals Buford and Bayard covered the country with cavalry as far up the river as they could push them. There was Federal cavalry, also, at Warrenton Junction; but they were charged with other duties than watching the enemy. "Straggling," as Pope called desertions from his own ranks, had become a serious evil. The ease with which large numbers of his men escaped had caused Pope to request that they might be arrested and confined as prisoners in Washington<sup>4</sup> if they eluded the pursuit of his cavalry, who were ordered to scour the woods and watch the roads for their apprehension.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel W. R. Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry.

<sup>2</sup> From General Stahl's brigade.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, Colonel Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry.

<sup>4</sup> Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 220, 221.

While all this skirmishing and scouting, straggling and deserting, was going on in Pope's army on the left bank of the Rappahannock, General Jackson was pushing up the right bank, concealing as well as he could his movements from the Federal army. Late in the afternoon of the 22d, he halted on the farm of a Dr. Scott, opposite the Fauquier White Sulphur Springs. Although there were indications that the Federal cavalry were not far from the opposite side, none were found there to oppose a crossing, and he resolved to pass the river immediately.

The bridge had been destroyed; but this was no impediment to Jackson. Before him on a hill, upon the opposite side, stood the buildings of a famed watering place known as the Warrenton or White Sulphur Springs. Looking farther south for a mile, General Jackson's eye fell on a ridge clothed with a forest; a creek ran along its eastern base, and its western slope was washed by the Rappahannock. From where the main road to Warrenton passed through the cluster of houses about the springs, branch roads ran down the river and in the direction of Fayetteville. It was at this point that Jackson determined to cross, and from here push forward his columns. It was the beginning of a movement to strike Pope's rear, cut off his supplies, and interpose the whole of Lee's army between him and the on-coming Army of the Potomac. One regiment of infantry and eight pieces of artillery were soon passed over, and the houses about the springs, with a few prisoners, were in possession of the Confederates. One mile below there was an old dam, which found its eastern abutment in the ridge of which I have spoken. These heights were important. General Early, with his brigade supported by two batteries, passed on this frail roadway to seize them. But now the heavy rain

began to fall, and night was coming on. Already the distant shores of the river were indistinct, and fading rapidly in mist and darkness into shapeless masses. But the difficulties arising from obscure foot-paths over fords and old mill-dams at night were not so much to be dreaded as that even these precarious roadways would soon be buried under torrents of rushing water. The rain that had fallen, was then falling, threatened a flood. Jackson's column would be divided; neither could aid the other. Although Early was in peril, it would have been more perilous to attempt the continuance of the movement than to trust to the skill and presence of mind of Early to recross at daylight; for now General Lee had determined to abandon his plan of crossing his army at this point, and had ordered General Jackson to withdraw his force from the north side of the river, with a view of a future passage at a point farther up.<sup>1</sup> It could not be supposed that the enemy's movements would be unknown to Sigel. And they were not. He dispatched to Pope his grave apprehensions that his flank would be turned, and most unmistakably intimated his intention of withdrawing from his position towards the line of the railroad to Alexandria. In this he was not encouraged. Pope ordered him to stand firm and hold his ground; to allow the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs, and develop towards Warrington. Then, to reassure his lieutenant by an appeal like that of Cæsar's to the timid boatman, Pope hastened to inform Sigel that as soon as any considerable force had crossed at that place he would rapidly mass his army during the night, and throw it upon

<sup>1</sup> See *Life of General Lee*, by J. E. Cooke, page 113. Cooke, *Life of Jackson*, pages 271, 272. Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, vol. ii. pp. 261-263. Jackson's Official Report. Official Report, J. K. Boswell, chief engineer to Lieutenant-General Jackson.

any force of the enemy which attempted to march in the direction of Warrenton.<sup>1</sup> Such a movement would have been the only course open to Pope; probably it would have been the only one he would have adopted. From the official communications of that period no one can conclude that Pope seriously contemplated crossing to the enemy's side to attack the rear of Lee's troops. His whole correspondence with Halleck shows that all his talk was mere fustian. When, therefore, it was reported to him on the morning of the 23d that the continuous rain during the night had so swollen the waters that his trestle bridge had been swept away and the railroad bridge was in danger, we can well imagine that he smiled grimly, as he saw not only a mode of escape from his rash offer to Halleck, but an opportunity of falling furiously (as he was wont to express himself) upon that portion of Jackson's corps which had already crossed, and which, because of the high waters, would be unable to return. A flood of joyful emotions so excited Pope at this juncture that in his official report to his commander-in-chief he put the rise of water at six feet, which was at least two feet higher than it was, as reported by General McDowell. But we shall find that even this rise did not avail the unfortunate Pope, that the river itself was Lee's ally; for while it presented a barrier to Pope's advance, it was not found by General Early to be a serious obstacle to his retreat.

Before tracing the history of the Federal and Confederate movements on our side of the river on the night of the 22d and the morning of the 23d of August, the assaults and affrays which took place between Longstreet's corps, as it occupied the fords vacated by Jackson, and Pope's army on the 22d claim our attention.

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

Although Longstreet massed his corps principally at Rappahannock Station, he held the front from Kelly's Ford on the south to Beverly Ford on the north. The brigades of McDowell's corps and most of those of Banks's passed the day of the 22d quietly lying down in line of battle in rear of the elevated ground, despite the roar of artillery from both banks of the river and from every commanding position.

To watch the effect of our fire, and to discover from the smoke of the enemy's guns his actual position, afforded amusement to groups of idle officers and men, whose eyes were ever watchfully gazing upon the Confederate side of the Rappahannock.

Now and then appearing upon a hill-top, or emerging from a forest, single horsemen of the Confederates came in view, and once a whole brigade of the enemy's infantry moved rapidly, in plain sight of the Union troops, across a field to the cover of timber skirting the river's bank. The chance was tempting to our artillerymen; shells exploded in the midst of the Confederate infantry. Some men fell and some men ran, as the brigade passed on to its shelter, while the wounded passed slowly to the rear. Clouds of dust arising behind wooded fringes indicated movements of vast bodies of men that we could not see, stretching far away to the north, followed by army wagons, of which we sometimes caught a glimpse on an exposed hill-side. While the artillery fire lasted, it was so precisely accurate that it gave our gunners much enjoyment. They were as cool as if firing a salute on a holiday. Some of McDowell's brigadier-generals, skilled in the science of gunnery, passed from gun to gun, rectifying elevations and advising as to length of fuse. The infantry, too, found new entertainment in artillery practice. Speculation was rife as to the exact spot where the enemy's

projectiles, passing over their heads, would strike in the fields beyond. Shouts of acclamation or jeers of derision mingled with the booming of guns and bursting of shells, as if the scene were a carnival of peace. Nor did wounds and death intimidate them. Close to the river and near the Rappahannock Ford was Hall's battery,—a battery spoken of in those days with unqualified admiration for the cool manner in which it replied to a hot fire. So many of its gunners had been disabled that there were not men enough left to work the guns. Soldiers from a near infantry brigade volunteered, and those who but a few moments before were speculating upon the fall of a distant shot were now hot with passion and begrimed with smoke, intent only on hurling shot into the enemy. But the fire was not from artillery alone. Over on the right a brigade of infantry, under command of General Hatch, had been skirmishing with some of the enemy's cavalry that had crossed the river to our side in the night. At intervals the roll of musketry pealed out, then died away, to be resumed in scattering sounds. It was nothing; the enemy were easily driven over the river, leaving in our hands prisoners, one of whom asked for whisky the moment he was captured, as if to whisky and for whisky he had always been and was always willing to be a captive.

Of the many fords across the Rappahannock the one known as Beverly Ford in its approaches and ease in crossing seemed to be the most attractive to Lee. The high banks on the southern side, crowned with forests, afforded cover and concealment. A broad road leading down the hill-side crossed the meadow at its foot, and continued on the northern bank in a road as broad which wound up a gentle declivity between a forest of large trees on the one side and a corn-field on the other.



In the early morning of the 22d the artillery engagement at Beverly Ford had been fierce and continuous. Batteries from Sigel's corps supported by a regiment of Sigel's infantry had been opposed to guns of General Taliaferro's division of Jackson's corps. That the obstinacy of the Confederate fire was only to cover the passage of Jackson's column to a more favorable crossing higher up the river<sup>1</sup> was not then suspected by Pope. Sigel's guns were silenced, but not without a severe struggle, in which the enemy admitted a loss of twenty privates in killed and wounded. When the result of this engagement was reported to Pope, it confirmed his belief that the enemy would make at Beverly Ford a resolute effort to pass the river; and he determined, therefore, to increase his force in the woods and upon the hills on the north side of the ford. For this purpose Gordon's brigade of Banks's corps, with Cothran's New York battery attached, was detailed by the chief of the Army of Virginia. General Pope was at this time in a state of unusual irritation. Arising from the perplexing condition of things around him, and involved in his campaign, there was much to annoy; grave doubts of the present mingled with grave uncertainties for the future. But it was not his campaign nor the enemy's that troubled him now.

In a newspaper received on the 22d by mail from the North appeared a copy of the official report of the doings of Gordon's brigade at the recent battle of Cedar Mountain. The report was brief; it was true. It made known to the public that we were whipped in that battle; and, further than that, contained not one word from which the enemy could have received any benefit or consolation. That the enemy knew we were badly whipped, at the time, seemed to me to be clear,

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General W. B. Taliaferro.

for we fled from, and he occupied, the battle-field, and captured our wounded ; and victors do not often leave their field, their wounded, their dying, and countless small arms in the hands of the vanquished. But in reason or in the want of it, Pope was angry, and he dispatched a letter of inquiry to know if the commander of Gordon's brigade furnished the offending copy. It was while I was holding the crossing at Norman's Ford, and in the full din of a fierce artillery fire, that the genial commander of our corps<sup>1</sup> addressed to me the interrogatory of Pope. "Send him word, if you please," I replied, "that I did furnish to an agent of the Associated Press, then and now on duty with this army, a copy of my report of the battle of Cedar Mountain." In a few moments an officer from Pope's staff conveyed to me, in courteous tones, the mandate of Pope's will: General Gordon will consider himself under arrest, and will yield the command of his brigade to his next in rank. Colonel Ruger, of the third Wisconsin regiment, was summoned, and informed of his new relations to my brigade. He received the order with sincere expressions of regret, and "this too," he ejaculated, "for so slight a cause, and just as we are going into action, by Jove." The cause for censure was slight; the time and method of showing resentment were ill judged. And yet here I would say that, while I think such acts were reprehensible, I believe they were not without justification. It was a bad practice, which arose from a necessity of imparting the truth about operations in the Shenandoah Valley, under Banks and Fremont and Sigel, and from a laudable desire to neutralize the falsehoods about others and the bluster and brag about themselves, which certain officers in general and one general officer in particular, in

<sup>1</sup> General A. S. Williams. Banks was sick.

Banks's corps, furnished immediately after the battle of Cedar Mountain to all the dailies in New York and Pennsylvania. It was an evil, but so is homicide in self-defense. Moreover, it had never been condemned by the War Department, although it was forbidden by the army regulations. The reports of Banks's retreat from Strasburg and the battle of Winchester, with the retreat across the Potomac, had been given in full, had been published in every paper at the North; yet no word of censure had ever fallen from the War Department. Indeed, I had every reason to believe that the War Secretary approved the publication, and believed it beneficial, since it alleviated the public anxiety, at that time so intense. But Pope thought otherwise; and I was for a moment relieved from my command, with its attendant responsibilities. Meanwhile Colonel Ruger, with other prominent officers of my brigade, acting without my knowledge or approval, besought Pope to place the deposed commander in command. The great man was moved. After the first infliction of punishment his temper had cooled; the order of arrest was vacated, and the important duty of preventing the whole of Lee's army from crossing at Beverly Ford was confided to me and to my command.

It was yet early in the forenoon of the 22d, when my brigade passed the headquarters of General Pope on its way to Beverly Ford. Ordered to present myself to Pope in person for explicit instructions, I announced myself in due form. Pope's utterances were brief, and without allusion to the newspaper report of the battle, to the arrest therefor, or to the sudden release therefrom. "You will move with your brigade to Beverly Ford," said Pope in a bombastic tone, "put your battery in position, support it with your infantry, and hold that crossing till the last extremity."

Even while General Pope was giving this order, the Confederate troops under Taliaferro, whose activity at this ford had been the cause of so much uneasiness to Pope in the present, and were to be a cause of so much more in the future, were hurrying up the river to join General Jackson's moving columns, and cover his flanks from any possible invasion from Freeman's Ford or its vicinity. But this, like many a movement of the enemy, was not known to us then, and I hurried on—a short march—to Beverly Ford, where my troops were soon placed in the best positions. That it was Longstreet's force then confronting us I did not know until I learned it from the Confederate official report.

On my left, just hidden by the crest of the hill, the muzzles of Captain Cothran's rifled battery of Parrott guns were turned towards the open field and forest beyond the river; while within the large timber on my right, formed in order of battle, the second Massachusetts, the third Wisconsin, and the twenty-seventh Indiana in an unbroken line awaited the movements of the enemy. During the day and through the night we maintained the same formation undisturbed.

It was from here, and while engaged in this defense, that we saw at sunset the infantry fight between Colonel Bohlen's brigade and the enemy on our right. But that was over, and so was the roar of artillery, which had been almost unceasing on our left. There was an ominous silence in our front.

With the sinking sun the clouds again gathered, and when the storm of battle had died away the storm of rain began,—a sorry comfort to the whole in body, a piteous hour to the pierced and mangled wretches helpless on the field. Night shut in around us without shelter,—without even a ray of starlight through the black clouds overhead.

### CHAPTER III.

#### BEVERLY FORD.

DAYLIGHT of the 23d of August found the rain falling, the water rising, and Longstreet's infantry and artillery on every ridge and behind every patch of timber that lined the river from Rappahannock Station to Freeman's Ford. A heavy fog, which at six o'clock in the morning was only partially dispelled, concealed from the eye the real positions of the enemy, though to the ear, through the thick vapor, sounds were unusually audible. Looking for an attack at any moment, I had been awake and on the alert all night. With no other shelter than the lee of a rail fence which ran along the crest of the hill within the woods, my infantry were sleeping in such uneasy slumber as the shelter afforded. At an early hour, before daylight, my vigilance was rewarded by a sound on the enemy's side of the river that revealed unmistakably the creaking of artillery wheels on their axles. The colonel of the third Wisconsin regiment was awake, and I called his attention to the noise. Together we groped our way cautiously to the river's bank, where, hidden from the view of sentinel or sharp-shooter, we heard distinctly a battery coming into position across the waters and near the shore of the Rappahannock. In a few moments I had aroused Captain Cothran, and warned him what to expect when the fog lifted. The dark muzzles of his ten-pounder Parrotts just cleared the crest of a hill,

on our left of the road, which covered the guns and the gunners from the enemy's missiles. It was an admirable position, and most judiciously selected for an effective fire; and we had not long to wait to prove it. Daylight brought with it a slight breeze; the curtain rose, and the opposite bank of the river was disclosed, revealing two batteries in position on the right and left of the road that runs southwesterly from the ford. Both were on the face of the declivity that falls gently to the shore, and both were in front of the wooded fringes on the crest of the hill-side. McDowell's front and mine were covered by these guns as well as by others that extended the enemy's line of batteries to the crossing at Rappahannock Station. Indeed, it is said that opposed to six batteries in McDowell's corps<sup>1</sup> there were nineteen guns of the enemy.<sup>2</sup> Before me the Confederates had in position four twelve-pounder Napoleons and three ten-pounder Parrotts, on both sides of the road and within one thousand yards of the river.

A position thus exposed was not selected, nor was it desired by the Confederate commander; but he took it as ordered, and "as doubtless the best the locality afforded."<sup>3</sup> The battery of three ten-pounder Parrotts to the enemy's left of the road had found a partial cover

<sup>1</sup> Mathews's, Thompson's, Leppier's, Hall's, Reynolds's and Naylor's. (McDowell's Official Report.)

<sup>2</sup> Four twelve-pounder Napoleons, Captain Miller; two ten-pounder Parrotts, Captain Rogers, and one ten-pounder Parrott, Captain Anderson; four three-inch rifles, Captain Squiers; one three-inch rifle, three twelve-pounder Napoleons, Captain Stribbing; one three-inch rifle and one light twelve-pounder Napoleon (see Chapman's battery), and two Blakeley guns of Captain Maurin's battery, under Lieutenant Landry. (Official Report, J. B. Walton, colonel and chief of artillery right wing.) Longstreet says in his Official Report that Colonel S. D. Lee was ordered to aid Colonel Walton, so there may have been more than nineteen.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, Captain M. B. Miller, commanding Company B, Washington Artillery.

behind the parapet of a field-work, slightly constructed and totally inadequate for protection. These were the guns I had heard moving into position. They were nearly opposite my battery, and nearer the river than the one on the enemy's right. Never was there a better target offered to a skillful gunner, and never did more skillful gunners avail themselves of such an opportunity than did those of Captain Cothran upon this occasion. Let us look at it.

The troops of McDowell's corps had eaten a very early breakfast; the tents of the officers were standing; there was quiet in the air, and perfect stillness within the dense vapor which brooded over the camps, the river, and the scene. Suddenly and in a moment the air was filled with missiles from the enemy's artillery. Then there was a rush: tents were struck; staff horses were hurried farther to the rear; headquarter wagons were started off out of range. The Federal batteries replied instantly, and the fire became general. It was rapid and vigorous. Batteries were now revealed within our lines which the enemy had not before suspected,<sup>1</sup> and the guns were fired as fast as the men could load them.

The ground in many places became dotted with shot, and the air filled with puffs of smoke from bursting shells. While McDowell's artillerists were bravely replying to the fire of the guns before him, the spectacle on my front was most satisfactory.

No official record of the thorough demolition of this battery of rifled guns seems to have been made, and no official record if made could reproduce the spectacle. Hardly had the Confederate shells begun to burst about our heads, hardly had the Confederate round shot torn huge gaps in the second Massachusetts regiment's rail

<sup>1</sup> Report of chief of staff, Longstreet's corps.

fence, when Cothran scourged the battery with such an appalling fire that its gunners fled in dismay, and with their guns and shattered material sought shelter in the merciful forest beyond. Our promptness in answering this Confederate challenge, the lightning-like rapidity with which our bolts were sped, seemed to have dazed the enemy, and so utterly to have crushed his pride that, as stated, not only is there no Confederate record of the doings of this battery, but its achievements are summed up by the chief of artillery in an official report that the "long-range guns of Captains Rogers and Anderson, on the left, had, shortly after the commencement of the engagement, been withdrawn from action and placed under shelter of the hill on which they had been posted."<sup>1</sup> This left Captain Cothran with only one battery on his left front, the one on the enemy's right of the road, one thousand yards from the river's bank. With this a battery from McDowell's corps to our left had joined in a spirited engagement. The Confederate commander fired spherical case. The engagement lasted about an hour: furiously for the first half, then almost ceasing on our part.<sup>2</sup> The Confederates claimed a victory in this engagement. But the end had not come. Cothran renewed the attack, and again a Confederate battery rushed wildly for the merciful woods on the crest. But Captain Miller of that battery shall tell his own story. He was considerably annoyed, he says, by an enfilading fire of a long-range battery posted to his right and entirely beyond his range,<sup>3</sup> when the batteries to his left (whose flight

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports, Colonel J. B. Walton, chief Confederate artillery right wing, and Captain Miller, Company B, Washington Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, Captain Miller, Company B, Washington Artillery, Confederate.

<sup>3</sup> Hall's Maine battery, probably, to our left, near Rappahannock Station.



I have described) fled from the field, which subjected him to a galling cross fire from the enemy's rifled battery in their front.<sup>1</sup> Captain Miller changed front on his left, and replied; but the enemy, having his exact range fired with terrible precision and effect, and then he retired from what he calls this unequal contest. The second victory by Captain Cothran was as rapidly and as decisively won as his first. Captain Miller, with his disabled battery and his diminished numbers, fled appalled before him. Indeed, so hotly was Miller pursued in his flight by the unerring aim of Cothran's gunners that the enemy seemed to fear that our infantry would attempt to cross the swollen river, and capture such fragments of Miller's battery as Cothran might scatter around. Ere this battery reached the sheltering woods, a regiment of Confederate infantry emerged therefrom, formed in a line, and offered a vain protection. It was a foolish display. In a moment their ranks were broken, and they turned with the demolished battery in flight for the forest.<sup>2</sup> During this

<sup>1</sup> Cothran's.

<sup>2</sup> General McDowell has strangely enough attributed to Hall's Maine battery, under his command, an achievement precisely similar, and, I suppose, the same as that which I have here affirmed to have been due to Captain Cothran's New York battery, commanded by myself. It is enough to refer to what was seen and recorded by myself and many officers of my brigade at the time, but an appeal may be made to the reports of the Confederate officers, as to the direction from which this fatal fire came. Captain Miller of the Washington Artillery says this terrible fire came from a battery in front of those that so quickly retired (on his right), and on his left; that he formed to his left to reply to it; that it drove him from the field he intimates, and that his loss was in killed and wounded thirteen officers and men and twenty-one horses; that although he suffered from a long-range battery on his right in the early part of his engagement, before the guns on his left had retired, his loss was but one man wounded and two horses killed. The battery on Captain Miller's left was Cothran's, and on his right Hall's. (Official Report of Major-General Irvin McDowell, third corps Army of Virginia, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 36, 37. Official Report of Confederate Colonel J. B. Walton, chief of artillery right wing. Official Report of Captain M. B. Miller, Company B, Washington Artillery.)

combat of artillery, shells roared over the heads and round shot bowled along at the feet of the supporting infantry.

The forest that held my brigade was rent and torn, but with a coolness that is born of much experience our men were indifferent to the danger.

There are always amusing incidents to relieve the horrors of the battle-field. Such an incident happened here, and I will relate it.

During the hottest of the engagement I stopped before a soaked and grimy private, who had retired a few paces to the rear of his regiment to cook his breakfast. Behind his back was a large tree, against which he rested, while before him a small fire smoldered in a feeble effort to burn, for the rain now poured down again with violence. Some water in a battered tin cup was urged in vain to boil; in vain were strips of pork held before the soggy embers. And yet the man seemed so contented with his surroundings, and so secure with the trunk of that great tree between himself and the enemy, that I stopped to ask him how he liked it, and if he thought that a secure place to cook. "Gin'ral," was his reply, "I've made a little calc'l'ation about this place, and I've found that the rebs has two batteries a-firin' on us, and that their fire crosses jest about three feet behind my tree. Gin'ral, you ain't in the safe angle; jest step up your hoss a little, and you'll be out of range."

This closed the artillery engagements with the enemy at Beverly Ford on the Rappahannock in Pope's campaign; and in the summing up of results we may claim that in the whole account the balance was on our side. But there were during this night important events transpiring on the Union side of the Rappahannock. The time was selected for a raid to Pope's rear,

for the destruction of his trains, and the railroad upon which he depended for supplies. This adventure was ordered by General Lee, and its execution intrusted to Stuart, who was authorized to use the greater part of the cavalry of the whole army.<sup>1</sup> Stuart endeavored to cross the Rappahannock at Freeman's Ford, at an early hour on the 22d; but he met with a fierce resistance from the batteries of Sigel's corps, which with his four pieces of horse artillery he tried in vain to silence, and at ten o'clock in the morning he retired. In his futile effort to silence Sigel's batteries, Stuart left many of his men upon the shores of the Rappahannock, silenced forever. Stuart followed Jackson's column, which was at this time heading up the river. He had with him two nearly full brigades of cavalry, in all fifteen hundred men, and two pieces of artillery,<sup>2</sup> and as brigade commanders Generals Robertson and Lee. Through the village of Jefferson, across the river at Waterloo bridge and at Hart's Mills, a few miles below to Warrenton, he moved without resistance. Pope had not even a suspicion of the movement; and, if he had had, it seems a fair inference, from all that is recorded of that day, that he would have made no especial effort to oppose it. In the afternoon of the 22d Stuart reached Warrenton, having marched since ten o'clock about twenty miles. At Warrenton he learned that Pope's supply trains were parked at Catlett's Station,<sup>3</sup> and he determined to destroy them. But there was an important railroad bridge over Cedar Run, and this he resolved to burn. While Stuart halted at Warrenton for a brief rest and to close his column, his officers visited their friends in this romantic town, and were entertained at the hotel,

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, J. E. B. Stuart.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, J. E. B. Stuart.

<sup>3</sup> See Bivouac and Battlefield, pages 96, 102.

where they left their names, with mighty titles, in a list of fabulous length upon the register. The Confederates marched by Auburn for Catlett's Station, where difficulties began to be felt that were not experienced by the Union army. A terrific storm set in, which gave little promise of ceasing, and threatened, moreover, impassable streams and bad roads for the artillery.

Nevertheless, with Lee's brigade in advance, the column manfully breasted the torrents of rain, and found themselves after dark in the immediate vicinity of the station they sought. There was a moment's halt, a brief consultation, a silent movement forward, and the astonished Federal pickets were in the hands of Stuart's cavalry. Beyond was the encampment, and the trains guarded by fifteen hundred infantry and five companies of cavalry,<sup>1</sup> and Stuart soon found himself within it. The night was so black that Stuart described it as the darkest he ever knew. Without a guide any concerted plan of action seemed impossible. The rain still poured down in torrents, and the raiders, soaked through to their skins, could only grope aimlessly on their way. But now an important capture was made of a negro, who recognized Stuart. He had seen him in Berkeley. The negro said that he knew where Pope's staff, baggage, and horses could be found, and offered to conduct the raiders there. He was told to lead on. Colonel Lee's regiment of cavalry was ordered to follow. The negro led the regiment within a few feet of the tents occupied by what Stuart called the "convivial staff of Pope."<sup>2</sup> Then there mingled with the noise of rain upon the canvas and the roar of wind in the tree-tops a rushing sound of many horse-

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 14.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, J. E. B. Stuart.

men, of human voices, and of clashing sabres. The surprise was complete. There fell into the hands of the Confederates at this camp a field quartermaster on Pope's staff; and his chief quartermaster and his aide-camp<sup>1</sup> barely escaped. Pope's uniform, his horses and his equipments, what was claimed to be his money chest, a great variety of other uniforms and personal baggage were captured. While Pope's especial property was thus subjected to such ignominious treatment, another camp of parked wagons and public property near by was visited and sacked. The First and Fifth Virginia Cavalry were sent across the railroad track, overcoming in their crossing a heavy embankment and ditches on either side. Torrents of rain added to the many obstacles to be surmounted. But at last the camp was reached. Its guard, having been by this time forewarned, was found somewhat prepared. At the first discharge of a pistol all the lights were extinguished, and the whole camp was wrapped in darkness. The raiders groped on, and were soon met by a fire of musketry delivered from the wagons in which the guards had taken refuge. By the flash of these discharges the raiders were guided in returning the fire. For a few moments only was this fusillade continued, for the enemy saw that further efforts were hopeless; moreover, it was now time to destroy the bridge over Cedar Creek. So attempts at plunder were abandoned, and the party moved on to the eastern end of the railroad bridge. At first an effort was made to burn the bridge, by a selected company, under command of Captain Blackford, who was detached for this purpose. He might as well have tried to set the creek itself on fire; and this he soon discovered. The wooden timbers were completely water-soaked. It was impos-

<sup>1</sup> Colonel L. H. Marshall.

sible to burn it. Then an attempt was made to cut it down. A whole regiment was detailed for this purpose,<sup>1</sup> and Brigadier-General Lee went in person to superintend. Axes were procured with great difficulty, and the work was commenced. But it was soon found that the bridge was as invincible to the axe as to fire. Stuart complained that insuperable difficulties met him at every step; the Federals fired upon him from the western side of the stream, while protected by a cliff; the bridge was a stout one, formed of a double trestle, so that to destroy it would have been difficult, and to repair it would have been easy; and then the stream was greatly swollen. Stuart was obliged to give it up, and hoped the commanding general would appreciate his trials.

And now came the winding up of this raid. The forces not employed at the bridge had secured horses and public property, packed off prisoners to the rear, and burned the abandoned camps of the enemy. One last ineffectual effort was made by the Union guards, as the light of their own tents revealed the foe engaged in their destruction, by a volley of musketry fired into the camp. A few hours yet remained before daylight, when Stuart's column turned back over the same course for the Rappahannock. The rain was still falling, the streams were rising, and in front was the river, now deep and turbulent. The command reached the left bank in safety, bringing with them over three hundred prisoners and many officers.<sup>2</sup> When Pope heard of the destruction of his wagons he was filled with bitterness. That the bridge at Cedar Creek was saved, that his railroad communications with his depots at Manassas and Alexandria were preserved, that any of his trains and supplies were left, afforded him no com-

<sup>1</sup> Fourth Virginia Cavalry.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, J. E. B. Stuart.

fort, relieved him from no feelings of chagrin. In his dispatches to Halleck and in his own official report he underrated both the numbers of Stuart's cavalry and the importance of their captures; and he found consolation only in censuring those Union troops which had been charged with the protection of the public property.<sup>1</sup>

During this night of raids and of rain, and this morning of artillery combats, General McDowell had not withdrawn Hartsuff's brigade from the hill at the head of the railroad bridge on the Confederate side of the river. The railroad bridge was still standing, and afforded an avenue of escape, if used before Longstreet's infantry, under cover of his guns, should overwhelm our small force, and drive it in confusion upon the bridge, a fair mark for his musketry and his artillery. It was this fear that caused McDowell to withdraw at an early hour after sunrise. Two brigades of the enemy were advancing in line of battle to storm the hill, as Hartsuff moved his battery and his infantry to the north side of the river. When the enemy entered the slight works Hartsuff had thrown up for his protection, they found them empty. The Confederate officers waved their swords, and the Confederate privates swelled their lungs and yelled until the welkin rang, as they pushed up the ascent. This brave spectacle was witnessed by many of our men, and was saluted by our gunners with salvos of artillery, as they rained down shot and shell upon the heads of the Confederate assailants, until they hopped out of the works much faster than they went into them.<sup>2</sup> But the Confederates were not altogether driven away from the hill;

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 14; and letter to Halleck, 2.20 A. M., August 23d, *idem*, page 220.

<sup>2</sup> Brigadier-General Evans's Report. Longstreet's Official Report.

with their line reaching to the plain, they remained for five hours under a heavy fire.<sup>1</sup>

The enemy, having thus met with success in forcing Hartsuff across the river, were encouraged to further struggles. Longstreet's chief of artillery was ordered to select new positions for his batteries ; but it does not appear that the efforts of Longstreet's artillerists gave General McDowell a moment's uneasiness, or hastened his march to carry out Pope's new plan for the destruction of Lee.

The storm had put an end to every mode of crossing the river at or near Rappahannock Station, save at Rappahannock bridge ; and the bridge destroyed, Pope had no fears for his rear. McDowell ordered its demolition and turned northward with his column, and Longstreet reported that he had driven him away with his artillery.<sup>2</sup>

The movements which have been related of Confederate troops to the left bank of the Rappahannock were interpreted by Pope as manifesting an intention to cut his railroad communication with Alexandria at Warrenton Junction, and he determined to put his whole force in motion to prevent it. This resolution, however, was not easily enforced. He considered himself hampered by orders to hold on to Fredericksburg to receive reinforcements from the Peninsula, and he remembered that at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, while Jackson was moving rapidly up the river, he had, in a dispatch to Halleck, requested that Heintzelman's corps and the troops of General Cox might be landed

<sup>1</sup> Losing in killed and wounded one hundred and three commissioned officers and enlisted men. (Official Report, Colonel G. T. Anderson, commanding brigade General D. R. Jones's division. See also McDowell's Official Report.)

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of General Longstreet and Colonel J. B. Walton, chief of artillery.



at Bealton Station, and those of General Kearny near Licking River, two miles southwest of Warrenton Junction;<sup>1</sup> and that he had declared that he should not attempt to prevent the crossing of the enemy at Sulphur Springs, for that would take him too far from reënforcements arriving by rail.<sup>2</sup> Then, too, there was the abandonment of the heroic resolution to invade the Confederate side of the river, and instead thereof an attempt to drive the enemy across a stream that was too deep for him to follow. To sum it all up, it appears that Pope awoke on the morning of the 22d with a determination to hold on to the line of the river; that at five o'clock in the afternoon he determined to abandon it; that at eleven o'clock at night he rejected both plans, and resolved to cross the river; and that he awoke on the morning of the 23d with no very clear notions of what he intended to do.<sup>3</sup>

However, at fifteen minutes after seven o'clock in the morning of the 23d of August, General Pope ordered Sigel to march with his whole corps upon Sulphur Springs, and thence towards Waterloo bridge, "to attack and beat the enemy" wherever he might find him. The Federal commander referred in a hopeful spirit to the situation, in which there seemed to be a providential interference. The swollen waters of the Rappahannock divided the enemy's forces; the burning of the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station would

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report, General Heintzelman.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> At twenty minutes after two A. M., August 23d, General Pope, in a dispatch to Halleck, requested that all the troops from the Army of the Potomac moving up from Fredericksburg be sent to the fords of the Rappahannock, to be ready to move across the river to Beverly Station and Stevensburg. (See Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 224.) He still labored under the delusion that he would cross to the enemy's side when the enemy had passed to his. But at seven A. M. he abandoned this plan and the river altogether.

destroy the only possibility of a crossing there; and thus McDowell would be set free and could be united with Banks and Reno, who would support Sigel, while McDowell would move on Warrenton, and Pope in person would accompany him. It was announced that the whole army was to be brought together by night in the neighborhood of Warrenton.<sup>1</sup>

At nine o'clock Halleck was advised of Pope's intentions, and informed that the movement across the river on the enemy's flank and rear was impossible. The river had risen, Pope reported, six feet; there were no longer any fords; the bridges were carried away. He had succeeded in time in withdrawing his advanced forces from the south side of the river, but the enemy's forces on our side were cut off, and he would march immediately to destroy them. He hoped for thirty-six hours before the river ran down. The rain still continued. After destroying the enemy, he would detach a large force to reopen his communication with Catlett's for reception of supplies. "Hurry forward Heintzelman and Cox," and it would be easy to hold the Rapahannock and damage the enemy for his temerity.<sup>2</sup>

The Federal army was withdrawn from the river in the height of a severe storm and heavy artillery firing from the Confederates, who took this occasion to bestow upon us a parting compliment. General Sigel led off in the advancing column, and was followed by Banks, with orders to keep his corps in close communication with the foremost troops, as also with those of General Reno in his rear. In his dispatch to Banks, Pope gleefully referred to the high waters of the river, informed him that the new line would unite the whole

<sup>1</sup> "You will have an effective force of twenty-five thousand men, and you are expected to be in the neighborhood of Waterloo bridge before sunset." (Pope to Sigel, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 225.)

<sup>2</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 226.

of his army between Waterloo bridge and Warrenton, and exhorted him to "be quick, for time was everything."<sup>1</sup>

Banks faithfully obeyed his instructions, — so faithfully, indeed, that many times along the crowded and devious course it would have been exceedingly difficult to disentangle Banks's corps from Sigel's, had the occasion required it. Nor was this all. As usual, Sigel's trains blocked the way, to the delay and hindrance of Sigel's corps. In a narrow road some five thousand troops, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, were crowded, — with trains in front and trains in rear of them, — when the enemy's shells and shot began to fall in their midst, and then it was found that without the apparent knowledge of the enemy our troops were marching within destructive range of his guns.<sup>2</sup>

As General Sigel's column advanced towards Sulphur Springs, Schenck's division was directed towards Fayetteville, and a cavalry reconnaissance was made from there to Great Run Creek, within two miles of the springs. Advanced guards of the enemy were found here, between whom and the Federal cavalry a skirmish fire was kept up,<sup>3</sup> until the arrival of an infantry brigade commanded by Milroy. This brigade formed the rear guard of Sigel's corps; but it happened that in the advance of the column its position was changed, and it passed to the front in an attempt to save distance by a rough but shorter route to the springs. Milroy with his usual luck beat the column he attempted to follow, arrived first at the junction, and was therefore the first to reach the bridge over the creek, where he found the Ninth New York Cavalry, behind the

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Banks, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 225.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Colonel W. R. Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry, to Major-General Sigel, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 135.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report Ninth New York Cavalry, by Major Knox.

woods that bordered it. In a moment he had asked and received an explanation. The enemy had opened fire; he was in force at and across the run. Milroy with his brigade passed the trembling cavalry, plunged audaciously into the woods, and encountered some of the enemy's infantry, who retreated, burned the bridge across the creek, and defied him with artillery.

With no more moving adventure Sigel went into bivouac, between three o'clock in the afternoon and sunset, on the eastern bank of the creek, and began to rebuild the bridge. It was completed by the morning of the 24th.

The night's encampment on the banks of the creek was soggy and comfortless. Before us ran the stream, bridgeless, fordless, and turbulent. The ground was low; there was no view. Where the Confederates were, what doing, we could only imagine, and therefore unusual sounds caused an unusual anxiety. In the evening, just before night-fall, we heard at intervals volleys of musketry. The firing bodies could not have numbered less than a regiment, probably more. It was not an engagement; there was no reply, nor was there the sputtering of a skirmish, nor did I hear the yells of an attack. Neither could I hear artillery. We were near the Rappahannock, not more than half a mile from it, and there was the main body of Jackson's command. Only Early with one of his brigades was on our side of the river. Was this volleyed firing from Jackson's army to encourage Early, — to apprise him that friends were near, in brigades equal to battalion volleys, and that with the daylight he should be wrested from the dangerous grasp of Pope and Sigel? Or was it rather to reload damp muskets, to be in readiness for an expected attack? The solution of this mystery puzzled me, but as will appear it was explained subsequently.

The result of his discoveries Sigel reported at night to Pope. "There is no doubt," he said, "that the enemy has outflanked us, and that his army crossed near Sulphur Springs and Fox's or Lawson's Ford." Sigel then advised "sending instantly" Reno's division to Fayetteville, — sending it "to-night and immediately;" and then Reno could advance to Lawson's Ford, or maintain his position until Pope had made his proper arrangements. Banks had not obeyed Sigel's orders. The latter had directed him to "march to Lawson's Ford, and he had not done it," and the enemy was therefore crossing at that ford, "from which Bayard's cavalry retired an hour or two ago." Then followed Sigel's plan of operations. He advised Pope to withdraw the first (Sigel's) corps towards Bealton, or towards his original position near Beverly Ford; Pope would then be able to concentrate all his forces in a central position, and thereby "gain a day."<sup>1</sup> To which Pope instantly replied that Buford was at Fayetteville with his cavalry, and would watch any movement of the enemy towards that place or towards Sigel's right. "Stand firm," continued Pope, "and let the enemy develop towards Warrenton." Pope then assured Sigel that reënforcements were coming up in his rear; that he desired the enemy to cross as large a force as he pleased in the direction of Warrenton; that Sigel need be under no concern, for when he (Pope) wished him to fall back to the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railway, his movement should be covered. "Be ready to march at a moment's notice," continued Pope. "Send word to Bayard to keep his position as far up the river as possible." Then, as if he thought his expressions of indifference to the enemy's crossing the river required a little qualification, Pope directed Sigel

<sup>1</sup> Sigel to Pope, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 224.

to check, if he found it necessary, any attempt of the enemy to cross at Lawson's Ford.<sup>1</sup>

Thus terminated the 23d of August on the Rappahannock. On the whole, we had much to reflect upon, — doubtfully, perhaps, but still with the feeling that at least we had not been idle. My brigade had withdrawn in the morning from Beverly Ford, while the practice of Longstreet's artillery was in its most malignant temper. Far over our heads and in our midst, crashing and tearing through ranks of men that were near, in among the ambulances and wagons that were far off, shot and shell burst or tore their way through all impediments. Sometimes, however, — fortunately for the sick and disabled who filled our ambulances, — the falling rain quenched the burning fuse. As in the midst of appalling scenes there are always ludicrous incidents which are remembered long after the danger has been forgotten, so it was here within my brigade during the shelling of the ambulances. Some officers of my staff who were on duty near these vehicles were amusing themselves with a favorite dog, whose home was in an ambulance, when a shell fell within a few yards of the group, rebounded, and rolled, fizzing like a demon, towards the officers. In a moment every one crouched to the earth, some throwing themselves on their faces for safety. But the dog, with barks of delight, leaped wildly for a chase. On rolled the shell, with the dog in pursuit, its motion becoming slower and slower, until it stopped with an expiring hiss just as the dog leaped upon her fortunately harmless game, to retire in disgust at the unpleasant smell of hot iron.

The part of the programme for a withdrawal from the river, intrusted to General McDowell, had been faithfully executed. General Tower, of Ricketts's divi-

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Sigel, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 224, 225.

ion, with his brigade, was charged with the important duty of burning the bridge at Rappahannock Station, and this he faithfully performed while the thick clouds of a thunder-storm fortunately obscured his movements. The enemy also took this opportunity to occupy the hill from which Hartsuff had been withdrawn, and from which Federal guns had driven him in the morning, and thus availed himself of a good position to open a rapid fire upon Tower's command, as his infantry was forming and his batteries were limbering up. But this fire was so harmless that it gave no occasion for delay, and General Tower turned from the river, accompanied by Brigadier-General Reynolds, who with his command of Pennsylvania reserves (the first troops from the Army of the Potomac that joined Pope) was ordered to push on and join McDowell's command, to which, after reaching Warrenton, he was to be attached.<sup>1</sup>

The advance of McDowell's first division entered Warrenton at night, and the remainder of his corps were strung along between eight and nine o'clock in the muddy roads south of the town, where, after a long and vexatious halt, during which the men cheered themselves with fires of fence rails, cooked rations and hot coffee, they slept as best they might.

In reflecting on the night of the 23d of August upon the strength of his army and the force he was required to overcome, Pope was encouraged, for he had received assurances that the whole Army of the Potomac was hastening to form under his banner.

Reynolds's splendid division, accompanied by an ammunition train supplied by General Burnside, had ar-

<sup>1</sup> Orders to Reynolds were sent him at eleven A. M. of the 23d, to march to Warrenton, ten miles distant, and to make it "to-night." (Pope's Official Report.)

rived on the 22d at Kelly's Ford, after a very severe and arduous march from Fredericksburg; and General Reno, an officer of distinguished bravery, with two divisions of eight thousand men, unsurpassed for fighting qualities, had joined the Army of Virginia by the same route. From this direction no more troops were then expected, for all the reinforcements arriving from the Peninsula were disembarked at Alexandria for transportation over the Manassas railway, of which fact, and that many were en route, Pope was advised by General Haupt, who was charged with dispatching the trains.<sup>1</sup> That the utmost vigilance and endeavor should be used in sending forward the troops that had not already gone, Halleck knew and Pope believed; for General McClellan had written that the whole of Franklin's corps was embarking as rapidly as possible on the 22d, and that Sumner's corps was at Newport News, only awaiting transportation.<sup>2</sup>

We left General Early of Ewell's division on the left bank of the river on the night of the 22d of August, with General Sigel in pursuit of him on the morning of the 23d. It is time now to turn back and see what came of it.

Hardly had Early passed the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs, when General Lee abandoned his intention of crossing the Confederate army at that place; regretted on the morning of the 23d that he had ever begun it, and was more anxious to get Early back again than Sigel and Pope were themselves. When this brigade, with its eight pieces of artillery, was well over, it was Jackson's intention to send Hays's brigade of the same division to the left bank to join it; but Early's movements over the dilapidated dam were so

<sup>1</sup> Haupt to Pope, August 22d, 10.40 P. M.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan to Halleck, August 22d, 2.15 and 4.30 P. M.



slow that only one of its regiments<sup>1</sup> crossed before the darkness of night arrested the movement, which on account of the rising waters was subsequently abandoned.

General Early, with his own and one regiment of Hays's brigade, was therefore alone on our side of the river, covered by thick woods, without food, without shelter from a heavy rain, and without molestation. He formed his line parallel to and not far from the river in his rear, with its left resting on a road leading from Sulphur Springs to the fords of the Rappahannock below him, and his right extended to an old field near his crossing place. Here he remained during the night, and but for one interesting episode it would have been a night of unrelieved disgust. A Major Pitzer, of Early's staff, while unarmed, captured and brought in as prisoners of war six troopers of the Federal cavalry, with horses, saddles, arms, equipments, and rations. Even Early does not claim that the major's feat was one of force; it was a stratagem. The major was himself captured while he was alone, searching for the thirteenth Georgia regiment, on the left near the springs, by the Union cavalry men who were trying to make their way there. He was disarmed, and forced to the rear along the road his captors were traveling, when, with great presence of mind, which, says Early, did not forsake him, he told the Federals that the Confederate pickets were in the woods, that they guarded every avenue of exit, and that they would be fired at if they did not submit to his guidance, but if they did he would lead them out in safety. The wily major beguiled their hopes with their fears; the dunces yielded, and were led into the presence of General Early and his brigade.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thirteenth Georgia.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General Early, Moore's Rebellion Record, pages 615, 616.

When daylight came Early was appalled. The swollen river defied all attempts to cross it; no reënforcements could reach him. He immediately set about devising means of escape. He ordered a messenger to swim the river, and carry a note to General Jackson or to Ewell, whichever should be first encountered, in which he declared that if the enemy moved on him in force his whole command must inevitably be captured. To avoid the perils of his situation, he begged to be permitted to move his command up the river to Waterloo bridge. Before this note could be delivered, Jackson had sent verbal instructions to his lieutenant to move up to Sulphur Springs, and there, resting his left flank on the river, extend his right until it touched Great Creek, in which position he would, Jackson thought, be secure, for no enemy could be seen around the creek, and whence he could be relieved by the bridge across the Rappahannock, which was being repaired and would soon be in condition for use.

On a hill extending from the river to Great Creek, Early formed his new line of seven regiments of infantry and eight pieces of artillery,<sup>1</sup> with two more regiments to cover his rear.<sup>2</sup> His right rested where the road from Fayetteville to Sulphur Springs crosses the creek, at a bridge which he destroyed. In the mean time Jackson replied to Early's note. He informed him that he might move up to Waterloo bridge if the enemy appeared in too heavy force, and that he (Jackson) would move along the opposite bank with his whole corps to cover him. While in this position General Early received and repulsed the slight attack made by Milroy on his right, which has been described, at

<sup>1</sup> Twelfth and thirteenth Georgia, and twenty-fifth, forty-fourth, forty-ninth, fifty-second, and fifty-eighth Virginia; Brown's and Dement's batteries, four guns each.

<sup>2</sup> Thirteenth and thirty-first Virginia.

the burned bridge over the creek. But he saw with alarm, late in the afternoon, a heavy column of infantry with artillery (Sigel's corps) opposite his right flank, which was every moment more and more exposed by the subsiding waters of the creek.

The presence of Sigel's cavalry hovering around him in the morning, the presence of Sigel's infantry threatening him in the afternoon, with evidence that the Federals were moving up from below in heavy force, no longer left a doubt in Early's mind that he was in a critical condition. To be sure, his troops were entirely concealed in the thick'woods; their number was unknown to the Federals, who moved in a cautious manner, as if they exaggerated the force of an enemy they could not see. In such reflections Early found assurance; to such facts Early thought he owed his deliverance. Late in the afternoon, however, he received unexpected aid. Colonel Robertson, with two or three regiments of cavalry and two pieces of artillery, joined him, from the direction of Warrenton, with a part of the force that had been raiding at Catlett's Station under Stuart. It was the same that left Warrenton just before McDowell entered it. The cavalry commander opened fire with his artillery from a hill to the north of Sulphur Springs upon the Federals who appeared in sight about sundown, and kept it up till dark, with some loss to the Second Virginia Cavalry.<sup>1</sup> At dusk one column of Federal infantry was seen advancing to the front, and another column moving off to the left. The thick forest covered now, as all day it had covered, the wet and hungry troops of Early. Every observed movement of the enemy filled the Confederates with painful apprehension. The night was falling, and the mist filled the air with obscure though fantastic

<sup>1</sup> Stuart's Report, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. ix., p. 600.

shapes. Suddenly a volley was fired into the woods where the Confederate infantry was posted. When the crash died away, there was a silence, which in a moment was broken by three cheers ending with a prolonged yell of exultation, described by Early as a "tiger given in regular style." Sigel's infantry again were at it. They were evidently enjoying the purest delirium of New York militia achievement. But, strange to say, the effect upon Early was magical. This Chinese demonstration revived his hopes. From such troops little was to be feared. He opened upon his exultant foe with canister; and his joy was unspeakable as the air, filled with cries and groans, bore to his ears assurances of dismay. No further volleys in the darkness at nothing were fired; no more cheers and no more tigers troubled Early; but the mysteries of the midnight volleys we had heard were explained.

And yet Early was far from tranquil. New noises were heard, and new reports were made that heavy columns moving from below were preparing to surround him. Another dispatch was sent to General Jackson. This imperturbable old warrior responded by sending the remainder of General Lawton's brigade over the river to join the thirteenth Georgia. It crossed on a temporary bridge which had been commenced by Jackson's orders on the morning of the 23d, and reached Early at night. At one o'clock in the morning of the 24th General Lawton arrived. He told Early that he had seen instructions to General Ewell to cross in person at daylight, and, if it was evident that the enemy was in heavy force, to recross the troops, as it was not desired to have a general engagement at that place. Early was now more disturbed than before. He dispatched a messenger to General Ewell, telling him there was no doubt that the enemy was

in heavy force, that he had heard artillery carriages moving around to his left, and that it would be easy for the enemy to cover with his batteries the bridge and the ford at Sulphur Springs. "If I am to be recrossed," urged the supplicating Early, "it should be done at once, without waiting for daylight." At three o'clock in the morning of the 24th General Ewell came over the river, consulted with Early, and ordered the two brigades and batteries of his division to recross the Rappahannock. General Lawton crossed first, carrying the artillery by hand; and then came Early, the last of whose command reached the friendly shore about daylight, and went into camp in the vicinity of Jeffersonton. In his official report Early reveals his painful apprehensions, though he confesses that he was at the time ignorant of the strength of his enemy. But since he had learned from Pope's official report that the latter "had brought up his whole force to attack what he supposed to be the whole force of General Jackson," he was convinced that his command was rescued from "almost certain capture." His situation, he adds, was felt by every officer and man of his command to be most critical. For two nights and a day his men were without food; for the same time they lay upon their arms. Although these were their privations, no losses in killed or wounded were suffered, and no losses known to the Confederates were inflicted upon their enemy. There is no attempt made by Early to reconcile his grave apprehensions for his safety while confronting Sigel, with facts long after acquired by him from Pope's report, upon which, he admits, these apprehensions were founded.<sup>1</sup> Southern historians have, since the close of the war, praised Early's achievements as most adroit and courageous, but

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Early.

the fact remains that while he was piteously entreating Jackson to remove him from a neighborhood endangered by the rapid approach of the Federal forces under Sigel to attack him, while he was dispatching messenger after messenger to represent to his superiors his deplorable situation, cut off from the main body of his friends by a rising river, Sigel was crying out lustily to Pope that his flank was turned, and Pope was blustering back again as lustily to Sigel. In this movement Jackson alone is entitled to praise. To him Lee intrusted the critical movement of crossing the Rappahannock, and meeting with the head of his columns the shock of battle that might have ensued with the whole of Pope's army. It was Jackson's spirit and soldierly courage that returned to Early's outcry the curt response, "Tell General Early to hold his position,"<sup>1</sup> and it was Jackson's skill that finally reunited the parts of Ewell's division without the loss of man or material. General Pope blamed General Sigel for Early's escape; and General McDowell, whose march, with no other enemy in his front than the mud, was prolonged into the night to accomplish with his advance his ten miles to Warrenton, emulated Pope in his reflections upon Sigel's slowness.<sup>2</sup>

At ten o'clock at night, from Warrenton, Pope reviewed in his dispatch to Halleck his achievements of the day, and declared his purposes for the morrow. His advance, he said, had entered the town of Warrenton about an hour since, the enemy fleeing at his approach towards Hedgeman's River and Sulphur Springs, where his left was engaged about sunset. He should move, he said, at daylight on the 24th, on the springs and on Waterloo bridge, although he did not know

<sup>1</sup> Life of Jackson, by J. E. Cooke, pages 271, 272.

<sup>2</sup> See McDowell's Official Report.

whether the enemy was really in very large force or not on his side of the river; if he was, he would be trapped, for the river was very high.<sup>1</sup>

At this time General Jackson's corps extended along the right bank of the Rappahannock from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo, with six batteries on the heights near Scott's house, not far from the springs,<sup>2</sup> and was, as we have seen, in little danger of disturbance from any of Pope's troops. But General Pope was concerned for himself; he was anxious about his line of communication, his railroad to Alexandria. He ordered General Sturgis, who was in command there, to superintend in person the posting of strong guards along the railway from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Station, and he ordered General Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, who with his division had reached Warrenton Junction at noon, to see that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. That General Lee would break this line, upon which Pope depended solely for supplies, nay, upon which he now depended solely for reënforcements, it would seem ought not to have been doubtful to Pope.

Even if Lee's declared intentions when south of the Rapidan, and Stuart's successful raid upon Catlett's Station, had not revealed Lee's purposes, it was so manifest that this was the blow Lee ought to deliver as the most damaging to Pope, that it could not be doubted by an intelligent student of the art and practice of war that Lee would cut the line which furnished Pope with men and material, if it took his whole army to do it. And yet Pope prepared for no more serious flank movement than a repetition of Stuart's cavalry

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 226, 227.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of Colonel R. L. Walker, Captains McIntosh, Latham, Braxton, and Davidson, and Lieutenant Hardy.

raid. He should not be charged with a belief that his orders to Sturgis and Kearny were sufficient, if carried out, to foil General Lee, for he must have known better than that, although from the importance which he attached in his official report to his orders to these officers, and the complaining tone in which he criticised their conduct, we do not feel justified in asserting that he did.

With a report to General Halleck of the steady movements of his troops for Alexandria, and a complaint that there were as yet no transports for General Sumner's corps, General McClellan sailed with his staff in the afternoon for Acquia Creek. Thus ended the important events that transpired on the 23d of August.



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE HOSTILE ARMIES MOVE UP THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

THE morning of the 24th of August witnessed a repetition of the scenes that had been enacted at the lower fords of the Rappahannock. Between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge there was artillery firing and sharp-shooting on both sides; but the Confederates were making skillful demonstrations to deceive the Federals as to their real movements, in which, as we shall see, they were eminently successful. Stuart's raid to Catlett's Station had ended, and he had on this morning followed Early's infantry to the Confederate side of the Rappahannock. While Pope affected to consider the results of this raid as of trifling importance, to Lee they were most valuable, for among the articles of captured property was a box of official papers belonging to Pope, which revealed to General Lee the movements and designs of his enemy. He now learned that the entire force lately under McClellan on the James was to be brought rapidly north of the Rappahannock and united under Pope, and that other troops from other quarters were to be added, until an army vast in numbers was to oppose him. Stuart hastened day and night, through storm and through flood, to lay these papers before his chief. Lee saw in a moment that he must advance before the Union armies could concentrate, or he must abandon his plans, retire, and present to the Confederate Congress and the Confed-

erate people a campaign in which Jackson's victory at Cedar Mountain over Banks's corps alone would be their only compensation for a large expenditure of life, money, and material, their only consolation for a fruitless campaign from Richmond to the Rappahannock.

Not for one moment did Lee hesitate. Although the rise in the water had forbidden his intended passage of the river at Sulphur Springs, it should not interfere with his crossing still farther north, where such secrecy should follow his movements that he could gain Pope's rear without exciting Pope's suspicion of his intent. To cut Pope's line of communication on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and thus retard, or prevent, if possible, the passage of troops to reënforce the Federal army ; to seize upon and destroy the depots of supplies at Manassas Junction, and thus deprive that army of rations for its soldiers, of forage for its horses, and of ammunition for its arms, was a new plan, which Lee substituted for the plan abandoned at Warrenton Springs, while yet the troops of Early were anxiously awaiting relief in their peril. Nor was this all. Under the confusion thus created by a movement so bold and so surprising, the whole of Lee's army, thrown rapidly forward in the path of the flanking column, were to fall upon Pope. The more readily to mask his designs, so important, especially in modern warfare, the skillful pretenses so skillfully practiced at the fords and crossings below were to be continued at Sulphur Springs. Lee hoped to bewilder Pope by the evolutions of his troops and the roar of his artillery, and a sturdy defense of the bridge across the Rappahannock at Waterloo.<sup>1</sup> All the manœuvres of Lee's troops, and all the incidents connected therewith, were planned on this day in furtherance of this design, and all the move-

<sup>1</sup> Life of General R. E. Lee, by J. E. Cooke, pages 113-116.

ments made by Pope were made not only in utter ignorance of such design, but as if every ruse were a reality and every pretense the only demonstration meditated by his enemy. To detach so large a portion of his force as would be necessary to make this flanking movement was not in Lee so reckless an act as might at first appear. To divide one's forces in the face of an enemy has always, by all eminent commanders, been condemned. But this rule is not invariable; a departure therefrom sometimes is justified. Indeed, there is no rule of action by which the commander of an army in the field should be governed when his opponent is utterly wanting in those military elements which are deemed essential for the very existence of military ability itself. Lee knew Pope of old, and he had little but contempt for his leadership. To attempt, therefore, against him and his troops what he would not have even considered against another cannot be thought to be recklessness in Lee. Moreover, the nature of the country was most favorable to the secrecy of such a movement. Hills and forests would cover and valleys would conceal the march of a column. Then, too, the effect of such a surprise would be most beneficial to the Confederates. Neither army was composed of veterans; in neither was there much discipline, nor was it of that kind which transforms a citizen into a soldier. The effect, therefore, of finding a large portion of Lee's army in their rear, while, as they supposed, they were regarding it in their front, or driving it demoralized into the valley of the Shenandoah, could not be otherwise than disastrous to the Federals under Pope.

The day of the 24th wore on with the Federal army, as if the only important events for Pope's consideration were centred in his front, between Warrenton Springs and Waterloo bridge. The troops of Sigel's

corps had passed the night of the 23d on the banks of Great Run, whose swollen waters formed a somewhat formidable barrier between them and the Confederates under Early. About ten o'clock in the morning of the 24th, General Sigel, with Banks and Reno following, prepared to cross this stream. In a room of a small house on its banks a grand council was held. There were Pope and McDowell, Sigel, Reno, Banks, and many other general officers. It was as yet unknown whether Lee's forces had recrossed the Rappahannock, and it was uncertain whether they intended to do so. To determine this question the irrepressible Milroy was ordered to pass over the bridge where he had encountered the enemy upon the preceding evening. The planks had been torn up by Early's men, and nothing but the sleepers remained. Over these Milroy crossed his infantry, and proceeded, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry, to advance upon Sulphur Springs. He reached, without molestation, the heights commanding the bridge which Jackson had constructed to relieve Early; but here the Confederates opened fire from the opposite shore. No enemy was found on our side of the Rappahannock, but on its right bank, with his batteries placed in eligible positions and his infantry sheltered in rear of them, was the Confederate division of General A. P. Hill. The artillery of this division checked Milroy's advance. After a few minutes, however, this fire was discontinued, to await the appearance of Pope's infantry.<sup>1</sup>

In the mean time Milroy had sent for his batteries and had replied to a hostile fire<sup>2</sup> which seemed to offer

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Colonel R. L. Walker, artillery battalion, Moore's Rebellion Record, page 722. Official Report, Major-General A. P. Hill, *ibid.*, pages 592, 593.

<sup>2</sup> Life of Jackson, by J. E. Cooke, pages 272-274. Report of General Milroy, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 93, 94.

a serious obstacle to the onward march of our infantry to Sulphur Springs. Sigel would remove it. He would go forward, he said, and silence the opposing guns. In a few moments a general artillery duel was in progress; but it was soon suspended, for the Confederates were ordered to cease firing until Pope's infantry should show itself. Mistaking the character of this silence, Sigel boasted that he had driven the enemy from his guns; but it did not seem to be so to any of the officers who heard Sigel report to Pope that now there was no obstacle in our path,—that the troops could move forward upon Sulphur Springs with impunity. In this delusion Milroy appears to have shared. He saw that the enemy had retired from his guns, that the pieces were very temptingly displayed,<sup>1</sup> and he felt that this was too exciting to resist. Therefore, with one of his regiments following close behind, Milroy crossed the bridge. The coveted prize was almost within his grasp, when suddenly the woods and hills became alive with the enemy. The deserted batteries were manned, and from a semicircle of guns which reached nearly a mile around "us" shell and canister in steady streams were poured upon the bridge. Milroy "called to his regiment, which was then crossing," to retire; and they obeyed him, moving in "rapid style," but in "very good order." "Then," continued Milroy, "our batteries responded." "The air was alive with shot and shell;" the enemy's attention was diverted, and I took "advantage of the elevation of the guns to join my command."<sup>2</sup> Before we close the history of this campaign we shall be compelled to refer more than once to the self-reported heroic feats of the undaunted Milroy. But it is to be feared that the

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, R. H. Milroy, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 93, 94.

<sup>2</sup> See Report of R. H. Milroy, *ibid.*

splendor of this achievement eclipses all the rest. In the presence of a large portion of two great armies, whose batteries had thundered at each other across a stream scarce one hundred yards in width, one intrepid brigadier-general of Sigel's corps marches calmly towards the hills and forests occupied by the enemy. Over the frail bridge that spanned the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs, in advance of his followers, he takes his way. No guards precede him. He moves on the deserted guns of the enemy. But suddenly the adversary appears, and the fight is resumed. Over the head of this single brigadier the thunder breaks. He turns, and, warning his followers to retire, marches backward with majestic mien.

When our troops moved towards Sulphur Springs, but had not proceeded far, we discovered, even as had Milroy, that Sigel's boast was a vain one. He had not driven off the enemy. Simultaneously five batteries of Hill's division<sup>1</sup> opened on our columns. We were often in plain sight of the Confederate gunners, and always in range; but we reached the springs without that serious loss which the enemy believed we had suffered, and which, from what he saw, it was but natural he should believe. When the Confederate gunners poured forth their storm of shot, they saw our columns breaking for a moment, to unite again immediately under a near cover, from which the march was resumed. In this there was but little loss, none perhaps, and yet the enemy, who reported his own as but eighteen, was convinced that ours must have been heavy in comparison.<sup>2</sup> In truth, our loss was slight, very slight. Sigel does not give it, nor does Banks or Reno.

<sup>1</sup> Braxton, Latham, Davidson, McIntosh, and Pegram. (Report of Major-General Hill, Moore's Rebellion Record, pages 592, 593.)

<sup>2</sup> Major-General Hill, *ibid.*

The column now moved on for Waterloo bridge. It was Pope's purpose to destroy it, and it was Lee's to save it, or at least to persuade Pope that such was his wish. General Stuart feared that an attempt to destroy the bridge would be made: For reasons which he has not revealed, he thought its preservation important to Lee. Therefore, all the sharp-shooters of two cavalry brigades, one hundred in number, were sent to its defense; and they defended it until relieved by a regiment of Confederate infantry. It was five o'clock in the afternoon before the advance of Sigel's corps reached Waterloo, Milroy in front. Here, as at Sulphur Springs, opposing batteries crowned the hills, and sharp-shooters on either shore lay in wait in deadly ambush. The fire of the enemy was severe; but it was returned by our men with great coolness. General Hill's commander of his artillery battalion reports the Federal fire as terrific. It was delivered, he says, from not less than seven batteries, and lasted from ten in the morning until six o'clock in the afternoon; and yet the Confederate loss was small.<sup>1</sup>

While this artillery combat was being kept up with a fury of sound, the whole of Lee's army was moving towards Jefferson,<sup>2</sup> at which place the whole of Jackson's corps was being concentrated. General Hood, of Longstreet's corps, relieved General A. P. Hill's division along the river.<sup>3</sup>

The main positions held by the Federal troops covered

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Colonel R. L. Walker, artillery battalion, Moore's Rebellion Record, page 72. Also see report of James H. Lane, Brigadier-General Hill's division, *ibid.*, page 660; Brigadier-General McGowan, second brigade, Hill's division, *ibid.*, page 663; and Captain J. K. Boswell, chief engineer, second army corps (Confederate).

<sup>2</sup> Called Jeffersonton by Confederate officers.

<sup>3</sup> Reports of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, A. P. Hill, W. B. Taliaferro, Archer, and Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, artillery battalion, A. P. Hill's division.

the line of the Rappahannock as far up as Waterloo bridge, then held by Sigel's advance, with its rear in the direction of Sulphur Springs. Banks was on the Sulphur Springs road, in rear of Sigel and in contact with him. Reno with his divisions was near where the Warrenton road forks, east of and very near the springs, which place was guarded by three brigades, one from each of these three commands.<sup>1</sup> The whole of McDowell's corps was at Warrenton, and stretched along the road from there to Sulphur Springs. Reynolds's division was in camp one mile south of Warrenton, with one of its brigades, under the command of that distinguished officer, General George C. Meade of the United States army, two miles in advance. At this period, General Meade, though an eminent graduate of the national Military Academy, was known to the public as a courteous gentleman and an officer of scientific attainments only. He had been intrusted with a subordinate command, in which there had been but few chances to win laurels. But his day was coming. And when it came he succeeded where McClellan and Pope, Burnside and Hooker, had failed. Through days of hope alternating with despair; through shameful defeats, and through shameful abandonment of the fruits of victory heroically won; through the impending calamity even now brooding over all of us under Pope; through the oncoming struggle at Antietam, with its fields strewn breast-high with corpses, ere yet the Confederates were driven backward across the Potomac; through the mad ruin of a winter campaign at Fredericksburg; through the unutterable mortification of Chancellorsville, this commander of the single brigade at the outpost was destined to rise from rank to rank, until,

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report, Sigel to Ruggles chief of staff, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 14, 15, 229.



wielding the same forces which now surrounded him, he was to hurl back the same enemy that he now confronted, in the last effort of that enemy to carry the war from Southern into Northern fields.

The arrival of General McDowell's troops within the old and very respectable town of Warrenton was not an agreeable surprise to the inhabitants, who from behind the closed and curtained windows of their houses brooded with angry hearts and scowling brows over what they called the wicked Yankee invasion of the sacred soil of Virginia. Even the railway station was closed and abandoned, and mine host of the Warren Greene Hotel, who saw with chagrin ill concealed the names of our cavalry officers ornamenting his register ere the ink was dry which announced the arrival of those Confederate officers who fled at our approach, was not well pleased with the substitution of the blue uniform for the gray. But he was civil, if nothing more, and supplied all the fresh bread, real milk and butter, that the Federal officers paid for; courtesy, therefore, was dispensed with.

While a deep gloom hung over the town, out of which there came the tramp of troops, the sound of horse and clank of sabre, certain prominent officers, among whom were Pope and McDowell, made themselves as comfortable as possible at the hotel, while beneath superb shade trees that lined the streets or filled the squares the soldiers sought shelter from the heat of a midday sun. While here rumors came to us that the Confederate Congress had resolved that Pope's officers, captured in action, should be denied the treatment accorded by civilized nations to prisoners of war. General Pope, it was said, had ordered the destruction of the country through which he passed; and such a campaign was in defiance of the rules of warfare adopted

by civilized nations. It was the resort of a barbarian to lay waste the country in rear of his troops. If he fed his own soldiers and his own animals from the small supplies which were gathered in every house he could reach, wherever his army went, he would inflict upon helpless multitudes all the horrors of starvation ; he would be as responsible for the death of men, women, and children as if his soldiers, by his orders, were to slaughter them in cold blood at their doors. The horrors that Pope threatened in the promises of his campaign might have equaled, if not exceeded, the frightful evils of the siege of Londonderry. Five generations have passed away since that noted siege, but the story of the agony there endured can never be forgotten by future generations. The sufferings of the Protestant garrison from famine, from pestilence, and from assault were borne with an heroic fortitude which gave little promise of success to the besiegers. New methods were devised by the French commander under the Popish king, methods so infamous and inhuman that they wrung a protest even from that King James who, while under the protection of France as a royal guest at St. Germain, commissioned with his own hand his own creatures to assassinate his own son-in-law, the Prince of Orange. The wives, the children, the aged parents of the defenders within the walls of the besieged city were forced from their homes and driven into the vacant space between the two armies, there to die, unsheltered and unfed, in the presence of those to whom they were dearer than their own lives. It is to the credit of his master that the beastly and boorish general who served King James was compelled, before many days had expired, to send these poor creatures back again to their homes.

Had Pope's orders signified more than the usual rod-

omontade with which the Spanish government in the seventeenth century met the demands of the allies for material for their wars against France, then the Southern mode of defense against the inevitable ills we have painted would have been justified by every Christian nation. Every Christian nation at war endeavors to make its own burdens light and its antagonist's burdens heavy. But no nation whose morals, whose religion, or whose practices are to be found among the enlightened of the earth would save its treasure at the expense of the lives of the women and children within the territory of its enemy. But Pope did not mean to do what his orders to his troops signified should be done. He was a vain man, rather proud of his power of using words, and he thought his orders would frighten both Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Congress. Many of Pope's officers were captured while fighting gallantly but hopelessly in Pope's campaign, but in no instance were any of the threatened reprisals made. Once at Libby Prison in Richmond there was a pretense of a fatal lot to be drawn, and some of the officers of the Second Massachusetts Infantry were more or less imposed upon, after their capture at Cedar Mountain, by threats of violence; but even this soon ceased, and nothing remains of this whole subject matter for future thought or future study save the bombastic order which produced it.

Not only the streets of the town of Warrenton, but the hill-sides north of it, were covered with our troops. On the road to Waterloo bridge Ricketts's division was posted, with his advance within four miles of the bridge. King's division was near Warrenton, on the Sulphur Springs road.<sup>1</sup> This was the disposition of Pope's infantry and artillery on the night of the 24th

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Report, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 14, 15.

of August. The cavalry of his army were engaged in various duties at various points within an area of some fifty square miles. At the south there was a regiment at Fayetteville;<sup>1</sup> a part of another was convoying trains of provisions for Reno, and the remainder were escorting General Sigel above at Waterloo bridge,<sup>2</sup> where still another regiment was encamped.<sup>3</sup> The remainder of Pope's cavalry, under Buford and Bayard, were patrolling thoroughfares, examining roads, or reconnoitring positions. Wherever they were, whatever doing, they were already worn out with severe and arduous labor. One brigade commander thus early in the campaign officially reported that the horses of his command had been taxed to their utmost strength; they had been almost constantly saddled since the battle of Cedar Mountain (the 9th of August); they had been irregularly and scantily fed; they had been in perpetual demand, to move here or there, to guard different fords or to examine the country; and they were often placed under different division and brigade commanders.<sup>4</sup> As we progress it will be seen how rapidly the destruction of Pope's cavalry went on, and through what causes it happened that when this force could and ought to have been used most beneficially, not a single horse could be tortured out of a walk, and that many gaunt and half-starved animals were able to stand on their legs only by an incessant use, which prevented them from falling down. We shall find in this a confirmation of the maxim that the secret of the art of war is not in the legs of horses or of men, but in the head that directs them.

<sup>1</sup> Ninth New York.

<sup>2</sup> Sixth Ohio.

<sup>3</sup> First Maryland.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Ninth New York Cavalry, commanding cavalry brigade, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 131.

After dark of the 24th the whole of Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the river bank, and troops from Longstreet's took their places. This was necessary, not alone to give the former time and rest for the arduous duty about to be undertaken, but to lull any suspicion in the mind of the Federal commander that such a movement was contemplated. For this nothing could be more effective than the concentration of troops and artillery at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo; nothing could better deceive Pope than pretenses of a determined purpose to protect the bridges at these places. Accordingly, Longstreet's artillery resounded from the same elevations from which Jackson's had been withdrawn, and Longstreet's sharpshooters fired as persistently from the same cover on the banks. It may again be confidently stated that on the 24th of August not a suspicion of Lee's real purposes entered Pope's mind. As he believed that he had frustrated Lee's efforts to cross the river between Rappahannock Station and Sulphur Springs, so he would now foil him in a crossing at Sulphur Springs or Waterloo. Nothing would then remain to Pope but to await on the left bank of the Rappahannock the arrival of forces from the Peninsula, with which Halleck could begin his grand campaign. Late in the afternoon, from his headquarters at Warrenton, General Pope dispatched to Halleck a most hopeful tale of Sigel's pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Waterloo bridge. McDowell's withdrawal from Rappahannock Station was described, the three days' continuous engagement along eight or ten miles of the river dwelt upon, and the result claimed that no force of the enemy had yet been able to cross except that now inclosed by "our forces between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge," which would undoubtedly be captured, unless they found some means

of which he knew nothing of escaping across the river between these places.<sup>1</sup> Then Pope revealed his plans for the future. Early to-morrow morning, after clearing this side of the river, he would move back a considerable part of his force to the neighborhood of Rappahannock Station; for by that time the river would doubtless be fordable again. But he should leave a corps of observation to watch the crossings at Waterloo and Sulphur Springs. Pope then dwelt upon the assembling of the forces arriving from Washington and Alexandria. "Until Halleck was ready to begin a forward movement," he would assemble them near Germantown, between there and the railroad, with a reserve force somewhere between Warrenton Junction and Warrenton. He would like some idea of the forces that were coming and Halleck's plans of organizing them, that they might be assigned and posted in some order. Then, returning to the aspect of things around him and his present duty in connection therewith, he admitted that he could form no estimate of the forces of the enemy, but asserted that they were heavy. Nor could he say how far his movements towards "our right will extend;" but his whole tendency had been in that direction since he appeared in "front of us" at Rappahannock Station.<sup>2</sup> There is still further evidence that Lee's plans were not even conjectured by Pope. At five o'clock in the morning of the 24th, Pope sent to Sigel for a full report of the condition of things in his front, adding, "Our work must be finished here to-day. We have no time to spare."<sup>3</sup> Still later he instructed Sigel to send "to-night," or at an early hour in the

<sup>1</sup> No force was captured, for there was none there to be captured. Early had recrossed in the morning.

<sup>2</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 228, 229.

<sup>3</sup> Pope to Sigel, *ibid.*, page 227.

morning, spies and scouts around by Front Royal to Thornton's Gap and into the valley of the Shenandoah, to ascertain whether any of the enemy's forces were moving in that direction.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore beyond controversy that on the 24th General Pope exhibited a singular fatuity in interpreting the movements of the Confederate army. Were Lee's troops seen marching northerly? They were striking for the Shenandoah Valley through the passes of the Blue Ridge at Front Royal or Thornton's Gap. Did their camp-fires extend from Waterloo bridge to Jefferson, or from Amissville to Sulphur Springs?<sup>2</sup> They were massing to force a passage at one or the other or both of these points; and they would be defeated here, as they had been defeated wherever, from Rappahannock bridge to Sulphur Springs, they had, in the last three days, attempted a crossing of the Rappahannock. This campaign was over. It was time to prepare for the one to follow. Thus did Pope's vanity obscure his judgment and afflict him with a fatal blindness. Then, too, there were other causes conspiring to produce an exaggerated estimate of the value of his own opinions. On this day he received a telegram that more than thirty thousand troops demanded transportation from Alexandria to his army, and that, although this demand exceeded the capacity of the road, twelve thousand a day with supplies could be managed.<sup>3</sup> It was inconceivable to Pope that the enemy could hazard a flank march leading them into the arms of the reënforcements which were pouring in to him from the Army of the Potomac. Lee could not be ignorant of their coming. By this time, the embarkation of that army from Harrison's

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Sigel, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 229.

<sup>2</sup> Sigel to Ruggles, chief of staff, *ibid.*, page 229.

<sup>3</sup> Haupt to Pope, *ibid.*, page 227.

Landing must be known to him, and, if known, that they were to coöperate with Pope should not be doubtful. Under such circumstances the commander of the Federal army did not believe that so skillful an officer as General Lee would expose himself to the whole Army of Virginia on his flank, and to the Army of the Potomac in his front. To do so would be a reflection upon the prowess of the commanding general of the Federal forces, of which Pope was utterly unable to conceive.

Many days after his defeat, doubtless from the quiet retreat of his military district at the west, Pope wrote an official report of his campaign. Then he knew that on the 24th he had failed to discover the purposes and plans of the enemy, and that he had wholly misinterpreted his movements. He did not even suspect that Lee would attempt to throw one half of his force in the rear of the Federal army; but now he saw his error, and he lacked the manhood to admit it. So, with characteristic effrontery, he officially declared that he knew all about the contemplated flank movement on the twenty-fourth day of August. He even gave the detailed courses of the enemy's infantry, and pointed out their probable direction to his rear over the way they actually marched on the 25th and 26th; and he regretted exceedingly that Halleck's orders to him to keep up his communications with Fredericksburg prevented his taking proper steps to defeat Lee's army. Had Pope admitted in his report, when he saw his error, that he was mistaken in his conjectures, that he was too sanguine for the future and too vain in the past, he might have received sympathy from his countrymen, perhaps from some of them justification; but he would not have been Pope.

It was in this conjuncture that General Lee deter-



mined to make his great flank movement. The perils and the responsibilities of this important and delicate operation were intrusted to General Jackson.

Although the army in which Jackson had rendered such conspicuous service had been in the field not eighteen months, he had in that time won among his fellow officers an enviable reputation for an energy that defied all obstacles, for a sagacity that confounded all opposition, and for a courage that rose highest amidst the shock of arms. To all this was added a zealot's ardor for a cause which he believed to be under the direct guidance and care of the Supreme Being. In every movement of his command, whether on his fatiguing marches or on the eve of battles, whether in the anguish of defeat or in the exultation of victory, he poured forth his soul in earnest prayer to a God who, with an immutable faith, he believed heard his petitions, and received his songs of gratitude when those petitions were answered.

To Dr. McGuire, the medical director of his corps, who, in recounting the many casualties which he had witnessed on Jackson's front on the hard-fought field of the 29th of August, said to him, "General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting," Jackson replied, "No! it has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence."<sup>1</sup> Thus Jackson had no will of his own to gratify, no earthly ambition to drag him down to the level of those who measure the virtue of their achievements by the rewards their fellows bestow upon them. In the service of Jehovah, death would be a triumph greater than the world could bestow; therefore death had no terrors for

<sup>1</sup> See *post* for an account of this fight. Pope claimed the victory. This incident is taken from *Life of T. J. Jackson*, by R. L. Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 275-283.

him ; and he flung himself and his followers into the most dangerous movements, which would inevitably lead to the most murderous slaughter, with an abiding and a joyous trust. With "Thanks be to God!" he begins and closes his dispatches, whether he announces a victory or a defeat. How this singular nature was wrought upon to result in the most austere soldier this country has ever known, the most marked type of Roundhead or fiery Covenantner that Cromwell ever commanded or Claverhouse ever charged with his dragoons, it is not easy to discover. Jackson was a poor boy, born in Western Virginia. Both his parents died while he was little more than a child. Complete histories of all that is known of his childhood represent him as grave, self-reliant, and thoughtful. Before he was twenty he had trials and struggles, for his life was cast amidst the roughest ways of nature. He tried, with his only brother, the life of a flatboatman on the Mississippi, he cut wood for steamboats, and turned his hand in any way to live. Upon the death of this brother Jackson returned again to his birthplace. He was elected a constable, and was serving his town and county thus when the village blacksmith told him there was a vacancy for that district at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and that the member of Congress could nominate whom he chose to fill it. Jackson applied, and was appointed. The writer of these pages was his classmate,—the class of 1846. Among its graduates there are many memorable names, George B. McClellan, Stoneman, Reno, Couch, Foster, A. P. Hill, and Pickett, but among them all the name of T. J. Jackson of Virginia stands preëminent. It is before me now, recorded on a sheet that holds the autographs of my classmates, as he wrote it, at my request, when as boys we left West Point forever.

Jackson was of medium height, with a compact frame, and a countenance which lighted up with a pleasing smile of kindly feeling when he spoke. When at rest his face bore a severe expression. His gait was awkward, his dress slouchy; his position, as a soldier, in recitation, or at the blackboard, sturdy and strong; it was characteristic. In the army as well as at the academy, Jackson was respected, not beloved, for his nature was unsocial. He talked but little; he was grave. What he had at any moment on his mind absorbed his whole soul and all his energy. It was so at the blackboard as a student, where in his abstraction he made more chalk marks on himself than on the board. It was so in the army, where he let no disturbing thoughts interfere with a purpose to which he gave every faculty of mind and of body. In truth, it may be said that in the homeliness of his youthful life there were no pleasing remembrances to distract him. He had lived in the present; it was painful to look back; when therefore a duty came before him, to do it was his chiefest pleasure. When the religion of an austere Calvinist seizes such a soul, you have a Jackson.

After the war with Mexico, in which Jackson served, and in which he won renown without exhibiting any of the great qualities he began to manifest at the period of our civil war, he encountered the dull routine of life upon the sea-coast, in an artillery company, with impatience. About his food and his exercise he became a monomaniac; he prescribed for his diet, his food in given weights, his drink in given quantities. The measure and manner of his exercise, too, were governed by a rigorous law. There are men yet in the army who remember when Jackson, as an officer of artillery, at an early hour in the morning sawed wood so vigorously in his apartments that slumber in the officers' quarters was

impossible. As a new revelation Jackson had appeared to his countrymen. From his beloved Shenandoah Valley he had driven Banks a fugitive. He had defeated all attempts to cut off his own retreat, or to retard his rapid march to Richmond. His sudden appearance on the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, while McDowell, who ought to have been with that army, was chasing Jackson's shadow somewhere on the west of the Blue Ridge, contributed greatly to McClellan's disaster. We had just met him at Cedar Mountain. He had savagely turned upon Pope, while awaiting the arrival of Lee. It was no wonder that Jackson was ordered to strike Pope's rear, or that he set about the work with his accustomed energy and intelligence. At three o'clock in the afternoon General Jackson at Jeffersonton sent for the chief engineer of his corps, and directed him to select the most direct and covered route to Manassas. The one by Amissville, Hinson's Mill, Orleans, Salem, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville was at once recommended. Jackson approved, ordered the engineer officer to select guides, and to lead the front division in person at dawn on the following morning.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, General Fitz-John Porter's corps of three divisions, commanded by Generals Sykes, Morell, and Piatt, had landed at Acquia Creek, and had made their way to the vicinity of Morrisville post-office, about five miles from the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford.

General Porter had moved his troops rapidly; he had marched them by night as well as by day, and had done everything that he could to push forward to Pope's army as rapidly as possible.<sup>2</sup> At Kelly's Ford

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, J. K. Boswell, captain and chief engineer, second army corps.

<sup>2</sup> To this fact General Burnside (under whose command Porter had been for some days before) testified before the Porter court-martial. See rec-

Porter expected to find Pope; for he had received no information that he had withdrawn from the lower fords of the Rappahannock. But Porter was disappointed. There were no troops between his own and Rappahannock Station; and Rappahannock Station his scouts found burned and abandoned. They searched for Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens, who had preceded them over this route; but they searched in vain, and it was supposed that these officers with their commands were with Pope; nothing could be heard of them.<sup>1</sup> General McClellan had arrived at Acquia Creek, and had reported to Halleck for orders.<sup>2</sup> That the Army of the Potomac was transferred from the scene of its late defeat to coöperate with the Army of Virginia he knew; but where it was to coöperate, or who was to command it, he had not been informed. If his veterans were to concentrate where they could be the most effective in carrying out Pope's plans, it seemed to McClellan most urgent that he should know something of what Pope's plans were to be. When he landed at Acquia Creek McClellan was sure that his old army was to be moved to the lower fords of the Rappahannock. But one of his corps commanders had reported to him that he found those fords abandoned. At two o'clock in the afternoon he dispatched to Halleck the information he had gained, and asked anxiously for Pope. "Please tell me immediately exactly where Pope is, and what doing," was his urgent appeal. Then, still supposing

ord of the trial published by order of the House of Representatives, Executive Document No. 71, Thirty-seventh Congress, second series, pages 182, 184. Also see testimony of General McClellan, that from the time Porter "knew he was to go to the assistance of General Pope" he did, in his opinion, do "all that an energetic and zealous and patriotic officer could have done." *Ibid.*, page 196.

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, *McClellan's Reports and Campaigns*, page 322.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, page 321.

himself responsible for his own army until it had absolutely reached the theatre of another's operations, he declared that he could not until he had this information regulate Porter's movements; he was much exposed now. Calling Halleck's attention to "decisive measures" which should be taken, he said, "at once," he asked the general-in-chief what his command and his position were to be. Did the general-in-chief still intend to place him in the command indicated in his first letter to him, and orally through General Burnside at the Chickahominy? Until he knew, he could not decide where he could be of most use. But if his determination was unchanged, "I ought to go," said McClellan, "to Alexandria at once." "Please define my position and duties," were the closing words of the telegram.<sup>1</sup> At three o'clock and forty-five minutes in the same afternoon in which McClellan pleaded with Halleck in the foregoing dispatch, Pope by telegraph transmitted to the general-in-chief the full details of his own movements and those of the enemy, as recorded in these pages. And yet not a word of information was sent to McClellan. It is true that on the same day it was received, Halleck sent a dispatch in reply; but it was curt, morose, and false: "You ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either where Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have been all day most anxious to ascertain."<sup>2</sup> This was all, and it was characteristic. That any reply from Halleck would be discourteous could surprise no one who knew him. But that he should find no word of kindness, no tone of encouragement, no lisp of sympathy, for his former rival; nay, that he should put off his former

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, *McClellan's Reports and Campaigns*, page 322.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to McClellan, *ibid.*

commander by false utterances and falser suppressions ; that he should affirm ignorance of that which McClellan did not seek to know ; that he should deny that he had any information of that which was well known to him at the time, or might have been by a single touch of the wire, will surprise many who little knew the crafty ways in which Halleck sought his own reputation in the ruin of his rivals'.

Before the close of the day the troops of Pope's army suffered from hunger. In Banks's corps, notably in one regiment<sup>1</sup> of one brigade,<sup>2</sup> the men enjoyed a diet of green corn, with a little meat scraped from bones left by another corps. But late at night rations were sent by rail to Warrenton, and there wagons from various corps between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo were laden with supplies.

<sup>1</sup> The second Massachusetts.

<sup>2</sup> General Gordon's.

## CHAPTER V.

### POPE AND HALLECK.

THE 25th of August was a day of exasperating annoyances to Pope. Early in the morning he ordered his troops to occupy a new defensive line, with his left upon the Rappahannock and his right at Warrenton, under McDowell, with a brigade of infantry to be advanced towards Waterloo and another towards Sulphur Springs. The cavalry under Buford and Bayard was to stretch along the line of the river. At Fayetteville Sigel was to take post, throwing his cavalry also along the river. This corps was to be strengthened by the command of General Cox, which Pope supposed to be seven thousand strong. Banks was to rest his right on Bealton Station, extending his left along the north side of Marsh Creek, and throwing out at least a division on the railroad towards Rappahannock Station. General Sturgis, with a division reported by Pope to be ten thousand strong, was to be added to this corps. General Reno, with his detachment of the ninth corps, was to return to Kelly's Ford, and communicate immediately with the forces below it on the river. At Germantown Heintzelman was to establish his corps, extending it along the Licking River. Its numbers were given by Pope as ten thousand men.<sup>1</sup> General Pope

<sup>1</sup> The reinforcements by Cox, Sturgis, and Heintzelman, in numbers as here given, Pope reports as expected by him, because of Haupt's dispatch of the 24th, that thirty thousand men awaited transportation from Alexandria, and Halleck's dispatch of the 28d, that heavy reinforcements would begin to arrive at Warrenton Junction on the 24th.



announced that the headquarters of the Army of Virginia would be near Warrenton Junction.

That Pope in this new disposition of his troops was carrying out the plans Halleck had originated in Washington before Pope entered on his campaign is manifest, not alone from the words used in his dispatch of the preceeding day,<sup>1</sup> but from the savage reply which Halleck returned.

That General Pope believed that in defending the line of the Rappahannock he was opposing the purposes of the enemy to cross that line somewhere between Kelly's Ford and Waterloo bridge is beyond controversy. But in that dispatch there were significant sentences that were less pleasing to the general-in-chief than a soldier would readily conceive that they could be. That General Halleck was eminently qualified to supersede McClellan as general-in-chief of all the Federal armies was doubted neither by the President nor by Halleck himself. That General Halleck, in superseding McClellan, would put himself at the head of the combined armies of Virginia and of the Potomac; that he would take an active part in an energetic campaign, and be responsible for its battles; that he would run the risks of defeat for the glory and honor of victory, was not only what an ardent warrior would most ardently have demanded, but it was what Halleck had intimated to Pope it was his intention of doing as soon as the two armies were united. Believing the time had come when his duty was done, and Halleck's was to begin, Pope did not hesitate to say as much to the general-in-chief. And the general-in-chief did not hesitate to scold his subordinate for his sayings; nay, even to intimate that it would be much more pleasing to him if his subordinate would think more of leading his own troops across

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, page 83.

the river to attack the enemy than of marshaling them upon a strategic line to await his arrival. Pope's reply to this curt dispatch is a revelation. He was, he said, not only ready to recross the Rappahannock, but was on the best roads for crossing; he had concentrated his troops in central positions for defense. For four days he "had defended the line of the river, and forty-eight hours were all you wished to assemble the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock." He did not like to act on the defensive, but his orders tied him to Burnside's forces, not yet wholly arrived at Fredericksburg. His duty, as he supposed, was to prevent the enemy from passing the Rappahannock; he had done it, and should do so in the future, though he did not think the enemy was ready yet to cross. He did not know what Halleck's views for the future were, though Halleck seemed to suppose that he did, and he would be glad to know them, so far as his own position and operations were concerned. What, he asked, was to be his own command? Was he to act independently against the enemy? He certainly understood that as soon as the whole of our forces were concentrated the general-in-chief designed to take command in person, and to move forward with him in concert. It was evident from the tone of Halleck's dispatch that he "was dissatisfied with something." What is it? asked Pope. Unless he knew, he could not correct it. He had tried to conform his operations to Halleck's plans, yet he had not received full information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac. He did not complain. He was anxious to do everything to advance Halleck's plans for his campaign. He supposed that his army was to maintain the line of the Rappahannock until all the forces from the Peninsula had united behind that river, and he distinctly understood that he was to hazard

nothing except for this purpose, for delay was all that was wanted. He did not suppose that the scope of his duty embraced even the assignment of the fragmentary commands arriving, for several new regiments had been assigned to his army corps directly from the office of the general-in-chief in Washington. If offensive operations were to be commenced by him, he must know what forces he was to take, and what Halleck wished left, and what connection was to be kept up with Burnside.<sup>1</sup> The meaning of this dispatch was plain. It was manly; doubtless it was true. But these revelations would never have been made had not Halleck manifested an ill-temper that nettled that chief of his subordinates upon whose valor and whose skill he relied, not only to vindicate his course in the removal of McClellan's army from the Peninsula, but to win such successes in the field as to repress reflections upon either the valor or the skill of a general-in-chief who preferred the city of Washington to the dangers of a campaign.

Halleck saw his error, and instantly corrected it. He removed the principal cause of Pope's irritation by denying that it had ever existed. "Not the slightest dissatisfaction," he said, "has been felt in regard to your operations on the Rappahannock." He was discreetly silent upon the beginning of his own campaign, although he admitted that Pope had performed his part, for the troops from the Peninsula *had* arrived, though there had been delay.<sup>2</sup> Halleck's reply was sent to Pope at fifteen minutes before twelve o'clock at noon.

No one willing to do justice to the prominent officers of that Virginia campaign can turn from a careful study of this correspondence without a touch of sympathy for Pope. To divert the attention of Lee while

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 230.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to Pope, *ibid.*, page 231.

McClellan's army was being transferred to the Rappahannock, to hold the line of the Rappahannock while that army was being concentrated on its left bank, provided not more than forty-eight hours were required to concentrate it, was a task from which Pope did not shrink. He calmly reviewed his own capacity, and the review was not discouraging. But now new and larger demands had been made upon his generalship. The meaning of Halleck's dispatches he could not misunderstand. Though in terms the general-in-chief did not refuse to lead his forces against Lee, it was as clear as if expressed in the plainest words that he intended to put that responsibility upon Pope. And it is hard to tell how General Pope could have evaded this responsibility. It mattered not that it was a duty he did not seek, one that he did not solicit; nay, one which his correspondence with Halleck justifies us in saying he would have declined, if laid down as part of his campaign when he marched his small command to the Rapidan. What other course was open to him now? Under the circumstances in which he found himself on that twenty-fifth day of August, General Pope accepted the heavy burden.

In transferring this charge to the shoulders of his subordinate, Halleck cannot escape the consequences. For all the errors committed; for all the precautions omitted; for all the useless and wearisome marches in blind gropings after the enemy where he was not, and failures to find him where he was; for absolute ignorance about the great flank march of Jackson's column to Pope's rear until it was fully achieved; for loss of life and immense losses of property, we look over the incompetency of Pope to the many selfish but all ignoble considerations through which Halleck made Pope possible.

Hardly had Pope's new responsibility opened to him when he manifested a new irritability to his subordinates. He was filled with disquieting apprehensions. Though he had ordered his troops to take up a new line, to drive back the enemy if he crossed the Rapahannock anywhere between Kelly's Ford and Waterloo bridge; though he had informed Halleck that the whole of Lee's army was stretched along that line, with the main body opposite Sulphur Springs,<sup>1</sup> he was perplexed with fears that he had not done what he ought to have done, or that he had been misled by the movements of the enemy. Of all his troops, the corps of Sigel, Banks, and Reno were the only ones that had been posted along the river, and these were now ordered to take new positions. Indeed, all but Sigel had moved, and he too would have withdrawn but for military scruples that, under the circumstances in which he found himself, a withdrawal would be a most improper movement. This conclusion led to a multiplicity of orders and instructions, confusing and irritating to all concerned. Sigel was irritated. He found the bridge at Waterloo, when he arrived there on the 24th, in good order and strongly defended by the enemy. Pope had not only assured him that it had been destroyed by General Buford,<sup>2</sup> but he had reported its destruction on the same day in a dispatch to Halleck, giving details of the force and number of pieces defending it.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 230.

<sup>2</sup> Sigel's Official Report, *ibid.*, pages 80-82.

<sup>3</sup> Pope to Halleck, *ibid.*, pages 228, 229. As an instance of Pope's candor, it may be stated that in his official report he puts it that he *ordered* Buford to destroy Waterloo bridge. As this is all he says of the error then known to him, of his report to Sigel and his dispatch to Halleck, it is presumed he justifies his silence, and would defend his errors by saying that what he reported as facts he considered as facts, and if it turned out that they were not facts it was not of consequence enough to mention it, in an official report.

There was a sharp skirmish at the bridge on the morning of the 25th, which was followed by a breaking up of the enemy's camps and a movement of his troops as if he were massing on the south side of it. The outlook was threatening. While Longstreet was doing his best to draw the attention of the Federals away from Jackson,<sup>1</sup> Sigel believed that Longstreet would force a passage over the river. While such was his situation Sigel received his orders to march to Fayetteville. But how could he withdraw until he was relieved by other troops? He had notified Pope that the Waterloo bridge was standing, and the enemy moving from Jeffersonston down to his side of the bridge. Could he leave the bridge undefended for the enemy's use? Who would relieve Milroy? His troops were deployed along the bank, and his guns were posted on an eminence above. Who would take post at Sulphur Springs? The bridge there was still standing, and behind it were perceived masses of troops. How could Sigel withdraw? This was the question he asked of General Roberts,<sup>2</sup> who came at this time to where Sigel was watching the river, the bridge, and the gray columns of the enemy in his front. General Roberts did not see how Sigel could withdraw; so he gave him a verbal order to hold his position at Waterloo bridge under all circumstances, and to meet the enemy if he should try to force the passage of the river. But Sigel was anxious about his right; Roberts told him that Buford's cavalry would be on his right. He was anxious about his left, and Roberts told him that Banks would be on his left.<sup>3</sup> Thus was Sigel reassured, and thus was he relieved from the more formal order to march to Fayetteville and form the centre of the new line.

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Generals Longstreet and D. R. Jones.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's chief of staff.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report of General Sigel, Pope's Virginia Campaign.

But hardly had Roberts turned away from Sigel when the front looked more threatening than before. Now Jackson's movement was revealed. A large body of the enemy's cavalry had crossed the Rappahannock on Sigel's right, and were moving towards Orleans, and another large body had crossed on his left, and had taken possession of Sulphur Springs. By noon twenty-eight regiments of infantry, six batteries, and several regiments of cavalry of the Confederate army had taken positions near the bridge on the right bank of the river. Sigel reported this to Pope. The cannonading continued. The situation became more alarming. Sigel feared that the enemy was about to make with his whole force an attack upon his position. He sent to the left to find Generals Banks and Reno, but they with their commands were some distance on their way to Bealton. He sent to the right to find the cavalry brigade of General Buford, and found it in camp four miles behind him on the Warrenton road.<sup>1</sup> It was now forty minutes past one in the afternoon. Five companies of Sigel's cavalry had been sent to his right, and all the rest of his cavalry brigade, with four mountain howitzers, under command of Colonel Beardsley, were sent to his left to drive the enemy out of Sulphur Springs;<sup>2</sup> when Colonel Beardsley approached the springs he sent back a report that the village was occupied by the enemy's infantry and cavalry. These were not all the alarming reports that Sigel heard, nor were they the most alarming of all the demonstrations that Sigel saw. Since daylight the steady sweep of Jackson's corps, regiment, brigade, and division, had pressed on Amissville in a direction which seemed to Sigel to indicate an intention to turn

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General McDowell, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 36-38, Official Report of General Sigel, *ibid.*, pages 80-82.

<sup>2</sup> Sigel's Report.

his right. From a hill a mile back from the bridge at Waterloo officers and men of one of Sigel's cavalry regiments watched the line of Jackson's troops from daylight until noon.<sup>1</sup> A break in the woods and the trace of the column in a dark cloud of rising dust where the woods shut out the troops left no doubt that a very large body of Lee's army was moving in a direction which would bring it, when opposite Sigel's position, less than two miles from Waterloo bridge. To add to this alarm, if the Confederate troops should ford the Rappahannock, their course, as far as Sigel's cavalry could follow it, would bring them nearer still. Nor was this movement apparent to Sigel's corps only. Wherever from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo bridge there was a hill-top, the march was seen. It was witnessed by thousands of officers and men in Banks's corps and in Reno's divisions. Every one who saw it speculated upon its meaning, yet none of these speculations revealed the truth.

In different ways and as indicating different purposes this absorbing and rapid march was conveyed to Pope. To Banks, at twenty-five minutes past eleven o'clock in the morning, it presaged a movement of the enemy upon the Shenandoah Valley, via Front Royal, with designs upon the Potomac possibly above.<sup>2</sup> To Sigel, as we have said, it indicated an attack upon his position, while to Pope himself, upon a calm review of all the reports of the day, as dispatched to McDowell, as late as half past nine at night, it was clear that the whole force of the enemy had marched for the Shenandoah Valley via Front Royal and Luray.<sup>3</sup> Sigel was justified in his uneasiness, and therefore he properly reported to

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Colonel Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 135, 136.

<sup>2</sup> Banks to Pope, *ibid.*, page 231.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pages 367, 368.



Pope that the main force of the enemy was advancing upon Waterloo bridge.<sup>1</sup> This report was sent at forty minutes past one in the afternoon; but it brought no reply from Pope, and no relief from any one. Indeed, it seemed as if confusion reigned at the council board. For now a dispatch came from McDowell to Sigel, part of which was for himself, and part for General Banks, in which McDowell asked for news from Banks's corps and directed Sigel to join his pontoon train at Fayetteville.<sup>2</sup> This paper was forwarded to Banks with a request from Sigel that he would furnish what information he could. And this was answered later in the day by Banks with advice to march to Fayetteville.<sup>3</sup> Then Sigel sent to Pope and McDowell at Warrenton village for an explanation and for orders, but Pope had gone to Warrenton Junction, and McDowell made no reply.<sup>4</sup> It was now nearly sunset. Sigel regarded his situation as more critical than ever. He was threatened on his right flank, and on his left. On his front he was menaced by an army which he estimated as high as thirty thousand men. The shallow river before him could be forded by infantry at many points. There was no support within four or five miles; he could not believe that Pope meant to leave him in this position, and he determined to withdraw to Fayetteville at night-fall.<sup>5</sup> But hardly had he made his preparations, when, as his troops were about moving, one of Sigel's officers returned with an order from Pope directing him to march to Warrenton and encamp there.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sigel to Pope, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 228.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, Sigel, *ibid.*, pages 80-82.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Though he did not believe in the policy of such a plan. (*Ibid.*) But it was a movement formerly ordered by Pope, it will be remembered, in the morning, repeated by McDowell, and advised by Banks in the afternoon.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

In the mean time the Ninth New York and the Sixth Ohio Cavalry with the four mountain howitzers, under command of Colonel Beardsley, — in carrying out the movements that had been ordered upon the 25th, — marched upon Sulphur Springs.

From the hills on either bank of the Rappahannock might have been seen on this day at their feet the quadrangle of buildings that inclose the spacious grounds known as the Warrenton Sulphur Springs of Virginia. Cottages shaded by superb trees, affording all the privacy of homes, confronted on one side a large building whose numerous apartments and extensive halls were well adapted to the publicity of a hotel, and, on another, halls, offices, and kitchens, suited to the various needs of this popular resort. Within the area arose a fountain of pure water, which fell in a refreshing spray into a reservoir built in imitation of a Grecian temple, and surmounted by a statue typical of health.

It was from here that General Early had recrossed to the Confederate side over the bridge that Jackson had prepared; and it was for the purpose of again using this bridge that it was allowed to remain for the Confederate skirmishers who had come over to meet Beardsley and were established under cover in the houses and fields adjoining.

As Colonel Beardsley approached, he opened with his howitzers in a vigorous fire. The enemy fled (for his numbers were small), escaping to the other side of the river, some on the timbers of the then burning bridge, and some wading through the water. This gave Longstreet's gunners on the right bank an opportunity, which they used with effect, in the destruction of the buildings around. In a few moments the hotel was in flames, — whether from our fire or that of the enemy, Colonel Beardsley was in doubt.

But whence it came mattered not. Nowhere in Virginia could a more righteous judgment have fallen, for nowhere were more treasonable conferences held, or more damnable conspiracies entered into for the overthrow of the government itself, than among the men conspicuous in Southern annals, who passed at this celebrated resort, yearly, seasons of rest and recreation, in the most gracious, the most refined, and the most courtly society of the South. The influences that were here subtly gained were from here as subtly diffused. From the Mississippi to the Atlantic, from Florida to the Ohio, the possibility of war with the North came to be entertained by thousands of men and women who, but for the artful conspirators of these summer resorts, would have rejected the thought with horror. The flame thus ignited was fanned into active life until the possible changed rapidly into the probable and then passed into the desirable. So craftily had the Lees and the Hamptons, the Butlers, the Hugers, the Calhouns, and the Randolphs drawn a great people into a great conspiracy, that the cry of civil war, which so startled the North in 1860, found our Southern brethren anxious and eager for the contest. That walls reeking with treason should be destroyed in the hostilities that traitors had caused seemed just to those who saw the cluster of buildings at the Warrenton Sulphur Springs fall away into unsightly heaps of ashes, leaving in the ruins, of all the joys and all the splendors of the past, only a broken tumbler,<sup>1</sup> on the tiled floor at the fountain.

When Beardsley turned from the springs, Sigel prepared to march for Warrenton as ordered by Pope.

At about seven o'clock in the evening he cautiously withdrew his troops. General Milroy, amidst much ar-

<sup>1</sup> Seen by one of General Doubleday's staff officers, who groped into the inclosure after the fight. (*Bivouac and Battlefield*, pages 108, 112.)

tillery and infantry firing, had finally succeeded in igniting the Waterloo bridge, whose timbers of heavy oak burned slowly until long after dark, when it was entirely consumed. Then General Sigel turned from the river and pursued his night march for Warrenton. A guard of infantry under Milroy, at nine o'clock, and the cavalry commanded by Colonel Beardsley, between ten and twelve, brought up the rear.<sup>1</sup>

When McDowell received Pope's order for the disposition of the third corps in the new defensive line from Kelly's Ford to the base of the Bull Run or Piedmont range at Warrenton, he ordered its *immediate* execution.<sup>2</sup> Reynolds's division moved on the road to Sulphur Springs, with Meade's brigade in advance, to within four miles of the springs. Ricketts's division was established on the Waterloo road, with Tower's brigade pushed forward to about four miles from the bridge;<sup>3</sup> and King's division remained near the town of Warrenton, in the forks of the Sulphur Springs and Waterloo roads. Buford's cavalry was posted between Waterloo bridge and the advance of Tower's brigade, and Bayard's was ordered to take post between the advance of Meade's brigade and the Sulphur Springs at the river.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Milroy, Colonels Beardsley and Knox, Lieutenants Haskins and Westchky, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 94, 109, 132, 134, 138.

<sup>2</sup> McDowell does not give the hour of his order. Pope issued the order at Warrenton, where McDowell was stationed, and Sigel received it at Waterloo between sunrise and noon. Banks and Reno obeyed it, leaving for Bealton Station before noon. (Sigel's Official Report, *ibid.*, pages 80-82.)

<sup>3</sup> Report of General Ricketts, commanding division, *ibid.*, page 169.

<sup>4</sup> Pope, in his volume of Official Reports of this campaign, criticises in foot-notes such parts of the reports of his subordinates as seem to reflect upon him. Sigel officially reports that, soon after his interview with Roberts, chief of Pope's staff, in the forenoon of the 25th, "I sent to the right to look after General McDowell's troops, especially the cavalry brigade, and

Thus the day of the 25th had drawn to a close. General Pope was at Warrenton Junction. As he brooded over the events of the past twelve hours, he was dissatisfied. In his dispatches to Halleck, to McDowell, and to Sigel; in his bluster before his staff, and all or any of the subordinates of his command at his headquarters, he had expressed a conviction which he was far from feeling. Sigel's dispatches had disturbed him. What if they bore the true construction of the purposes of the enemy; if all these marching columns that had been seen and reported were moving to turn the Federal left at Waterloo, while the masses of Confederates still before him were to coöperate on Sigel's front? What if the whole army of General Lee were not in motion for the Shenandoah Valley? How, then, his plans and his dispositions would be justified, presented a most distressing problem to Pope. He had already departed from his formal order of the morning, sending Sigel's corps to Fayetteville, by a new order, which that officer received at night-fall,<sup>1</sup> to march to Warrenton and to encamp there; and the consciousness that he had ordered this command to withdraw from this important position, while the reports of its commander of the critical situation of affairs were ringing in his ears, did not add to his composure. He would bear this suspense no longer. He

was astonished to learn that no troops could be found on my right except the cavalry brigade of General Buford, which was encamped four miles behind us on the Warrenton road." (Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 80-82.) That this was so at this time is indisputable (see note as to when McDowell placed Buford's cavalry where Sigel found it), yet Pope has the effrontery to deny, in a foot-note, this official statement of Sigel; he says, referring to the same time, "General Buford's whole cavalry force was on Sigel's right, picketing the river for several miles above."

<sup>1</sup> Sigel's Official Report, Milroy's Report, and Lieutenant Haskins, commanding Battery K, First Ohio Artillery, with first corps, *ibid.*, page 109.

would cross the river at Waterloo bridge, and by an armed reconnoissance put an end to further surmise. At thirty minutes past nine o'clock at night, he issued his orders from his headquarters at Warrenton Junction, to Generals McDowell and Sigel. To General McDowell he said he believed that the whole force of the enemy had marched for the Shenandoah Valley by the way of Front Royal and Luray; that the column which had marched to-day to Gaines' Cross Roads had turned north, and when last seen was passing under the east base of Buck Mountain, towards Salem and Rectortown; and that he desired him, as early as possible in the morning, holding Reynolds in reserve at Warrenton or vicinity, to make a reconnoissance with his whole corps, and ascertain what was beyond the river at Sulphur Springs. There was no force of the enemy, he said, between Warrenton Junction and Culpepper, or at Culpepper. He sent inclosed a dispatch for Sigel, which he wished McDowell to forward to him. This communication was received by McDowell at twelve o'clock at night. Sigel's corps had at that time been on the march from Waterloo to Warrenton since seven o'clock in the evening. The distance is about seven and one half miles. The dispatch to Sigel was dated at the same hour as the one written to McDowell. It directed Sigel to force the passage of the river at Waterloo bridge "to-morrow morning at daylight," to see what was in front of him. Pope did not believe, he said, that there was any enemy in force there, but he did believe that the whole Confederate army had marched to the west and north-west. He was not satisfied — such were the words — "with your reports or your operations of to-day," and he expected to hear to-morrow, early, something much more satisfactory concerning the enemy. He then

directed Sigel to bring up his provision trains, but he wished him to consider it a positive order and to obey it literally, that no regimental or baggage trains were to be brought up. Sigel was also directed to communicate with Pope by telegraph from Warrenton.<sup>1</sup> This dispatch was sent to Sigel by one of General McDowell's aids. It was delivered at two o'clock in the morning of the 26th; delivered whilst General Sigel was obeying his order to march to Warrenton. It found him on the road, at the rear of his command, about entering the town. And here arose a controversy which reflects little credit upon Pope or McDowell, for the latter charged, and the former indorsed it, that Sigel, in moving to Warrenton, was not obeying orders received, but was running away, without orders, from the enemy.

General McDowell might have found it incredible that a corps ordered to cross the Rappahannock River at daylight of the 26th could be found at a little after two o'clock in the morning of that day, marching to the rear through the town of Warrenton, seven and one half miles distant from that river; unless, indeed, he could believe that the troops of that corps would be ordered to march at sunset of the 25th to Warrenton<sup>2</sup> and back again, a distance of fifteen miles, to the point they started from the night before. General McDowell might have been inspired with such confidence in the wise decisions and inflexible purposes of General Pope, as to believe that his plans could not be subject to such vacillation; and he might, evidence to the contrary being wanting, have indulged in such ungenerous reflections as to affirm, as he did, that Sigel's back was turned from the Rappahannock without or-

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Sigel, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 281.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, page 107.

ders from Pope. In his official report of the events of this day, General McDowell refers to the delivery of Pope's dispatch to Sigel as occurring "whilst the general was on the retreat in the night from Waterloo to Warrenton, through which his troops were moving all night long." That McDowell fully intended to convey the meaning that General Sigel was moving backward to shelter is no more to be denied than that he intended to convey a meaning that such a movement was made by Sigel without orders from any one. McDowell does not write thus in words, but the context is such, and the words used are so significant, as to leave no other meaning probable. A single word in McDowell's report would have made the truth plain, but that word McDowell did not vouchsafe. And yet when he used this severe language, he knew that Sigel's movement was ordered by Pope. For at forty-five minutes past one, on the morning of the 26th, McDowell sent to Pope a dispatch that Sigel, under "previous orders" so to do, was moving through the town of Warrenton, and that his aid was in search of Sigel to give him the order to cross the river at Waterloo, at daylight.<sup>1</sup> About four hours later McDowell again reported to Pope that the order for the reconnaissance was given Sigel "while he was on the march" from Waterloo to Warrenton. Why, then, when the substance of these events was woven into the form of an official report, did General McDowell describe General Sigel's movement to Warrenton in opprobrious terms? The inquiring student will find that the battles of this campaign under Pope did not cease with his flight to Alexandria; but that they were renewed and continued in official reports, in charges and in counter-charges, in courts-martial and in courts of inquiry, in accusations and in defama-

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 195, 196.



tions, till the war of papers, though less bloody than that of bullets, was more vigorously conducted. When McDowell wrote his report, Sigel's official narrative of his own doings under Pope was before him. This paper related what had been done to Sigel, and what he had done to others, without exaggeration or important misstatement. It was doubtful to McDowell whether Sigel had not tried to make it appear that himself, not Pope, was responsible for all the confusing and contradictory orders issued to him on the 25th. And this doubt angered McDowell. So he marred his own official account of his own movements on the day of the 26th, by a disingenuous attack upon Sigel's report of his movements on the day of the 25th.

Sigel did not reflect upon McDowell. It was an unworthy suspicion. Pope is held responsible in Sigel's official report for all the blunders there reported. Nowhere does General Sigel intimate that McDowell was responsible for his retrograde movement to Warrenton: he made it, he expressly avers, because Pope ordered it; and yet McDowell asserts that the responsibility for this movement was charged upon him.

Nowhere does Sigel aver that McDowell was ordered to relieve Milroy's brigade at Waterloo bridge: he says in his report that Milroy's brigade ought to have been relieved by a brigade from McDowell's corps; and yet McDowell asserts that Sigel charged him with this responsibility.

General Sigel does, however, affirm that when he moved away from Waterloo bridge he had no supports within eight or ten miles of him, and McDowell proves that he had supports within four or five miles; and McDowell is thus far sustained. Sigel does assert that part of the confusion of his situation at Waterloo bridge arose from the fragmentary order to himself and Banks

from McDowell, in which he was ordered to join his pontoon train at Fayetteville, and McDowell avers that Pope's chief-of-staff sent such an order by telegraph from Warrenton Junction to Warrenton, and that it was sent from Warrenton, "he thinks probable," bearing evidence of emanating from his own headquarters; but he declares that he knows nothing about it, and therein Sigel's statement is confirmed. To cast censure upon the author of an imaginary attack upon himself, McDowell reported that Sigel had retreated to Warrenton; and thus he had his revenge. And when Pope, too, wrote his report he had the benefit of Sigel's narrative of his operations. But unlike the case of McDowell, Sigel did severely reflect upon Pope, for he said that there was evidence of confusion in the contradictory orders he had received from Pope on the 25th. This filled Pope with wrath. He retorted in a footnote to Sigel's accusation, that the confusion existed in Sigel's own mind alone.<sup>1</sup> Nor was this the whole of his revenge. With McDowell's official report before him, he took careful note of all of McDowell's accusations against Sigel, and published them as notations upon Sigel's report in the official record of his own campaigns. Pope thus became responsible for errors, when he knew them to be such. And yet he allowed McDowell's charge that Sigel was retreating, and his inference that he was retreating without orders, to pass unnoticed. Pope could not defend Sigel without exposing himself. Thus far, therefore, he suppressed the truth.

While these unhappy events were passing among the Federals on the left bank of the Rappahannock, Jackson's corps, led by Jackson himself, moved with rapid pace to throw itself between the Federal capital and

<sup>1</sup> Pope's report of his Virginia campaign.

the Federal army defending it. As we have said, General Lee hoped to make this movement before the arrival of the Army of the Potomac at Manassas Junction or its vicinity. If there was to be found no army well organized between Bull Run and Washington to oppose Jackson in front, we are justified in saying that Lee felt little apprehension from any efforts Pope might make in Jackson's rear, for he was ready to follow his left wing and to reunite his army, despite any effort the Federal commander could make to resist it; and when united, Lee was ready and willing to give battle to the combined armies of the Potomac and of Virginia. So far as Jackson's success in tearing up the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, in burning its bridges in Pope's rear, and in the capture of all the material of war and supplies for Pope's army, gathered at Manassas, depended upon a line of march carefully prescribed in both time and course, no precaution was omitted. But for his subsequent movements it is probable that with the single imperative condition that he should hold on if he could, or move if he must, where the two wings of Lee's army could unite in the quickest time possible, the plans were left largely to be determined by Jackson when the time came for a determination. It was a large discretion, but Jackson's courage, perseverance, and sagacity justified it. At dawn of the 25th Jackson's corps was in motion. His soldiers were in the lightest of marching order. They carried only their arms, their cartridge boxes, and their haversacks. Many of them, however, were not even encumbered with rations. The roads were freed from all obstructions by baggage trains. Only ambulances and ammunition wagons accompanied the column. The course of the march led first to Amissville, thence northeasterly across Hedgeman's River, then northerly to Salem, — a

small town on the Manassas Gap railroad. Where the roads diverged from the shortest practicable line they were not followed. General Jackson's chief engineer, with a small body of cavalry, preceded the leading division, and stationed guides at every gap in wall or fence, or at every farm gate where the distance could be shortened by abandoning the highway. Every precaution was taken to conceal the march from Pope. All unnecessary noise was suppressed. Every road leading in the direction of the Federal army was watched by the Confederate cavalry. The troops moved as men will move when they are impelled by enthusiasm. Their eyes sparkled, their expression was ardent, and their step elastic. They seemed to have been lifted out of the obscurity of their lives into a higher plane of glorious achievements. The march too was absorbing. On their left stretched the ranges of the Blue Ridge, and on their right the Bull Run or Piedmont Range towered above the valley, through which the streams unite that flow together as the Rappahannock to the sea. The music of waters brawling by rocky shores, the distant ridges bathed in the rich color of the rising or the setting sun, the rugged paths up which the artillery toiled, the little hamlet where white cottages peeped through the greenest shade, tempted neither the eye nor the ear of those whose absorbing march called forth exclamations of wonder as it flashed upon us from the hills around Waterloo.

Near the end of the day's march General Jackson rode to the head of his column. There, on a great stone, he stood, gazing as his soldiers passed. It was sunset. His face was darkened by exposure; his uniform was soiled and dingy. But his figure was rigid, and his expression, though stern, was radiant with hope. Before him passed in review his faithful men and their

devoted leaders. Ewell's division was foremost. What the half of a lifetime passed as an officer in the regular army of the United States could add to intrepid valor, to a high sense of honor that feared death less than reproach, were exhibited in his professional capacity, and in his social relations, by General Ewell. His life in the Union army began some years before Jackson's, and continued longer; but such genius as Jackson's to permeate that life was wanting. The campaigns of the Shenandoah Valley, the battles around Richmond and at Cedar Mountain, Ewell shared. But in them all Jackson was the master. When the next division passed, a deeper flush overspread the face and a deeper feeling of pride swelled in the soul of Jackson. Here were the men whom he had so often hurled against the enemy to snatch victory from the very jaws of defeat, the men whose sturdy courage had marked them in 1861 as standing like a wall before the fiery assaults of the same enemy that they were now marching again to meet in the same cause, and, by a singular coincidence, upon the same field. "Stonewall" Jackson the Confederates bestowed as his baptismal name upon the chief who now gazed upon his veterans with a pride greater even than when he bade them stand amidst the fiery torrent on the field of Manassas, and they obeyed him. They were as motionless as a wall. And now some of these men of the old Stonewall brigade were before him. Jackson could not repress their enthusiasm. In vain he sent to them to be silent; in vain urged them not to make known their presence to the enemy by their cheers. Such considerations had been urged to the first troops passing, and they had repressed their desires, giving token of their expressions of confidence and admiration for their commander, by silently swinging their caps in air. But the men of the

old brigade, now grown into a division, could not repress their shouts. They cheered tumultuously. "It is of no use," said Jackson, "you see," turning to one of his staff, "I can't stop them." Then he added, "Who could not conquer with such men as these."

No one can read the closing scenes of the battle of Waterloo without emotion. The dark hour when Napoleon Bonaparte struggled with his destiny seems at times to be the history of an hour filled with the acts of gods, not men. All lost for France save one more throw; and that Napoleon now will hazard. Upon the solid squares of British infantry the Old Guard shall be hurled. They came, and as they passed they saw, clear cut and bold, as if the solid rock had taken form, the figure of Bonaparte. With arm outstretched, he pointed to the English squares; his lips were closed; but clearer than if the words were spoken, they saw he meant, Your pathway: it lies there. In that devotion which men yield to monarchs of the battle-field, in that glow of pride which men share with the great chieftain whose powers have created chances and directed results, the soldier subjects under Napoleon Bonaparte were closely allied in enthusiasm, in worship, and in admiration, with the soldier citizens under Stonewall Jackson.

The light division, as it was called, of Jackson's column, was commanded by General A. P. Hill. In a brief time this officer had won the approbation of General Lee. Though he was of Jackson's class at the United States Military Academy, no memorable companionship had existed between himself and Cadet Jackson. The commanding position Hill now held was due more to his own merit than another's patronage. That he gained the confidence of General Jackson was manifest, for he retained the same or a larger command under this distinguished man during the remain-

der of Jackson's life. Nor at the hour of his death was Hill forgotten, for when at last on his dying bed, from his fatal wounds at Chancellorsville,<sup>1</sup> Jackson's mind wandered through past conflicts, he uttered in feeble though commanding tones, "Tell A. P. Hill to prepare for action." But we would not anticipate the hour when light from another world streamed in upon the great soldier as his hold loosened on this, and he whispered under the smile of the heavenly vision, "Let us cross over the stream and rest."

It remains now to say that the march of which we are writing continued. The sun sank down, the stars appeared, the night sped on till nearly twelve, when Jackson's advance had approached within one mile of Salem,<sup>2</sup> where, as his weary column sank down to rest, McDowell received the message that Pope believed the enemy was marching for the Shenandoah Valley, by way of Front Royal and Luray. Before dawn of the 26th, Pope claims to have made up his mind to revoke his order of the 25th, and establish his army between Warrenton and Gainesville.<sup>3</sup> He would no longer attempt to cover the lower fords of the river, or keep up his communication with Fredericksburg. He would place his troops where he could either pursue or meet the enemy, as future movements of the enemy might make a pursuit or an attack a necessity. But this purpose, or intention, or feeling, remained in Pope's mind in a shadowy state. It took no form even of resolu-

<sup>1</sup> In 1863.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, McGowan, Early, W. B. Taliaferro, Colonel Stafford, Captain J. K. Boswell, chief engineer General Jackson's corps; Colonel Munford, of Robertson's brigade of cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, artillery battalion; *Life of Jackson*, by Cooke, pages 274-276; *Life of Lieutenant-General Jackson*, by R. L. Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 265, 266; *Life of General R. E. Lee*, by J. E. Cooke, page 116.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report.

tion; it resulted in no plan of action. The future should be what the future might reveal. Pope's official report of his mental condition and his resolutions claims more; but the facts to be revealed of the incidents of the 26th and 27th of August utterly confound his official report.<sup>1</sup>

Before sunset, Hooker's division from the Army of the Potomac, packed in cattle-cars, inside and out, on steps and platforms, was moving along the Orange and Alexandria Railway to reënforce Pope.<sup>2</sup> The second corps, under Banks, had turned from the river, leaving behind it the sound of the cannon at Sulphur Springs and at Waterloo, and the flames of the burning hotel, to bivouac at night near Warrenton, on its way to Bealton Station.

<sup>1</sup> Pope seems, in his official report of his operations of those days, to have taken advantage of his order to Sigel, received at night of the 25th, "to go to Warrenton and encamp there," to declare that he ordered Sigel and McDowell to Warrenton (the new line he intended to take up). But at 9.30 p. m. he ordered Sigel to make a reconnaissance across the river at Waterloo. If he had not forgotten the previous order, why did he not mention the substituted order? Why did he allow his own revision of McDowell's report to go forth with the charge that Sigel had retreated from the river? Pope must have known that Sigel was on his march to Warrenton as ordered. Did Pope expect Sigel to return and be at Waterloo bridge at daylight? Or did he take advantage of his own blunder to prove his own sagacity?

<sup>2</sup> *Three Years in the Army*, by Captain Blake, Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteers.



## CHAPTER VI.

### POPE GROPING AFTER THE ENEMY.

UNSATISFACTORY as had been the results of the 25th, those of the 26th of August were more unsatisfactory still. Everything went wrong. That daylight would reveal the force of the enemy at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, and the purposes of the column that had marched north from Amissville, was confidently expected. But the events of the night confounded the expectations of the morrow. Some consolation indeed Pope derived through a dispatch from McDowell, who had, from the top of a high mountain, on the afternoon of the 25th, seen no other indications of the enemy than the smoke of their camp-fires extending from Sulphur Springs back beyond Jefferson, and from the same point, up the river, beyond Waterloo.<sup>1</sup> But subsequent reports from Banks and Sigel left the vexed question more perplexing than ever. Banks, who had been at Waterloo bridge late in the afternoon of the 25th, declared that there had been no enemy there during the whole of that day, while Sigel insisted that the enemy was still there in force.<sup>2</sup> Among many uncertainties one thing was certain. The enemy had been at the front; and one of his columns had moved on the 25th towards Salem. McDowell was implored to ascertain what had become of the former, and where the latter

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, 1.25 A. M., 26th.

<sup>2</sup> Pope to McDowell, 5 A. M., 26th.

had gone. "Please use every means possible to ascertain at once," wrote Pope.<sup>1</sup> In the mean time Sigel had telegraphed to Warrenton Junction that it would be impossible for his corps to force the passage of the Rappahannock at Waterloo by daylight. His men were too much fatigued to return there. They would require one day's rest.<sup>2</sup> Pope ordered him to halt near Warrenton and put his corps in camp for a day. This was the first break in the proposed reconnoissance. Soon there came a second. General Reno had been ordered to coöperate with McDowell and Sigel. He was to cross the Rappahannock at daylight at Rappahannock Station; but he had reported with his command at Warrenton Junction; and then it was too late for the movement.<sup>3</sup> From Sigel now Pope expected nothing,<sup>4</sup> and even Reno had disappointed him. In this dilemma Pope turned to McDowell. He invested him with almost supreme authority. Here it seemed at this juncture was his only hope. He had ordered him to cross the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs, but as to that he might use his own discretion, though he thought it important to watch the movements of the enemy "towards our right."

Not only was McDowell empowered to assume command of Sigel's corps if he thought necessary, but the whole defense of the front was intrusted to him. He was authorized to "use everybody" he "found there." His command therefore would have included almost the whole of Pope's army. It would have embraced Reno, who had now been ordered to Fayetteville. It included Banks, who was at, or on his way to, Bealton. To both

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell, 5 A. M., 26th.

<sup>2</sup> General Milroy did not arrive at Warrenton until daylight of the 26th.  
See Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 94.

<sup>3</sup> Pope to McDowell, 8.10 A. M., 26th.

<sup>4</sup> Pope to McDowell, 5 A. M., 26th.

of these commanders McDowell was directed to give notice of his authority.<sup>1</sup> Fortified with this support, General McDowell determined to force a passage across the river. He set instantly about his work. His plans were wise and his conduct was energetic. In view of this movement he had concentrated, as rapidly as possible, his whole command on the road to Sulphur Springs. At this ford the ground opposite was low and flat, and extended for half a mile to an amphitheatre of hills, crested with the enemy's batteries. Trees covered the hills, and concealed the enemy. To save his troops from this murderous exposure, General McDowell determined to make only a feint at this place. His actual passage should be below, at Fant's Ford or Fox's Mills. He relieved Pope's apprehensions by a plan of the course he contemplated, and he quieted his fears by assuring him that his corps was already on the march to Sulphur Springs, that he should start himself in a few minutes, and when he got there he would endeavor to ascertain what he wished.<sup>2</sup>

King's division was put in motion towards Sulphur Springs. The distance from where the head of McDowell's column rested was about seven miles. The march began at day-break. The morning was bright, the air was clear, and the troops, refreshed by a sound sleep, manifested eagerness at the possible approach of a fight. This, at least, may be said of those who had never experienced the realities of a battle. It may well be doubted if the survivors of well-fought fields await the opening tragedies of a contest with emotions of unfeigned pleasure. To the veteran there is a seriousness in the work which braces his nerves, controls his emotions, and hardens a resolute spirit. He may not give

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell, 8.10 A. M., 26th.

<sup>2</sup> McDowell's reply to Pope's dispatch of 5 A. M., August 26th.

way in a panic, but if forced to yield will turn again and again with a dogged spirit which has often wrested victory from the very jaws of defeat. There was this marked contrast on this morning in King's division between those who had seen their baptism of war, and those who for the first time were approaching the altar. The division marched freely; it was unobstructed with regimental wagons. Only ambulances and an extra supply of ammunition accompanied the column. As the troops approached the river they were greeted with the boom of cannon, and they saw the smoke of shells forming graceful rings in the air. Near our batteries the brigades were turned off to the right and left of the highway, to make their way over open ground to where slightly rolling surfaces afforded cover. There the troops, with arms in hands, awaited further developments. In the mean time the batteries of King's division kept up a rapid fire upon those of the enemy. The combat was much less severe than that in which this command had engaged at Rappahannock Station. So far as McDowell could discover there were not more than two four-gun batteries delivering fire from the enemy's side. The Federal gunners fired with precision, depressing or raising their pieces at a signal from an experienced officer who, by the aid of his glass from an exposed position, directed their aim. Many times the enemy sought new positions, and many times the Federal gunners planted their shots plump among the enemy's guns. But the Confederates were not backward in returning our compliments, although their aim was poor and their fire harmless. The contest was not alone confined to the artillerists of the contending armies. Soon after King's arrival near the river, a detachment of men numbering less than two hundred were sent into the woods that lined the bank, to skirmish

with the enemy's infantry on the other side. With a keen eye for human game, each marksman, from his cover, carefully scanned every movement in his front. It was a sport in which the penalty of careless exposure was almost certain death. Sometimes the crack of musket sounds was heard only at long intervals, and then it broke out into a roar, or seemed to die away again into silence. The firing from the artillery lasted during the greater part of the day. It was the same, and delivered for the same purpose, as that which had accompanied us from Kelly's Ford northward on our march. It indicated nothing more. There was, however, something unusual that arrested McDowell's attention. The country from Sulphur Springs up to and beyond Waterloo was covered with the dust of large moving masses. If there were any cavalry that could perform any service, General McDowell expressed his determination to send them to Waterloo, which, since Sigel retired, had been watched by only a feeble force of Federal horsemen. The qualifications for this service were by no means superfluous. The severe labors put upon the horses by Pope were apparent. And now, when a most important duty was demanded, both Generals Bayard and Buford reported that their horses were broken down. Indeed, General Buford reported that his command was disorganized, and Bayard declared that his would neither charge nor stand a charge. Notwithstanding such unfavorable reports they were, however, forced into condition for important service, which will soon be revealed.

The more effectually to carry out his instructions of finding the enemy, McDowell now resolved to assume command of Sigel's corps. He informed its commander in Warrenton of his purpose, gave his authority for so doing, and ordered a report of its position and of its

strength to be sent to him. Then came his personal attention for forage and rations, and finally a new disposition of his troops. General Reynolds was ordered to the Waterloo road, and General Ricketts's division was held in reserve.<sup>1</sup> Banks was at Bealton Station, where he could be reached if needed. In the mean time the artillery duel continued; but as it did not appear that anything was to be gained by replying to the enemy's fire, King was directed to avoid a useless cannonading, and finally was withdrawn out of range. Sigel's corps was searched for cavalry. If there were any fit for duty they were to report to General Buford. In the morning, Pope had recommended General Milroy to McDowell as a "courageous man" to be used in exploring for the enemy, and McDowell had searched for, but could not find him. Now, from another and an unlooked for source, information was received which McDowell used to discover the numbers and purposes of the enemy. A flag of truce was sent to King by General Anderson of Lee's army, to return a woman who was captured while dressed in the uniform of a Federal soldier. To McDowell the presence of Anderson was significant. It indicated that another division from Richmond had joined Lee. McDowell knew that Anderson commanded Huger's old division; and he also knew that that division was at Louisa Court House, while Longstreet was at Racoon Ford. He inferred, therefore, that the enemy's extreme right was before him at Sulphur Springs, and that in numbers there was at least a division. Though these conclusions were mere inferences, and it might be that they were not justified, because other divisions might have left Richmond since the last information had been

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope at Warrenton Junction, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 197. See Reynolds, *ibid.*, page 67.

received, yet McDowell very properly gave his conclusions to Pope.<sup>1</sup>

By the early afternoon McDowell had organized a force of cavalry and artillery, with which, on the next day a vigorous effort was to be made to discover the whereabouts of *that* missing column of the enemy. To all the horses of Buford's and Bayard's command, that could be made to stand on their legs, were added all that were in a similar or better condition from Sigel's. The artillery was taken from Sigel's corps. Buford, who was placed in command, was ordered to be ready to march at dawn on the 27th, with cooked rations for three days. In this emergency Pope called entreatingly upon McDowell for a regiment of cavalry. Although, as he declared, he had not a mounted man with him, he was particular to exempt Sigel from the draft. He called for something from Buford or Bayard.

Long before dawn of the 27th the Federal camp was filled with rumors. That this march of battalions, trains, and batteries continued, from Rappahannock Station to Waterloo, was agreed to by those who differed in their opinions as to the force of the enemy at Waterloo or Sulphur Springs. To meet whatever this movement betokened, McDowell from Warrenton advised Pope to march Hooker and Kearny, commanding divisions in Heintzelman's corps, not in the direction of Rappahannock Station, but in that of Warrenton rather, where Sigel's corps then was. Indeed, so urgent did McDowell think it, that he pressed Pope to order them to march that afternoon in the direction of Sulphur Springs or Waterloo bridge. At this hour (the middle of the afternoon of the 26th of August), from all that McDowell had seen, and from all that he

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, reply to Pope's dispatch of 8.10, 26th. See McDowell's Official Report.

had heard, he felt prepared to report to Pope, and he did report to him, "that as things now stand," whether we attack or are attacked, the contest must come off rather above than below Sulphur Springs.<sup>1</sup> Of Jackson's march on the 25th, and of the approach of his columns, at the hour of McDowell's dispatch on the 26th, to within less than four hours of the rear of McDowell's command on the line of Federal communications with Washington, McDowell had no more conception than Pope. In forecasting the anticipated movements of Lee's army, Jackson's march was not dissevered, in McDowell's mind, in time, purpose, and place, from Longstreet's march; and in his speculations as to the movements and purposes of the troops then moving to his right, McDowell made no preparation to meet or to make any attack from or upon any separate column or any detached army. He expected to meet, at first and at last, the whole of Lee's army united, and he expected to have ample time to make his preparations. And so did Pope, whatever to the contrary he may have officially declared. Therefore McDowell, at the time of which we are writing, reported to Pope that he was in doubt as to the enemy's purposes. He had thought the enemy meant to march around our right through Rectortown to Washington, while others thought he was going down the Shenandoah through Chester or Thornton's Gap; but he believed this would be too hazardous. Again, some thought the enemy was only drawing his supplies from the valley, and changing his front to the east from the north; while others there were who thought that, while a portion of Lee's force had marched up the right bank of the Rapahannock, a large portion had gone through Culpepper up the Sperryville road. Though these were

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, 3.20 P. M., 26th.



the rumors and opinions which were communicated to Pope, McDowell rested not upon them, nor upon his own observations, for perfect or even reliable knowledge. It was upon the cavalry reconnaissance of the next day that all his hopes were fixed. Until this revealed it, Pope was informed that nothing could be reported of the movements of the enemy across the Sperryville pike in the direction of Gaines' Cross Roads and Salem.<sup>1</sup> When this, and much more of the same tenor from others, reached Pope, his remaining tranquillity forsook him. There was a restless, meddling person on Banks's staff who, it was said, had been a hireling of an eminent public man in New York, to whom his services were of that base kind which officials must secure, and which they well reward in money and in contempt. However that may have been, Banks thought so much of him that he instated him as prime confidant in his council. For his zeal in discharging congenial duties, he was rewarded with his master's approbation. Sometimes, as a mark of great confidence, Banks loaned him to Pope. This person, from near Waterloo, at forty-five minutes after three o'clock in the afternoon of the 26th of August, sent to Warrenton Junction a fearful budget. He told Pope that trains and troops of the enemy were still passing to the north; that Longstreet's corps was in the woods back of Waterloo bridge; that Jackson's corps was somewhere above Longstreet's; and that the entire district from Jefferson to Culpepper, Sperryville, and as far as Barbours, was covered with smoke and lines of dust. This region, which embraced more than one hundred and forty-four square miles, was represented as teeming with hosts of the enemy.

Pope in haste transmitted this dispatch to McDowell.

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, 3.20 P. M., 26th.

But McDowell, proof against both sensational reports and sensational authors, quietly informed Pope that he had received the same dispatch direct, and from the same source. Though this reply soothed the commanding general, by allaying his apprehensions, there was yet another cause of uneasiness, experienced by Pope. General McDowell had advised that Cox's command be sent to him. Why was this? To Pope it seemed ominous. So again the wires at Warrenton Junction were invoked, and McDowell was asked what had happened, what information he had received since his last telegram, to make Cox's presence necessary with him. And again McDowell sent relief by replying that he had sent for Cox only because he was ordered to act with Sigel's corps at Fayetteville, and now Sigel's corps was here with him at Warrenton.<sup>1</sup> These are matters perhaps of little importance, but they are matters which it seems proper to consider in representing the *morale* of Pope's army. If the head of that army was in a constant state of excitement, now depressed by fears, now agitated by hopes, never tranquil, never composed, trusting everything to the commander of one corps, and distrusting everything that the commander of another did or said, how could it be that his own army should escape the contagion?

Sigel, too, had been unremitting in pouring into Pope's ears all the information he could gather from scouts, from spies, and from his cavalry. But whether the column of the enemy that had marched towards Salem was destined for the valley of the Shenandoah, to attack McDowell at Warrenton, or to cut Pope's line of communications with Washington, he neither received nor imparted any information until late at night of the 26th.<sup>2</sup> In this state of uncertainty Pope pre-

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, 3.20 P. M., 26th.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Report of Major-General Sigel.

pared to meet the enemy at Warrenton. If the fight there could be postponed for two days he affected but little apprehension for the result.<sup>1</sup> By noon of the 27th Reno and Banks should, and by night he hoped Cox and Sturgis would, strengthen McDowell. Fitz-John Porter's corps of regulars certainly, and Franklin's corps probably, could be relied on. The former had on the 26th announced his arrival at seven P. M. at Bealton. He should be within two and one half miles of Warrenton, on the Fayetteville road, by the night of the 27th. The latter he hoped would be up in time to support McDowell, or prevent his right from being turned in the direction of the Manassas Gap railroad. To insure this, Halleck was requested to push Franklin forward, at once, to where the Manassas Gap railroad intersects the Warrenton turnpike. But Pope also provided for another contingency. There might be a raid upon his line of communications, an attempt to capture his supplies. He was by no means assured that the column of the enemy that had moved towards Salem would appear in McDowell's front at Warrenton. So the whole of Heintzelman's corps that had arrived at Warrenton Junction, and almost all of it was there and in the vicinity of Weaversville,<sup>2</sup> was there held, to await a report from a scouting cavalry regiment that Pope had sent from Manassas along the Manassas Gap railway, or to act upon any other information that might be received of the purposes and destiny of the missing column of the enemy.<sup>3</sup>

No better proof of Pope's incredulity that the enemy could contemplate any serious movement this day

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell, 7 P. M. and 8.20 P. M., 26th.

<sup>2</sup> See Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 76.

<sup>3</sup> Pope to McDowell, 7 P. M. and 8.50 P. M., 26th. (Official Report, General Heintzelman, *ibid.*, page 54.)

upon his rear is needed than that while he was sending his dispatches to McDowell at ten minutes before nine at night, to prepare to fight at Warrenton, he knew that his rail and telegraphic communication with Washington had been destroyed. For at twenty minutes after eight o'clock in the evening he had ordered General Heintzelman to send a regiment on a train of cars immediately to Manassas to ascertain what had occurred there, and to repair the telegraph wires and to protect the railroad until further orders.<sup>1</sup> And later he had received from that officer a report that his regiment had found a force of the enemy upon the railroad to Manassas, too strong to confront, and that it had fallen back.<sup>2</sup>

This alarming news was soon followed by reports still more alarming. General McDowell sent to headquarters at Warrenton Junction over the wires an important dispatch. An intelligent negro, who had come from White Plains, told General Buford that he saw there, that day, at twelve o'clock, batteries, cavalry, and artillery of the Confederate army marching in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap.<sup>3</sup> McDowell, much impressed with this information, told Pope that he believed the man's story, and that General Buford believed it, for his scouts not only confirmed the statements, but reported large trains passing up through Orleans and White Plains. If Pope believed what McDowell and Buford believed, there could no longer be any doubt of the direction the missing column moving towards Salem was taking. It was not moving towards the Shenandoah Valley, nor through Rectortown; so

<sup>1</sup> Dispatch to Major-General Heintzelman from T. C. H. Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel and Aid-de-Camp, 8.20 P. M., August 26th.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General Heintzelman, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 64.

<sup>3</sup> McDowell to Pope, dispatch, nine P. M., August 26th.

much was sure. Was it connected with the hostile movement at Manassas? Pope did not even now act as if he so considered it. But at ten o'clock more reports came in. One of General Sigel's scouts who had just arrived reported that from daylight until four o'clock that afternoon a continuous line of troops, chiefly cavalry, commanded by General Stuart, passed onward to White Plains, where they encamped. With this movement the Confederate Generals Jackson, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill were connected. Both Sigel's scout and Buford's intelligent negro agreed in the identification of commanding generals. What was thus reported, however it may have affected Pope, made a strong impression upon McDowell. He saw the danger and would have averted it. "If the enemy is playing this game upon us," he said, "if you fear any attack in force by the enemy coming through Thoroughfare Gap, and you should not get your force in time at Gainesville, I wish to remark that Centreville and Manassas are fortified, the former sufficiently so to offer a stout resistance, and the latter enough to aid materially raw troops. If," he continued, "we can keep down the panic which the appearance of the enemy is likely to create in Washington, it seems to me the advantage of position must be all on our side." With a caution which reflected favorably upon his own judgment and upon Pope's, as it may appear to those who judge, McDowell concluded his dispatch by trusting that "sufficient food and ammunition and forage might get through by to-morrow," and with the added intelligence that a great deal of artillery ammunition had been wasted.<sup>1</sup> This information did not shake Pope's convictions. He could not believe that Lee would march contemptuously around his position at Warren-

<sup>1</sup> McDowell to Pope, ten P. M., August 26th.

ton, and he did not reflect upon the consequences if his expected troops should fail him from Washington. Nor was he yet convinced that the attack upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad near Manassas was more than a cavalry raid. So he sent further communications to McDowell for more perfect preparations for the expected conflict at Warrenton. Reno was to be directed by McDowell to take post at Greenwich, advancing four regiments and a battery to Gainesville. Kearny's division was to support him. It would be found one mile in Reno's rear, on the road from Weaversville to Greenwich. This arrangement, it must be remembered, could not be carried out until the next day at noon, the 27th of August, and then, ordered Pope with sublime assurance, if the enemy advances this side of Thoroughfare Gap, Reno must attack and beat him. But even then, late at night of the 26th, Pope did not believe the enemy would dare to pass through Thoroughfare Gap, and he therefore admonished McDowell to be prepared to break up at Warrenton to march on the west side of Thoroughfare. In that event, or in the event of a movement of any part of McDowell's forces, Banks should be commanded to draw near Warrenton upon McDowell's notification. Pope closed his dispatch with the promise that Fitz-John Porter should be near Warrenton on the night of the 27th, and an admonition to McDowell to keep that force of cavalry well on his right or rear, which Buford had all day been culling over for his morrow's march at daylight, to find the missing column of the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

It would seem that by this time Pope might have conjectured that the enemy's movements near Manassas threatened something more than a raid, but it

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell, Warrenton Junction, between ten and eleven at night, August 26th.

appears that yet more was required to create even such a belief. It was near midnight. Sigel had again sent over the wires from Warrenton more startling information. The enemy's rear guard was at Orleans to-night, with his main force encamped at White Plains. Although Sigel was in error by just twenty-four hours,<sup>1</sup> Pope at last began to waver. But even now, neither Pope nor Sigel contemplated the possibility of a division of Lee's forces, much less that the whole of Jackson's column was actually in our rear. Now for the first time Pope thought it worth mentioning to McDowell "that his communication had been interrupted by the enemy's cavalry near Manassas." But even that was not dwelt upon. Was the whole Confederate army going around him—to his rear? It was a question to be settled instantly. Pope could not, McDowell must not, allow any part, nor the whole nor the largest part of the enemy's force to march opposite us to-night, while we remain here in ignorance. Please ascertain, pleaded Pope, to-morrow morning very early, — ascertain it to-night, you better, for we must know at a very early hour in the morning so as to determine our plans. But something more was necessary. If the enemy came around him, Reno had been ordered "to attack and beat him." It was but an hour since such had been the dispatch to McDowell, and in that hour grave possibilities had been presented. Reno could not be expected to beat nearly seventy thousand men, though he might make an impression upon a column of not more than ten or fifteen thousand. It was "the enemy" that McDowell was informed it was Pope's purpose to beat with Reno. It was even now hard for Pope to relieve General Reno from the duty of beating, with his

<sup>1</sup> Longstreet's advance was near Orleans the night of the 26th, and his main force was encamped at White Plains the night of the 27th.

two divisions, the whole of Lee's army ; and harder still for him to realize that the whole of that army, or any detachment of it in respectable numbers, could contemplate moving through Thoroughfare Gap to his rear. So he continued to occupy himself with his proposed conflict at Warrenton. Twelve o'clock at night of the 26th found General Pope forwarding dispatches to McDowell, to send artillery from Warrenton to Greenwich, by the evening of the 27th, to meet General Kearny, who had moved so rapidly to Warrenton Junction that his artillery had been left behind him.<sup>1</sup>

We should turn now to the Confederate column under Jackson, which we followed until midnight of the 25th, at which hour his advance had reached Salem, where it halted for the night. At dawn of the 26th, General Jackson pressed forward along the railway towards White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap, in the Bull Run Mountains. Colonel Munford's cavalry preceded his column, and entered the gap as soon after daylight as it could get there from Salem. Colonel Munford was filled with joy when he found this mountain gorge unoccupied, for it gave assurance that the march would remain undiscovered, until broken wires and burning bridges should announce to his enemy that Jackson was in his rear. In a brief period the column of infantry followed the cavalry with bayonets glistening in this mountain pathway, which, since the earliest days of Virginia's colonial life, had been untrodden by a foe.

To the peaceful inhabitants of this region there had come no change to relieve the monotonous drudgery of their daily lives. The graves of those intrepid borderers who once waged savage warfare with a savage foe had long since disappeared ; even the story of their con-

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell from Warrenton Junction, twelve P. M., August 26th.



tests was forgotten. It was with amazement ill concealed that among the frowning ramparts of Thoroughfare, crested with their gloomy pines, endless columns of soldiers were seen hastening onward through the narrow defile, down which rippled the winding stream that poured its waters into the Occoquan, the Potomac, and the sea; and through which, under a prosperity of modern days, the railway passes from Manassas Junction to the Shenandoah, and the valley of beauty which it waters.

As on the preceding day, so on this, the march was conducted with all possible precautions for secrecy. Stuart with his cavalry guarded the flank. He left the vicinity of Waterloo at two o'clock in the morning of the second day of Jackson's march, and followed Jackson's route to Salem. Here he found the roads so obstructed by the wagons and artillery of Jackson's column that he drew his cavalry to the fields, and thence by farm roads and paths parallel to Jackson's route he made his way, hanging upon the flank of the infantry, which he covered and concealed from the enemy. Stuart, by the aid of guides, passed successfully over a country exceedingly rough, arriving at the eastern base of Bull Run Mountain by an obscure pathway south of that pursued by Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap. The cavalry then passed through Haymarket and overtook Jackson near Gainesville, whence the united column pressed on for Bristoe Station. While on its march through Haymarket and Gainesville a few unimportant captures of wagons on a foraging excursion were made near the former place by a regiment of cavalry from Lee's brigade. Some twelve or fifteen Federal cavalry were also surprised and captured by the advance guard of Confederates as they passed.

When Jackson struck Gainesville he saw before him

the broad Warrenton turnpike, the most direct highway to the city of Washington, and to his right Manassas Station with its depots of valuable supplies for Pope's army. Doubtless Jackson thought the Federal commander would put forth his mightiest efforts to preserve those stores and that material of war which it was of the first importance to the Confederates to destroy, and he therefore determined not only to reach this depot in the most expeditious manner, over the most available route, but so to obstruct pursuit that the destruction should be complete. Without halting at Gainesville, Jackson turned to his right and entered upon a road that led him to the Orange and Alexandria Railway at Bristoe Station, where an important bridge spanned the Great Run Creek. Once at Bristoe, Jackson would be in rear of the Federal army, established upon its line of communications with its depots and with Washington, in possession of a railway bridge the destruction of which would sever the Federal line of communication with Manassas, and render almost impregnable the Confederate position upon the eastern bank of Great Run. He would be, too, within four miles of Manassas Station, and could therefore operate there upon Federal stores undisturbed. The advantages to the Confederates of this route to Manassas more than compensated for the increased distance of the direct road by the railway and roads near it, which was unimportant, since it added but two miles to the march.

The column was pressed forward with such vigor that, when Jackson's cavalry arrived within striking distance of Bristoe Station, it was hardly sunset.

The Federal guard consisted of only a single company of cavalry and one of infantry. The cavalry, without much resistance, made its escape; but the in-

fantry, from a small building used as a hotel, and from surrounding houses, maintained a fire of musketry, until they were overpowered by the Confederate brigade of Hays's Louisiana troops, which came up to the support of Munford's cavalry.<sup>1</sup>

The sun was sinking below the horizon when General Jackson's column, with the divisions of Ewell, A. P. Hill, and Taliaferro, approached the railroad. The latter brought up the rear. Hardly had the foremost troops arrived, when the sound of approaching trains was heard, and Hays's brigade of Ewell's division, in advance, was thrown across the track. The train soon appeared, moving in the direction of Alexandria. It was then about six o'clock in the evening. There was light enough to reveal the masses of hostile troops that stretched in an unbroken line on either side of the road until they were lost in the forest. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the engine-driver pushed furiously on past Bristoe, heeding neither the loud shouts of Confederate voices, nor the louder discharge of Confederate muskets, which greeted his contemptuous disobedience.<sup>2</sup> Soon, however, another train was heard. The enemy had in the mean time torn up the railroad track for a short distance beyond the station. Such an obstruction was of course fatal. The train, consisting of an engine with twenty empty cars, was thrown down a high embankment. Still another following shared the same fate. But by this time the alarm had been given. A fourth train came in sight,

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Munford had but one hundred men, with whom he claims to have killed two, wounded seven, and captured forty-three Federals, including the Lieutenant-Colonel of the Fourth New York Cavalry, a major, three captains, and four lieutenants, fourteen cavalry horses, and a few sabres, and to have suffered a loss of but three wounded Confederates.

<sup>2</sup> This train followed one which had passed the station as Jackson's troops came in sight of it.

stopped, and moved back for Warrenton.<sup>1</sup> The position of the Confederates could of course no longer be kept secret. It would be known at Alexandria and at Washington through the trains that had escaped, and it would be known at Warrenton through those that had returned. If, therefore, General Jackson proposed to take advantage of the swiftness and secrecy of his movements, it became necessary to move still further before his enemy could frustrate his efforts.

Jackson turned his face towards Manassas Junction. Everywhere upon his march he had been informed that stores of vast value had been collected at that depot. Many reasons have been suggested why these supplies should be secured, but there was another that was controlling. The Confederate troops were hungry. So rapid had been their march, that their supplies were left far in their rear. They had marched fifty miles in two days, and had subsisted on green apples and corn alone. But so urgent was the need of immediate action, and so apparent, that before orders could be issued, General Trimble, of Ewell's division, had volunteered to move his brigade, without rest, upon Manassas. His offer was accepted, and he was directed by General Jackson to proceed there without delay.

It does not appear that the small garrison of Federal troops at Manassas Junction knew that Jackson's column had arrived at night-fall at Bristoe Station. It does not appear that, from night-fall until they were surprised at their guns, any unusual precautions were taken to protect from capture the supplies that were destined for Pope. Not a roadway that led outward towards the Rappahannock, not a hill-top, saw an added

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Captain J. K. Boswell, chief engineer second Confederate army corps ; Official Reports of Generals Jackson, Hays, and Ewell.

sentinel, not a forest nor a valley covered the movements of a watchful patrol to give warning of the approach of an enemy. At nine o'clock at night, the twenty-first North Carolina and the twenty-first Georgia regiments, of Ewell's division, in all numbering not more than five hundred men, under their brigade commander, General Trimble, moved out silently from Bristoe and proceeded along the railroad, to within one mile and a half of Manassas Junction. Although General Jackson had accepted with alacrity what he officially called General Trimble's gallant offer to capture the enemy's stores at Manassas Junction; although he had sent him on his mission without a hint that in its performance he might find himself superseded by a superior in rank, no sooner was he on his way, than General Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, was ordered by General Jackson to move forward and as ranking officer to take command of the expedition. Unhappily for the Federals the enemy escaped the ills which ought to have resulted from a night attack by two independent commanders, each operating in ignorance of the other's purposes, to the accomplishment of a similar end. Confusion there was, of course, but the Confederates were not confounded. While General Trimble, with his two regiments of infantry, was making his way in the night through roads and along hill-sides that in the darkness were dim and difficult, Stuart—who had so faithfully covered the march of Jackson's column; who had so carefully defended with cavalry and with artillery the approaches along the Warrenton pike to Gainesville, both from the west and from the east; who had covered the Broad Run a few miles above Bristoe and struck the railroad to the south of that point—was marching toward Manassas. The story of this night has been told in official papers by many officers who

were present. The cause of Trimble or of Stuart has been warmly espoused, as the writer served under the leadership of the one or the other of these commanders; but the main facts, as gathered from Trimble's own narrative, clearly demonstrate that until he reached with his infantry a point within one mile and a half of Manassas, he did not know that any other force was to co-operate with his own; nor was he aware, in marching on Manassas Junction, that General Stuart had preceded or was to precede him. No staff officer of General Jackson's or of General Ewell's had informed him that Stuart was to act with or to command him.<sup>1</sup> Near midnight a few musket shots broke upon Trimble's ear. He was then one mile and a half from Manassas. The sound caused a murmur of astonishment. What could it be? It was certainly not directed at Trimble. An investigation was ordered, and Stuart's cavalry stood revealed between the Confederate and the Federal infantry.<sup>2</sup>

Charged as Stuart was by General Jackson with the performance of this duty, he had proceeded to execute it without conferring with the commander of the infantry upon whom, for such night work, he could alone rely. He had ordered the Fourth Virginia Cavalry to move to the rear of the Federals at Manassas to cut off avenues of escape, while with such of Robertson's brigade as were not on outpost duty, he had proceeded on the direct road to Manassas. Along the railway he had marched until a Federal sentinel was seen standing upon the track. He was captured, and the march continued until the picket of infantry and cavalry from which he came was revealed. Here a few shots were

<sup>1</sup> See General Trimble's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> But for the precautions of his aid-de-camp Trimble reports that he might have fired into "our own cavalry."

fired, and the Federal picket retired. The enemy pushed on. And now a shell shrieking over the woodland lighted up its pathway with fire. It was too dark to venture cavalry over uncertain ground against artillery. Stuart drew back to await the arrival of the infantry. He was disappointed, for he had hoped to surprise the place. It was for this he had pushed on; and it was that Trimble might not share his coveted honor that he had thus far risked alone the great peril of an attack.<sup>1</sup> Now the infantry and cavalry — commands and commanders — were united. But there seems to have been from this time no concert of action. Trimble narrates under his official pen that he informed General Stuart that he intended to attack Manassas Junction and wished aid from his cavalry; while Stuart says that he directed Trimble to rest his centre directly upon the railroad and advance upon the junction with skirmishers well to the front; but that Trimble asked to be permitted to wait until morning, and Stuart on account of the darkness directed him so to do. Trimble says the idea never entered his head that he was under Stuart's orders; and Stuart reports that the idea that Trimble was under his orders never left his own.<sup>2</sup>

Believing himself charged with a most important duty, General Trimble, in disregard of Stuart's presence, set about its execution. The night was very warm, and it was very dark. The Confederates moved in order of battle with skirmishers in advance. Before them stretched the line of railway that led through the cluster of houses at the junction and onward to Alexandria. For a mile the troops marched without interruption. It was nearly twelve o'clock at night. Only

<sup>1</sup> To one of the empty trains that had run the gauntlet at Bristol it was attributed that the Federal garrison was on the alert.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of Generals Stuart and Trimble.

one half of a mile more remained, when all the wealth of all the stores at Manassas would be temptingly exposed to a resolute foe. Then and there the feeble struggle began. Trimble's march was arrested by repeated discharges of Federal artillery, which, aimed at nothing and fired in the darkness, encouraged those whom it was intended to alarm. Had this fire been reserved until the nearer approach of the Confederate infantry, it might have been more fatal. The Confederate troops were now moved forward in line under a constant fire of artillery. Two regiments, one on each side of the railroad track, halted within one hundred yards of the Federal batteries, until watch-words and replies were given out. Then a charge was ordered.

The Confederate regiments advanced rapidly. At their approach, the frightened Federal gunners abandoned their guns. The Georgia regiment had moved forward on the north side of the track, the North Carolina on the south. The exultant boast of the latter, flung out in the darkness across the railway, "We have captured a battery," was answered by the former with "So have we." Vociferous cheers from united voices rent the air. Each captured battery contained four field-pieces and caissons, with seventy-two horses, equipments, and ammunition complete.

A rather discreditable controversy concerning this Federal disgrace arose between rival claims of the Confederate cavalry and the Confederate infantry for the honor of the capture.

Regiments of Stuart's cavalry under Wickham seized the avenues of escape from Manassas, and entered the place after its capture by Trimble. These regiments were found by Trimble's messengers, where they were posted, as Trimble's command advanced to the assault, and they asked if the infantry had captured Manassas.



This testimony, offered by many witnesses of character and of rank, confirms Trimble in his claim that, unaided by Stuart's cavalry, his infantry captured Manassas and the Federal stores. Equally is he entitled to belief when he affirms that the cavalry shared in an indiscriminate plunder of horses. Perhaps no better illustration than this can be found, of the unprincipled manner in which modern warriors covet honors which they have not earned. Stuart was a brave man, a dashing fighter, and a courageous leader, in marches attended with threatening perils. Before Richmond he had given proof of his fearless nature in his march in rear of the Federal army. In the present Confederate campaign many bold and daring movements had attracted the attention of General Lee. The commander of the Southern forces found no one within his army better fitted by nature and by education to command the cavalry accompanying Jackson on his perilous march, than Stuart. But to a warrior's virtues Stuart added a warrior's failings. He was selfish, he was envious of others' achievements, and he was a notorious romancer. Perhaps he did not indulge in wild tales with mean intent. It may be doubted if a brave soldier ever does that. In his own narrative of his own achievements, of his own perils, and of the fear in which his enemies stood of him, Stuart was unreliable. It is more than probable that he was filled with chagrin when he saw that Trimble had so easily won a victory; and it is more than possible that Stuart's activity after Trimble had gained a victory was intended to cover his own inactivity before. To spread out achievements at one time and place, so cleverly as to blind the public to failures at another time and place, is not the trick of the politician or the knave alone.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports of Lieutenant Duncan McKim, aid to General

While the leading division of Jackson's corps was thus engaged along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railway, his remaining divisions, with all his reserved artillery, pressed on to within one mile of Bristoe Station, before they rested from their fatiguing march. Then they knew that their efforts had been successful, and they slept with the consciousness that they were thus far in the enemy's rear, and that he was ignorant of their movements.<sup>1</sup>

At the same hour, when the artillery firing and the skirmishing at Waterloo bridge had, after resounding at longer intervals, ceased altogether, General Lee pushed Longstreet's corps over the Rappahannock at Hinton's Mills, six miles above Waterloo, to pursue the route towards Manassas that Jackson had followed.<sup>2</sup> And on the same day a full division of Confederate infantry, commanded by D. H. Hill, left Hanover Junction to add its strength to the already powerful army assembled under Lee.

While the Confederates rejoiced on the close of this day at the successes thus far achieved, and were sustained by the conviction that if unusual demands had been made upon their legs and their stomachs, such demands were wise and were indispensable to the success of Lee's campaign, the Federals were tormented with an activity that made it doubtful whether Pope's

Trimble, Moore's Rebellion Record, page 607; of the major, two captains, and sixteen first and second lieutenants of the twenty-first North Carolina regiment, *ibid.*, page 608; of the major, two captains, and four lieutenants of the twenty-first Georgia regiment, *ibid.*, page 608; and of the captain and assistant adjutant general of the twenty-first North Carolina, *ibid.*, page 608. Stuart's story is confirmed by but a single witness, and he Surgeon T. Eliason, *ibid.*, page 606.

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report of W. B. Taliaferro, commanding division, Moore's Rebellion Record, page 628; and Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, commanding artillery battalion, *ibid.*, page 722.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of Generals Longstreet, J. B. Hood, and D. R. Jones.

precautions would not be more disastrous to his army than his defeat.

This was especially true with the officers of rank in the Federal army, who were constantly on the alert, while the privates might fall asleep anywhere and at any time, for they enjoyed a blissful indifference to all responsibility. It seemed, when Banks's corps had found on this night a comfortable encampment at Bealton, there was hope for a few days of that refreshment which one month's incessant activity had denied, and that here, watching the Rappahannock,<sup>1</sup> the officers might at least for once in ten days remove their boots at night. But even this salutary indulgence was not to be. Who could tell, what now we know, that many of the trials to which we were exposed were uncalled for and unnecessary; that this eternal chasing up and down the Rappahannock was to provide against surprises that were most improbable; that it was a pastime of irresolution and of timidity?

<sup>1</sup> Gordon's brigade marched via Fayetteville, and had not on this day reached Bealton.

## CHAPTER VII.

### GENERAL JACKSON AT MANASSAS JUNCTION.

DAYLIGHT of the 27th revealed to the Confederate General Trimble a wealth of treasure. He had captured military stores and equipments of great value and vast in amount. Indeed, he had no conception of the real magnitude of his prize until daylight revealed it. The night had been to him a season of great anxiety. At any moment the roar of an approaching train from Alexandria, filled with Federal troops, might be the signal of an opening conflict in which the results of this gallant attack might be wrested from his grasp. Through the slow hours General Trimble awaited with impatience the coming day. His men did not dare to close their eyes. In the morning it was found that the results of this midnight dash comprised about three hundred prisoners and two hundred slaves (recaptured), and that the loss to the Confederates was none killed and but fifteen wounded. But in addition to the guns and equipments an amount of army supplies and valuable material was disclosed that was far in excess even of Jackson's wildest dreams. In the official statements, by the superior officers of Jackson's command, of the incidents of that day's occupation of Manassas, they never tire in the repetition of the barrels of bacon, sugar, and pork, of the canned delicacies of sutlers' stores, of the long trains of new cars heavily laden with supplies for Pope's army, that fell into their

hands. Nor were they weary in gloating over the delivery to their emaciated troops of a full issue of "Yankee rations." According to reliable statements, the captured storehouses contained fifty thousand pounds of bacon, one thousand barrels of corned beef, two thousand barrels of salt pork, and two thousand barrels of flour. Besides, there were two miles of burden cars, laden with clothing, oats, corn, and whisky. The list further contains one hundred and seventy-five draft horses, forty-two wagons and ambulances, four sutlers' stores with their contents, and from two to three hundred new tents.<sup>1</sup> Well might General Jackson, in the pride of his achievement, speak of these captures as "vast in quantity and of great value." Before turning again to the operations of the Federal army in its efforts to thwart the plans of the Confederates, we may, by first following the movements of the latter during the day of the 27th, receive a clearer impression of the campaign.

Shortly after Trimble had arrived at Manassas, he became so much alarmed at his situation, that he called for reënforcements. Jackson sent to him a brigade of infantry, which arrived after dispersing with a few shots from a battery a regiment of Federal cavalry that confronted it.<sup>2</sup>

At daylight General Jackson marched with two of his divisions for Manassas. General Ewell, with his division, was left at Bristoe Station, where he encountered the Federal advance along the railroad from Warrenton Junction, as will hereafter appear. In the concentration of the remainder of Jackson's corps at the junction, the six brigades of General A. P. Hill's division took

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Generals Jackson and Trimble. See Dabney's *Life of Jackson*, vol. ii., pp. 266-269.

<sup>2</sup> Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

the lead. General Taliaferro's division followed. To the left of the depot at Manassas Station, Hill drew up his division in columns of brigades.

The ground occupied by the Confederate troops was familiar to them. Here were the redoubts which they had thrown up in 1861. The hospital on the left, the ground around the railroad station, the path of the railway, and the run over which it crossed about three miles to the east, the roads, hills, and forests were the same that had known them daily for many weeks after their triumph on the battle-field of Manassas. From here, in 1861, the Confederates had threatened the national capital, and from here had they withdrawn when their own capital at Richmond was in danger from the march of McClellan's army up the Peninsula. And now that the Federal army had been vanquished ; now that the Confederate capital was no longer threatened by a hostile force, again had they returned to Manassas to strike the first blow in a series of strategical movements whose boldness and whose vigor more than ever before or ever after threatened the very existence of our national life.

When Jackson arrived at Manassas Station instant measures were taken to meet any force that might threaten him from Washington. That Halleck would send along the railway all his available infantry, to recover the stores at Manassas, could not be doubtful. What that force was may have been known to Jackson through spies that swarmed at Alexandria ; for he did not move as if he were apprehensive of serious danger from the front, though he posted his troops to meet whatever might come. Muzzles of field-guns again looked over parapets of deserted earth-works, and again the plains of Manassas were dotted over with compact columns of infantry, while the wooded hill-

tops, that look down upon the historic Bull Run at their feet, were filled with skirmishers of infantry and dismounted cavalry. The Confederates were soon apprised of the appearance of the enemy. At about seven o'clock in the morning, a long train of cars coming from the direction of Washington drew up on the eastern side of the railroad bridge. The troops disembarked at the stream, crossed the bridge, and formed in line of battle, facing towards Manassas. Their commander was General Taylor, of New Jersey, and his troops were regiments of New Jersey volunteers. An order to move forward was given, and obeyed with a spirit and determination to which General Jackson himself bore witness in his report. The Federal brigade had advanced without serious molestation to a point near the hospital building, which is about eight hundred yards from Manassas Station, when General Jackson rode up to General Archer, of Hill's division, with a battery, and ordered him to support it. For a brief period there were exchanges of shots from Federal and from Confederate artillery. From the redoubts and from the plain on the east and on the west of the railroad, six different batteries of Hill's division concentrated their fire on this single brigade of raw levies. The result could not be doubtful; it was too uneven to last long. The Federal troops broke in confusion and turned towards the railroad bridge in flight. The Confederate batteries followed, firing upon the retreating column. The infantry of Hill's division took up the pursuit. The Federals reached the railroad bridge, crossed it, and attempted a stand upon the eastern bank of Bull Run. But they were soon driven away. The Confederates crossed the river, destroyed the train of cars which brought General Taylor to the scene of action, burned the railroad bridge, and ad-

vanced for half a mile beyond the run. The gallant conduct of General Taylor called forth from Jackson commendation for his character, and condemnation of his cause. General Taylor was mortally wounded in this fight, and this was his eulogy. The Federal dead and wounded were left on the field; many prisoners were taken.<sup>1</sup>

When the Confederate troops were recalled from the pursuit, their attention was turned to the captured stores, which there had been some attempt to preserve from the hungry men that swarmed around them. General Trimble had seen with impatience what he called an indiscriminate plunder of his Federal commissariat by the Confederate cavalry; but now he was called upon to bear a greater grievance. General Hill's division had returned from its pursuit. His men were very hungry; with longing eyes they looked upon the captured rations, over which Trimble's sentinels had been keeping guard. General Hill would not restrain them.

Weak and haggard from their diet of green corn and apples, one can well imagine with what surprise their eyes opened upon the contents of the sutlers' stores, containing an amount and variety of property such as they had never before conceived of. Then came a storming charge of hungry men rushing in tumultuous mobs over each other's heads, under each other's feet; anywhere, everywhere, to satisfy a craving hunger stronger than a yearning for fame. There were no laggards in that charge, and there was abundant evi-

<sup>1</sup> General A. P. Hill reports the number of Federal prisoners as two hundred. General Archer, of Hill's division, reports the loss in his brigade as four killed and seventeen wounded. For accounts of Federal attack on Manassas Junction, August 27th, see Official Reports of Generals Jackson, Hill, Archer, Pender, Branch, Trimble, and Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, chief of artillery of Hill's division.



dence of the fruits of victory. It is barely possible that the luckless purveyors of luxuries for Pope's army witnessed such amusing scenes without reflecting upon an ensuing ruin. Men ragged and famished clutched tenaciously at whatever came in their way, whether of clothing or food, of luxury or necessity. Here a long yellow-haired, barefooted son of the South claimed as prizes a tooth-brush, a box of candles, a quantity of lobster salad, a barrel of coffee; while there another, whose butternut-colored homespun hung around him in tatters, crammed himself with lobster salad, sardines, potted game, and sweetmeats, and washed them down with Rhenish wine. As there were no wagons at hand to transport these captured delicacies, every soldier ate what he could, and carried away all the lighter articles that he could not eat. Nor was the outer man neglected. From piles of new clothing, the soldiers of Jackson's corps arrayed themselves in the blue uniforms of the Federals. The naked were clad, the barefooted were shod, the sick and wounded were provided with comforts and luxuries to which they had long been strangers. Jackson's men found themselves in possession of all they most required, and they fell to in its distribution with a will to which Peter in his vision was a stranger. But though all was eaten that men could eat and all was laden that men or the means of transportation at hand could bear, there yet remained vast amounts to be destroyed. The first step in Lee's plan of operations against Pope had been taken. Jackson had met with a success that exceeded even the most sanguine hopes of his commander, as high as his hopes may have been raised when he let loose such an agent as Jackson to mar and destroy the plans of such commanders as Halleck in his chair at Washington, and Pope as his subordinate in the field. Therefore Gen-

eral Jackson made preparation for his second move in the game. And this was, to throw his corps northward upon the old battle-field of Bull Run, taking up a position between Sudley Spring and Groveton, and thus, while controlling the Orange and Alexandria turnpike near Groveton, remain where he could over the shortest line effect the most rapid junction with Longstreet, who in command of the remainder of Lee's army was hastening to pour his veterans through Thoroughfare Gap. And there were other reasons why General Jackson established himself there. But now and here to discuss the advantages which this position secured to the Confederates, to meet such contingencies as Halleck and Pope might evolve, would be out of place. It will be referred to hereafter.

During the afternoon of the 27th, preparation was made to burn the doomed supplies at Manassas. This was to occur simultaneously with the evacuation of that place. At night, two brigades of Hill's division were thrown south of Manassas Junction, and formed in line of battle, facing in the direction of Bristoe Station, to guard the rear of Jackson's army. As they stood there under arms, the conflagration burst upon them. In their front was the retiring division of Ewell, the last of Jackson's corps, moving toward Manassas. Beyond them was that portion of Pope's army that was hurrying on eastward along the line of the railway to Bristoe Station. To the north the division of Hill was in motion for Blackburn's Ford, thence to march on the direct road to Centreville. Taliaferro, too, was on the march. By the nearest road that led across the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, he pursued the old military road towards Sudley Mills, to halt on the old battle-field of Manassas. In his charge were all the Federal spoils that the Confederates could

transport. Ewell's pathway carried him across Bull Run, thence up its north bank, until the Centreville turnpike was reached, when he was ordered to move westward in the general plan of concentration. Stuart's cavalry covered the infantry columns.

The Confederate cavalry had, on the 27th, pressed the good fortune of the Confederate infantry with wonderful activity. General Fitz-Hugh Lee, with a portion of his command, had pursued the terror-stricken fugitives from the Federal brigade of Taylor, until he captured stores and prisoners at Burke's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, within but about twelve miles of Alexandria. Nor had other detachments of the Confederate cavalry been wanting in most zealous endeavor. It is true that their task was not attended with either danger or difficulty. To hang on the outskirts of Pope's army, to raid over all the highways and turnpikes along which small fragments of Federal foot or Federal horse might be found foraging, was either the sportive effort which Stuart claimed to have found it whenever the Federal cavalry commander Buford was not present to oppose, or the serious business which Buford always made it whenever he led his men into action. But now Buford was endeavoring to find Jackson to the west of Thoroughfare Gap, and Stuart's cavalry raided with impunity.

With their path illuminated by the red flames bursting out from the warehouses, the sutlers' stores, and the cars, the rear guard of Hill's division witnessed the smouldering ruins of almost every article necessary for the outfit of a great army.<sup>1</sup> The emotions which such ruin created in Pope may be contrasted with the

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports, General Jackson, General Hill, General Stuart, General Early; Captain J. K. Boswell, chief engineer of Jackson's corps; Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, Hill's division, chief of artillery.

elation which it aroused in Jackson. That both armies should, under the circumstances, be differently affected could not but follow. The despair of the Federals excited new hopes in the Confederates.

It has been charged that but for grave omissions and negligences, General Jackson would have met with disaster at Manassas; and it has been a popular belief that if General McClellan had forwarded troops from Alexandria as rapidly as he could, this disaster might have been averted.

A brief reference to the facts of that campaign will not only show the falsity of this charge, but will give, it may be hoped, a clear insight into the motives that controlled the general-in-chief in Washington.

There is no evidence that on the day Jackson cut Pope's line of communication at Bristoe, Halleck was much impressed with the necessity of strengthening Pope's army, or guarding Pope's communications, by troops from Alexandria. Although Pope in his official report bewails the heavy misfortune that happened to him on the night of the 26th of August, through faults and negligences not his own, it cannot be denied that his dispatches to Halleck were the sole cause of Halleck's unconcern.

That Pope believed the Confederates were marching for the valley of the Shenandoah on the 26th of August plainly appears from his dispatches to McDowell; and that he communicated that belief to Halleck as plainly appears from Halleck's dispatch to McClellan as late as eleven o'clock in the morning of the 26th, in which he says, "There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving in large force into the Shenandoah Valley," and that "reconnaissances will soon determine."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Halleck to McClellan, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 322.

Further instructions given by the general-in-chief in this dispatch to McClellan, who was then at Acquia Creek, overlooking the arrival of troops from the Peninsula, and transferring them to Falmouth, — that he would “draw no more troops down the Rappahannock at present, for all would be wanted in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley,” — only strengthen the conviction that Pope had impressed his fatal blindness upon Halleck. We are not, therefore, surprised that, as one would speak upon matters of little concern, so Halleck, in his dispatch of eleven o'clock in the morning of the 26th, informed McClellan that he “had better leave Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and come himself to Alexandria, for great irregularities were reported there;” and that “Franklin’s corps would march as soon as it received transportation.” No doubt there had been irregularities; no doubt there had been confusion in Alexandria: officers clamoring for transportation; managers in despair at the inadequacy of the means of transportation at hand; new relays of men and material constantly arriving from the old Army of the Potomac; and a single line of railway, crowded to its utmost capacity, and yet making little impression upon the troops, equipments, and stores that poured into Alexandria. Had Halleck known how near Jackson was to that single line of railway while he was sending this dispatch, he might perhaps have overlooked the irregularities of railway officials, and censured his subordinate, whose false information and erroneous judgment had lulled him into a fatal security.

Upon the receipt of Halleck’s dispatch, McClellan sailed for Alexandria. He arrived there at night. The railway was then in the possession of the Confederates.

At eight o’clock on the morning of the 27th of August, General McClellan telegraphed, as his first dispatch

from Alexandria to Halleck, that he had just heard that the enemy had burned the railway bridge over Bull Run. The city of Alexandria seemed to McClellan to be quite full of soldiers; but he was told that those remaining there were convalescents chiefly. The duties devolving upon the quartermaster were reported as well performed. General McClellan saw nothing to criticise. The officers and agents of the government were hopeful; their temper was serene. That the Bull Run bridge would be repaired by the morrow, McClellan was assured. All this was communicated to Halleck as early as twenty minutes before ten in the morning. It was therefore to be expected that the movements of his old army, not yet completed, should claim a part of McClellan's care. The line of the Rappahannock had been the point along which Pope was mustering his forces. To that point the corps commanded by Fitz-John Porter, and the division of Reynolds, had been dispatched. Sumner's corps, en route for the same destination, was, on the 26th, landing at Acquia Creek.<sup>1</sup> Burnside was at Falmouth. Two divisions of his corps, under Reno, had, as we have seen, moved up the Rappahannock; and Burnside was charged with hurrying on the troops towards Rappahannock Station.<sup>2</sup>

A telegram from Fitz-John Porter to Burnside was next received by Halleck, and transmitted to McClellan. It gave information of Pope's army. Banks was at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, Ricketts, and Reno were near Warrenton. Reno was on the right. Porter was marching on Warrenton Junction to reënforce Pope.

<sup>1</sup> That the Rappahannock could be reached at an earlier period from Acquia Creek than from Alexandria, McClellan gave to Halleck as his reason for disembarking Sumner's corps at Acquia.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan to Halleck, 9.40 A. M., August 27th, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 323.

Nothing was said of Heintzelman. A battle was reported by Porter as imminent. Halleck was now aroused. "Franklin's corps should march out by some other route than Centreville," if McClellan preferred, "carrying three or four days' provisions." He should move in forced marches and be supplied as fast as possible by railroad. The railway manager, Colonel Haupt, should receive directions from McClellan. He had asked them from Halleck. There must have been a serious neglect to guard the railroad. This should be immediately remedied. General Casey was directed to furnish McClellan with about five thousand of the new troops under his command, and General McClellan was ordered to take entire direction of the sending out of the new troops from Alexandria, determining questions of priority in transportation, and the places they should occupy. That Pope's headquarters were near Warrenton Junction, Halleck knew; but he "could not ascertain the present position of his troops," nor could he get any satisfactory information from the front of the enemy. There had been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible, and a competent officer should be sent in that vicinity to take direction of affairs.<sup>1</sup>

McClellan's reply was dispatched immediately. Orders had been sent to Franklin to prepare to march at once with his corps, giving information of his means of transportation. Kearny, of Heintzelman's corps, was yesterday at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford. Sumner, with his corps, would commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Couch's division had been sent for at once to come from the Peninsula. McClellan had

<sup>1</sup> Halleck to McClellan, *McClellan's Reports and Campaigns*, pages 323-325.

loaned Burnside his personal escort (the first squadron of fourth regular cavalry). to scout down the Rappahannock. Although Halleck may have already received it, McClellan would forward to him all information he might secure, and as fast as received.<sup>1</sup>

Now addressing himself to the task of finding out where Pope was, and where the enemy, McClellan sent a telegram both to General Heintzelman and to General Porter. "Where are you?" he asked, and "what is the state of affairs?" He inquired as to the troops in their front, and on their right and left. Where was Pope's left, and what of the enemy. These dispatches, with the further information that the enemy had burned Bull Run bridge last night with a cavalry force, were sent to Warrenton and to Bealton, with directions to the nearest operator to those places to forward them to the officers designated.<sup>2</sup>

Fears of impending disaster were now crowding fast upon McClellan. His dispatches from this time forth bear evidence that he was filled with a sense of a heavy responsibility. An active quartermaster could have done all that Halleck had thus far required of him. But now steps should be taken to avert the dangers of a defeat of Pope's army. Therefore Halleck was advised that McClellan, in informing Burnside of all that had occurred at Alexandria, had cautioned him to look well to his right flank between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and to guard well his trains moving to Porter. McClellan had fears that the cavalry, who dashed at Bull Run last night, might trouble Burnside. So the next cavalry that he got hold of he should land, and use to keep open communication between Pope and

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, 10.20 A. M., McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 324.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan to Generals Heintzelman and Porter, *ibid.*, page 325.



Porter, as well as to watch the vicinity of Manassas. He had again endeavored to communicate with Porter and Heintzelman from Falmouth. He closed by asking for maps of the present field of operations.<sup>1</sup>

From this hour onward on the day of the 27th, we have no further dispatches from Halleck to McClellan. Telegrams from McClellan to Halleck there are, however, from eight o'clock in the morning, almost hourly, until six o'clock at night. Halleck's silence need not excite wonder. McClellan's cautions and suggestions, though wise and prudent, could not have failed to fill the soul of Halleck with wrath, perhaps with shame. Every word of every one of these messages was courteous, deferential, and patriotic, and yet every word was a reproach. With all Halleck's conceit he could not but feel the sting. In the plan and in the performance of Pope's campaign, the possibility of a disaster which might open the city of Washington to Lee, Halleck seemed not to have considered. Of that reserved strength which a skillful general holds back to retrieve his failing fortunes, or which he opposes as a barrier behind which his broken ranks may form, and his feeble columns be restored, Halleck had not even spoken to McClellan. At the hazard of being charged with holding up Pope's campaign to derision and to contempt, and with the feeling that every suggestion he might make to avert a possible calamity would be used as evidence of his envy and hatred of those who had supplanted him in the field,—a treasonable envy and a malignant hate, damnable enough to lead him to withhold, under the guise of taking measures of precaution against Pope's defeat, all means that could enable Pope to win a victory,—McClellan nev-

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, 10.50 A. M., McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 326.

ertheless pressed upon Halleck telegram after telegram filled with most suggestive inquiries as to the course to be pursued should Pope be overtaken with disaster. "Should not Sumner's corps," he asked, "be moved here, and united with Franklin's? Would not a disaster to Pope if he should fight a battle at Warrenton be also a disaster to troops on the lower Rappahannock? Cannot those troops render their best service in front of Washington?"<sup>1</sup> At five minutes past twelve, noon, it was reported to McClellan that heavy firing had been heard in the vicinity of Centreville; but he could not report to Halleck what had occasioned it, for he had no cavalry to send out. He could only inform Halleck of the fact, accompanying it with a question as to the works and garrisons for the defense of Washington.<sup>2</sup>

Franklin was now ordered by McClellan to get his corps in readiness to move at once. Twenty minutes after twelve found McClellan making more minute inquiries of Halleck. He was as anxious for the preservation of Pope's army as he had been for the defense of Washington. His mind dwelt upon every detail that should aid. The bridges over Bull Run, were they sufficient to reënforce Pope, or to afford him means for a retreat? Was Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success? and if not, should not General Sumner's corps come to Alexandria? Two gun-boats should be sent to Acquia Creek; already the works near Alexandria and their garrisons were being inspected; and the railway should be seen to as soon as General Casey or any other commanding officer could be found. Whatever he ordered, no time would be

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, *McClellan's Reports and Campaigns*, page 326.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

lost in carrying it out, was McClellan's concluding assurance to Halleck.<sup>1</sup>

At fifteen minutes past one in the afternoon the condition of Franklin's corps was made known to Halleck. There were horses enough in his corps for but four guns without their caissons, and no cavalry could be found; therefore, should not Sumner's corps be moved as rapidly as possible for the defense of works in front of Washington? Could Franklin's corps without his artillery or cavalry effect any useful purpose by moving to join Pope? Should not Burnside at once evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, covering any of Pope's troops who might fall back in that direction? Pope's exact position McClellan did not know, nor did he know the enemy's force between Pope and Washington. Did Halleck? Have we force enough in hand, asked McClellan, to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know? Are we safe in the direction of the valley?<sup>2</sup> Thus, while rendering all possible assistance to Pope, McClellan revealed in a tone not open to criticism his fear that Halleck's general was doomed to defeat. In view of all that McClellan had been, in view of the exalted command he had held for his country and before his countrymen, of the issues involved in his campaign, and the great trusts that the people had reposed in him, it was not strange that his dispatches were filled more with battles and strategic movements than with beef, clothing, and transportation of troops. Who will condemn him, if, perchance, he exposed to reproof the person who in elevating such a commander as Pope had degraded such a commander as himself; or who will say that if, in the performance of his duty, he expressed his own fears of an impending

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, *McClellan's Reports and Campaigns*, page 327.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

disaster, he was not somewhat justified in the belief that a disaster was inevitable, when incapacity and ignorance confronted an ability as marked as Marlborough's and a sagacity as unerring as Napoleon's?

Within twenty minutes from the time his last message was dispatched to Halleck, the disaster attending Taylor's brigade in the morning in its contest with Jackson's corps was known at Alexandria.<sup>1</sup> Five troopers of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, illustrious remnants of a whole company, rode into the camp of the fifth Wisconsin regiment to tell the tale of their surprise in the morning, and to brag that they alone remained to reveal it.

Then came straggling infantry and more cavalry, with wagons, and then hundreds of fleeing negroes, loaded with packs and babies, filling the roadway for miles as they crowded onward away from the fight at Manassas Junction,<sup>2</sup> — crowded onward to Alexandria, under the very dome of our own capital, before an enemy whose capital we believed it would require all their own power to defend.

That the force opposed to Taylor had many guns, that it numbered five thousand infantry and was receiving reinforcements every moment, and that General Taylor's command was either cut to pieces or captured, McClellan at thirty-five minutes past one o'clock in the afternoon reported to Halleck. But the end of Federal misfortunes did not come with this disaster. Gainesville was in possession of the enemy. Again was Halleck implored to send cavalry in the direction of Drainsville and Lewinsville to watch the Potomac.

<sup>1</sup> It was brought by some of those valiant members of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry who had been driven away so easily in the morning of the 27th between Bristoe Station and Manassas.

<sup>2</sup> Army of the Potomac, Behind the Scenes, pages 207, 208.

This last disaster confirmed McClellan that the true policy to be adopted in Washington was to garrison the forts in front of Alexandria, to send cavalry in the direction of the upper Potomac, to observe the movements of the enemy, and to mobilize a corps as soon as possible, but not to move it forward until supplied with artillery and with cavalry. These three expedients he pressed upon Halleck in his dispatch of thirty-five minutes past one on the 27th of August, from Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

In conformity with these suggestions McClellan ordered Sumner to send to Alexandria the whole of his corps if he could reach it. Couch with his division was summoned to embark for the same destination from Yorktown. One squadron of cavalry that had now arrived McClellan caused to be at once landed and sent out towards Pope. More cavalry, if there was any at Washington, McClellan begged Halleck to send him. For the defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac McClellan again urged Halleck to provide. But while thus taking upon himself the whole catalogue of responsibilities that belonged alone to the commander-in-chief, McClellan was oppressed with the consciousness that he was powerless to do more than press forward troops and supplies to Pope. What Halleck had ordered him to do was not what McClellan under the circumstances would have advised; and what he had advised he had no power to perform. It was not strange that then there came over him a feeling that interference with his plans for the Army of the Potomac before Richmond was the cause of the disaster then impending over Pope's army before Alexandria. Nor was it to be wondered at that such a feeling should find expression when McClellan fully appreci-

<sup>1</sup> See McClellan to Halleck, *McClellan's Reports and Campaigns*, pages 327, 328.

ated that before the magnitude of the task he was absolutely powerless. "Please inform me at once," McClellan asked of Halleck, "what my position is." He did not wish to act in the dark. He was not responsible for the past, nor could he be for the future, unless he received authority to dispose of the available troops according to his judgment.<sup>1</sup> That the sweetness of Halleck's dreams was somewhat embittered by such dispatches cannot be doubted. To be an ignoble factor in Halleck's movements, Halleck was willing to concede to McClellan. But now the sound of Jackson's guns, borne to the capital, carried to the soul of the general-in-chief a feeling of dismay. Again might the salvation of the nation depend upon the skill of McClellan. Bitter indeed must have been Halleck's reflections. Should Pope fail, should Lee press forward to the Potomac, and carry his triumphant army into Northern States, around whom would the old Army of the Potomac rally with such enthusiastic devotion as around McClellan?

After all Halleck's plans for the defeat, for the downfall, of his rival; after all his hopes that he might through Pope's efforts, though without sharing Pope's perils, achieve a success giving assurance that in a distant future he might grow strong enough to fill the chair from which he had displaced McClellan; after all his wiles and his ways, his deep schemes and his unwholesome influences, to find himself spoken of with contempt, as a general-in-chief, by his countrymen, to find himself doomed to a deep, to a bitter disappointment, — this was too severe, it was too exasperating. Therefore, it is not to be wondered at that to all of McClellan's suggestions ranging above the level of a quartermaster's tasks Halleck returned no reply. Not

<sup>1</sup> McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, 2.30 P. M., August 27th, page 328.

yet had fear opened Halleck's mouth. Nevertheless did McClellan continue to press forward dispatches filled with information and with most fitting suggestions. It was not until six o'clock at night that a copy of Pope's dispatch to Halleck of ten o'clock in the morning was seen by McClellan. In this dispatch Pope had requested that all forces sent to him should move to his right at Gainesville. Halleck had transmitted this copy to McClellan; and McClellan hastened to avow his readiness to coöperate with Pope's desires. If Halleck wished him to order any part of the force at his disposal to the front, it was in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point Halleck might indicate. That force now consisted of about ten thousand men of Franklin's corps, of about twenty-eight hundred of General Tyler's brigade, and of Colonel Tyler's First Connecticut Artillery. The defense of Washington, in this dispatch as in others, appeared as a necessity constantly pressing itself upon McClellan's attention. He had for this purpose recommended that Tyler's artillery regiment should be held in hand; and he had ordered General Casey not to move his men to Yorktown until further orders.<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding such was the activity and zeal with which McClellan labored on the 27th of August, men of the Halleck type in journalism labored with malignant feelings that they might arouse in the public mind contempt and ridicule for the course McClellan pursued. It was said in a sometime reputable journal that McClellan was ordered by Halleck on the 27th of August to place himself within easy supporting distance of Pope; but that he sat idly at Alexandria, thus destroying Pope's justifiable reliances.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, six P. M., August 27th, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 328.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan from Ball's Bluff to Antietam, pamphlet by Wilkes, from Spirit of the Times, page 20.

Nor was this censure confined to journalists alone. In both the armies of the Potomac and of Virginia there were men whose powers of fault-finding and of complaining absorbed their vitality. In the diaries of these days we find the first mutterings of discontent with McClellan, based upon accusations as false as they were malicious. Censorious officers thanked God that they had bidden farewell to the Peninsula, the land of blasted hopes, "the place of our disappointment," the "hot-bed of disgrace to the finest army of modern times." "There are men in the Army of the Potomac to whom Stonewall Jackson's official report of his splendid victory at Cedar Mountain gives more joy than would the winning of a splendid success by McClellan." These are some of the grumblings of the times. They are in that tone and breathe that spirit of malicious feeling which the war department subsequently imputed to McClellan and to his highest officers. They form the very groundwork upon which rested Pope's accusations of treachery, upon which he attempted to explain his defeat. It may, however, be positively affirmed that the bad hearts that could conceive, or the foul mouths that could utter, such tissues of baseless falsehoods were confined to but few, and these were of as little consequence as is the author of a book of the war from which I have quoted, who was a surgeon in a Western volunteer regiment, and whose book exceeds in false statement and falser inference the works of the most renowned grumblers of Christendom.<sup>1</sup> But we must turn from a research among the spiteful falsehoods of the day to follow the windings and courses to which Pope resorted to beat and destroy his pursuers.

Before Buford's cavalry had confirmed the rumors and reports which McDowell had forwarded to Pope

<sup>1</sup> Army of the Potomac, *Behind the Scenes*, pages 202, 203.



since ten o'clock in the evening of the 26th, it became evident to Pope that heavy columns of the enemy were approaching the Federal line of communication with Alexandria, and that the whole of Lee's army was moving towards White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap, rather than toward the valley of the Shenandoah. But Pope was not convinced that the reported interruption of his railway communications was a part of the general Confederate plan. The most serious consequences resulting from this daring raid involved, in Pope's estimation, no more than a strong force to repair damages, to keep the road open, and a want of supplies for his army till the road was again made serviceable.<sup>1</sup>

At an early hour in the morning of the 27th the Federal commander became painfully conscious that, while a movement of his army was a necessity, he was utterly unequal to the task of determining what that movement should be. He inclined to the abandonment of Warrenton and the occupation of Gainesville; but this he would not order until the counsel and guidance of McDowell had been invoked.<sup>2</sup> Pope must "act promptly in some way," but in what way, he frankly confessed, he knew not until McDowell gave him his counsel. Before half past eight in the morning, McDowell suggested a movement of troops, and at half past eight Pope approved McDowell's plans. These plans involved a movement of the Federal army upon Gainesville; and they were no sooner determined upon than Pope became masterly in his advice and energetic in his orders.

"Execute the movement you suggest." Be cautious; conceal it from the enemy. "Send your trains this way; call Banks to you." "Order him to send

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell, August 27th.

<sup>2</sup> Pope to McDowell, 5.30 A. M., August 27th.

his trains off immediately," and send your trains; "we must get to Gainesville to-night; it would be better to move by night, but may not be safe to wait." "Your scouts and lookouts can see the movements of the enemy, and they can tell better than I." Pope then disclosed his intention of moving to Manassas to open the road, and of joining McDowell when that was done.<sup>1</sup>

No time was lost by General McDowell in his advance towards Gainesville. At forty-five minutes past eight, Pope was advised of the movements of Sigel's corps, and of the purposes for which they moved; and at the same time McDowell invited the general in command to place himself near the telegraph instrument at Warrenton Junction and converse with him.<sup>2</sup> Pope replied by averring his intention to be at the telegraph office the greater part of the day. Then through numerous dispatches the transfer of all kinds of public property by wagon or by rail from Warrenton through Warrenton Junction and Catlett's Station towards Manassas was agreed upon. Then, too, the destination of Banks's corps was changed. To McDowell we owe it that our command, respectable in numbers, undaunted by defeat at Cedar Mountain, active, willing, and courageous, was diverted from that pathway which would have thrown us with Hooker, Reno, Porter, Sigel, Reynolds, Ricketts, and King upon Jackson and Longstreet on the old battlefield of Manassas. To repair bridges and mend highways for the safe passage of horse equipments, salt pork, and hard bread is undoubtedly a military duty. But to send, under the circumstances in which Pope

<sup>1</sup> Pope to McDowell, from Warrenton Junction to Warrenton, 5.30 A. M., 8.30 A. M., August 27, 1862, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 201, 202.

<sup>2</sup> McDowell to Pope, 8.45 A. M., Warrenton Junction, August 27th, *ibid.*, page 202.

found himself, a whole corps along a road upon which no enemy appeared, and where there seemed no reason to apprehend that he would appear, to defend wagon trains, instead of using it to oppose the enemy, was, as we now know, an error of judgment arising from McDowell's over-caution. "Had not Banks better retire by way of Warrenton Junction, preceded by his trains?" asked McDowell of Pope at the telegraph office; and thus the matter was settled. McDowell was directed to send Banks such an order from Warrenton, for, said Pope, he is nearer Warrenton than the junction; and Banks was ordered by McDowell to move upon Catlett's Station. Other matters relating to the march by Reno and Kearny on Greenwich were then discussed. Porter's corps, too, was considered, and McDowell was informed that it was on the road. That Sigel would supply Kearny's division with artillery was settled; for Kearny had none with him.<sup>1</sup> The condition in which at this time Pope found the troops that had joined him from the Army of the Potomac and from North Carolina could not but cause uneasiness. The corps of Fitz-John Porter had neither wagons nor provisions, and there were but forty rounds of ammunition to each man. The corps of Heintzelman and the divisions of the ninth corps under Reno were no better supplied. They had no wagons, and provisions with them were getting very scarce. So hurriedly had some of these troops been pushed forward that even their artillery had been left behind.

This conference between McDowell and Pope resulted in a general order for the immediate movement of the Federal army. Sigel's corps and McDowell's with Reynolds's division added, the whole under the

<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic communications between Pope and McDowell at 4.30, 5.30, and 8.45 A. M., August 27th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 202, 203.

command of McDowell, were ordered to move along the Warrenton turnpike and reach Gainesville by night. Heintzelman, with Kearny's division of his corps and Reno's divisions of Burnside's, was ordered to move from Catlett's Station to Greenwich, and to be there by night or early daylight.<sup>1</sup> General Fitz-John Porter was to remain at Warrenton Junction until General Banks relieved him, when he too would push forward for Greenwich. All the troops at Greenwich were to support General McDowell in his operations against the enemy. To General Banks, with his corps, was assigned the duty of covering the movement of the army wagons, which, in immense numbers, and generally from every threatened point, had concentrated around Warrenton Junction.

Banks's instructions were minutely detailed. How the train of his own corps was to be guarded, and that it was to move on a road south of the railroad, was as carefully prescribed by Pope as were his instructions provided he encountered the enemy. Long trains of burden cars, heavily laden at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, were to be pushed forward as fast as bridges were replaced and the road was repaired. The defensive position for Banks's corps was to be on the eastern bank of Cedar Run, and this he was to hold as long as possible. If he could not defend the public property until Manassas was reached, he should burn it. But Banks was to understand that Pope expected a tenacious defense. If he needed assistance, General Fitz-John Porter would aid him. Banks was ordered to keep in constant communication with Porter, whom he would find on his right.<sup>2</sup> Nor were the sick forgotten. Those that could be removed must be trans-

<sup>1</sup> Greenwich is four or five miles from Gainesville.

<sup>2</sup> That is, in the direction of Greenwich, and easterly.

ported to Manassas in the wagon train of Banks's corps, even if it necessitated the destruction of much baggage and regimental property. Pope deemed it prudent to close his order with an avowal of his belief that Banks would discharge the very important duties which he had put upon him with "intelligence, courage, and fidelity."<sup>1</sup>

Upon the receipt of this order, McDowell moved to its instant execution. Of his whole command, Sigel, at Warrenton, was the nearest to Gainesville; Sigel therefore was directed to push a strong force immediately to Buckland Mills, where, on the road to Gainesville, a bridge crossed Broad Run. The remainder of Sigel's corps were, as quickly as possible, to be held in hand to follow his advance. None but ammunition wagons were to accompany the corps on the road; the baggage trains were to proceed to Manassas via Catlett's Station, under charge of Banks. The divisions of Reynolds, King, and Ricketts, in the order named, were to follow Sigel. But Sigel had no cavalry: his own had accompanied Buford, who, at daylight, had moved northwesterly towards White Plains, on that reconnaissance from which Pope had great expectations, about which McDowell made many promises, and of which Halleck made note to McClellan as the one reliable source in settling whether Lee had gone into the Shenandoah Valley. So Bayard, with three regiments, was loaned to Sigel. Kearny's division was, as we have seen, coming up to Greenwich to aid Sigel. But Kearney had no artillery. Sigel, therefore, was directed to hold three of his own batteries in readiness to be sent to him. From Buckland Mills Sigel was

<sup>1</sup> General order by Pope from his headquarters at Warrenton Junction, morning of the 27th of August. See Pope's *Virginia Campaign*, pages 235, 236.

ordered to push on with his corps to Gainesville, but not until the divisions of Reynolds, King, and Ricketts closed up on him.<sup>1</sup>

Thus was the first step to be taken by Pope's army in retiring from Warrenton towards Manassas. Gainesville was the objective point; and in the way towards Gainesville lay the important bridge at Buckland Mills. Milroy was ordered to seize it. For this purpose he marched with his independent brigade. A small detachment of cavalry preceded him. In nearly eight miles the bridge was reached. The condition of Pope's cavalry was such that its arrival in advance of the infantry could not have been predicted. But it did arrive. Confederate cavalry, with one piece of artillery, were found on the eastern side of the run. The bridge was on fire. Milroy claims that Major Krepps charged twice with his cavalry upon the enemy before putting him to flight. The bridge was saved, but in a damaged condition. Now appeared the intrepid Milroy leading his infantry. In fifteen minutes his pioneers had made the bridge safe for his artillery. But Milroy had not waited fifteen minutes. He pushed on with cavalry and infantry in the direction of Gainesville. But two of the three and one half miles to his goal had been passed, when the road to Haymarket opened before him. It was a dangerous point. If Lee were not traveling westward for the valley of the Shenandoah, it was to be feared he was marching eastward towards Washington. A mixed force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was posted here, and Milroy sped on. Gainesville drew nigh. It was unoccupied, save by some two hundred stragglers from Jackson's army corps. Claiming these as prisoners, Milroy, without bloodshed or re-

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Irvin McDowell, Pope's Virgini Campaign, pages 40, 41.

sistance, sat down in Gainesville, and halted his brigade for the night.<sup>1</sup> With the remainder of his corps Sigel advanced rapidly on Gainesville, leaving Steinwehr's brigade at the bridge over Broad Run.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, the three divisions of McDowell's corps were withdrawn from their advanced positions on the Sulphur Springs and Waterloo roads, and pushed forward to the same place.<sup>3</sup>

It was indeed apparent to McDowell that, wherever else he might meet the enemy, it would not be on the banks of the Rappahannock, at Sulphur Springs, nor at Waterloo. For when the morning of the 27th dawned, the hill-sides and the forests were found silent and deserted. Suspicions of the night before were fully confirmed. Longstreet had followed Jackson in the direction of Salem and White Plains.<sup>4</sup>

The march of McDowell's troops from their station near Warrenton and on the Rappahannock was both long and tedious; no excitements cheered, no dangers relieved, its monotony. At New Baltimore Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania reserves came up. The men of this division had been old comrades with those of King's and Ricketts's two months before at Fredericksburg, while McDowell was awaiting a summons to strengthen McClellan at Richmond. But circumstances which "Stonewall" Jackson had done much to create had sent these divisions to different fields. In all their campaigns they had fought the same enemy under the same leader, although at different times and at

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General R. H. Milroy, commanding brigade, first corps, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 94, 95.

<sup>2</sup> Sigel, Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> McDowell to Pope, 4.30 A. M., August 27th, in which positions of his divisions are given.

<sup>4</sup> Longstreet's, Hood's, D. R. Jones's, and Wilcox's Official Reports, Life of General R. E. Lee, by Cooke, pages 116-118.

different places. That leader was General Jackson. Ricketts had pursued him through the Shenandoah Valley after Banks had retreated before him. Reynolds had fought with the Army of the Potomac before Richmond against this untiring and indefatigable chief; while McDowell, with King's and Ricketts's divisions united, confronted Jackson near the Rapidan and behind the Rappahannock. All these events had transpired since the preceding June. And now, on this twenty-seventh day of August, the three divisions of McDowell's corps were reunited in the pursuit of the same invincible Jackson.

Reynolds's veterans from the Peninsula showed many traces of the severity of their campaign. Their faces were bronzed, their colors pierced and torn with bullets, and their ranks thinned. Hearty and enthusiastic sounded the welcome cheers, as, once more united with its old comrades, this division took its place in line, and moved forward, to halt at eleven o'clock at night at the bridge across Broad Run. At the same hour Ricketts's division halted at Gainesville, while King bivouacked by the roadside somewhere between the two. By night, McDowell's entire command was at or near Gainesville, on the pike from Warrenton to Centreville and Alexandria.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### BATTLE OF BRISTOE STATION.

IN tracing thus far the movements of the Federal and the Confederate armies on the 27th of August, no mention has been made of the conflict which took place at Bristoe Station. So important a narrative, and the part this struggle played in shaping the course of events in Pope's campaign, demand the attention of the historian.

When Jackson pressed forward to Manassas Junction, he ordered General Ewell to so dispose his division in the neighborhood of Bristoe Station that a Federal advance towards Manassas might be checked, perhaps prevented. By the earliest dawn the three brigades of this division were formed in line, on either side of the railroad track, on the western bank of Great Run. Lawton's brigade was on the left, and Hays's on his right, while Early, entering a pine wood, formed the extreme right of the line. From here a reconnoitring party of five regiments of infantry and one piece of artillery was sent further to the front. Colonel Forno, commanding this detachment, was ordered to destroy the bridge over Kettle Run, and tear up the rails along the track. He met the regiment of Federal infantry that Heintzelman had dispatched the night before to the scene of reported disturbance near Manassas. No conflict, however, ensued ; for the Federals, seeing themselves outnumbered, reëntered the cars, and made

their way back towards Warrenton Junction. Forno opened upon the retreating train with artillery. The Federals escaped, however, without any casualties. The Confederate commander now retired with his main force to the vicinity of Bristoe Station, leaving two regiments of infantry to demolish the bridge and the railroad. The sixth Louisiana, under Colonel Strong, took post two miles to the west of the Kettle Run bridge, to check any attempt of the Federals to drive away the eighth Louisiana, who, with their main body one mile in rear of the bridge, had engaged in its destruction.<sup>1</sup>

At this time General Pope, conforming to his purpose as declared to McDowell, advanced Hooker's division along the railway from Warrenton Junction on Bristoe Station. It was not Pope's intention to hold back this fine division from the anticipated contest at Gainesville; he intended only to delay its arrival there until he had discovered what force of the enemy really was in his rear at Manassas. For Pope was not yet satisfied with any information he had received from Bristoe Station, or from any other point along the line of the railway, where the enemy had appeared.

So far as we are informed by Pope's dispatches, written on this day in the field, or from his official report, prepared with deliberation in his retirement, nothing had yet transpired to convince him that his rear had been reached by any other force than a raiding body of the enemy's cavalry. Nor did he know the real truth of the matter until after dark of the 27th, when he learned it from the mouth of Hooker himself. But before inquiring into those revelations upon which Pope acted, we are now to relate that Pope thought it advisable to use Hooker on the 27th by sending his division

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports, General J. A. Early and Colonel H. Forno, commanding Hays's brigade, Jackson's corps.

on that day to Bristoe Station, whence, on the 28th, he ordered him to advance on Greenwich,<sup>1</sup> where he would have met Kearny and joined Heintzelman's corps.

In the march to Bristoe Station, the third brigade, commanded by Colonel Carr, moved from Warrenton Junction at seven o'clock in the morning. The march was along the line of the railroad, and Colonel Carr was foremost in the advance. The field and staff officers were on foot; their horses had not been sent forward from Yorktown. It was observed that on this march there was less strife than usual with the stragglers; and it is reported that those mounted officers who had claimed that the fatigue from riding was greater than that from walking, and who had, therefore, been most exacting with the footmen, were now the first to fall out from exhaustion.<sup>2</sup>

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon Colonel Carr had advanced to within half a mile of Bristoe Station. The sixth and eighth Louisiana regiments of Hays's Confederate brigade had, with desultory firing, fallen back before the steady sweep of the Second New York Infantry, deployed as skirmishers. Following the skirmish line, the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth New Jersey, and the one hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania regiments of infantry of Carr's brigade moved in two lines. At this time the enemy made a brief stand, then fell back to within three or four hundred yards of the main Confederate line, where, reënforced by two regiments of infantry and a battery,<sup>3</sup> he offered battle to a force which he then reported and believed to be overwhelming. His position was strongly covered by a thick forest of pine, affording concealment as well as

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Heintzelman.

<sup>2</sup> Captain Blake's *Three Years in the Army*, pages 120-125.

<sup>3</sup> Fifth Louisiana and sixtieth Georgia.

cover. An open field, gently descending towards the Federal approach, separated the Federal infantry from the forest. In this open ground the Confederates had not only a great advantage in the fire of their infantry, but their artillery from a hill in rear could yield efficient aid.

The main Confederate line of infantry of Ewell's division was some three or four hundred yards to the west of the right bank of Broad Run, and was supported by batteries on the ridge of the hill to the right of Early's brigade, which commanded the open ground in front of the right of the Confederate infantry and a road from Gainesville which ran over the bridge. To the left of the railroad, and close upon the railroad station, numerous batteries covered the left of the Confederate line. The main line was well situated to sustain the advanced line by covering its front with the fire of artillery, by advancing to its support, or by sustaining its retreat.

In the event of a contest between the whole of the Confederate and Federal divisions at Bristoe Station the result would have been doubtful. They were evenly matched. In each there were present three brigades, with the advantage to the Confederates of the use of the whole of their equipments, upon a field selected by themselves for a defensive battle.<sup>1</sup> Nor, when we compare the commanders of the opposing divisions, can either claim superiority. Both were soldiers by profession, nearly of the same age, and graduates of the same military school at West Point. In that courage which rises higher as the tide of battle turns furiously, Hooker was not the inferior of Ewell. In that mental serenity which is clearest and coolest when the shock of arms is

<sup>1</sup> Federal brigades : General Grover, Colonel Taylor, Colonel Carr.  
Confederate brigades : General Early, General Lawton, Colonel Forno.

fiercest, Ewell was not the inferior of Hooker. What, therefore, might have been the result had there been an angry or a bitter contest between these two divisions on that afternoon of the 27th of August, no partisan even will venture to hazard an opinion. Though Hooker did not shrink from the trial, we now know that it was no part of General Jackson's plan to seriously oppose the Federal advance on Bristoe Station. He instructed General Ewell, if hard pressed, to join his corps at Manassas Junction. We are, therefore, to describe that course of Federal procedure which in the estimation of the Confederate commander came up to the full measure of a hard pressure when tested by a standard furnished by General Jackson.

Colonel Carr formed his line of battle with the fifth New Jersey on his right, and the second New York and eighth New Jersey on his left, of the railroad. The sixth and seventh regiments of New Jersey infantry, of Carr's brigade, were moved to the left under the guidance of General Hooker in person. An advance was then ordered. The eighth New Jersey on the extreme left and the second New York next to it sprang forward through a dense undergrowth of small pines in their front. They were met by a sharp fire of canister from a battery stationed near the railroad. Near the centre of the open field there was a small ravine, into which the eighth ran for cover, and from which a vigorous fire of musketry was delivered until twenty rounds of ammunition were expended. This fire, mainly directed upon infantry supporting a battery upon the railroad, was delivered with such telling effect that it forced the enemy to retire from his position and seek shelter in the woods in his rear. The second New York sustained the charge with a vigor that was not surpassed by their comrades of the eighth New Jersey.

The contest lasted an hour. The second New York was hard pressed and required relief. Colonel Carr sent in the one hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania to give the second time to breathe. This regiment moved by its left flank along a broad path through the woods from which the eighth, second, and fifth had advanced, and emerged upon the open field, where it was struck full and fiercely by a cross-fire of infantry and artillery. Officers and men went down like nine-pins. For a moment Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, its commander, was staggered. No definite position had been assigned him. The fifth New Jersey, on the right of the railroad, had been unable to move forward, for a dense wood in which it struggled impeded its efforts. To make its way on its own front seemed almost impossible. Its commander therefore turned towards the railroad. There he met the enemy, who, covered by high embankments, were delivering a stinging fire upon the left of our line. From this position a portion of the left wing of the fifth were enabled to take the enemy in flank. While thus engaged the one hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania came to the front. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson saw an inviting interval to the right of the fifth New Jersey, between it and the woods. There he directed his regiment, and added his fire to that of the fifth. After a few volleys the enemy gave way. A charge was ordered, in which the fifth and one hundred and fifteenth participated with shouts of defiance. As soon as the eighth saw, from the left of the railway, that the Confederates were in flight on the right, its commander ordered a charge. The line was formed, and the men ran forward so quickly that though the enemy escaped with the guns of a battery towards which the charge was directed, the ammunition and the rammers fell into the hands of the Federals, and ten or twelve prisoners were captured.

The sixth and seventh New Jersey had been directed by General Hooker towards the right and rear of the enemy's line. Their course had diverged from the main advance soon after crossing Kettle Run. With skirmishers in front, they had met the enemy's skirmishers, had forced them back, and under a severe fire from artillery had gained the hill which rose before them. The combined attack of the regiments of the third brigade drove the enemy from the field. Meanwhile the first and second brigades of the division followed sharp after the third. Colonel Taylor came up with the second brigade in time to strengthen Colonel Carr, with two regiments in rear of his right and the others in rear of his left. Turn now to the first brigade of Hooker's division, which, under General Grover, had left Warrenton Junction at an early hour, and had marched rapidly towards Bristoe. The day was warm; the men suffered from heat. Near the bridge over Kettle Run the videttes of the enemy could be seen in the distance. Line of battle was formed, and the advance continued. Skirmishers in front penetrated the woods, climbed the rising ground, and opened fire at every suspicious object behind which an enemy could find shelter. A small detachment of worn-out cavalry accompanied the brigade; but the infantry quickly marched by the horses, to the mortification of the cavalry commander, who could only gaze hopelessly at his gaunt and staggering animals.

When Bristoe Station was reached, General Grover found that the enemy had crossed the river, and taken a strong position on a high bluff north of it, where, supported by his artillery, he awaited an advance. His flight had been precipitate: the dead and wounded were abandoned; knapsacks and equipments strewn the ground; slaughtered beeves lay where they fell;

fires burned under Dutch ovens filled with baking bread ; pans were filled with half-kneaded dough ; and bags of raw pea-nuts, for coffee, awaited that roasting which the Federals had just inflicted upon the Confederates. The poor occupants of the surrounding houses and farms had brought geese, turkeys, and many delicacies to regale their friends, and these fell into the hands of the Federals, to the chagrin of their owners, who suddenly became indignant when charged with sympathy for rebels. A poor woman with a small household, in whose kitchen were discovered two barrels of cakes, vowed that she had cooked them for family use. It would have been strange indeed if horrors which these poor people witnessed, horrors which had without warning so suddenly fallen, had not unmanned them. In a poor Irish hut, within the field of conflict, the head of the family with his children sought refuge in the cellar, while his wife prayed to the Virgin in a closet. Houses were ransacked in search of treasures. No hovel was too mean to escape. Federal uniforms covered with blood were found. No one could solve the mystery ; even the inmates of the house where they were discovered were ignorant. At this juncture, an aged citizen of the hamlet came to make complaints of spoliation, and was interrogated about the uniforms ; but he knew nothing, or pretended to know nothing, about them, which so incensed a conscientious volunteer that, to rebuke his ignorance, he stole the old gentleman's spectacles from his nose.

Shameful exhibitions not unusual were in this conflict displayed by skulkers and cowards. Squads of them fell to the rear in absolute indifference, while others, sensitive to jibes but too craven to fight, blackened their lips with powder and rejoined their companies, declaring that they had fought in other parts of the field.



From where General Grover rested with his brigade upon his arrival near Bristoe, he moved to his left to higher ground, where he covered his position in front, on his left flank, and on his right. It was now sunset. On the left of the railroad the new line was continued by the brigades of Carr and Taylor. General Hooker then ordered his troops to cross the stream and attack the enemy. The Federal line moved forward two miles, and bivouacked for the night. The enemy was in retreat; he was moving to join Jackson at Manassas. If we recall the movement by Hooker at the beginning of the conflict, when he led the sixth and seventh New Jersey volunteers to the left, while the remaining regiments of the third brigade were moving to the front, we shall find that the enemy saw the flank movement, and that it filled him with apprehension. Early declared that the force would command the rear of the Confederate line and the crossing of Broad Run. This caused an uneasy feeling among the Confederate commanders. The advancing brigades of Hooker's division were plainly seen, and it was feared that if the crossing of Broad Run was delayed until these brigades got into the fight the Confederate division might not be able to avoid a severe action; possibly that it might not cross the river at all. For there is no doubt that the Confederates magnified the force of the Federals before them; they thought it much larger than their own. They spoke of the advancing brigades of Grover and Taylor as "heavy columns." General Jackson reports the advance against him as in "heavy force," and Dabney, in his *Life of Jackson*, says that it was evident "Pope's main force was at hand."

Therefore General Ewell ordered his division to retire across the stream. When Early was told to cover this retreat with his brigade, he glanced with dismay

towards the clouds of smoke arising from the combat in his front. It was a doubtful experiment. The precipitate retreat, however, of those regiments of Forno's brigade that had been engaged at the front, and the passage of the river by both Lawton and Forno across the ford near the site of the bridge, made Early's task a simple one. But in this he was materially aided by Lawton, who formed his brigade and established his batteries upon a bluff on the northeastern bank of the run. In successive lines of battle, with reduced front, Early withdrew to the eastern side of the river, and retired to a hill about three fourths of a mile distant, where again he formed his brigade in line of battle. In the mean time Hays's brigade had proceeded to Manassas, and Lawton's was withdrawn to move in the same direction. Again was Early left alone on his hill, — alone to confront the enemy. The sun had long since disappeared; the light was fast fading. The hills and forests in the waning light were formless and indistinct; and yet Early was restive in his apprehension. By only one method could he confound his enemy, and that method should be a ruse. Unmindful of the darkness, he ordered two of his regiments to elevate their colors and display them while marching in that arc of the circle from which reënforcements might be expected, concealing them on their return. Early reports gravely that then the enemy paused in his pursuit. In this action the Federals lost about three hundred killed and wounded; and this, it may safely be affirmed, hardly covered the casualties suffered by the Confederates, although in their reports they refer to their losses in general terms as "small," or "comparatively slight."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports, on Federal side, of Major-General J. P. Heintzelman; Brigadier-General C. Grover; Colonel Joseph B. Carr, command-

Meanwhile General Buford at daylight bent his course towards Salem, in a northwesterly direction from Warrenton, with all sorts and conditions of cavalry, gathered from all sorts and conditions of commands in Pope's army, to find, if possible, where Lee's army really was and what it intended to do. The weary horses were pushed over the hills and through the meadows and forests with a speed which would have been impossible had Buford met with opposition; but no enemy opposed him. Indeed, both friend and foe seemed to have fled. The stillness was oppressive. Cottages, cabins, and fields were alike devoid of any human occupant. Wherever the works of human hands, for any cause, have been bereft of human life, a weird and ghostly feeling possesses the beholder. The cabin by the roadside closed and vacant; implements of homely toil unused and falling to decay; time's rents and ravages that no one shall repair; the absence of a human face; the air unbroken by the sound of human voice,—these scenes are potent to make us fully realize a desolation from which the horrors of despair are born. Buford pushed forward through this abandoned region. At nearly noon he reached the small village of Salem, situated on the Manassas Gap railway. The march was not a long one, nor was it severe; it was not over

ing third brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Thompson, one hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Burling, sixth New Jersey volunteers; Captain George Hoffman, eighth New Jersey volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Sewell, fifth New Jersey volunteers; Major Banks, sixteenth Massachusetts volunteers; Colonel William Blaisdell, eleventh Massachusetts volunteers; Captain Blake, eleventh Massachusetts volunteers; *Three Years in the Army*, pages 121–125. Official Reports, on Confederate side, General T. J. Jackson, commanding corps; General J. A. Early, commanding brigade, Ewell's division; Colonel H. Forno, commanding Hays's brigade, Ewell's division; "Stonewall" Jackson, by Cooke, pages 281–285; and *Life of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson*, by R. L. Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 269–273.

twelve miles in length, and yet the column of feeble animals was more than twelve hours upon the road.

At Salem, Buford received startling information. Longstreet was within two miles of him, and Jackson's corps had passed on towards White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap on the preceding day. That it was Lee's purpose to do what now Buford found he was doing, scouts and spies had declared on the day before. But now Buford knew it.

The occupation of Salem by the Federal cavalry was soon known to Longstreet. His column was halted, and his march delayed for an hour. No cavalry accompanied this column of Confederate infantry; the whole, under Stuart, was with Jackson; therefore Longstreet was for a time unable to interpret Buford's movement. But he soon advanced, ready to deploy into line of battle. This movement was seen by the Federal commander in time to abandon Salem without coming into collision with Longstreet's infantry. Buford marched towards White Plains. At Salem some fifty prisoners were taken and sent to Warrenton; on the road from Salem many stragglers from Jackson's column were picked up. From White Plains Buford turned to his right; he reached Warrenton at about nine o'clock at night, to find it abandoned. His men were wearied; his horses were worn out with hunger and with fatigue; no food or forage could be procured. The deserted village was guarded until daylight. As it was necessary that the command should be ready to mount at a moment's notice, the horses were kept in waiting with all their heavy equipments on. Such was this day's rest and refreshment for the severer labors that each day of Pope's campaign exacted from his worn-out cavalry.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of McDowell; Colonel Beardsley, Sigel's corps; Colonel Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry; and Confederate General Longstreet.

General McDowell congratulated himself, when he received Buford's report, that he had concentrated his troops at Gainesville and its vicinity ; for he was in the best possible position to throw himself in the path of that column of the enemy which had not yet passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and to pursue that column that had ; besides, he was in position between the wings of Lee's army.

When McDowell, pushing forward in person to join his command at Gainesville, reached Buckland Mills, he met General Sigel. It was in the early evening.

A conference between these commanders took place, in which McDowell told Sigel that Longstreet would be coming through the gap the next morning (the 28th), and that as the head of Sigel's corps was already on the road leading from the gap to Manassas Junction, he would charge him with the duty of marching to Haymarket, watching the gap, and engaging the enemy when he came through. For this purpose he would strengthen him with a division from his own corps, while with his two remaining divisions he would go in pursuit of that column of the enemy that had passed through the gap. While preparations were being made to carry out this movement, Pope, — who, then at Bristoe Station, had been advised of it, — by an order written at nine o'clock at night, commanded the complete abandonment of the position at Gainesville, and of McDowell's plans.<sup>1</sup>

Now that there was no longer a shadow of doubt where the enemy was, General McDowell's position was justified by every rule of military experience, by every maxim of military law. Sigel *had* reported to McDowell his belief and strong conviction that a very large

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Irvin McDowell, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 40, 41.

force of the enemy had passed through Salem many hours since, and McDowell, in reporting to Pope that such was Sigel's belief, accompanied it with a dispatch throwing doubt upon Sigel's conclusions.<sup>1</sup> But at last there was found abundant justification for Sigel's belief and for the movement to Gainesville, as well as abounding thankfulness on McDowell's part that he was there.

At five o'clock in the afternoon, Pope, still at Warrenton Junction, had announced to McDowell that the enemy had retired from the railroad before Hooker's advance, without great damage to road or bridges; that Reno would reach Greenwich by night; that Heintzelman would follow him; and that Porter, with his whole corps, would follow Heintzelman. At the same time, he declared that he was just leaving for Bristoe Station, and that his "headquarters to-night would be with Heintzelman."<sup>2</sup>

Pope then moved forward to Bristoe Station, and when there formed the determination of ordering his whole army to that place. What the causes were which induced him to commit this stupendous blunder will be revealed in the narrative of what transpired there.

When Pope met Hooker at Bristoe, he found that the enemy, who had been raiding in his rear, burning his bridges, tearing up his railways, and destroying the immense stores of supplies that they could not transport, was commanded by General Jackson in person, and consisted of the three divisions of his corps under Generals A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Taliaferro; and he heard, with a joy to which for many days he had been

<sup>1</sup> "A signal officer on Watery Mountain has made out a wagon train and a line of troops northwest of this mountain moving towards Chester Gap, and no signs of the enemy or his train at Jefferson." (McDowell at Warrenton to Pope at Warrenton Junction, August 27th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 203.)

<sup>2</sup> Pope to McDowell, five P. M., August 27th, *ibid.*

a stranger, that Hooker had engaged the Confederates and had been victorious.<sup>1</sup>

In what numbers the Confederates actually opposed Hooker was unknown to Pope, though he did know that the forces of the enemy which had resisted his advance had been driven back by a steady and determined onset of one of Hooker's brigades; that they had retired across Broad Run towards Manassas; and that the brigades of Generals Grover and Taylor were then following, or preparing to do so. The aspect of the ground where the conflict had raged confirmed Pope's belief that the enemy had met with a serious repulse. Until half past six in the afternoon all the reports from Hooker's front pointed to the conclusion that the enemy had retired with precipitation. Pope was once more hopeful. With no clear apprehension of the use to be made of him, Pope, at half past six o'clock in the evening, summoned General Porter's corps to the scene. General Porter was at night-fall at Warrenton Junction. The greater part of his command had marched that day from eighteen to nineteen miles. "His troops were wearied and broken down."<sup>2</sup>

Although Pope's dispatch to Porter clearly indicated an aggressive purpose, there may have been in his mind at half past six a feeling that Jackson, smarting from defeat, meditated further aggression himself at or in the vicinity of Bristoe Station. But whatever his real motive may have been (we shall endeavor hereafter to discover it), he ordered Porter, then at Warrenton Junction, to move at one o'clock at night,<sup>3</sup> with

<sup>1</sup> See, for this admission, Pope's orders to McDowell, Fitz-John Porter, and Kearny, at 6.30 and 9 P. M., August 27th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 236, 237.

<sup>2</sup> See record of the trial of General Porter, Executive Document No. 71, Thirty-seventh Congress, third session, page 160.

<sup>3</sup> August 28th.

his whole corps, and be at Bristoe Station "by daylight to-morrow morning." If Morell had not joined him, "urge him forward." If Banks had not arrived at Warrenton Junction, "hurry him forward with all speed." Tell him, if he is with you, — and if he is not, write to him, — that "he had best" run back the railroad trains "to *this* side of Cedar Run." Leave a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery at Warrenton Junction, if Banks is not there, till he arrives; and leave instructions for him to follow you immediately upon his arrival. Hooker had had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred in killed and wounded. "The enemy," continued Pope, "has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad." "It is necessary," reads the dispatch, "on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight." The officer who bears this "will conduct you to this place."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Porter at Warrenton Junction, 6.30 P. M., August 27th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 236.

Out of this and other duties with which General Porter was charged during the remaining days of Pope's campaign, there came a trial by court-martial, in which Porter was accused by Pope of negligence, of disobedience, and of misbehavior before the enemy. Matters brought into controversy before the court involved almost all the important facts which make up the history of Porter's duties and his conduct in Pope's campaign. Particularly is this true of the days of the 27th, 28th, and 29th of August. Of course there existed much controversy as to what was truth and what was error. To do all in my power to establish the truth I shall refer, in this history of Porter's movements, not only to the official statements of contemporaneous reports, to the sworn statements of witnesses at the trial, to the many reviews and reports which, since the trial, have been made by many distinguished men, but to new evidence not accessible at Porter's trial, and therefore not before the court.

Since the above paragraph and all that follows relating to the conduct of General Porter in Pope's campaign was prepared for the press, General Porter has been most honorably acquitted, by a board of officers of high rank in the United States Army, of every charge on which he was tried and convicted by a court-martial in 1863. The opinion prevailed among thoughtful men that the conviction by that court and the approval of its



As the night waned and darkness enveloped the river, the fields, and the forest, reports from the front grew more and more favorable. General Grover with his brigade had crossed Broad Run, had followed the enemy, who was retreating, and had advanced two miles beyond the river. It seemed as if the enemy was in flight. This turn in affairs dissipated the gloom which had so seriously oppressed the Federal commander, and restored that assurance which he was wont to manifest in his boasting dispatches in the earlier part of his campaign. Pope was buoyant; he no longer feared being caught by the enemy; the enemy should fear rather what it was to be caught by him. So he determined to make his fears practical by an attempt, as he described it in his dispatches, to "bag him." Pope's plans

sentence of lasting disgrace by Abraham Lincoln were not justified by the facts which were known, and would be utterly indefensible with a full knowledge of all the facts, the most important of which were not available to Porter in a season of open hostilities. For many weary years since the war closed in 1865, General Porter has made strenuous efforts to have the whole facts set forth in a review of his cause. With President Johnson, during his single term of office, with his old associate at West Point and in the army, U. S. Grant, during his double term, he pleaded beseechingly, asking for justice; but he pleaded to ears that were deaf to his appeal. It remained for President Hayes, a man who had no professional sympathy with General Porter, to incline his ear to Porter's cry, to open his heart to Porter's demand for justice, — justice alone, — and to resolve that, so far as he could, he would give to this suppliant the opportunity he craved. Accordingly, he ordered Major-General J. M. Schofield, Brigadier-General Alfred H. Terry, and Brevet Major-General George W. Getty, all of the United States Army, "to examine the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, late major-general of volunteers, and to report, with the reasons for their conclusions, what action, if any, in their opinion, justice requires should be taken by the President on the application for relief in that case." And they, after a thorough examination of all the evidence presented and bearing in any manner on the merits of the case, made on the 19th of March, 1879, a report that "in our opinion justice requires at his [the President's] hands such action as may be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which that sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the date of his dismissal from the service."

for the execution of this insane purpose were immediately formed, and orders issued to carry those plans into execution.

At nine o'clock at night at Bristoe Station, dispatches to McDowell, Kearny, and Reno called these officers and their commands from Gainesville, and from routes along which they were hurrying to reach Gainesville, to march upon Manassas Junction. Revealing his triumph in the fight at Bristoe in a laconic manner, the Federal commander, with a nervous style and a florid pen, urged what he commanded and commanded what he urged. To McDowell and to Kearny "bagging the whole crowd" should reward their full and instant execution of his plans.

McDowell received orders to march rapidly with his whole force at daylight to-morrow morning<sup>1</sup> on Manassas Junction, because Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill were between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. He was directed to march with his right resting on the Manassas Gap railroad, and his left thrown well to the east. The "severe fight" with Hooker was then revealed, and the result claimed that we "drove them back several miles along the railroad." Pope ended his dispatch with the exhortation to "be expeditious," and the fruits should be that the "day is our own."<sup>2</sup>

Pope was exuberant in his faith; no doubts now, no gloom. His whole army was rushed forward to capture Jackson's corps. Reno was diverted from Greenwich and directed upon Manassas Junction. Kearny was saluted with an urgent appeal: "At the very earliest blush of dawn push forward with your command with all speed to this place." "I want you here at day-

<sup>1</sup> The 28th of August.

<sup>2</sup> Pope to McDowell, nine P. M., August 27th, from Bristoe Station, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 237.

dawn, if possible, and we shall bag the whole crowd." "Never mind wagon trains or roads till this affair is over." "Be prompt and expeditious." "You cannot be more than three or four miles distant. Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Ewell are in front of us."<sup>1</sup>

The corps of General Banks, at ten o'clock in the morning of the 27th, was calmly resting in the woods near Fayetteville, contemplating the plains and the hills, the cleared land and the forest that lay between them and the Rappahannock, when Pope's order for the movement of our corps was received. The undefined air of nervous apprehension, perceptible though undefined, that Pope's order betrayed, was increased in its transmission by Banks to his division commanders. Preparation for an immediate movement, and the personal supervision of commanding officers to such preparations, was commanded; while the urgency of the occasion, in the words, "let no time be lost," concluded the order with an exhortation. None but ammunition wagons were to accompany the troops, who were to move in full force with three days' cooked rations. Supply trains were to precede the corps, and so were all the sick that had been sent down from Warrenton, and all the countless teams and trains crammed with public property for Manassas. A hasty examination of each man's supplies of food and ammunition preceded the order for an instantaneous movement, which brought the corps to Bealton on the railroad, and thence, by a hurried march in the afternoon through Warrenton Junction, to Catlett's Station.

These movements were made with haste, for McDowell's march to Gainesville had sent a rumor flying from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction that the enemy

<sup>1</sup> Pope at Bristoe Station to McDowell, Kearny, and Reno, at nine P. M., August 27th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 237.

threatened the former place, and if so, that he soon would appear at the latter seemed so probable that the Federal sick and all public stores were hurried forward out of immediate danger.<sup>1</sup>

General Pope estimated the numbers of his own troops within the theatre of his operations on the 27th of August, as follows: At Gainesville and at Haymarket, Sigel's corps of 9,000 men, and McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, of 15,500; at Greenwich, or where it was easy to reach Greenwich, were Reno's divisions of Burnside's corps of about 7,000, and Heintzelman's and Porter's corps of 18,000 men; and Banks's corps, whose destination was changed from Gainesville to Warrenton Junction, of about 5,000 men. The concentration of Heintzelman's and Porter's corps at Greenwich, as ordered early on the 27th, would have brought Pope's army to within about four miles of Haymarket or of Gainesville, and would have given Pope an available force at these points of 54,000 infantry and artillery. His cavalry was not enumerated in the totals; for it was spoken of as a broken-down force, from which nothing could be expected, numbering on paper about 5,000 men, with only 500 of them able to render proper service.<sup>2</sup> But, whatever may have been the real numbers of the Federal army, — and it will not be affirmed that Pope exaggerated his numbers, — that army, on the night of the 27th of August, was firmly established between the corps of Longstreet and of Jackson.

Now if we turn for one moment to the position of Lee's army on the night of the 27th of August, we

<sup>1</sup> Orders of General Banks, near Fayetteville, August 27th, ten A. M. Reports of Colonel Colgrove, twenty-seventh Indiana volunteers; Colonel Ruger, third Wisconsin; Colonel G. L. Andrews, second Massachusetts volunteers, — Gordon's brigade, August 27, 1862.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's Official Report.

shall be able to form a clear idea of the advantages which the Federals had gained.

The right wing of Lee's army, commanded by Longstreet, rested at night, on the 27th, at White Plains. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the head of this column halted at the entrance to Thoroughfare Gap.<sup>1</sup> Before it, to the eastward, stretched the same road that Jackson had followed, with Haymarket but four miles away, Gainesville but six, and both Haymarket and Gainesville, which had witnessed the passage of Jackson's corps on the morning of the 26th of August, while Pope was watching the Rappahannock, were now swarming with Federal troops under McDowell.

The new line of battle which General Jackson was pushing forward to take up during much of the night of the 27th, and the early morning of the 28th, we have before referred to.<sup>2</sup> But the relations of the two armies will be clearer, if we point out that the line on which Jackson formed his troops was but three and one half miles from Gainesville, to the north of the old battle-field of 1861 at Bull Run, and facing toward the little hamlet of Groveton; and that to form his corps on this line, the second brigade of Taliaferro's division was moving on Groveton, the third on Sudley Mills, and the first and fourth to take a position about half a mile beyond the intersection of the turnpike with the road running north to Aldie.<sup>3</sup> Hill's division, at ten A. M., moved out on the Warrenton turnpike, towards Stone

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of General Longstreet, commanding corps; General Hood, commanding division; General D. R. Jones, commanding division; General Wilcox, commanding division.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pages 151, 152.

<sup>3</sup> Official Reports of General Taliaferro, commanding Jackson's old division; Colonel Safford, commanding fourth Louisiana brigade. This brigade passed through Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 27th, marched to Manassas, and fell back to Groveton at night of the 27th and A. M. of the 28th.

bridge.<sup>1</sup> The brigades of Ewell's division bivouacked on the night of the 27th between Manassas and Bull Run, in the morning at dawn continued their march, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, moved through the fields on the north side of the run to Stone bridge, where, again crossing, the division marched out on the Warrenton turnpike and formed in line of battle, on the morning of the 28th of August, near Sudley Church. Stuart's cavalry moved generally on the flanks.<sup>2</sup>

It will be readily seen, from this description of the positions occupied and to be occupied by the Confederate troops on the night of the 27th of August and on the morning of the 28th, that for all the good he could have accomplished in furtherance of his plans, it was entirely immaterial to Pope whether General Porter left Warrenton Junction at one o'clock or at three o'clock on the morning of the 28th, or whether he arrived at Bristoe Station at daylight or as soon after daylight as he could get there, for Jackson would have carried out his plans for a union with Longstreet, unmoved and undisturbed by any force that Pope could have summoned to Bristoe Station. But Porter was ordered to leave Warrenton Junction at one o'clock A. M.; he was ordered to be at Bristoe Station at daylight, and this order he had not literally complied with; and because he had not literally complied with this order, Pope was very angry. Pope's dispatch was received by Porter at ten P. M. of the 27th, and sent by Porter, as soon as received, to General Banks, "so that no time should be lost" in acquainting Banks with his instructions.

At this hour it was Porter's intention to march at one o'clock in the morning; but he was induced to de-

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, A. P. Hill.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports, A. P. Hill, Early, and Stuart.

lay until three o'clock, by representations addressed to him by his division commanders, that their men needed rest and food, that the night was dark, the roads incumbered, and that little progress could be made. At three o'clock, the column stretched out along the roadway. It was then dark; the roads were still obstructed by all the corps trains of Pope's army, and the troops could make no headway. It soon became apparent that, if nothing could be gained by starting at three, nothing could have been lost by not starting at one, and that the column could not advance until daylight. It was eight o'clock in the morning when Porter, in person, reported to Pope at Bristoe Station. At ten A. M. his whole division was up. At the same hour, Kearny's and Reno's divisions arrived. These divisions were directed to leave at the "first blush of dawn," and be at Bristoe at "day-dawn if possible," and they were but four miles distant from Bristoe, while Porter's march was more than ten miles in length.

It was nothing to Pope that these facts existed; nothing to him that no plan had been frustrated, no movement defeated by Porter's delay. Here was a technical disobedience of orders which Pope remembered and put away for future service, perhaps. It would make a good pretext for a charge of willful insubordination against Porter. But it was apparent, even to Pope, that Porter's conduct was a slender thread upon which to hang so weighty an accusation; therefore, that thread should show a strand of contemptuous disobedience from which treasonable purposes might be woven, if, perchance, subsequent disaster made it expedient for Pope to find a scapegoat to bear the fearful load of his own incompetency. Unhappily, disaster came, and unhappily, too, Porter gave Pope another opportunity. When Pope put forth to the world his

statement of the causes, motives, and actions which made up his campaign, he saw clearly enough that, to convict General Porter of a traitor's conduct that should merit a traitor's doom, he must connect his own interpretation of Porter's conduct on the 29th of August with his own interpretation of Porter's conduct on the 28th. One animating spirit of contemptuous insubordination must pervade them both. Therefore, in Pope's official report of this campaign, he abused General Porter savagely for not literally obeying his orders in the march to Bristoe Station. "General Porter," he said, "failed utterly to obey the orders that were sent him. He gave as an excuse that his men were tired; that they would straggle at night; that the wagon trains would obstruct his march. He made no attempt to comply with the order."<sup>1</sup>

This charge was a misrepresentation, a perversion of the truth. To charge Pope with nothing more than recklessness in making it, is to treat him with a charity which he denied to those who incurred his displeasure. He was in his denunciations of others inveterate, universal, and circumstantial. His imagination was vivid, but his faculty of scolding and fault-finding surpassed the power of his imagination even.

That it was proven before a court-martial that Porter attempted a night march to Bristoe, and that he abandoned it for justifiable reasons; that Porter's arrival at Bristoe was in ample time for any use that Pope might have made of his corps, could not move Pope to shame for his false accusations on the one hand, nor did it on the other move him to admit that the exigency for the order not having arisen, an exact compliance with that order was no longer a necessity. Pope, in his official report, many days after his defeat, declared that he

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.



summoned Porter from Warrenton Junction by night, to prevent Jackson from turning his right at Bristoe; that from this arose the urgency for his order. A writer on natural history begins a chapter on snakes in Ireland with the opening remark that "there are no snakes in Ireland;" and Pope, though obliged to admit, in his chapter on the disasters arising from General Fitz-John Porter's disobedience on the night of the 27th of August, that Jackson did not attempt to turn his right at Bristoe, dwells upon the awful results that might have happened to his army if he had. The severity of Pope's denunciation, while reflecting upon this hypothetical assault by General Jackson, is so far in excess of the results flowing from Porter's alleged disobedience, that an impartial reader will search beneath the words of the accusation for the concealed spirit that prompted it. That this declared necessity was a subterfuge and an after-thought, there are many reasons for believing, other than those already given. It is noticeable that this necessity is not found among those which Pope volunteered to Porter in his order for the night march. As revealed to Porter at half past six P. M. of the 27th, Pope's purpose was aggressive only, — "we must drive Jackson from Manassas;" "Jackson is retiring along the railroad;" "we must clear the country between Manassas and Gainesville,"<sup>1</sup> — and this purpose continued to grow more and more aggressive until at nine o'clock at night it culminated in Pope's expressed determination "to bag the whole" of Jackson's command. Here there is nothing that resembles fear that Jackson would turn Pope's right at Bristoe; nor had there been a cause for this fear in the precipitate retreat of the whole of Ewell's division be-

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Porter, 6.30 P. M., August 27th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 236.

fore an attack by one brigade of Hooker's late in the afternoon of the 27th. Was not this sufficient to allay any apprehension that Jackson intended to attack Hooker in force; was it not proof that Jackson would do no more than cover his troops while the desolation of Manassas was completed? Was Pope so blind as to believe that Jackson would reoccupy, later at night, the ground from which he had withdrawn voluntarily in the afternoon? Granted that these signs made no impression upon Pope; and that he did, at half-past six P. M., really look for Jackson to turn his right at Bristoe; even then he cannot deny that at nine o'clock at night he had abandoned that belief. His whole army was summoned to march at daylight towards Manassas to "bag Jackson." That the whole of Jackson's army at daylight of the 28th was in position from five to seven miles north of Manassas Junction, at the very hour when McDowell and Sigel, Reynolds, Kearny, Reno, and Porter were starting on a tramp, varying in length from eight to ten miles, to reach Manassas Junction and open their bag, disturbed neither Pope's serenity nor his confidence in himself. With an unblushing audacity, he declares in his official report that Jackson's movement was a mistake, and that this mistake "alone saved us from the consequences which would have followed this flagrant and inexcusable disobedience of orders on the part of General Porter."<sup>1</sup> Men versed in military art, looking not beyond the words of Pope's report, may wonder why, when at nine o'clock the necessity for Porter's night march had disappeared, Pope did not relieve his already overburdened troops from making it. It would have been but the legs of one horse overtasked, for the well-being of a corps; but a single word to General Porter to delay

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

till daylight. Pope has drawn for us in his official report a piteous condition of his army on this day. His troops, he says, had been continually marching and fighting, night and day, from the 18th to the 27th of August; there was scarcely an hour's interval in the roar of artillery during that period; the men had had little sleep, and were greatly worn down with fatigue; with little time to get proper food or to eat it, they were engaged in constant battles and skirmishes, and were performing services laborious, dangerous, and excessive beyond any previous experience in this country; therefore their numbers were greatly reduced by deaths, wounds, sickness, and fatigue.<sup>1</sup>

It might therefore be supposed that a useless march, though ordered, would, if not performed, be an occasion which Pope might seize to express his gratification. That both men and animals had not toiled in darkness over obstructed roads during the night, even though the men and animals were from a corps of the Army of the Potomac, might give promise of better service, when service was needed, and therefore Pope's interest, if not his humanity, might have found nothing to condemn, even if he found no cause to rejoice. But Pope was not thus moved; he could not look beyond himself; he made pretense that he could not believe that Porter's delay was due to his humanity. Thus reasoned Pope; and thus reasoning, he found the inspiring motive of Porter's conduct to be disobedience. This was the key by which he would interpret all of Porter's action in the future.

Little, however, did Porter suspect the malevolence which Pope treasured up against him. Porter had failed to give a blind, unreasoning obedience to Pope's order. He had not left Warrenton Junction at one o'clock;

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

he had not arrived at Bristoe Station at daylight; and therefore, as soon as he could report to him, he explained that darkness, obstruction, mud, and rain<sup>1</sup> had caused him to postpone leaving Warrenton Junction for two hours; that since then he had pushed on as fast as he could. Not the slightest word of disapprobation did Pope then utter; no reproach, no accusation escaped him. So far as General Porter could judge, Pope approved his subordinate's discretion. Military law and usage attach to the execution of an order by a subordinate, in the absence of his superior, an honest discretion, guided and controlled by a sincere sense of duty. So far as Porter could judge, Pope justified his delay; for no military duty had suffered, no military plan had been changed, no success was compromised, no danger was threatened. Therefore Porter remained quietly and calmly with his corps during the day and night at Bristoe Station. After events, then slowly but fatally enveloping this most unhappy general, did not "cast their shadows before." Conscious of his own innocence, he could not believe, he did not dream of, the lurking spite in the heart of his commander. Before the court-martial which at a later period investigated this matter and others made subjects for charges against Porter, and which will be hereafter referred to at greater length, Pope, then being under oath as a witness, did not remember that at eight o'clock on the morning of the 28th of August he had any conversation with General Porter in reference to obeying or disobeying the order for the march from Warrenton Junction, and the arrival of his corps at Bristoe Station. Nor was he sure that Porter gave him any explanations. He did have, he said, a general recollection that

<sup>1</sup> See quotations from Court-Martial Record (hereafter to be cited as Court-Martial), Appendix.

Porter spoke to him "of his march, and the difficulties that he had in getting wagons out of the mud; but the particulars" he "did not remember, for he was very much occupied, and *the necessity which made his presence important had passed away.*"<sup>1</sup> That the necessity did not exist at all we claim to have shown in preceding pages; unless, indeed, Pope believed that blind obedience to his orders, be they wise or foolish, possible or impossible, founded on probable or improbable movements of the enemy, made the necessity. That such is the belief of vain men trusted for a brief period with the reins of power, is as well recognized as that men wise and great leave to the commanders of their corps in the execution of their orders a wise and a large discretion. Commensurate with the interest of the general in command is the interest of every officer and soldier within it. Responsibility for interests of such magnitude as those of a nation in jeopardy by war, throws upon the commander of a corps a corresponding duty, which sometimes justifies a departure, in details, or in matters not material, from the exact words of a military order. But that such a relation had no place in Pope's mind; that he was supreme, mighty, unapproachable, and alone responsible for all that could happen; that his words were law, and his commanders of corps bound to give to them unreasoning obedience, is clearly demonstrated from the further answers made by Pope before the court. He was asked to refresh his recollection as to whether, on the morning of August 28th, he complained to Porter for his not complying with his order. "I should not be very likely," was Pope's answer, "to complain to my subordinate officer of a disobedience to [*sic*] my orders. I am therefore very sure that I did not complain to General Porter."<sup>2</sup> What dignity! what

<sup>1</sup> Court-Martial.

<sup>2</sup> Court-Martial, page 18.

majesty ! Can we forget Pope at the telegraph wire at Warrenton Junction, where "he would be all day" to hear what his subordinate McDowell would advise him to do ? Can we forget his distrust when, still later, as the movements of the enemy became more alarming, he called out to his subordinate McDowell, at Warrenton, to take command of everything and do anything he pleased, — anything and everything, — to defeat the enemy ? Or is it that Pope in the city of Washington, under the inspiration of the warlike fictions of the civilian Judge-Advocate Holt,<sup>1</sup> rose to a mightier stature than when in council with McDowell and his own Inspector-General Roberts in the field ?

We have endeavored faithfully to recall the incidents of the 27th, and the movements made by Pope to meet the corresponding movements of the enemy. Pope's despondent conference with McDowell, resulting in the movement to Gainesville and Greenwich to meet the threatened movement of Lee, of which upon the 27th Pope was apprised ; Pope's arrival at Bristoe, his elation at Hooker's victory, and his purpose to "bag" Stonewall Jackson and the whole of his corps, have been treated in full. And it now remains to refer to his official reports of these periods, for they only make clearer the fact that his report of his campaign is in a large measure the creation of his own imagination, that it has no basis to stand upon when facts strike telling blows at fame. For example, when Pope reports that he was not fully apprised of Lee's movements on the 26th and 27th, because a cavalry reconnaissance, ordered by him from Manassas on the 26th, did not report to him Jackson's march through Thoroughfare ; and that if it had he would have done otherwise than

<sup>1</sup> Holt, as Judge-Advocate-General of the army, prosecuted the cause against Porter before the court-martial.

he did ; he fails to reveal, what he cannot conceal, that before such a report could have been made to him, Jackson would have cut the railroad at Bristoe. He fails to reveal that if what he ought to have feared, from what he saw, did not forewarn him of Jackson's movements, a reconnaissance that could not have penetrated the lines of Stuart's cavalry, and could not have reported to him before the 27th, if it had, would have been of no avail. But Pope would have us believe that he felt "but little uneasiness" at the movement of Jackson "toward White Plains and in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap ;" he relied upon troops that had been promised him from the Army of the Potomac, upon Franklin, upon Cox, and upon Sturgis. "If Franklin had been at Centreville, even if Cox and Sturgis had been as far west as Bull Run on the 26th," then says Pope, "the movement of Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap upon the railroad at Manassas would have been utterly impracticable."<sup>1</sup> When Pope heard that Jackson had struck the Manassas Gap railroad at Kettle Run, he felt, he says, that he must rely "alone" upon the small force under his "own immediate command for any present operations against the enemy." He "determined," therefore, he relates, "to abandon at once the line of the Rappahannock and throw his [my] whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction, to crush the enemy who had passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and to interpose between the army of General Lee and Bull Run."<sup>2</sup> Pope's main object, he says, was to cover Washington ; his own disappointments about reënforcements made him fear that there was no other sufficient force to cover it. Therefore, he says, he would not retire in the direction of the lower fords of the Rappahannock

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

and unite with the forces there, which would have been easy for him to do.<sup>1</sup> One who reads Pope's dispatches of the 26th and 27th of August, addressed to his corps commanders, — the dispatches from which this history has been compiled, — will hardly believe that Pope formed this Spartan resolve. He will read of the indifference with which, on the night of the 26th, Pope informed McDowell of the interruption of his railway communication at Kettle Run; he will remember the single regiment sent to open it, and the single division forwarded the morning of the 27th, under Hooker, to Bristoe Station, and from there to concentrate at Greenwich. He will recall Pope's arrival at sunset of the 27th at Bristoe, where for the first time he knew that "Stonewall" Jackson with his whole command was in his front; and then he will remember the hilarious shouts of joy, and not the groans of sacrifice, with which Pope called his whole army into an utterly false position to "bag" his opponent. Not to cover Washington was it, that Pope on the night of the 27th ordered that ill-fated movement for daylight of the 28th. When Pope failed to realize his expectations from such acts of consummate folly, he resorted to his usual pretexts, and declared that his failure was due to the omissions and disobediences of others. He cried out that Buford did not report the results of his reconnaissance to him, that Porter was disobedient, and that he was not aided from Washington.

These are some of the subterfuges to which Pope resorted to escape the inevitable consequences of his fatal order of nine o'clock at night of the 27th of August.

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.



## CHAPTER IX.

THE TWENTY-EIGHTH OF AUGUST.

WHILE the Federal capital was filled with consternation by the reports of fugitives from Manassas; while McDowell was confounded by a strategy which flung away a splendid opportunity for a concentration of the whole Federal army completely and squarely between the two corps of the Confederates at Gainesville; Pope, thinking only of the doubtful advantages of a stern chase after the enemy from Bristoe Station and from Gainesville to Manassas Junction and to Centreville, pushed onward in pursuit.<sup>1</sup> Though McDowell's corps might have been held at Gainesville, without fear of disaster; or might have advanced to take Jackson in rear, while the three corps of Sigel, Heintzelman, and Porter with the divisions of Reno assailed him in front; and though the advantages of such a disposition were apparent, the command to pursue was so positive that no discretion in its execution was open to McDowell. He could not protest that Pope's order for his march on the 28th took no note of Jackson's march during the night before; that the line which his extreme left would traverse in following the direction indicated would take him far south of the course which Jackson had many hours before pursued towards Sudley Mills, and that he could do no more than cross the trail of Jackson's column, not less than six hours too late. Noth-

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

ing was left but obedience, and that McDowell gave without delay and with his usual vigor.

The wearied troops of his own corps did not fail him, though many of them, from long marchings and counter-marchings, had hardly closed their eyes by the roadside on the 27th before they were summoned again to new trials and more severe exertions on the 28th. Many of them, too, had sunk supperless to sleep, only to realize that they must bear the cravings of hunger during the long and doubtful trials of the day. For on that hustling march from the Rappahannock, proper daily supplies for all the men of Pope's army, at the time and place when needed, could not by any foresight have been provided.

Notwithstanding, however, the hunger of some and the fatigue of all, the men of McDowell's corps sprang at midnight from many a weary bivouac that lined the roadway from Buckland Mills to New Baltimore. To march from Gainesville at daylight made the march by night to Gainesville a necessity. But here McDowell's impatient spirit chafed at the phlegmatic Sigel. As Reynolds came on at the head of his men, he found the troops of the rear division of Sigel's corps leisurely yawning out of their bivouac. It was thought that they might form rapidly and proceed, but in this there was disappointment. Reynolds became uneasy, grew impatient, ordered his men forward, and passed the division that should have preceded him. But not alone with sleeping men in bivouac by the roadside was the march of McDowell's corps embarrassed. Sigel's attachment to a vast wagon train was notorious to all who had ever fought with Sigel. Napoleon believed in his Old Guard, Wellington in his squares, Murat in his sabres, and all, from Luxembourg to Pope, had found their chief reliance in strong battalions. It would not be just

to say that what the Old Guard, and the squares, and the sabres were to Bonaparte, to the Iron Duke, and to Murat, wagons were to Sigel; for army wagons scarcely ever form the central figure in a fight. Neither poet nor painter, by fiery flights or lurid touches, has ever stirred the imagination with army wagons. We commemorate the fields where we have won renown by charging columns wreathed in smoke and pierced with death. Such was our Gettysburg. But we remember the fields where we have not won renown, and which we do not feel anxious to commemorate, as conspicuous with myriads of army wagons, hauled rearward by hapless mules. Such was our first Bull Run. It would not be fair to say that Sigel desired to reproduce that picture, although McDowell could not understand why he brought with his column on the road to Gainesville two hundred army wagons, that he had been ordered to send to Catlett's Station; and Reynolds complained loudly that his march was encumbered by them.

When Reynolds reached the head of Sigel's column at Gainesville, his march was again arrested. Sigel's force had halted at the junction of the turnpike with the railroad; the men were building fires, and calmly preparing to cook their breakfasts. It was then half past seven o'clock in the morning. Five hours had passed since McDowell at Buckland Mills had shown Pope's urgent order to Sigel, for a movement of the Federal troops from Gainesville at daylight, and had directed him to move immediately, and close up his divisions to avoid delay. The advance division of Sigel's corps was then in the town of Gainesville, and there it remained, with nothing to be done to prepare it for its march at dawn but to close the rear divisions on the first.

Anxious as McDowell had been for an exact compliance with Pope's orders, he had manifested a show of patient resignation at delays in reaching Gainesville. But when at half past seven Reynolds sent word to McDowell that he could proceed no further, every vestige of Christian resignation fell away from him.

The order of march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction placed the right of Sigel's corps upon the Manassas Gap railroad. Reynolds was to march in rear of Sigel, his division formed on Sigel's left, with columns in echelon. In like manner King was to march on Reynolds's left; Ricketts, if upon his arrival at Gainesville there were no indications of the approach of the enemy from Thoroughfare Gap, was to march in a like formation, in rear of King. But Ricketts did not observe this order, for Longstreet was too active at Thoroughfare Gap, and Ricketts was sent in that direction, as will be seen hereafter.

It was apparent, after all that had been done, the personal explanation by McDowell of the necessity for a prompt movement, and the urgency of Reynolds, that all had availed nothing with Sigel. What more could McDowell do. There seemed to be no alternative but to submit or try more urging. An assistant adjutant-general was sent forward, through whom it was hoped an immediate movement upon Manassas might be brought about; but it was not till late in the forenoon that the head of Sigel's column started, and then it took the wrong road to Manassas. Though McDowell's order in plain and explicit language had guided the march of Sigel's corps to Manassas, by an unbroken line of iron rails from Gainesville, upon which his right should rest, Sigel, with a perversity more trying than his composure, insisted that he supposed he was to march on the nearest road to the Orange and Alexan

dria Railway, and thence with his right resting on that road to Manassas Junction. This obdurate German, therefore, advanced in a country road south of the Manassas Gap railway. It is not easy to see how Sigel misunderstood his orders; nor is it apparent why both McDowell and Pope find a grievance in this misunderstanding; for it is not only uncontradicted that Pope suffered nothing thereby, but it is entirely capable of proof that by the road he marched he would in quicker time and in better condition have reached his destination than if he had been obliged to wrestle in a trackless space with fields and forests along the railway from Gainesville. And so Reynolds found it when he tried the experiment.<sup>1</sup>

But hardly had Sigel's march commenced when he became aware of the presence of the enemy. Shells burst over the heads of his cavalry, on his left, a mile and one half from the road he pursued, and the sound of an artillery engagement with Reynolds's division was heard on or near the pike road to Groveton. Halting his corps, Sigel counter-marched, and formed a line of battle on the heights parallel to the Centreville Gainesville road. The enemy's cavalry and infantry pickets were about three hundred yards from the Federal line. Sigel's skirmishers had advanced against them, when he reported to McDowell, and received in reply an order to move forthwith to Manassas Junction. Sigel then resumed his march.<sup>2</sup>

Before Reynolds had left Gainesville, the enemy defied his advance with two pieces of artillery, posted on the heights above Groveton, and to his left of the turnpike. General Meade, being foremost, rapidly threw his brigade into line of battle, and the guns of Ransom's

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General Sigel, not denied by McDowell.

battery replied; but the range was too great, and Cooper's rifled pieces were summoned. Under the effect of this fire the enemy withdrew, and the Federal infantry deployed, with skirmishers along the pike and through the woods to the right. But this display was unnecessary, for Reynolds, without further molestation, turned from the pike along a roadway, south of the railroad, that carried him to Bethlehem Church and to Manassas.<sup>1</sup>

Neither General McDowell nor the commanders of his divisions seem to have been aware that Reynolds's march was interrupted by that part of Taliaferro's division of Jackson's corps which had been left at Groveton when the remaining brigades of that division pushed forward toward Sudley Springs.

General Taliaferro's march had been made by night; had been most successfully concealed from the Federals; and had secured a position which, covering Jackson's front towards Gainesville, preserved at the same time a ford over Bull Run, which Jackson could use if it became necessary to move northwest for the preservation of his command, and to unite with Longstreet. It was that he might watch the movements of the Federals from Gainesville that Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, of his division, with his second Virginia brigade, was held at Groveton; and it was before daylight of the 28th of August, when Colonel Johnson threw out his advance guards upon the three roads which, leading to Sudley Ford, to Gainesville, and to Manassas, find a common junction at Groveton.

Towards Gainesville and towards Manassas the ground was already occupied by troops of Confederate cavalry.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Reynolds. Meade's loss was slight.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Brian, First Virginia Cavalry, and Colonel Rosser. See Official Report, Stuart.

That judicious use of cavalry by which Jackson covered his front, concealed his movements, discovered his enemies, and succeeded in his raids, had not at that period been generally appreciated by Federal commanders, and was almost entirely neglected by Pope. Had more consideration been bestowed by this unfortunate commander upon the indispensable work which only cavalry can perform, and less upon loud-sounding manifestoes and unworthy accusations against his officers, he could have foiled Jackson's efforts at Manassas and saved all the public property at that important station, and would not now have been withdrawing his army from where Jackson was concentrating, to chase him to Centreville, where he was very sure not to be found. Early in the morning, one of the many orderlies which McDowell dispatched to Sigel was captured by the enemy's cavalry. He was the bearer of a dispatch, in which the movement on Manassas Junction by both Reynolds and Sigel was revealed to Colonel Johnson. The important information was forwarded to Jackson; but the captain of the cavalry troop who bore it was himself captured while seeking General Jackson in the direction of Manassas. That the Federal troops in large force would occupy the road from Gainesville to Groveton, the commander of the Confederate brigade at Groveton could not doubt, for it was the purport of the captured order; and if they did, that he could not alone resist them was plain. To the right of the road there was a high hill, from the summit of which the Federal movement was exposed. Reynolds was seen moving forward his division along the pike towards the road that ran south to Manassas Junction, with his skirmishers in advance; and Sigel, with his corps, was discovered pushing along that road for Manassas. From Gainesville along the pike to where the road turned to

Manassas Junction was half way to Groveton. Near there, the Confederate commander had posted one battalion and one regiment of his infantry, and a battery of rifled guns; the remainder of his brigade he had thrown out on the road from Groveton to Manassas.

We have given the result of the feeble Confederate attack from this point upon the columns of Sigel and of Reynolds moving from Gainesville upon Manassas, and we can come to no other conclusion than that if the march of Sigel and of Reynolds had been directed along the Warrenton turnpike instead of towards Manassas, the overthrow of the Confederate brigade at Groveton would have been inevitable.<sup>1</sup> Later in the day a division of Federal troops ordered to march on Centreville pursued this road. But then the conditions were altered. The whole of Jackson's corps controlled the way, and there resulted a deadly conflict which we shall hereafter describe.

It remains now to follow the march of the two remaining divisions of General Jackson's corps, that had moved from Manassas Station across Bull Run towards Centreville. At an early hour in the morning Ewell, who had marched westward but a short distance from the run, turned back, recrossed at the Stone bridge, changed his direction to the north, and moved through the fields to near the old houses of Mathews and Carter; while Hill,<sup>2</sup> who had reached Centreville, turned backward at ten o'clock A. M., and proceeded along the Warrenton pike to a road about one hundred yards west of Young's Branch, where, turning to his right, he moved a short distance up the branch, and there, changing front, united with Taliaferro and Ewell in a

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, commanding second Virginia brigade, Taliaferro's division.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, page 195.



convex line fronting towards the Warrenton turnpike.<sup>1</sup> Hill's division formed the left of Jackson's line, and Ewell's the centre, while Taliaferro, strengthened by cavalry and Pelham's horse artillery, was drawn up on the right. The general direction of the line bore away between one and two miles from the Warrenton pike,<sup>2</sup> and crossed an unfinished railroad bed (leading from Gainesville to Alexandria), whose deep cuts and steep banks were to witness on the morrow a bitter and a deadly conflict.<sup>3</sup>

At noon Pope entered Manassas Junction. No enemy was in sight. The march of McDowell and of Sigel, of Reynolds and of Porter, of Reno and of Heintzelman, scurrying to Manassas to "bag" Jackson, was simply a fool's mission, which of course Pope had at length discovered. He paused for meditation. Jackson was escaping — such was his conclusion — to the north, along the Little River turnpike, towards Aldie. He should be pursued, and punished for his temerity. General McDowell was ordered to arrest the movement of his troops on Manassas, to move northward to Gum Springs, and to intercept Jackson on his march.

In one hour and twenty minutes from the time Pope had issued this order, he countermanded it. Then addressing himself to the execution of the only sound plan of operation that he had conceived in his campaign, he wrote McDowell that unless there was a large force of the enemy at Centreville, which he did not believe, he would push forward Reno to Gainesville

<sup>1</sup> Between it and Sudley Ford on Bull Run. See Official Reports of General J. E. B. Stuart, Captain Boswell, chief engineer, and Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery, Jackson's corps.

<sup>2</sup> Life of Lieutenant-General Jackson, by R. L. Dabney, vol. ii., p. 273.

<sup>3</sup> Official Reports of Confederate Generals Archer, of Hill's division, and Early, of Ewell's division.

and follow with Heintzelman. Would McDowell "find out this"? He need not move to Gum Springs if he considered it too hazardous. If McDowell would suggest anything to be done, or anything that Pope ought to do, he would push forward from Manassas Junction, across the turnpike, and support him. Jackson had a large train with him; it should be captured. McDowell knew the country much better than he did. "Come no further towards Manassas Junction with your command, and recall what has advanced."<sup>1</sup> But at fifteen minutes after four o'clock, Pope was again himself. The enemy was now in force on the other side of Bull Run, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and near Centreville. March immediately with your command, he wrote McDowell, from where you are upon Centreville. Sigel, Kearny, and Reno, with Hooker in reserve, I have ordered to march there.<sup>2</sup>

Whether the whole, or a part only, of Jackson's command had marched upon Centreville did not seem in the least to have perplexed Pope. He assumed that the enemy had not divided his forces, and he resolved instantly to pursue. Kearny's division took the lead. By the burning cars not yet consumed; by the ashes to which millions of dollars' worth of public property of the United States had been reduced; by the desolation and soul-saddening scenes that ever mark the tread of an army's triumph, this division pursued its way to Bull Run, and thence to Centreville, where its advance arrived late in the afternoon, to find that at ten o'clock in the morning the single division of Jackson's corps<sup>3</sup> that had occupied the place had marched out of it, westward, along the Warrenton pike, to concentrate on the line we have described, from Sudley Mills to

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General McDowell.

<sup>2</sup> Pope to McDowell.

<sup>3</sup> Hill's.

Groveton. The flight of Jackson's army to Centreville, to save the grand bagging process at Manassas, was, after all, only the march of a single division along an unoccupied road, the nearest to a determined line upon which Jackson could unite with Longstreet, or move away northward if he willed it. One regiment of Confederate cavalry turned leisurely from Centreville as Kearny's advance entered there. The main portion of this Federal division went into bivouac between Bull Run and Centreville. They were worn out with fatigue. Hooker's division followed Kearny's rear. It, too, had marched from Bristoe. As late as two o'clock in the afternoon, the third brigade of this division moved thence for Manassas, where, however, it did not halt, but kept on for Bull Run, and on the south side, near Blackburn's Ford, with the remainder of Hooker's division went into camp, as then anticipated, for the night.<sup>1</sup> That Pope at Manassas Junction, on the 28th of August, might plead, in extenuation of his bad guessing, the actual presence of an enemy, and therefore the uncertainties of prophecy, may not be denied; but it is unpardonable that his official report should submit so gross an error as that Jackson did not begin to evacuate Manassas Junction till three o'clock in the morning of the 28th, and that at ten or eleven o'clock on that morning his troops were still marching from that place.<sup>2</sup>

McDowell's command, arrested in its march to Manassas Junction, must now claim our attention. Late in the afternoon, McDowell found that Jackson had evacuated Manassas, and later still received Pope's dis-

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Generals Pope, Heintzelman, and Grover; Colonels Carr, commanding third brigade, Hooker's division; Blaisdell, eleventh Massachusetts; Burling, sixth New Jersey; Major Banks, sixteenth Massachusetts, and Captain George Hoffman, eighth New Jersey.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's Report.

patch of twenty minutes after one P. M. to the same effect.<sup>1</sup> But hardly had he read it, when Pope's second dispatch of fifteen minutes after four P. M. was handed him, in which the immediate march on Centreville was ordered. There had been delay in the transmission of the first note from Pope,<sup>2</sup>—never yet accounted for,—during which the commands of Sigel and of Reynolds had been toiling further from the course they must return to (a march on Centreville), over a country unknown to McDowell or his subordinates, and over ways partly in fields and mostly in woods, in the general direction from the Warrenton turnpike to Manassas Junction.<sup>3</sup> At about five o'clock P. M., Reynolds had arrived near Bethlehem Church. He was a little less than three miles from Manassas Junction. Here he received the order to march upon Centreville, and he obeyed it by turning the head of his division to the left at the church and directing it to take the Sudley Springs road towards the Warrenton pike.<sup>4</sup> At noon, Milroy, in the advance of Sigel's corps, was within one mile of Manassas Junction. While his men rested in the shade, he went forward with his artillery to the Junction for water. There was Pope, and "an immense amount of government stores in cars yet burning," of which Milroy took note. General Sigel in person halted the remainder of his corps within two and one half miles of Manassas, for his cavalry reported to him there that the place was free from an enemy, and that General Kearny was in possession. Communication was opened with Pope, and Sigel was ordered to march immediately to Centreville. The nearest route, and

<sup>1</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> Twelve o'clock note.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, McDowell.

<sup>4</sup> Official Report, General J. F. Reynolds, commanding division.

the one pursued, carried Sigel's corps from where he rested, into the Sudley Springs and Manassas Junction road, to within less than one mile of New Market, and thence by a course leading northeasterly over the fords on Bull Run to the Centreville turnpike, a little more than one mile east of the Stone bridge. At three o'clock P. M., Sigel's corps was marching in this direction, and Milroy was preparing to move out from Manassas Junction across the country to overtake him.<sup>1</sup>

King's division of McDowell's corps had arrived near Gainesville about the time that McDowell was ordered to hurry everything to Centreville. It was sent, therefore, along the pike, as the shortest and best road to its destination. This duty performed, McDowell left Gainesville for Manassas Junction to confer personally with Pope.<sup>2</sup>

Since early morning the troops of King's division had been pushing along the Warrenton pike. The morning air was cool and bracing, and the troops enjoyed the light of an August sun, which filled the landscape with its golden touches. But at noon the heat was intense, and the men rested under groves of chestnut-trees, and enjoyed their rations, if they had them. When the sun was low the march was resumed. Gainesville was passed, and Groveton was less than one mile and one half in advance.<sup>3</sup>

The leading brigade, commanded by General J. P. Hatch, was made up of four New York regiments and a United States regiment of sharp-shooters. It was designated as the first brigade of the division. The second brigade was commanded by General Doubleday, a soldier of whom the country knew much.

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports, Sigel and Milroy.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, McDowell.

<sup>3</sup> Major Pelham (Stuart's horse artillery) puts the distance as one mile.

and was proud of his gallant deeds at Fort Sumter and in the field. His brigade followed Hatch. It was made up of troops from the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, four regiments in all. The fourth brigade, composed of one Indiana and three famous Wisconsin regiments, was commanded by General Gibbon, an officer of our regular army, a native of the State of North Carolina, and came next. Last of all, and near to Gainesville, was General Patrick, with the third brigade, of four regiments of New York infantry. The road was wide. Infantry and artillery moved on in parallel columns, through the deepening shadows, as the sunset hues were fading. The tranquil peace which comes with the hour of rest had settled down upon the lines. There was no thought of the unfolding tragedy, when suddenly a quick and rapid fire of artillery sent bursting shells within the Federal ranks. Without one note of warning, without a thought of the proximity of the enemy, this roar and crash fell upon the brigades of Doubleday and of Gibbon. For a moment there was a confusion which the exactness of the enemy's fire increased. The location of the Confederate battery seemed to be on elevated ground to the north of the pike, very near it, and about a mile and one half from Groveton. Had the distance to the Federal column been measured, the range could not have been more accurate. Shells exploded in the very faces of the Federals. Men and horses began to fall. A panic was imminent. Under an impulse that sometimes is irresistible, less than a dozen men of the second brigade leaped a fence and ran for a wooded cover south of the pike. But this did not save them, though it tended to increase uneasy demonstrations in the ranks. For a moment the lines wavered hesitatingly; but for a moment only. "Forward! double quick!" rang out loud and clear.

Braced up now, for he in whom the men believed had seized the reins, the order was obeyed; the line moved on, and halted less than one hundred and fifty yards in advance, where a thick wood shut out the battery. But the troops were all themselves again, as soon, Heaven knows, they had need to be. The two commanders of brigades now came together. It was a hurried moment. General King was in rear, near Gainesville; no time to send for orders. General Hatch was in front, where, do all he could, he could do no more than maintain himself. So Generals Doubleday and Gibbon resolved that they would move forward from the pike, up through the woods, and storm the hostile battery. But a fence intervened. It was prostrated in an instant; then the Indiana and Wisconsin regiments of Gibbon's brigade, renowned for heroic deeds, sprang forward to add new laurels to their fame. Hardly had they disappeared in the cover, when the brave colonel of the fifty-sixth Pennsylvania regiment, of Doubleday's brigade, saluting his commander with his sword, begged eagerly to follow. There was no time for hesitation, for now the sharp ringing of bullets announced that the Confederate infantry were in front. "Forward, the fifty-sixth<sup>1</sup> and the seventy-sixth!"<sup>2</sup> Through the woods, slightly ascending, for a few hundred feet, the two regiments of Doubleday's brigade rushed forward to the support of Gibbon. The Federal troops almost instantly encountered an enemy who had for many hours been drawing his lines close upon the Federal flank. Jackson had been well advised by Stuart of McDowell's movements. When the advance of Reynolds and Sigel reached the vicinity of Groveton to turn southward to Manassas, Jackson, whose whole corps was then concentrated on the line from Groveton to Sudley Springs

<sup>1</sup> Pennsylvania.

<sup>2</sup> New York.

and nearly parallel to the Warrenton road,<sup>1</sup> believing that the Federal course would be onward to Alexandria, made dispositions to attack whenever it had reached a position most favorable for himself. When, however, he perceived that this detachment of Federals did not advance in force, when he saw it leaving the pike and inclining towards Manassas Junction, Jackson advanced his own command to meet the enemy.<sup>2</sup> Then, as we have seen, he realized that expectation in which he had been unconsciously baffled by Reynolds and by Sigel, for King was marching towards Alexandria with his flank exposed to Jackson's front.<sup>3</sup> The Confederate line was near the Warrenton Centreville pike, where a cluster of farm buildings and an orchard formed a cover within and around which, at sunset, Jackson formed his troops. It was a good position, and favorable for the attack which Jackson contemplated.

On the right, Taliaferro's old brigade held the buildings and one corner of the orchard; then came the old Stonewall brigade (under Colonel Baylor of Virginia), memorable on the same field one year before, when Jackson stood before Federal troops commanded then as now by General McDowell. Two brigades of Ewell's division, Lawton's and Trimble's, held the left of the Confederate line in front of the railroad. The remaining brigades of Taliaferro and Ewell remained in rear

<sup>1</sup> See Cooke's Life of Jackson.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Reports of General Jackson and General Taliaferro.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report of General Jackson.

To meet King, General Jackson had, at twelve o'clock at noon, sent forward his two divisions under Taliaferro and Ewell through the woods and along the deep cuts and steep embankments of the unfinished railway for two and one half miles towards the Centreville pike. Here he formed his line in a wood on the brow of a hill, with Groveton on his left. At half past four, he ordered the whole of his artillery forward, and all, with the exception of five pieces left on the north side of Catharpin Creek to protect his wagons parked there, moved to the front. (Official Report of Colonel Crutchfield and Major Pelham, Confederate artillery officers.)



of the railroad cut during the fight, and took no part in it, though they were near enough to support the four Confederate brigades which now confronted the single brigade and two regiments opposed to them on the Federal side.<sup>1</sup> Three of Jackson's batteries had opened fire at the outset; but they had been gallantly met by Doubleday, who had so disposed his pieces that he soon sent the Confederate artillery to a new position on the right of its line. When the fire of the skirmishers ceased and the roar of the artillery was dumb, the crash of musketry followed.

The left of the Federal line was somewhat sheltered, by the orchard and inclosure next to the turnpike, from the fire of the right of Taliaferro's brigade, which was delivered under cover of a corner of the same orchard and the buildings adjacent. But further towards Groveton the hostile lines stood uncovered in an open field, not more than one hundred and not less than eighty yards apart.<sup>2</sup> In this position both lines discharged their muskets literally into each other's faces for a period not far from thirty minutes.<sup>3</sup> The contest ended at nine at night. Its close was terrific. Fire leaped in waves from the musket's mouth, and men saw in the darkness the angry flame; bullets filled the air or struck with heavy thud a living mark, and men heard the cruel sound; but neither fire, scream, nor blow, nor the presence even of almost certain death, appalled that Federal line. Conduct so intrepid extorted from the Confederates a willing tribute of admiration. "The conflict here was fierce and sanguinary," and the "Federals maintained their ground

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Jackson, Ewell, and Taliaferro.

<sup>2</sup> Cooke's Life of Jackson, vol. ii., pp. 273, 275, Official Report of General W. B. Taliaferro.

<sup>3</sup> Bivouac and Battlefield, pages 114-123.

with obstinate determination," is the frank avowal of praise bestowed by General Jackson himself in his official report. "It was one of the most terrific contests that can be conceived," and "the enemy withstood with great determination the terrible fire which our lines poured upon them for two hours and a half, without an instant's cessation, of the most deadly discharges of musketry, round shot, and shell;" and "both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing and neither broken or yielding, until at last, about nine o'clock at night, the enemy slowly and sullenly fell back, and yielded the field to our victorious troops," is the tribute which the Confederate General W. B. Taliaferro, two of whose brigades were engaged in and about the farm buildings, the orchard, and the open field, pays, in his official report, to the heroic conduct of the men of Wisconsin and Indiana, of Pennsylvania and New York.

The loss of life and limb was very heavy on both sides. Men fell like leaves in autumn. More than one third of the Federal command were left dead or wounded on the field. The colonel of the fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, who had begged for an early opportunity in the fight, was wounded in the onset. A Wisconsin colonel was killed. Many officers, field staff and company, and private soldiers, dead and dying, lay in heaps on the ground. Nor was the loss light on the Confederate side. General Jackson, while admitting that he suffered heavily, mourned casualties of which he was himself the cause. The two division commanders, whose brigades were in the battle line, were sent wounded from the field. General Ewell was found after the fight had closed in front of the line where Lawton and Trimble had fought. Jackson had called reinforcements to the front as the fight was closing. Early's brigade with Hays's had come forward, had attempted

to cross the railroad cut in front of the first Confederate line, had found its steep banks an impassable obstacle, had marched to his right, and crossed over to the ground where the other brigades of this division had been. Here, helpless and bleeding, Ewell lay. His knee was shattered by a bullet; amputation followed, and the Confederacy lost for the remainder of the war the services of this gallant man. W. B. Taliaferro too was wounded; the command of his division fell to General Starke,<sup>1</sup> who held it for some months, while Taliaferro was absent from the field. With expressions of sorrow for the loss of two of his ablest division commanders General Jackson found food for lamentation, in the next sentence of his official report, that the difficulties of getting his artillery through the woods deprived him of as many pieces as he desired at the opening of the contest; while in the next he followed with praise to a major of horse artillery, who, with but a single gun, dashed forward to his right, where his services were much needed.<sup>2</sup> General W. B. Taliaferro reported as killed a mournful list of noteworthy men, of whom and also in wounded he admitted his loss to have been very heavy. That Colonel Neff of the thirty-third Virginia, whose regiment, watching the second Massachusetts at Winchester in the preceding May, received from Jackson in special orders a compliment for his gallantry, was now among the killed; and so was Colonel Botts of the second Virginia, while the colonel of the twenty-seventh and the majors of the second and fourth Virginia were among the wounded. If we turn from the losses of the old Stonewall brigade to any of the others that were engaged, we shall find that the killed and wounded are recorded in appalling numbers.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report, Colonel W. E. Stafford, second Louisiana brigade.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports, General Jackson, Major John Pelham.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, General Taliaferro. In Ewell's division the losses in

Within the Federal lines the Federal dead and wounded lay in pairs or heaps, a ghastly sight, on the green turf beneath the trees, or near a pathway leading from the field where many wounded had, in the darkness of the night, dragged their fainting bodies. Where the surgeons gathered in the wounded, bits of candle and burning torches shed through the gloomy forest a gloomier light. No cries of suffering, no complaints, were heard from those brave men, who when spoken to replied in tones as brave as should have been expected from the men who had shown such heroic resistance. When the combat ceased the Federal troops were withdrawn to a field close to the road, where with arms in hand they slept, while on the side of the road near burning embers, the two generals commanding the brigades and General King the division commander, were engaged in deep and earnest consultation. Could the march of this division be continued to Centreville? Could it alone break through the whole of Jackson's corps? Was it not apparent that a force no less than this was now hanging upon the Federal flank to strike a still more deadly blow? Was it now possible even to withdraw? To relinquish the march to Centreville, to turn back towards Gainesville and follow the road taken by Reynolds and Sigel for Manassas Junction, was finally resolved upon as the only proper course to pursue. The march was to commence at one o'clock in the morning of the 29th. The wounded who could bear transportation were to move with the column in the ambulances, while those whose hurts were more serious were to be left on the ground in charge of the surgeons. It was then eleven o'clock at night. Soon after, General King returned to Gainesville, while the

this battle were officially reported as 219 killed, 539 wounded, and 11 missing. (Archives of the Rebellion in the War Department at Washington.)

general officers who remained, wrapped in their cloaks, passed the chilly hours dozing by their camp-fires.<sup>1</sup>

Pope at nine fifty P. M., near Bull Run, received information of the Confederate attack upon King's division, and received it with joy. It may seem strange that he should have construed Jackson's attack upon McDowell's division as an attempt on the part of Jackson to escape with his life. But nevertheless it is true.<sup>2</sup> The thing therefore to be done, so reasoned the Federal commander, was to throw Kearny from Centreville westward along the Warrenton pike, until Jackson, barred by McDowell on the west, should be crushed. And this, with his usual perversity of judgment, Pope attempted to enforce.<sup>3</sup> At the hour above named General Kearny was destined to receive one of Pope's usually erroneous statements as a foundation for one of his most importunate commands. General McDowell had interrupted the retreat of the enemy wrote Pope, and was now in his front, with Sigel on his right, and there was no escape for Jackson. Unless indeed he could escape to-night by passes leading to the north, he must be captured. Kearny was therefore commanded to move forward at one o'clock to-night, even if he could carry with him no more than two thousand men; but Pope hoped he would carry the larger part of his division, and that he would not march later than one, with all the men he could take. "Pursue the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton; the enemy is not more than three and one half miles from you; seize the

<sup>1</sup> See Bivouac and Battlefield, pages 114-123, for a very interesting narrative of this scene.

<sup>2</sup> "I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escape for Jackson." (Pope's Official Report.)

<sup>3</sup> "I sent word to McDowell and King during the night of the 28th to hold their ground, at all hazards, to prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west." (Ibid.)

ABOUT 1000

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## EXPLANATORY TABLE OF PLATE I.

*The battle near Groveton, fought on the 28th of August, 1862, between King's division of McDowell's corps and Ewell's and Taliaferro's divisions of Jackson's.*

### DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL ARMY.

- S Patrick's brigade of King's division.
- Z Gibbon's brigade of King's division.
- Y Doubleday's brigade of King's division.
- X Hatch's brigade of King's division.

### THE ATTACK OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

- b b b b Lines over which the enemy marched to the scene of action.
- A First position of A. G. Taliaferro's brigade, Taliaferro's division.
- A' Second position of A. G. Taliaferro's brigade, Taliaferro's division.
- B First position of Baylor's brigade, Taliaferro's division.
- C First position of Lawton's brigade, Ewell's division.
- C' Second position of Lawton's brigade, Ewell's division.
- D First position of Trimble's brigade, Ewell's division.
- D' Second position of Trimble's brigade, Ewell's division.
- E First position of Hays's brigade, Ewell's division.
- F First position of Early's brigade, Ewell's division.
- E' Second position of Hays's brigade, Ewell's division.
- F' Second position of Early's brigade, Ewell's division.
- C''' Third position of Lawton's brigade, Ewell's division.
- D''' Third position of Trimble's brigade, Ewell's division.
- H Colonel Bradley T. Johnson.





people for your guides ; advance cautiously and drive in the enemy's pickets at night, and at early dawn attack him vigorously, extending well your right," were the closing words of Pope's command. Kearny was promised that Hooker should follow close behind him.<sup>1</sup>

At ten o'clock p. m. General Heintzelman was ordered to send Hooker with his division to support Kearny. Pope's order to Kearny, and what was expected of him, and why such expectations, were rehearsed to Heintzelman.

Therefore, continued Pope, "I see no possibility of Jackson's escape." It was of the utmost importance, wrote Pope, that Hooker should march at three o'clock a. m. of the 29th, on the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton, resting as a reserve for Kearny one mile and a half beyond Centreville. Pope would rely upon the execution of this order at the time designated, even if Hooker should have to march with one half his men.<sup>2</sup> In the thunder of his orders Pope was undaunted. If they had the true ring of defiance, no matter what disasters attended their execution. Pope had marched against the enemy from Manassas for Centreville after the enemy had left Centreville for Sudley Ford ; and now, while he was shattering the Confederate army with his paper fulminations, the whole of Jackson's corps was formed in line, with the Catharpin Creek at its back, and behind it in safety Jackson's wagons and public property were parked ; while in his front was the whole field of inextricable confusion in

<sup>1</sup> Order of General Pope to Kearny from headquarters, Army of Virginia, near Bull Run, 9.50 p. m., August 28th.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from General Pope to General Heintzelman, from headquarters, Army of Virginia, near Bull Run, ten p. m., August 28th ; and dispatch from Pope to Heintzelman, eleven p. m., August 28th. See Heintzelman's Official Report.

which Pope was floundering. There was no enemy in Jackson's rear. He could turn behind him to one hundred and eighty degrees of peaceful domain; his communications with Longstreet were practically open to him. In this condition of things, when General Jackson moved from his position to smite the jaw that was to grind him to powder, Pope seized the opportunity to cry out to his command that Jackson could not escape, that he must be crushed between his forces.

No movements had been ordered by General Pope to obstruct the approach of Longstreet's division, which was surely and fatally during the entire day of the 28th, making its way through Thoroughfare Gap to unite with Jackson on the old battle-field of Bull Run. And none would have been made had not McDowell, with the true instincts of a soldier foreseen the appalling necessity, and taken upon himself the responsibility of disobeying Pope's order to move his *whole* force to Manassas, starting at daylight from Gainesville. But McDowell's audacity was to Pope of little moment, as compared with transgressions by Porter, or by Sigel, or indeed by any other of his subordinates. Nor did it ever occur to Pope to censure McDowell because Ricketts was thus diverted from a march which would have strengthened the resistance made by King's division against Jackson. It is true that Pope, in his official report, declared his belief that if his commands had been literally complied with there was no escape for Jackson from destruction. And this he proclaimed as the result of his meditations upon his campaign many days after that campaign had ended; proclaimed it unblushingly in the presence of military men who knew that the movement of McDowell's command to Manassas Junction, in both time and place pre-

cisely as ordered by Pope, would not even have threatened the Confederate corps under Jackson, then awaiting near Sudley Mills, what would but for McDowell, have been an unobstructed march by Longstreet to a union. That under such circumstances the approach of Heintzelman's corps from Centreville would have crushed Jackson could not have seemed possible to any one outside of a select body of incorrigible fools.<sup>1</sup> If at all, only thus inferentially was blame imputed to McDowell for that disobedience which sent Ricketts's division and the cavalry of Buford and Bayard, into Thoroughfare Gap (rather than to the east of it), to hold Longstreet in check.

What happened to this division of McDowell's corps and to the cavalry which accompanied it, it is now our purpose to relate.

At early dawn of the 28th, Colonel Wyndham, of the First New Jersey Cavalry had reported to McDowell that Longstreet was doing what McDowell well knew he would be doing at that time: to wit, marching through Thoroughfare Gap.<sup>2</sup> Thereupon the cavalry force was strengthened, and infantry sent forward to support it.<sup>3</sup>

At fifteen minutes past ten o'clock in the morning, General Ricketts had put his division in motion from New Baltimore and had marched into Haymarket, where his troops left their knapsacks and pushed forward rapidly towards Thoroughfare. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Ricketts met Colonel Wyndham's skirmishers retiring before the enemy who then were in possession of the gap. To seize a point of such importance in holding Longstreet back, Ricketts pressed onward. The road was filled with fallen timber; delays

<sup>1</sup> See Pope's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> See McDowell's Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

were vexatious ; the batteries were much obstructed. The third brigade was in the advance, supported by the first and fourth ; the second was in reserve. It was soon apparent that the efforts of the Federal column would be unsuccessful. The Confederates were not only in full possession of the pass itself, but they had occupied strong and advantageous positions upon both sides of the road on the eastern face of the mountain from which, as the Federal troops tried in vain to advance, they poured into them a severe fire resulting in serious loss. Though there was no prospect of gaining the gap Ricketts determined to hold on till night, and to withdraw under its cover.<sup>1</sup> By nine o'clock at night the whole Confederate column with Lee at its head, was pouring through the defile.<sup>2</sup>

The force of Confederates advancing through this mountain pass against the opposition of a single Federal division was indeed overwhelming. General Lee had felt the necessity of making a rapid march, and as the two wings of his army were then situated it cannot be denied that he had reasoned correctly ; though at the time Jackson was most conspicuously demonstrating his capacity to take care of himself.

No sooner was it known on the morning of the 28th, that a Federal force was in possession of Thoroughfare Gap, than three divisions of Longstreet's corps, at three different passes of the mountain were hurled forward against it. The only column that was opposed was, as we have seen, that one which moved along the railway towards Gainesville. Two of the four brigades of infantry commanded by the Confederate General D. R. Jones, strengthened by two regiments of a third, clambered on hands and knees up the rough mountain on either

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General James B. Ricketts, McDowell's corps.

<sup>2</sup> Life of General R. E. Lee, by J. E. Cooke, pages 118-120.

side of the pass, and made their way through tangled thickets of laurel and brush to the summit, where they saw in full view, the Federal division of Ricketts emerging from a wood, and forming in line on a plateau parallel with the mountain range, and distant from it about eight hundred yards. It was from this vantage-ground that Ricketts opened his first heavy fire of artillery on the road leading through the gorge and on the mountain sides. No reply was returned by the Confederates, for Jones had no artillery on his front. Seeing this, the Federals took heart, and again advanced their guns supported by infantry, until they reached a position but about three hundred yards from the eastern entrance to the gap. Here Ricketts made a heavy demonstration on both sides of the road. On his right he came sharply in contact with a Confederate brigade commanded by Colonel Anderson. It was here also that the advanced Federal brigade suffered the most. Glorious achievements were claimed by Colonel Anderson. It would appear that his brigade contained regiments distinguished from the ordinary volunteer organizations, of which the Confederate army was composed, by the name of regulars, and that the first Georgia regiment of infantry claimed this distinction. Not only did it secure amidst impenetrable thickets, a more favorable position than any other, but it also inflicted upon the Federals, a more serious loss. In reciting its performances, Anderson indulged in exaggerations with a gravity that even Falstaff might have envied. One Captain Patten is reported as having brought down five Federals with his pistol, of which three were killed. The too credulous Anderson "regrets that our army is not made up of regulars."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Colonel G. T. Anderson, eleventh Georgia volunteers, commanding Anderson's Confederate brigade.

The result of this skirmish was soon apparent. Ricketts fell back to his original position on the plateau, and this ended the contest on the Confederate left. Something appears to have been accomplished on the Confederate right. The two regiments of Toombs's brigade detached to scale the mountain had run forward through an open field under a rain of Federal shells; climbed through ivy and laurel thickets to the summit; thence descending, engaged in a feeble struggle with Federal skirmishers; followed up the retiring Federal line; and with long-range rifles, defeated attempts to establish annoying batteries. By sunset these regiments had gained an advantageous position at the eastern foot of the mountain on the crest of a ravine, which was favorable for an attack upon the Federal left. Here, awaiting the arrival of the brigade which had been thrown to the right of the pass, they saw the Federal division withdraw towards Gainesville.<sup>1</sup> But if this Confederate division was the only one that General Ricketts resisted, it by no means follows that it was from this alone that he had cause for apprehension. While General Jones attacked him in front, General Wilcox, with three brigades of infantry and two batteries of rifled guns, marched north, by the Hopewell Gap to turn his flank by the right. Though only three miles from Thoroughfare, they were tedious and fatiguing miles. The road was so rough and hilly that not until ten o'clock at night was this pass reached, and then it was questioned if it were occupied by the enemy. Ricketts's cavalry had been there, but they were there no longer. Wilcox resumed his march, and halted at midnight at the eastern foot of the mountain with his advance one mile beyond near Antioch

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Colonel H. L. Benning, seventeenth Georgia, commanding Toombs's brigade, General D. R. Jones's division, Longstreet's corps.

Church.<sup>1</sup> Jones's division went into bivouac beyond the pass. He was on the direct road to Gainesville. His loss (only twenty-five) was small for so great a gain; but he boasted as if his dead were numbered by thousands, of the Federal division of *eleven* thousand men that he alone had defeated.<sup>2</sup> From where Wilcox slept, a good road entered the Gainesville pike less than one mile from Haymarket.

But there was still another flanking column employed by the Confederate General Lee. Two brigades of infantry commanded by General Hood marched to the right, to pass the mountain by a foot-path to the south of Thoroughfare to turn the Federal left. The same causes which moved Ricketts to anticipate the march of Wilcox were as appealing in the march of Hood. The Federal commander was seriously threatened on both flanks and in front by a force greatly outnumbering his own, and it would have been madness to stay. Ricketts therefore, no longer opposed the advance of the Confederate right wing, and withdrew as we have seen, about night-fall. General Hood passed the mountain and bivouacked for the night between the eastern foot of the gap and Gainesville.<sup>3</sup> Lee had passed the Rubicon, and his union with Jackson was assured. If he had risked much, he had won much and he was content.

When the sound of Jackson's guns near Groveton was first heard by General Lee, he was approaching the gorge from its western side. With all his confidence in Jackson and with all his contempt for Pope, the heart of the Confederate commander was troubled. How

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Brigadier-General Wilcox, commanding division of three brigades, Longstreet's corps.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General D. R. Jones.

<sup>3</sup> Official Reports of General Longstreet, commanding right wing, and General Hood, commanding Confederate division in the same.



could he know that Jackson's single corps would not be overpowered by the whole Federal army before he could come to its assistance? A Federal force whose numbers he could not determine barred his way. Had Pope interposed the whole Federal army between the two Confederate wings, and thus threatened each in turn with destruction? He had run the hazard of his great flank movement by reflecting that it was Pope who would seize upon the advantages offered by his rashness. What if he had counted too much upon Jackson's resources, and had overestimated the weakness of his antagonist?

Concealing from all observers under a calm exterior the grave apprehensions he felt, General Lee mounted a hill, from whose summit in the declining day he looked long and anxiously through his glass. Before him was the shaggy gorge through which his own troops were now pushing up to the advance of their skirmishing line. Beyond was Groveton, a beautiful hamlet about eight miles to the east, hardly to be distinguished among the fields and forests, the rivers and mountains around it.

But now Groveton was wreathed in the smoke of battle. Over and around the little village the air was thick, and the boom of artillery came to Lee's ears, as he looked long and looked eagerly upon the scene; then turned and thoughtfully retraced his steps, to hear, as the night shadows darkened, cries of exultation from his column under Longstreet, who was advancing by and beyond all obstructions, to stand side by side with Jackson on the morrow.<sup>1</sup>

Midnight of this long and eventful day found the various divisions of the Federal army scattered all along

<sup>1</sup> General Stuart with parts of two brigades of cavalry had made fruitless efforts to push by the Federal commanders Buford and Bayard at Haymarket, to communicate with Longstreet. (Stuart's Official Report.)

from Bull Run to Centreville, and from Bristoe Station to Bull Run. .

Ricketts had returned to Gainesville and intended to withdraw no further; but learning from General King of his intention to march at one o'clock in the morning of the 29th by the road followed by Reynolds and Sigel, for Manassas Junction, he resolved that it would be prudent for him to retire, and he made a long and fatiguing march by the way of Bristoe Station for the same destination.<sup>1</sup>

There remain of the eventful incidents of this day the movements made by Reynolds and by Sigel to comply with Pope's order to hurry forward on Centreville. Therefore it should be told that Reynolds, who had turned into the Sudley Springs road to march on Centreville, arrested his column at the sound of the conflict near Groveton. He could hear reports of artillery in his front near Bull Run, where Sigel's right was, and to his left, where Gibbon and Doubleday had met Jackson. Should he move to Centreville and obey strictly his orders; or should he turn to his left towards the sound of the artillery? This diversion he knew would be justified, and he made it. His command advanced with a rapid pace, while in person he galloped forward to the field. There he remained until the fighting had ceased. It was nearly dark when he arrived, and it was not until the conflict was over that he met General King, whose intention to maintain his position he then learned. Promising to bring his own division to King's aid early in the morning, Reynolds was about rejoining his troops, when he was informed by General Hatch<sup>2</sup> that the whole of King's division was even then preparing to march via Gainesville upon Manassas Junc-

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports, Generals McDowell, Reynolds, and Ricketts.

<sup>2</sup> Commanding the first brigade of King's division.

tion. Movements that fully confirmed this report were seen before Reynolds returned to his command.<sup>1</sup> On the morning of the 29th at daybreak, on a hill by the Warrenton road near Groveton, McDowell, who had been vainly searching for Pope at Manassas, found Reynolds's division. Then for the first time he learned of the movements of the other divisions of his corps under King and under Ricketts.<sup>2</sup>

The march of Sigel's corps upon Centreville had also been arrested. Its right division (Schurz's) with Stahl's brigade had arrived near the fords of Bull Run, where its further progress was opposed by artillery of the Confederate General Hill's division.<sup>3</sup> There were also weak demonstrations on its left near the New Market road in front of Schenck's division and the two brigades of Milroy and McLean further on the left. For a time Federal and Confederate batteries replied. Milroy pushed on. There was a little skirmishing, but not enough to retard the Federal advance. It was growing dark. Milroy heard the conflict between Jackson and King until it swelled into the thunder of desperation. He pushed on through the wood and the underbrush towards the firing. When the darkness increased so that neither friend nor foe could be recognized, the roll of musketry ceased and a great shouting was heard by the Federals, which Milroy interpreted as a Confederate victory. Sigel, no longer doubting that the enemy had left Centreville, moved his corps to the front and bivouacked for the night near Mrs. Henry's farm, fronting the Centreville pike, on the heights south of Young's Branch. Here was located the division commanded by General Schurz, and on his right, to the left of the

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General Reynolds.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, McDowell.

<sup>3</sup> Official Reports, General A. P. Hill, and Major Pelham, horse artillery.

Robinson farm on a hill, with his pickets advanced to Young's Branch, was General Stahl's brigade. On Schurz's left was the division of Schenck, east of the stone house, with his right resting on the pike.<sup>1</sup>

At night Sigel received orders from Pope to attack the enemy vigorously in the morning, and he made his preparations accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

General Fitz-John Porter remained the whole of the day of the 28th, and until daylight of the 29th, inactive and unemployed at Bristoe Station.

General Porter knew all about the contest at Thoroughfare, and the battle at Groveton. He could see the smoke, and he could hear the sound of the guns.

Twice during the day of the 28th had Porter sent a staff officer to Pope for orders, and twice was the answer returned, "Tell him to stay where he is; when wanted he will be sent for." Thus was Porter's importunity answered with a reproach; nor was this all. The just conclusions to be drawn from an anxious application by his subordinate to be permitted to march towards the sound of the enemy's cannon were utterly ignored by Pope in his official report. Not one word of the willing services of his subordinate appears. With a malicious spite the commander of the Federal army sneeringly reports in his official record, as the single act of zealous coöperation manifested on that day by Porter, that, finding upon his arrival at Bristoe that Jackson had evacuated Manassas Junction, he requested that his troops might be permitted to rest. Such proof of iniquity was so shocking to Pope that he added to the aggravation by argument. Sykes's division of Porter's corps, he wrote, had spent the whole day of the 27th in

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports, Generals Sigel, Schurz, Schenck, Stahl, and Milroy, Colonels McLean and Lloyd.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, Sigel.

camp, and Morell's division had remained at rest part of the day of the 27th and until morning of the 28th; therefore he believed Porter's corps to be in better condition for service than any troops he had.<sup>1</sup>

Pope affected thus to believe that here was to be found new evidence of Porter's indifference and lukewarmness. Of all men likely to be intrusted with the command of a Federal army, none but Pope would have distorted Porter's humane application into other than a humane consideration for the welfare of his men. But this flimsy evidence of Porter's guilty intent was enough to satisfy Pope, and what would satisfy Pope would be irresistible to Halleck and to the War Secretary himself. Indeed, it could not be expected that the motives which actuated a sagacious commander who deprecated useless fatigues and purposeless marches should be rightly interpreted by a jealous commander whose consideration for his troops and whose sagacity in war had often been spoken of in derision.<sup>2</sup> Long before night-fall of the 28th it was clear enough even to Pope that a brief halt by Porter's corps at Bristoe Station in the morning could not have lost to the Federal army even the shadow of an advantage. But it was not possible for Pope, while writing his report of his operations many days after these operations had terminated in disaster, to forego his opportunity of publishing this harmless application as another proof of Porter's treason during the campaign.

The positions held by the Confederate army at midnight brought their corps and divisions into a compact body on a front of not more than six miles. Beyond Gainesville was Lee, with Longstreet forming his right,

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report, Pope.

<sup>2</sup> Three Years in the Army, by Captain Blake, eleventh Massachusetts volunteers, pages 125, 126.

while on the extreme left General A. P. Hill's division had moved down from near Sudley Ford<sup>1</sup> to the unfinished railroad, where, in a deep cut in the woods, the troops slept upon their arms.<sup>2</sup>

The main force of Banks's corps, moving slowly forward towards Manassas Junction, rested on the night of the 28th in and around Kettle Run, with a portion of it thrown forward as far as Bristoe. Though its progress had been uninterrupted, there had been causes of anxiety. Ominous reports of artillery were heard. Did they portend an attack on the trains? Banks knew not where the Federal army was, nor did he know where the Confederates were. How soon Stuart's cavalry, with his horse artillery, would dash in upon him he could not know, for no information had reached him that all of the Confederate cavalry that was not then on the front and flanks of the Confederate infantry was at that time under the command of General Fitz-Hugh Lee on a raid towards Alexandria.<sup>3</sup>

The destruction of the railroad bridge at Kettle Run barred the progress at that point, of the public property which had been crammed into burden cars to be sent back from Warrenton and from Warrenton Junction to Alexandria; vast amounts of ammunition, as well

<sup>1</sup> Where it had been somewhat exposed to the fire of Federal artillery from the batteries of King's division. (See Archer and Lane.)

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of Colonel Thomas, third brigade; General Archer, General Lane, commanding Branch's brigade; and General McGowan, commanding second brigade, who had silently retired from the Federal front at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, and brought up the rear of A. P. Hill's division on its march to Blackburn Ford and Centreville. The artillery battalion of Hill's division marched from Manassas at twelve o'clock at night of the 27th, and arrived on the old battle-field of Manassas on the afternoon of the 28th. (Official Report, Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, commanding artillery battalion, Hill's division.)

<sup>3</sup> Official Report of General J. E. B. Stuart.

as other supplies for the troops, were in jeopardy. To Pope, at Manassas Junction, the aspect was serious. It was doubtful whether the bridge could be replaced in time to push forward the supplies. The passing wagons were therefore filled from the motionless trains, and something was saved from the torch which the Federal army was afterwards compelled to apply to the greater part of these Federal stores.

On the 28th, General McClellan, at Alexandria, without remitting his efforts to forward reënforcements to Pope, continued his preparations for the defense of Washington. He wrote Halleck that *to-day* he could not move; that Franklin was with him, and soon he would know the condition of the artillery and of the cavalry at Alexandria. If McClellan could not for want of means, properly equip Franklin's corps to enable it to take the field on the 28th, and strengthen Pope's resistance to Lee's march towards Washington, he yet had it in his power to throw all his available men into works that were themselves properly equipped and were invincible. Upton's Hill was the key to Washington. McClellan had already thrown troops into the works on its summit, and proposed to increase their numbers by a corps, as soon as he "could see his way to spare them."<sup>1</sup>

General Halleck had at last begun to despair of Pope. Slowly and with bitterness, he was forced to yield his wishes, his hopes, his all, to a stern necessity. He adopted what McClellan suggested, and was most urgent in his appeals for the immediate execution of these suggestions. The manner in which he would defend Washington Halleck did not set forth until the 29th, when he replied to the dispatch of the 28th from

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, from Alexandria, August 28th, 4.10 P. M., McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 329.

McClellan, and advised the use of all the troops in and around Alexandria in the fortifications and defenses that surrounded Washington.<sup>1</sup> It may have been that Halleck suffered less disquiet than McClellan, about Pope's army on the 28th, because he knew more about its movements; for while General McClellan could only infer from all that he could hear that the Confederate army was between the Federal army and Washington, and that Pope would be compelled to cut his way through to reach Alexandria, or would have to join Burnside at Acquia Creek,<sup>2</sup> Halleck had come into possession of a letter addressed to General Burnside, from Bristoe Station, by Fitz-John Porter, at half past nine in the morning of the 28th,<sup>3</sup> in which Pope's march on Manassas Junction was revealed, and that his army would soon be heard from at Alexandria was predicted.<sup>4</sup> Though no one could foretell through what perils and what disasters, through what heroic conflicts and what heroic sacrifices, the Federal army might retire towards Alexandria, its withdrawal was as certainly provided for by McClellan and by Halleck in their preparations as it was foretold by Fitz-John Porter in his prophecies.

<sup>1</sup> As will appear in the events of the 29th.

<sup>2</sup> See McClellan to Halleck, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 329.

<sup>3</sup> Pope, in his Official Report, says Porter's corps did not arrive at Bristoe until 10.30 A. M.

<sup>4</sup> See letter, Halleck to McClellan, August 29th, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 329.



## CHAPTER X.

THE TWENTY-NINTH OF AUGUST.

DURING the remainder of the night that followed the conflict near Groveton, Pope reveled in most cheering delusions. As the imagination lends a glow which in turn inspires the imagination, so the more Pope dwelt upon the visions of his dreams, the more real and possible did these visions become. That General Jackson would escape him by retreating to the north, in the direction of Leesburg,<sup>1</sup> was his only fear. That he really knew no details of the fight of Gibbon and Doubleday with the Confederates under Jackson; nay, that he did not even know how it had terminated, nor where a single brigade of McDowell's corps was posted after that fight, was of less importance to Pope than it was to assume that Jackson was retreating and that McDowell had intercepted that retreat. Therefore Pope gave himself no concern about McDowell's command. And herein is to be found the first blunder in Pope's dispositions. For the order for his attack at daylight of the 29th upon Jackson,<sup>2</sup> between Groveton and Sudley Ford, was based upon the assumption that the whole of McDowell's corps would be in position between Gainesville and Groveton to coöperate. That thus there would be between Jackson and Thoroughfare Gap a force in all of about twenty-five thousand men, and that with Porter,

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report of August 29th.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, page 237.

Kearny, Hooker, and Reno he could from the east hurl upon Jackson a force of about twenty-five thousand more, was the pleasing illusion indulged in by Pope.<sup>1</sup>

About daylight of the 29th Pope, near Bull Run, was rudely awakened to confront a most uncomfortable reality. King's and Ricketts's divisions of McDowell's corps, under cover of the night, had fled from near Gainesville to Bristoe Station and to Manassas Junction. The first wave of Longstreet's approach foretold the coming storm, and those who heard it escaped. But however justifiable the causes of a movement which so effectually destroyed those plans from which Pope had indulged such unreasonable expectations, no word had come to him in justification from McDowell, from Ricketts, or from King. McDowell could offer no explanation. Before those events had transpired which had made a retreat by his two division commanders probable or even possible; nay, before those events had happened which confirmed the imperative necessity of his own presence as the commander of his own corps at an unusually delicate and perilous period, he had left Gainesville, to pass the greater part of the night at Manassas Junction, some nine miles from where he ought to have been, groping around for an interview with his commanding general, whom he could not find. It is not intended thus to condemn McDowell; for Pope, by his repeated calls upon him for counsel and aid in repeated instances of his despair, and in frantic efforts to carry out the plans of Halleck in Washington, had encouraged the belief that if McDowell was no more, he was at least joint tenant with himself in the command of the Army of Virginia.

And it is further to be said in behalf of General

<sup>1</sup> See his Official Report of August 29th.

McDowell that he had not allowed himself to pass the whole night in a useless search after Pope. He had at a very early hour in the morning joined the only division of his corps he could find, and at daylight, when Sigel made his attack upon the Confederates, he had ordered this division<sup>1</sup> to coöperate with Sigel.<sup>2</sup> Then he had continued his search for Pope and the divisions of Ricketts and of King, and was at Manassas Junction as late as while Reynolds was engaged at Groveton.<sup>3</sup>

Ricketts had not opened his mouth. He was away at Bristoe Station, where his wearied troops had sunk down at daylight, overpowered with fatigue.<sup>4</sup> All that Ricketts knew of the three separate columns of Longstreet's corps, that had swept like an avalanche over the separate passes in the Bull Run Mountains, and had put him to flight at night-fall, was unrevealed to Pope. Nor had King uttered a word of his night conflict with that portion of Jackson's corps which was in position, before him, near Groveton. What Pope had heard of King's battle had deceived him; or, what is much more probable, he had with his usual perversity chosen to deceive himself. From where the battle was fought at sunset of the 28th to where Pope opened his eyes at daylight of the 29th, it was only about five miles, and it was less than four miles from Groveton to Gainesville; and yet Pope had interpreted two defeats of two separate divisions of McDowell's corps as victorious results, and at ten o'clock at night had announced to his troops at Centreville that McDowell had intercepted Jackson's retreat, and that there was no hope of Jackson's escape. But at daylight Pope's illusions were

<sup>1</sup> Reynolds's.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports, McDowell and General John F. Reynolds.

<sup>3</sup> McDowell's Report.

<sup>4</sup> Official Report, McDowell.

dispelled. Long before that hour General Porter was well informed of the disasters which had overtaken the Federal army. He had arrived at Manassas Junction in time to confer with King and with McDowell, and not too soon to know from Ricketts at Bristoe Station the whole truth and the real truth of Longstreet's threatening presence near Gainesville.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, all that he learned only confirmed what he himself had seen and heard during the long day that he had passed at Bristoe Station, on the 28th, idly awaiting and vainly applying for orders from Pope.<sup>2</sup>

Only eleven miles away in an air line from Bristoe Station, he had seen the mist of the mountain mingling with the smoke of battle; he had heard through the winding valley of the Broad Run at his feet, the roar of hostile cannon, sounding clear, and yet more clear, as it followed in pursuit of the Federal troops. We can therefore well imagine the dismay with which, at six o'clock in the morning of the 29th of August, he received an order from General Pope, dated at three o'clock on the same morning, directing him to move at daylight upon Centreville,<sup>3</sup> and rehearsing the details that at ten o'clock on the preceding evening had been so jubilantly given to Kearny, to Hooker, and to Reno: that McDowell had intercepted the retreat of Jackson; that Sigel was immediately on the right of

<sup>1</sup> "Porter should have been at Manassas Junction in compliance with my orders of the day previous." (Pope in his Official Report of his own doings at three A. M. of August 29th. See his report and orders in his Virginia Campaigns.)

<sup>2</sup> He had (morning of the 29th) "then seen McDowell at Manassas, who confirmed the information he had received that Longstreet had passed Thoroughfare Gap the night before, that Ricketts had fled before him and was then close to Bristoe, and that King had then abandoned Warrenton pike, and that all of Lee's forces were pushing down on Groveton." (Record of Court-Martial, page 90.)

<sup>3</sup> Court-Martial, page 245.

McDowell; and that Kearny and Hooker would march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. And not only was Porter ordered to move at the first dawn of day upon Centreville, but he was directed to leave his trains to follow him, for it was very important that he "should be here," and at a very early hour in the morning, as a severe engagement was likely to take place, and his presence was necessary.<sup>1</sup> That Pope, at three o'clock in the morning of the 29th, was manoeuvring his troops and making his dispositions to fight a great battle, upon the result of which depended the safety of Washington, the invasion of the North, nay, the very existence of the nation, in such reckless ignorance as to where his own troops were, and where those of the enemy, could not have excited in Porter that feeling of contempt to which Pope makes constant reference in his official report, and which appears in his testimony as a witness at the court-martial before which General Porter was arraigned for disobedience of the order of the 28th,<sup>2</sup>—and for other alleged disobediences and negligences further on,—and for which, through so many years, Porter has so unjustly and yet so nobly suffered. No; in such a momentous period Porter could not have despised Pope; nor could he have respected him. If therefore, he then indulged in what have been called satirical and ill-mannered dispatches to Burnside, for the truth of which he stands vindicated by history, a calmer *now* in a calmer review of all the surrounding facts and circumstances will pronounce<sup>3</sup> its condemnation upon the influences which these dispatches excited against their too persecuted author. And it may be that in a clearer atmosphere,

<sup>1</sup> Order from General Pope to General Porter, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 240.

<sup>2</sup> See note, *ante*.

<sup>3</sup> It has. See note, *ante*.

fatal to passion, to prejudice, and to factious strife, General McClellan may find his justification that he relied for a defense of the national capital, rather upon the strong works on its surrounding hills than on swelling the ranks of a commander whose unfitness, mismanagement, and obstinacy were but too well known to his army, and too seriously suspected by the nation. But whatever Porter thought of Pope's order, he made no halt in his march upon Centreville. Pope, in his final review of Porter's omissions and intents, makes no charge there. If this order was countermanded before nine o'clock in the morning, — of which there is some intimation in Pope's report, — Porter received no notice of it. At that hour he was near Bull Run. Here he was met with orders to turn and march towards Gainesville.

Two orders indeed, at this time and place, were received by Porter. The first was a verbal one; the second was in writing. Both directed him to push forward with King's division towards Gainesville. The orders came to him at about half past nine in the morning. When the written order came Porter was in the act of complying with the verbal one. His column retraced its steps. At Manassas Junction he found General King's division of McDowell's corps. General Hatch was in command. King had given out: he was sick. The men of this division had marched swiftly from the scene of their conflict with Jackson, and had arrived at the Junction at six in the morning of the 29th. The men were jaded. For forty-eight hours they had encountered dangers and fatigues that had told upon their *morale*. The promise of rest and of food filled the troops with joy. They flung their heavy knapsacks from their weary shoulders, lighted fires, cooked rations, and gave themselves up, as sol-

diers will, to an enjoyment in which the past was forgotten and the future disregarded. As the corps of General Porter on its way towards Gainesville, passed, the cry arose that these were troops from General McClellan's army, and cheer rang out upon cheer at this announcement, for it now seemed sure that the junction of the two armies was complete: the end for which all the fatigues, dangers, suffering, and death Pope's army had borne was attained. The Army of the Potomac was flying to reënforce the Army of Virginia. So strong was the excitement that men almost wept with joy. Want of sleep, fatigue, had weakened self-reliance.<sup>1</sup> The body required rest; but this it was not to have, for before the men could even kill the cattle that were to feed them, — before they had even swallowed their coffee, or found one moment's rest in sleep, — the order came to follow on to meet the enemy. The men arose wearily, replaced their knapsacks on their too tired shoulders, and in a state of complete mental lassitude, at ten A. M. plodded on, retracing a part of their last night's journey in rear of General Porter's corps.

Between eleven o'clock and half past eleven, General Porter with the head of his corps, reached the farthest point he was able to make that day in the direction ordered. At or about noon, General McDowell with Ricketts's division, joined him.<sup>2</sup> In the mean time a new order emanated from Pope. The hour of its creation does not appear upon its face; but it bears internal evidence of having been written before eleven A. M. It was surely written after the date of the one received at half past nine by Porter.<sup>3</sup> Composed at the

<sup>1</sup> See Bivouac and Battlefield.

<sup>2</sup> See McDowell's Official Report, movement of King and Ricketts.

<sup>3</sup> Confirmed by Report of Army Board, March 19, 1879, as follows :

"headquarters of the Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 1862," it was addressed to Generals McDowell and Porter, with the command that these officers "would please" move forward with their joint commands towards Gainesville,—a movement which, Pope wrote, he had sent Porter orders to execute one and a half hours ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, Pope continued, were moving on the Warrenton turnpike, "and must now be not far from Gainesville." "I desire," continued Pope, "that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movement of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aid-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear." Pope, continuing, declared that he did not even know Ricketts's position, and he had not been able to find out where McDowell was "until a late hour this morning." McDowell would communicate with Ricketts, and send him to his corps as soon as practicable; and "if any considerable advantage is to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out." It was then urged by Pope that the one thing to be held in view was that "the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run by to-night or by morning." "The indications are," closes Pope, "that

"On his way to the front McDowell had received the following [the above order] from General Pope, addressed jointly to him and Porter; and Porter had received a copy of the same order a moment before McDowell's arrival."



the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction, at a pace that will bring them here<sup>1</sup> by to-morrow night or next day." His own headquarters, Pope then announced, "would be for the present with Heintzelman's corps at this place" (Centreville).<sup>2</sup>

That this order, as remarkable in its distrust and fear as the order sent at three o'clock of the same morning to Porter was remarkable in its confidence and hope, should have impressed Porter with a conviction that the "one thing to be held in view" was "that the [his] troops must occupy a position from which they can [could] reach Bull Run by to-night or by morning" cannot be denied by any one who places a proper significance upon words when addressed by a commander of an army in the field to his troops upon the eve of battle.

But whether the order conferred upon McDowell as the ranking officer the command of General Porter's corps, or whether it left each of these officers subordinate alone to Pope, has been seriously discussed by military critics.

That the latter is the true interpretation of his meaning, Pope bore witness under oath: he swore that "his intention was that they should act independently of each other, and each in direct subordination to himself."<sup>3</sup>

But that the reverse may have been intended, or that Porter would be justified in believing such was Pope's intention, is contended by those who fortify themselves by a narrow construction of Article 122 of the Articles of War.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Centreville.

<sup>2</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> See Court-Martial Record, page 306.

<sup>4</sup> See United States Revised Statutes, title 14, chap. v., p. 240: "If

The importance of this matter will appear further on in giving a history of the part taken by General Porter's command in the movements of this day. At present it will be sufficient if we state that when the joint order reached Generals McDowell and Porter it "found them doing what that order directed them to do;" it found the "troops in the position in which it directed them to be."<sup>1</sup>

We will turn back again to daylight of the 29th, and to the country south of the Warrenton turnpike, upon the line held there by the corps of General Sigel and the division of General Reynolds.

When Pope heard of the retreat from Gainesville he denounced bitterly the wisest movement that his co-commander McDowell had ever ordered, — the march of Ricketts to impede Longstreet's advance through Thoroughfare Gap, — attributing to it as a consequence the overthrow and withdrawal of King.<sup>2</sup>

When however, he recovered from his indignation, he sent flying orders to Sigel: "Attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it is light enough to see; bring him to a stand if it is possible to do so."<sup>3</sup> As this was not a matter of great difficulty, Sigel, soon after daylight, found himself with only Reynolds to assist him, and with an engagement of considerable magnitude upon his hands.

In the pale gray of the morning, the right of the upon marches, guards, or in quarters, different corps of the army happen to join or do duty together, the officer highest in rank of the line of the army . . . then on duty . . . shall command the whole, and give orders for what is needful to the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President, according to the nature of the case."

<sup>1</sup> McDowell's testimony, Court-Martial, page 83.

<sup>2</sup> See Pope's Official Report: "Disposal of my troops west of Jackson having failed through Ricketts's movement towards Thoroughfare Gap, and the consequent withdrawal of King."

<sup>3</sup> Pope's Official Report.

Confederate line could be seen on the heights above Groveton. Its left rested near Sudley Mill.<sup>1</sup> The unfinished railroad, of which use had been made in the Confederate assault on King's division the night before, was now to be employed as a defensive work against the Federal assault. This road was constructed to connect the Manassas Gap railway with Alexandria over a shorter line. It was designed in the interests of peace and prosperity. Its value as a line of defense Jackson saw at a glance. The deep cuts through the hills were ditches, and the high embankments across the valleys were parapets. He would convert it into an instrument of war and desolation. It was therefore mainly along this line that Jackson established his corps to act purely on the defensive till Longstreet should arrive.<sup>2</sup>

The whole front of Jackson's line did not cover more than one mile and three fourths in length. Twenty thousand troops were there to defend it. Hill's division on the left was the most extended. Gregg's brigade held Hill's left. He was near Catharpin Creek, and commanded a very important position at Sudley Ford. Three of his regiments were deployed on a small, rocky, wooded knoll, before a deep excavation in the railroad line. One regiment was thrown back at right angles to the main line, and looked into a field which fell off northerly from the knoll; one regiment was in reserve. Gregg was a little in advance of the main line. Out of the three thousand yards in Jackson's front, he occupied at least one fourth of the distance. On Gregg's right came Thomas's brigade, and then Field's; the remaining three brigades of Hill's division were in the rear. Next to Hill came Ewell's division. His troops were in a wood, between which and Hill there was a

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General Jackson.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports, Generals Jackson, Hill, Early, and others.

field of growing corn. In front of this division, the railroad grade presented a high embankment. Next to Ewell, on the extreme right, the old "Stonewall" division was formed in a thick forest upon a side-hill to the north of Groveton, in front of the railroad line. Before the centre and left divisions of Jackson's corps, a belt of woods inclosed the railroad. In some places, as in the centre, the forest extended to the west, covering the Confederate position, while in others, as on the Confederate left, it extended towards the east, covering the approaches of the Federal army. In others, again, for small spaces the line was uncovered. Behind the line there were ridges for artillery, and hills clothed with trees to shelter the main part of Jackson's troops, who could not be disposed in line of battle on his contracted front. In artillery Jackson was not deficient. On his right he established five batteries,<sup>1</sup> mounting about thirty guns, and on his left four batteries,<sup>2</sup> numbering about eighteen guns. This was Jackson's disposition for a Federal attack from the east,—an attack which he then believed was to be made not only by all the Federal troops that had swung around towards Centreville, but by the troops which he had driven from the Centreville turnpike the preceding night.<sup>3</sup> In the direction of Manassas Junction, some apprehension of a movement by the enemy to his rear was felt by Jackson. Federal troops had been observed on the roads from Gainesville to Manassas.<sup>4</sup> Two brigades of infantry from General Lawton's division and Johnson's battery were sent to the northwest

<sup>1</sup> Poague, Carpenter, Dement, Brockenbrogh, and Latimer. (Official Reports of Jackson, and Crutchfield, chief of artillery.)

<sup>2</sup> Johnson, Braxton, Pegram, and Crenshaw.

<sup>3</sup> These troops he thought had moved onward to interpose between himself and the Federal capital. (Official Report, Jackson.)

<sup>4</sup> Official Report, General Jubal Early.

side of the Centreville Warrenton turnpike and the unfinished railway, and ordered to take post near the intersection of these roads, on a commanding ridge. Of this detachment Early was placed in command by General Jackson. With his own and Hays's brigades he was to defend the rear of Jackson's line, until Longstreet's arrival made his presence there unnecessary. Jackson selected his location, and gave him his orders. Early formed his two brigades in line of battle in a wood, and advanced his skirmishers to the railroad track. Two regiments of this command<sup>1</sup> General Jackson in person detached, and placed them east of the turnpike, in a piece of woods, to cover his right and to watch the movements of the Federal General Reynolds, moving into position on the left of Sigel's corps. Early's troops were a little more than one mile and a half west of Groveton. He was in position not later than eight o'clock in the morning.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the Confederate battle line that Sigel's corps, assisted by Reynolds's division of McDowell's, moved upon when the dusky light of dawn had given place to the pale purple that showed itself in the east. General Carl Schurz with his division was first in motion. It had just turned five o'clock. His right brigade was commanded by Colonel Schimmelfening, one of the best educated officers of all of those foreigners who offered their swords to the Federal government. He brought from his native land, where he had been tried and trusted in the field, a good reputation for both skill and valor. We had done wisely in accepting his services.<sup>3</sup> Schurz's left brigade was commanded

<sup>1</sup> Thirteenth and thirty-first Virginia.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Report, and letter dated February 23, 1874, to General Fitz-John Porter by General Jubal Early, from which this account is taken.

<sup>3</sup> See Official Report, General Carl Schurz.

by Colonel Krzyzanowski ; each contained but three regiments.

Schurz was on the right of Sigel's corps. Before him was the turnpike, the low ground through which wound the small stream called Young's Branch, and beyond, the woods standing in the dull light, dark, silent, and threatening ; there the enemy was supposed to be concealed. Schurz moved forward in columns by companies left in front, with one regiment of each brigade in rear formed in double column on the centre. The turnpike and the low ground in front of it were passed, and Young's Branch was forded. The division was now deployed into line, and skirmishers were thrown to the front. In less than one mile's advance the woods were reached, entered, and found deserted. The left of the line in its movement did not unite with that of the invincible Milroy, whom, with his independent brigade, we find again, a modern Ajax, defying the elements. Milroy formed the centre of Sigel's line. To connect with him Schurz was obliged to push his left wing into a long stretch of woods that rose beyond the clearing into which he had emerged. Here he met the enemy. Their fire struck him where the left of his line joined the right of Milroy's.<sup>1</sup>

The course of General Milroy to Schurz's battle line was marked, in his own narrative,<sup>2</sup> by the usual heroic adventures which befell that heroic man. In five hundred yards he came to the creek (Young's Branch) ; a few straggling shots whistled by ; he coolly halted his men ; it was breakfast time ; General Schenck and himself went on to an eminence five hundred yards beyond ; a shower of musket balls greeted him ; he sent for a battery, and the "bushwhackers," as he

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Carl Schurz.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report.

contemptuously termed them, fled. Milroy now discovered the enemy in great force at a distance of about twelve hundred yards. He moved upon him; a hostile battery challenged, but could not arrest his advance. The heavy musketry fire that had been opened in the woods into which Schurz entered had, however, a better effect. Milroy halted, and Schurz pushed on in the face of a lively fire, which began on his left and extended along his front, until the enemy gave way. In this manner about half a mile was gained. From the increase of the Confederate fire in volume and in quickness of succession, it was apparent that the opposing force was increasing in numbers. Batteries were stationed in rear of each brigade; reserves were brought up for sudden emergencies; and skirmishers were thrown to the extreme right, where a large force had been seen. A new anxiety now arose. There was a gap in the centre of Schurz's line, and a reserve regiment was thrust in to fill it, but too late. The centre gave way, was rallied, and the ground, after a sharp contest, was reoccupied.

It was now ten o'clock, and General Kearny was on the field.<sup>1</sup> From Schurz's right to Bull Run there was not space enough for five thousand men.<sup>2</sup> Kearny requested General Schurz to shorten his line, and Schurz gave an order to that effect to Colonel Schimmelfening. But there was no time to do more. The enemy was again active. The sharp contest on his right had aroused Milroy, who never could suppress his burning desire to do and dare for every one on the Federal side, regardless of his own front and his own duties thereon. He thought Schurz needed help; so he sent over one half of his command, to help turn the enemy's right, — the thing to do, — Milroy had no doubt about it.

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Carl Schurz.

<sup>2</sup> Kearny's division.

Schurz discovered that two strange regiments had slipped in between his two brigades. They were small ones, and they were in his centre, the very point at which the enemy again drove furiously.<sup>1</sup>

The contest was in a strip of thick timber about one hundred and fifty yards in width. Towards the enemy the ground was clear to the railroad track. Over this ground the Confederates had advanced, and now they had the timber. They moved to its edge. Schurz's centre had been violently thrown out of the woods in disorder, as he reported. A feeble effort of the twenty-ninth New York to stop the enemy had met with a feeble result. Schurz considered the moment critical. One of his batteries, well posted for this contingency opened. The enemy hesitated, but did not emerge from the wood. Schurz rallied and formed the fifty-fourth New York; then supporting it with the twenty-ninth he advanced again. On his extreme right, the brigade had not moved from its position. On his left, the brigade there had fought well. The whole attack was confined to not more than three regiments, in the centre of his line. With the two regiments designated, he reëntered the woods. The enemy had fallen back. At this moment a letter addressed to General Kearny by General Sigel was shown to Schurz. Kearny was requested to attack at once on the right, — to attack before Longstreet's arrival. He had not yet arrived, but was expected. Now we could gain great advantages.<sup>2</sup>

Milroy witnessed the rough treatment his two regiments had received under Schurz's hands, and he was wroth. He had intended with his two remaining regiments to amuse himself by capturing a Confederate battery, that somewhere over on the left annoyed

<sup>1</sup> Schurz.

<sup>2</sup> Sigel to Kearny.



him; but now he was obliged to forego this entertainment. Milroy had gazed upon his flying regiments. The fire, he said, was terrible; he saw the struggle of his brave colonels to rally their men, and he rejoiced when they succeeded. He sent his aids everywhere; he sent a regiment to the left where the woods ended, to approach the railroad track, but grievously were they treated under a Confederate fire; they broke and fell back in disorder.<sup>1</sup>

Hardly had General Schurz been driven from the woods when he made up his mind to try it again. Doubtless, the knowledge that Sigel had written to Kearny to attack on the right had its weight. It was now after twelve, — near one o'clock. Without consultation with Kearny or with any one else, with no order from Sigel and no request for coöperation, Schurz ordered a general advance of his whole line. His troops responded manfully, cleared the woods, and got possession of the very key of the enemy's defense, the railroad track in their front. Results far from disastrous

<sup>1</sup> Milroy's Official Report. Thus far in the battle, feats of valor on the Federal side we have given from official reports. It is remarkable that the most patient research among Confederate reports reveals no account of any heavy or prolonged struggle, *up to this time*, with either General Schurz or Milroy. Indeed, the Confederates claim to have resisted the efforts of these Federal officers with but a small part of their force.

General Gregg says that he sent out the first South Carolina regiment from his front to cross the railroad, enter the woods, and see with what force his skirmishers were engaged. The Federals were there in large columns, the colonel reported upon his return. The twelfth South Carolina was then added to the first, the thirteenth South Carolina to that, and the three regiments were ordered to advance and drive back the enemy. Then the reserve regiment was sent in (Orr's rifles). The advantage in the conflict that ensued was claimed by the Confederates, who reported that they had scattered the enemy to the right and left, and had driven away a heavy body of the enemy which was massing near the railroad. General Gregg reported that at twelve o'clock his front was cleared of the enemy, and that he recalled his regiments because he was ordered not to bring on a general engagement. (Official Report of General Gregg.)

to the Federal army, if Kearny had at the same time attacked on the extreme right, General Schurz reported officially he was entitled to believe. But Kearny did not attack. Schurz had moved forward alone.<sup>1</sup>

Behind cover the enemy poured into the assaulting column a rapid and destructive fire; but the assailants returned "volley for volley." Colonel Schimmelfening not only gained possession of an embankment on his right, but advanced beyond to a corn-field; then fell back under heavy pressure; but he retained the embankment. On Schurz's left the line came to a stand. Two batteries were sent to the right under a heavy cross-fire from the enemy; still the left advance was resisted. Two mountain howitzers sent by Sigel then arrived, and were placed happily in the skirmish line of Krzyzanowski's brigade. From the effect of this fire the Confederates recoiled for a time; then the left advanced until it too, gained the embankment. General Schurz held this position until about two o'clock in the afternoon, — held it against repeated attacks of the enemy. Then he was relieved by General Hooker's command, which had arrived on the field on Schurz's front.<sup>2</sup> One after another, as they were replaced by Hooker, Schurz withdrew his regiments. From five o'clock in the morning his division had been under fire. Since the evening before they had been without food; from death and from wounds their losses had been severe; from constant engagements they had exhausted their ammunition. They retired behind the hill on which the battery of the second brigade had been in position, and from thence they moved to a wood about four hundred yards to the rear. The division of General Schurz took no further part in the

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Carl Schurz.

<sup>2</sup> Between one and two o'clock P. M.

actions of the day. The general commanding this division praised the conduct of his troops, and they were entitled to praise.<sup>1</sup>

We should not pause in our narrative of Sigel's fight in the centre of Pope's army without a reference to the final efforts of the heroic Milroy. While Schurz was holding the railroad embankment, heavy firing was heard on his left. The sound swayed backward and forward. He no longer connected with Milroy; he did not know the meaning of this fire, nor from what commands the opposing forces came. But Milroy, in his record of that day's achievements, has revealed that this storm fell upon him alone; "for," he says, "Schurz had been obliged to retire with his two brigades an hour before," and "the whole rebel force" was turned "against [his] my brigade." "Like chaff before the tempest" his "brave lads were dashed back." He flew to his batteries; a wheel-horse was shot dead; Milroy never minded that. "Six guns with grape and canister mowed the rebels with fine effect." A colonel, while trying to rally his regiment, was shot through the brain and instantly killed.<sup>2</sup> Aid came luckily in the thickest of the fight; Schenck sent General Stahl with his brigade, and General Stahl was requested by Milroy to support a battery; but Milroy saw him no more during the day. Wholly unsupported during the next "hour or two," — time was of no consequence, — except by a portion of a Pennsylvania regiment, this invincible brigadier rallied his reserve regiments and broken fragments in the woods near his batteries, sent out his skirmishers, gathered all he could of his dead

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of General Schurz and Colonel Krzyzanowski; the lieutenant-colonel commanding the sixty-first Ohio; the major commanding the seventy-fourth Pennsylvania; the major commanding the fifty-fourth New York; and the captain commanding the fifty-eighth New York.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Cantwell, of the third Virginia, Milroy's brigade.

and his wounded, and here remained, occasionally firing a gun, until General Grover, of Hooker's division, came forward with his New England regiments to render memorable the ground where Milroy fought, by a bayonet charge as brilliant and as daring as his official account of it was modest and soldierly. Many days after the battle, while the earth was covered with shreds of clothing, with pieces of leather, and with all the fragments of a crash of arms, while the dead strewed the field and the earth was red with blood, men and women followed the course of those heroic men of New England, and knew not, nor cared to know, that it was on the same ground that Milroy had defied the whole Confederate army together. Indeed, had they been told it, there are good reasons for believing that Milroy would have been soon forgotten. But of this further on.

While Schurz and Milroy were engaged in the centre, Heintzelman's corps had — as we have seen — arrived on the field. Heintzelman in person was at ten o'clock in the morning one mile beyond Stone Bridge; General Kearny, who had preceded him, had made his way to the Confederate left. At ten o'clock he was within range of the Confederate artillery, and had thrown Colonel Poe's brigade to the front and General Robinson's to its right.

For a time Robinson bore with indifference a heavy and somewhat fatal fire from the enemy's artillery; but as nothing was to be gained by such losses, he found cover still further to his right, from which however, he was in a short time sent to Poe's left. He then formed his line of battle on the road that runs from Sudley through Gum Springs to Leesburg. A heavy fire of musketry was heard on his left and front. It came from Schurz's division in the attack upon the railroad.

In Robinson's front was a wood, and in it the railroad cut. If he could reach that, he could cut off the enemy's retreat in that direction, provided Schurz could make the enemy retreat. The railroad was gained; it was in possession of Colonel Schimmelfening; but the corn-field in front was filled with the enemy. Robinson immediately deployed his brigade along the railroad to the right of the troops he found there; but hardly had he prolonged this line when he found the troops there no longer.<sup>1</sup> They had given way, passed rapidly to the rear out of the woods, and his left flank was exposed. To occupy that deserted ground a rapid movement to his left for a space of about four hundred yards was made on the left of the Leesburg road, and here he was fiercely attacked by the enemy, who had, in superior force, crossed the railroad in pursuit of Schurz's troops. The time of this movement General Kearny places as towards noon.<sup>2</sup>

To meet this sudden assault General Robinson threw forward his right, and formed in line of battle at right angles to the railroad, and checked the enemy's advance. But the fighting was still severe in Robinson's first line. General Birney sent forward fresh regiments to relieve tired ones.<sup>3</sup> When four of Birney's regiments had come up,<sup>4</sup> they were deployed on the right and left of the railroad and pushed forward to the front, in support of those who had suffered not only from a terrific fire of musketry, but from Confederate artillery posted on a hill to Robinson's right and rear.<sup>5</sup>

It was now two o'clock. The fight again broke out in the centre; but the struggle there was carried on

<sup>1</sup> Schurz's troops being taken elsewhere. (Official Report, Kearny.)

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports, Generals Kearny and J. C. Robinson.

<sup>3</sup> "Gave them a hand to raise themselves to a renewed fight." (Kearny.)

<sup>4</sup> The fourth Maine, first, fortieth, and one hundred and first New York.

<sup>5</sup> Robinson's Official Report.

by the division of Heintzelman's corps commanded by General Hooker, and by a brigade from Reno's division. The contest was maintained by a Federal line of which Robinson was in command on the right, Hooker in the centre, and Milroy rampant generally on the left.

The head of Hooker's division showed itself at eleven o'clock in the morning one mile from Stone Bridge, on the Centreville pike. Reno's divisions followed it. Since three o'clock in the morning Hooker had marched from near Bull Run, through Centreville, to the battle-field. He had made ten miles. The third brigade<sup>1</sup> filed at once into a ravine behind a battery which was in rear of the dense woods where Schurz and Milroy were engaged. They rested here, with arms stacked, for an hour. Then there came a call for the relief of some of Sigel's command; and the sixth and seventh New Jersey regiments were moved up. An engagement with skirmishers followed, but nothing of importance transpired.<sup>2</sup> At two o'clock the remainder of Colonel Carr's brigade went forward into the woods. The Confederates were found too strong to be handled. Firing on the skirmish line and firing by regiments continued.

Pope arrived on the field between one and two P. M.,<sup>3</sup> in time to feel an apprehension about his centre, that even Hooker's veterans, with such a leader as Hooker himself, could not allay. Pope ordered Kearny to "send a strong force diagonally forward to the front to relieve the centre in the woods from pressure." General Roberts, Pope's chief of staff, bore this order.<sup>4</sup> It

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Carr commanding.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Colonel Revere, seventh, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruling, sixth New Jersey volunteers.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report of General Heintzelman.

<sup>4</sup> Official Report of General Kearny.

was received in the early afternoon.<sup>1</sup> The order was communicated to Robinson. He was ready. His men advanced, and gained steadily a distance of several hundred yards. But they could do no more; for fresh masses of the enemy (two brigades of them, Robinson thought) threatened him in front and flank, and he withdrew to the road, the second position he had taken on the field.<sup>2</sup>

At this time, but just before Robinson fell back, Colonel Taylor, of Hooker's division, and Reno with a brigade pressed forward into the woods to relieve Carr. The Confederate column bearing down against the Federal right and centre could not be resisted. Such was the impetuosity of the attack that the woods were cleared of the Federals and occupied by the Confederates. Carr fell back as his left was being turned by a Confederate brigade. The hour of this assault was between three and four o'clock.<sup>3</sup> Carr and Taylor and Reno and Robinson had rested from further effort, in the centre or on the right, to break through the Confederate front. Hooker was not content, however, and Kearny pondered upon plans of his own. As a last effort it was determined to throw General Grover's brigade with all the impetuosity that its able chief could command full and square upon the Confederate centre, where it was protected by the railroad embankment. Of all the powerful blows delivered upon the centre of Jackson's line, nothing in power can compare with

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Kearny.

<sup>2</sup> Robinson's Official Report. He was obliged to cease to advance, and held his own. Both flanks were in the air. He was in front of all others considerably. (Kearny.)

<sup>3</sup> Official Reports of Colonel Joseph B. Carr, commanding brigade; Captain Hoffman, eighth New Jersey; and Lieutenant-Colonel Sewell, fifth New Jersey volunteers. It was in this charge that one of the mountain howitzers Schurz had turned over to Carr was lost.

Grover's attack. It was irresistible, it was fearless, and it was portentous. In the boldness with which Massachusetts men parted the flames of three lines of Confederate fire to plunge their bayonets into three lines of the Confederate foe there must have been a revelation that there were men grown on Massachusetts soil who came fully up to the most chivalric of Southern standards.

General Grover had been turned over to Sigel by General Hooker when he first arrived on the field. Sigel was hard pressed and had applied for aid. As Grover went forward he was exposed to the enemy's artillery. Shells fell with remarkable precision along the line of the road he took, but without damage to his command. The First Massachusetts Infantry of this brigade was sent to the front at once, and the remaining four regiments, in two lines, were sheltered from the enemy's fire by a roll of the land. From the top of the hill which covered his men Grover saw before him an open field, falling off at one edge to a valley; in the valley he saw the embankment of the unfinished railroad, and beyond it the forest and the heights corresponding to the hill on which he stood; and he knew that the enemy was in force upon those heights, and that numerous and heavy batteries were behind them. From where his men lay it was about thirteen hundred yards to the embankment. The scene before him General Grover examined carefully. At times the fire of artillery was heavy. On the enemy's right the Confederates replied to the guns of Reynolds and Schenck, in his centre to Sigel and Reno, and on his left to the batteries of Kearny. During the middle of the day there was but little firing from the infantry. Under an August sun the fields were dry, and the grass, ignited by bursting shells, added a dense smoke to the



sulphurous pall above, and blackened ashes to the desolation below.

At three o'clock an officer galloped up to General Grover with an order to advance in line of battle over the cleared ground, to pass the embankment, enter the edge of the woods beyond, and hold them. For this work there was no reliance but the bayonet, and General Grover so told his men. Move slowly forward, he said, till the enemy's fire was felt; then advance rapidly and return it, and then the bayonet; give them one withering volley, and then the bayonet; man to man in the struggle. His line was formed, the first, eleventh, and sixteenth Massachusetts, the second New Hampshire, and the twenty-sixth Pennsylvania. These men entered a heavy wood, where the enemy's skirmishers were found, and they pressed them to their reserves, which in turn fell back, until the railroad embankment was seen, ten feet in height. As the Federals emerged from the woods, the first Confederate line from behind this cover opened a heavy fire. It was returned. The Federals leaped up the embankment, and the Confederates met them on its summit. For a few minutes there was a severe struggle. Neither had yielded to a fire which had been delivered almost muzzle to muzzle; nor had the Federal line halted before awful volleys, that tore life out of men in that leaden storm, as the tornado tosses leaves and branches from its path. It was a pure contest of muscle, hand to hand, man to man. But it was brief; skulls dashed in here with muskets clubbed, lives let out there with bayonet thrusts, were beheld with consternation by the Confederates. They turned in flight. Over the embankment our men followed in pursuit, — over the bodies of slain and mangled wretches that had rolled down the declivity when the breath went out of their bodies; on

through the scattered and broken fragments of the first line of the enemy to a second, which was broken like a reed. One frantic effort the Confederates made here; one terrible volley they delivered. The Federal onset never ceased. With wild yells on they came, and the Confederates continued their flight. Still onward pursued the Federals until a third defensive line was reached, from which the foe advancing met a thinned and wasted front of gallant men. The Confederates were fresh, their ranks were closed, and their numbers were larger than Grover's. Now, too, the Confederate artillery opened from the Confederate right with an enfilading fire. The right centre and a portion of the left of Grover's line were swept back. With the sixteenth Massachusetts General Grover tried to turn the enemy's flank; but the break in his own and the length of the enemy's line told against him. He was obliged to retire, first to the embankment, and thence, pursued by musketry from the woods and by shells and canister from the Confederate artillery, to his first position under the hill. The survivors rallied to their colors. Colors? In some regiments there were no colors left, nothing but the staff; in others there were shreds of colors only. Of the brave men of that brigade four hundred and eighty-six officers and men were killed, wounded, or missing.

In the eleventh Massachusetts regiment the loss was one hundred and twelve out of two hundred and eighty-three officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, carried into action.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The totals of losses in the brigade were as follows:—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
First Massachusetts,	5	66	7	78
Second New Hampshire,	16	87	30	133
Eleventh Massachusetts,	10	77	25	112
Sixteenth Massachusetts,	4	64	42	110
Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania,	6	33	14	53
	<hr/> 41	<hr/> 327	<hr/> 118	<hr/> 486

General Grover could not trust himself to speak to the heroic survivors of their heroic conduct. In the formal pages of an official report he records his opinion of those who "can look back with just pride to their conduct on that day."<sup>1</sup>

All that is here related of that fearless charge lasted but twenty minutes in time. In twenty minutes men became hoarse with cheers of triumph, or lost their voices with cries of rage. In twenty minutes officers blistered their hands in frenzied wavings of their swords; in twenty minutes hundreds of gallant men left only a record of their noble deeds to tell that once there lived a soul who fought and died in Grover's charge in 1862.<sup>2</sup>

How this gallant charge was met by the enemy has been told in the narrative of General Jackson's movements when he saw that Grover was bearing everything before him. Hays's brigade was sent from the centre division of his line to the front in support of a brigade on General Hill's right. He had fears for this point. Colonel Bradley T. Johnson on the extreme left of the right division and General Starke on his right were on the ridge covered with timber, where with the "Stonewall" division they had held in check since daylight the whole of the Federal left. Before them was the open

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Grover, in which he mentions as among those who won eternal fame from death on the field, or from wounds that were mortal, Tileston, eleventh Massachusetts, Captain Littlefield, second New Hampshire, Captain Stone, eleventh Massachusetts, Lieutenant Roberts, first Massachusetts, Lieutenant Porter, eleventh Massachusetts, Lieutenants Rogers and Moore, second New Hampshire, and Lieutenant Banks, sixteenth Massachusetts. "I had not the opportunity," he says, "to observe all cases of signal daring, but among those that in the short duration of the engagement I especially noticed were Captains McDonald of the eleventh, O'Hara of the sixteenth, wounded, and Lieutenants Merriam and Banks, killed."

<sup>2</sup> See Official Reports of General Grover, Colonel Blaisdell, and Captain Blake, eleventh Massachusetts.

ground with its embankment and cut, and the woods from which all the Federal movements had been made. They, too, saw Grover's onset, and, charging forward with their brigades to meet it, drove Grover over the railroad into the woods, and captured a three-inch rifled gun from a Federal battery that attempted to cover his retreat.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever of speculation, whatever of indignation, there might have been among the officers of Grover's brigade that they had received no support in their assault on the Confederate lines,—and there was much of both,<sup>2</sup>—General Milroy, in whose front and upon whose ground this charge was made, claims absolution. In his official narrative he reports that he advised everything. He told Grover where to form his line, and suggested charging with fixed bayonets at the embankment; and when the "rebels" were being driven "in clouds" he discomfited them so much by his fire that he ordered his reserved regiment to charge. With Grover's repulse Milroy's regiment turned, before it had crossed the meadow in front of the woods from which it came. Here the deeds of this chieftain ended, and a narrative of his achievements began. In his usual florid style Milroy wrote of the "immense columns" of the enemy, that, "surging back," drove before them Grover's brigade and his own "handful of men;" of the battery, which an hour before he had substituted for two of his own, "given out;" of the steady fire of grape and canister which he poured into the advancing columns of the enemy; of the "immense surging mass" which from behind pressed the foremost on; of the tenacity with which he supported

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports of Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Early; Colonels B. T. Johnson, and Forno commanding Hays's brigade.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Report of Colonel William Blaisdell, eleventh Massachusetts regiment.

his battery with but a "handful of men;" of his order to retire; of his loss of one gun; and of his withdrawal from further operations that day.<sup>1</sup>

Thus ceased the Federal attack upon the Confederate centre on the twenty-ninth day of August. In succeeding waves, succeeding divisions had assailed in vain. First, Schurz had gained the railroad track; then Carr and Taylor of Hooker's division, and one brigade of Reno's had assaulted, but all their assaults had been repelled before three o'clock in the day; and finally came the charge by General Grover, surpassing all in boldness and in power, and yet, like all the rest, it too had failed.

It was drawing near the hour of five in the afternoon. Along the front of both lines there was a lull. It was ominous of the storm that was soon to burst forth from Kearny's front.

General Philip Kearny had been, before our civil war, a distinguished officer in the regular army of the United States. He was noted in action for his bold and intrepid conduct. In the war between the United States and Mexico he served with a distinction which made him eminent among his comrades. The adventure and the danger which he craved in General Scott's campaign, he seized at the first opportunity offered him for renown. General Kearny then a captain, commanded the First Regiment of Dragoons. And he was proud of his command.

There was a reckless bearing to Kearny's cavalry as they swept along by our columns, with their restless and magnetic leader at their head. Some of his own spirit—all they would take—he infused into his men. To find the field from which he could gather the most glorious fruits of battle was his constant

<sup>1</sup> See Milroy's Official Report.

thought. Triumphs that were not emblazoned on his shield he counted as nought. In every army in Christendom there are men who clamor for distinction or for six feet of earth. But no one called it vapor when Phil Kearny said that he would give an arm for one chance to charge the enemy. In the valley of Mexico, in sight of the beautiful city glistening amidst the waters of Lake Tezcuco, Kearny had his wish and paid his penalty. In giving such a taste of glory for a human arm, those imaginary beings to whom we attribute the possession of occult powers to sway mankind were more considerate than that evil spirit who trades inglorious joys for human souls. It came to pass that at the close of the battle of Churubusco, Santa Anna, with his army turned in flight towards the city. His cavalry covered the fugitives as they pressed sorely stricken along the causeways, from the United States dragoons who hovered around the roads they took. Then Kearny, with his "grays" flashing onward like a meteor, led his men through dust and smoke, through shot and shell, till further progress was barred by the solid gates (near San Antonio) of the city itself, barred by the cannon that now thundered upon them. The brave men turned at last, and bore their leader back with one arm shattered and hanging useless at his side. The peace that followed that brief period of superb achievements by American arms offered no excitements to satisfy our hero. He joined, at the mouth of the Columbia River in Oregon, the first troops that made their way across the plains to the Pacific,—the regiment of mounted riflemen of the army of the United States,—and there he secured a detachment of two companies to explore the dangerous grounds from thence to San Francisco. In the spring of 1851 his march began. Though danger lurked in his path, no

hostile meeting was anticipated. But it came, as lightning sometimes comes from a clear sky. The struggle was brief, our troops were victorious; but the sacrifice was great. The noble, brave, and chivalric Stuart<sup>1</sup> had fallen.

<sup>1</sup> James Stuart of South Carolina, a lieutenant in the United States regiment of mounted riflemen, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, had hailed with delight this service with Kearny, and he rejoiced that his company was detailed to take part in it. Not only had it relieved him from a disagreeable voyage with his regiment, then about sailing, via Panama, for a new station in Texas, but he indulged the hope that he might be granted a leave of absence for foreign travel. The buoyant spirits with which he parted from his friends soon gave place, however, to an unusual dejection, which was apparent to his associates.

The troops had been but two or three days on the march, through a wooded country in which there were no signs of an enemy, when Stuart revealed to Captain Walker, a beloved friend and companion, that, do what he would, he could not shake off an overpowering feeling that his days on earth were numbered. — that he should never reach San Francisco alive. Walker rallied him upon his foolish indulgence in this dark vision; pointed out to him that the march in its future, as in its outset, was filled with an unusual promise of peace and freedom from hostile Indians, of which in that country there had been roving bands. Stuart admitted the truth and wisdom of Walker's remarks, and promised his best efforts to dispel the gloom that oppressed him. But it was in vain, though the day passed and nothing more of the matter was broached by either. On the next morning, however, Stuart again spoke of the uselessness of striving with this feeling, and secured a promise from Walker that his letters, and some things of personal value to his friends, should, in the event of his death, be forwarded to them. The promise was given, and Stuart assumed an air of contentment, which for a moment almost persuaded Walker that he had controlled the dark spirit that had oppressed him. Not many hours had elapsed after this interview, when, almost without warning, the cry of Indians arose, and a somewhat lively engagement was going on. The troops were advancing in a deployed line, Stuart cool and controlling his men, when suddenly, from behind a thicket that had concealed him, an Indian sprang out and advanced threateningly upon Stuart, who drew his revolver to shoot him. Then, as if moved with a more humane feeling, he reserved the weapon to disable his enemy by a blow. It would seem that this moment of irresolution cost Stuart his life, for before the blow was delivered the Indian had raised his bow and sent an arrow completely through the body of the unfortunate officer. Stuart fell into the hands of his men, by whom he was laid under a tree, and when the Indians were driven off, which was quickly done, there Walker found him. Encouragement and sympathy and all there is in manly love

Soon after his return to San Francisco, Kearny resigned his position as an officer of the army. In Europe as well as in America, at home or abroad, he sought those excitements which his profession no longer yielded. Upon the first outbreak between the North and the South, Kearny, loyal to his section and to the flag, offered his sword to the Federal government. It was accepted. He had served in General McClellan's army on the Peninsula; he was in Heintzelman's corps, and he chafed under Heintzelman's command. Indeed, it is doubtful whether his impatient spirit could well brook the control of any commander. More savage and insubordinate criticism against what he conceived to be the slow operations of McClellan on the Peninsula were poured out by Kearny, without restraint of time or of presence, than General Fitz-John Porter ever conceived or ever uttered against Pope. These censures must have come to McClellan's knowledge, but to vindicate his military fame by bringing Kearny before a court-martial under other pretenses did not come to McClellan's heart. Happy was it for the country that it did not, for now the country could rely, in her hour of trial, upon the valuable services of a valuable officer, even though General McClellan's vanity might suffer from peevish words uttered at a period of unusual aggravation.

It was this General Phil Kearny who was preparing to hurl his division headlong upon the closed ranks of Hill's division, on Jackson's left, with the hope that

were offered to hold that life which was fast passing beyond the region of human encouragement and sympathy; but all effort was vain. Once did Stuart allude to the fate which he had so surely foreseen, — once only did he utter the words, "I told you, Walker, it was to be; and now your promise." And so he died, regretted, respected, beloved, more than falls to the usual lot of man. The author, his classmate, lives to pen this tribute of affection to his brother officer and his friend.



he might "sweep with a rush the first line of the enemy."<sup>1</sup>

The Federal line was formed with Poe's brigade on the right, Birney on the left, and Robinson in reserve. Before it were the six brigades of A. P. Hill's division, and one of Ewell's, in two lines. Hill held the most important point of Jackson's line, his left. He had been intrusted with this defense because Jackson knew that his zeal and his courage in the Southern cause were equal to his own. Notwithstanding this disparity of numbers, General Kearny, without hesitation, gave the command to assault the enemy. The brave Federal troops dashed forward over all impediments, and "rolled the first line of the enemy up on his right."<sup>2</sup> It was the beginning of victory, it presaged success; but that was all. The force was too light; the wave was spent, and began to recede. General Stevens, of Reno's command, was on the ground on Kearny's left. He saw that assistance was needed, and he charged forward in support; but in vain; "he did not have the numbers."<sup>3</sup>

The enemy threw forward his reserves. Hill called upon Early, and Early with two additional regiments of other brigades responded. He found the Federals in possession of the railroad cut and the woods beyond. Gregg and Thomas were still before him, but their ammunition was exhausted. Early charged, and he claims that he drove the Federals from the woods and out of the railroad cut and several hundred yards beyond.<sup>4</sup> Early was then recalled to the railroad, where Thomas, Pender, and Archer had firmly maintained their positions during the day.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Kearny. General Kearny was then unconsciously standing in the very shadow of death, which he was to meet as a price for another and a more fatal charge at Chantilly. See *post*.

<sup>2</sup> Kearny's Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>4</sup> Official Report of General Early.

<sup>5</sup> Official Report of General Jackson.

Confederate reports of this day's work abound in almost extravagant admissions of the severity of Federal assaults and the display of Federal valor. The determination, pertinacity, and defiance with which assaults were made upon the Confederate lines are freely admitted by Generals Jackson and Hill, and by Colonel McGowan of Gregg's brigade, who fully reported the occurrences of that "glorious but bloody day," as he called it. Impressed with a conviction that Pope would attempt to turn the left of Jackson's line before Longstreet's arrival, General Hill anticipated a sanguinary struggle. But even Hill seems to have been surprised at what he calls the furious onsets, and persistent, with which column after column and battery after battery pressed upon him. "Heroic courage," he says, "and obstinacy almost without parallel, were exhibited by his division in resisting six distinct and separate assaults."

In the first attack, in the early afternoon, Gregg saw the enemy closing round him ; he heard shouts of defiance as the Federals gained the railroad track, and saw with dismay that, under cover of the deep cut in his front, large numbers were working their way through an interval of one hundred and seventy-five yards that separated the right of his own brigade from the left of Thomas's, and threatened to cut him off from his division. The moment was critical. Rapidly the fourteenth South Carolina, then in reserve, was thrown forward into the gap ; there it was joined by the left regiment of Thomas's brigade, and by parts of others that were hastily rushed forward. The danger was over. The struggle had been severe. Volleys were fired into each other's faces at a distance of ten paces.<sup>1</sup> And the fierce assault, at three o'clock, like those that had preceded it,

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Gregg.

seems to have staggered the enemy. The semicircle of flame and smoke almost surrounding the devoted hill, and the sight of Federal soldiers again making their way through a corner of the open field to the rear of Gregg's position, and pressing heavily on Orr's rifles, who were posted there, filled the Confederates first with apprehension and then with a renewed energy, under which they rallied, and drove, as they claim, the enemy beyond the railroad.

And finally, when Hill's reserves were all in, when the "majority of his men" were without a cartridge, when Gregg without a single round in his brigade declared that he would hold his position with the bayonet, then, says Hill, the enemy came forward in his final assault, with his serried masses and his bold bearing, until the chance of victory trembled in the balance.<sup>1</sup>

The varying fortunes of the day on the Federal right and centre have occupied much of our attention, because there the fiercest assaults were met by the most determined resistance. But the movements of Reynolds and of Schenck, with their divisions, on Pope's extreme left, though not illustrated by brilliant deeds, form part of this history, and should be given.

Schenck's division of Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division of McDowell's were in position on the extreme left of the Federal line at daylight. Reynolds's engaged the enemy's batteries from the same ridge, south of the Warrenton turnpike, on which the enemy was in position, above Groveton, to the north of the turnpike. Cooper's battery, supported by Meade's brigade, received and returned the enemy's fire, until Jackson's

<sup>1</sup> Hill's Official Report, in which he also claims that his own command were spent by seven hours of fighting, were out of ammunition, were exhausted in all things but an unconquerable spirit, and were attacked by an overwhelming superiority of numbers. As appears from previous pages, the superiority of numbers in front of Kearny was greatly on Hill's side.

guns, concentrating on him alone, inflicted a considerable loss in both men and horses, when he withdrew his division and fell back to connect with Schenck. In the mean time Schenck's division had advanced about one mile beyond the Dogan farm, where it had formed in line, with its right resting on the pike. From here Stahl was sent to the aid of Milroy. He came into line along Young's Branch, on Milroy's left, where, without cover of hill or forest, he was exposed to a heavy cross-fire of artillery, from which there were losses in killed and wounded. A battery of General Stevens's brigade of Reno's division, with two regiments, soon came into position behind Groveton, and Stahl was ordered forward about two hundred paces to the front, where, in the woods, with Colonel McLean's brigade of Schenck's division, a new line was formed, with Stahl's right on the turnpike. The thick woods covered the troops, but did not conceal them. The Confederate batteries, replying to Stevens, searched the woods with venom. The Confederate skirmishers, moving up the road, opened on the Federal skirmishers a heavy fire; but neither Federal nor Confederate was forced from his position.

When Pope arrived on the field from Centreville, he attempted an attack upon the enemy's right and rear. Reynolds, from the ridge, sent Generals Seymour and Jackson forward; but even Seymour and Jackson, at the head of their brigades, with all their courage and with all the steadiness their men exhibited, were compelled to fall back before the heavy fire of artillery and musketry which met them on their front and on their left flank. Reynolds fell back again to his original position. The troops that formed the left of Pope's line were not actively engaged during the battle of the 29th. They were exposed to a heavy artillery fire and to sputtering skirmishers, but otherwise there was no

engagement. While the centre and right were covering the ground with their dead and disabled in their heroic assaults; while their valor was extorting tributes of admiration from their foe for a fighting courage and a persistent effort that that foe had hardly looked for from Northern men; while in Southern history and by Southern firesides the brave deeds that Southern soldiers had on this day achieved were to mark it as the bloody but glorious day of the 29th of August, the entire Federal left was paralyzed by the strong divisions of infantry and the strong batteries of artillery which Jackson had established on the heights above Groveton. Often exposed to fire of artillery, sometimes advancing, sometimes retiring, always in line of battle and momentarily expecting an attack, two whole divisions of Pope's army, one of them containing the best troops and the best generals in the field, maintained this stately minuet until about four o'clock in the afternoon, when they retired to a chain of hills behind Dogan's farm, where they went into camp for the night. If however, these troops were held from inflicting wounds and death, they were the instruments of assuaging the pains of many a sufferer who had fallen in King's fight of the night before. At a period in their advance they reached Gibbon's battle-field on the north, and Gibbon's hospital on the south, of the turnpike. If it was sad business for men whole in body to look on the mangled frames of their comrades, to think how long before they too might be stretched prone upon the earth, as cold, as lifeless, or as helpless as those before them, how much more of agony and despair must those poor lingering wretches have suffered during the long night of the 28th, alone in the deep woods, alone under the cold stars, without help or sympathy; or during the day that followed, with its thunder of opposing batteries,

and the bursting of myriads of shells, threatening the fading life in their helpless bodies! It was a great mercy that Reynolds and Schenck were permitted by Jackson to do so much to relieve human suffering.<sup>1</sup>

Though Jackson, by the powerful resistance of his own corps, had been able to maintain with that corps alone his own position during the battle of the 29th, it by no means follows that if Jackson's troops had been borne down by the impetuosity of the charges of Kearny and of Grover any advantage would have been obtained by the Federal army. For before the contest with General Jackson had fairly begun, Lee, hurrying to the field, had extended the whole of Longstreet's infantry and most of Stuart's cavalry from Jackson's right, near Groveton, to and beyond the line of the Manassas Gap railway. By twelve o'clock at noon Lee's whole army, in deployed lines to the front, or in reserves massed to the rear, with cavalry and artillery on its right flank, and with its batteries on Groveton Heights, awaited calmly and with confidence the hour of action. But the thunders of artillery and the crash of musketry had died away on the left with the expiring effort of the heroic Kearny; and the morning which had dawned on Jackson's battle-field had passed into the sunset of a quiet evening before any part of that right wing, of thirty-four thousand men, which

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports of Generals Reynolds, Stahl, Colonel McLean, and of General Schenck by his aid, Lieutenant Chesebrough; Colonel Lee, fifty-fifth Ohio; Colonel Smith, seventy-third Ohio. Also, Meade to Colonel McLean, in latter's Official Report. He says, "At one time the division of General Reynolds took position on my left, and advanced a little beyond my front line, but in a short time General Meade informed me that he had placed a battery which he had been compelled to withdraw from superior artillery brought against it; also that the enemy were marching around our left in such heavy force that he had decided to fall back immediately; and he then marched the troops, which had been a little in advance on my left, to some point in my rear. Schenck then ordered me to fall back."

Longstreet brought to the field was seriously engaged with any part of the Federal army ; and then the conflict that arose was brought on by a movement but ill advised. Only one division, consisting of two Confederate brigades, took part in it ; and this division would have avoided it had not the action been roughly forced upon them, under the delusion of the Federal commander that General Lee was flying in retreat toward the Rappahannock.

Before alluding in brief to the details of an error which belongs to the history of McDowell's movements on this day, it is proper to consider more at length the time of the arrival of Longstreet's corps upon the right of Jackson's battle-field. Upon this subject there has been much controversy ; upon this subject there has been much bitterness and some perjury. To justify the advice of those who planned a military campaign to be conducted by Pope, — and a campaign by Pope required justification, — Longstreet should not have arrived on the battle-field during the day of the 29th. To justify the opinions of others who charged the failures and the losses in Pope's campaigns upon the conduct of Pope, Longstreet should have arrived on the battle-field by twelve at noon of the 29th. To the former, Pope's defeat was due to treachery in the camp. To the latter, there was iniquity in the cabinet and imbecility in the field. If partisans of the administration charged a leader in our armies with lukewarmness, opponents of the administration resented the charge with invective. If democrats defended a leader in the armies against charges of treason, republicans retorted with foul names and fouler accusations. Bitter were the partisans of 1862, and upon no measure of the administration was there more hostility expressed than upon the men and the methods connected with the

## EXPLANATORY TABLE OF PLATE II.

*The battle of Bull Run, or Manassas, fought on the 29th of August, 1862.*

### DISPOSITION AND ATTACK OF THE FEDERAL ARMY.

- H H H** Positions from which Federal columns moved forward to attack the enemy under Jackson.
- c c c** Generals Schurz and Milroy moving to the second position in the wood, **D D**, where the first fire of the enemy was felt.
- f f f** Brigades of Schurz's division and Milroy moving through the wood and charging across the unfinished railway at 1.30 P. M., at **F F**.
- G** Position to which Schurz's division retired after it was relieved, at two P. M., by Hooker's division.
- a a a** Kearny's division moving at ten A. M. into position at **K K K** to the right of Schurz.
- d d** March of Robinson's brigade to position **O O** to aid Sigel.
- P P** Third position of Robinson's brigade, supported by four regiments of Birney's brigade, from which Robinson fell back, when attacked, to his second position at **O O**.
- g g g** Line of march of Colonel Carr's brigade between one and two P. M. to relieve Schurz's division; also, line of march of Taylor's brigade, both of Hooker's division, with Reno's division to sustain Carr at **S S** between three and four P. M.
- h h h** Line over which Grover's brigade of Hooker's division advanced at two P. M. to **T T**, and where it remained until Grover charged along **h h** between three and four P. M. to **R R**, from whence he fell back to **T T**.
- X X** Position to which Milroy had retired by four P. M., and from which he sent a regiment along **x x** to **Z** to aid Grover.
- S' S' S'** Charge of Kearny's division, supported by Stevens on the left, at five P. M., from the position **B' B' B' B'**, to which they fell back before night.
- b' b'** Advance of Stahl's and McLean's brigades of Schenck's division at daylight of the 29th to a position behind Dogan's farm at **C' C'**.
- c' c'** Line of advance of Stahl's and McLean's brigades from **C' C'** to a position beyond Groveton, at **D' D'**, from which Stahl returned to left of Milroy's brigade to support him, and then advanced with Schenck's and Reynolds's divisions to **E' E'**, the furthest point reached by these divisions during the day.
- F' F'** Advanced position of Meade's brigade, supporting Cooper's battery, from which it was compelled to withdraw.
- G' G'** Two regiments supporting a battery of Stevens's division behind Groveton.
- K' K'** Position to which Reynolds and Schenck retired at night.



- d' d' d' Lines of advance of Porter's corps and two divisions of McDowell's corps from near Bull Run at nine A. M. of the 29th.
- O' O' Fitz-John Porter's corps at twelve M. in its most advanced position on the Gainesville road, during the battle.
- e' e' e' Line of march of King's and Ricketts's divisions to the Centreville pike at twelve M.
- Z' Z' Z' Position of three brigades of King's division under command of General Hatch, moving forward towards Groveton at 6.30 P. M. to pick up stragglers during the supposed Confederate retreat.
- R' R' R' Ricketts's division, of Tower's, Duryea's, Thorburn's, and Hartsuff's brigades of McDowell's corps at dark of the 29th.

#### DISPOSITION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

- A A A Position of Jackson's command along the unfinished railroad at daylight of the 29th.
- B Brigades of Hays and Early with Johnson's battery detached from Ewell's division, and in position by eight o'clock
- A. M., near the intersection of the Centreville pike and the unfinished railroad, to defend Jackson's rear until Longstreet's arrival.
- b b b The same brigades at twelve M. rejoining their division.
- m m Three regiments of Gregg's brigade sent beyond the railroad and recalled at twelve M.
- i i Line over which Hays's brigade was sent to V V by General Jackson to support the right of Hill's division after Grover's charge.
- A' A' Early's brigade, with two regiments of Ewell's division, responding to Hill's call for assistance against the assault of Kearny and Stevens along the lines i' i' i'.
- H' H' Confederate park covered by artillery.
- A'' A'' A'' A'' Longstreet's command after its arrival from Thoroughfare Gap over lines X X X X by noon of the 29th.
- y y Lines over which Wilcox moved with three brigades from the position L L to strengthen Longstreet's right at M M, and over which he returned by sunset to his first position at L L.
- N N General R. N. Anderson coming up, night of the 29th.
- i' i' Advance of a brigade of Jackson's command, after the Federal assault on the right, from the wood on Hood's left to the left of the hamlet of Groveton, to the position P' P'.
- g' g' g' Line over which Hood's division advanced to Groveton, before six P. M., to Q' Q'.
- h' h' Lines over which three brigades of Hood's division advanced and repulsed Hatch with great loss, after which Hood troops moved back to their first position in the rear Groveton, along g' g' g'.



1871

THE LIFE OF LITTLE

JOHN B. LITTLE

BY

JOHN B. LITTLE

1871

absorbing business of war. While parties and factions in heated controversies at heated periods were seeking justification for their conduct or for their opinions, tribunals of justice could not escape without suspicion. It is much to be feared that in many military courts the judges were swayed by the passions of party. It is much to be feared that there yet remain unreversed judgments in which, though the administration may have been sustained, justice has not been vindicated; judgments in which facts have been swept away in passion; judgments which have been made to support the administration by finding that not the general at the head, but a traitor in the field, has caused the loss of a campaign. It is because the truth in regard to the hour of the arrival of General Longstreet upon the field in 1862 bears so much upon the questions of party passion and of justice outraged, as exemplified in the trial and conviction of General Porter for matters occurring in the field on the 29th of August, that it becomes of especial importance to consider at this stage the testimony upon which we have declared that Longstreet's corps was in position, as we have given it, by twelve at noon of the 29th of August. This testimony, which is direct and incontrovertible, is amply sustained by the Board of Officers appointed by President Hayes, which fully exonerated General Porter in a report made on the 19th of March, 1879.<sup>1</sup>

It is supported by the testimony, subsequently given,

<sup>1</sup> A few of the more positive extracts of that report are here given: "Hence Lee's column had had eighteen hours by the morning of the 29th to close up in mass near the [Thoroughfare] gap, and seven hours that morning in which to march eight miles and form line on the field of battle." And again, "It was certain that the head of column of Lee's main army had arrived on the field in front of Groveton at least two hours in advance of the arrival of the head of column of Porter's and McDowell's corps at Dawkin's Branch; and it was so nearly certain that the main body of Lee's

of surviving officers, who thus under oath confirm the statements made by them in letters addressed to General Porter many weary years ago,—testimony by which the hour of Longstreet's arrival on the field can be no longer a subject of controversy.<sup>1</sup>

General Lee, commander-in-chief of the Confederate army, in a letter of the 31st of October, 1867, to General Fitz-John Porter, writes that "Longstreet's command arrived within supporting distance of Jackson on the 29th of August, 1862, between nine and ten A. M., and his line was formed by noon." And again, of same date, "It was after twelve at noon that Stuart<sup>2</sup> reported the approach of a column of troops which

army was already on the field and in line of battle as to absolutely require corresponding action."

And again, "Not only had the effort to destroy Jackson before he could be reinforced totally failed, but the Confederate army was on the field and in line while the Union army was not. The time to resume defensive action, awaiting the concentration of the army, had not only arrived, but had been too long postponed."

And finally, "As Porter was advancing towards Gainesville, and while yet nearly four miles from that place and more than two miles from the nearest point of the Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confederate army, twenty-five thousand strong, which had arrived in the field that morning, and was already in line of battle."

In arriving at these and other conclusions which exonerated Porter, the Board say, "We have had the benefit of the testimony of a large number of officers of the late Confederate army,—a kind of testimony which was not available at the time of General Porter's trial by court-martial. We have also availed ourselves of the testimony of many officers and soldiers of the Union forces who were present on the battle-field, and of much documentary evidence, to throw additional light upon points not made perfectly clear in the record of evidence taken before the court-martial. And we have had the use of accurate maps of the battle-field of Manassas, constructed from recent actual surveys, made under the direction of the chief of engineers, by a distinguished officer of that corps, who was a participant in that battle." See Official Report of Board, March 19, 1879.

<sup>1</sup> This chapter on General Porter was written before the Army Board of March 19, 1879, was convened, and upon such testimony of Longstreet's arrival as appears in extracts from letters received from Confederate officers. See *ante*, page 190, note.

<sup>2</sup> Commanding cavalry.

threatened our right, and Wilcox, with his three brigades, was sent to reënforce it. Longstreet, at that time, was with his command near Groveton, and I was with the portion of his troops south of Gainesville turn-pike. Longstreet's command was formed by twelve at noon on August 29th in two lines on Jackson's right."<sup>1</sup> General Longstreet, writing of the events of the 29th at the time of their occurrence, reports that his columns, after crossing Thoroughfare Gap, were united "early in the morning," and the advance to join Jackson was resumed. The noise of battle was heard before Gainesville was reached; the march was quickened "to the extent of our capacity;" new life and strength, he adds, were imparted to his jaded men by the sound; and the head of his column soon reached a position in rear of the enemy's left flank, and within easy cannon shot.<sup>2</sup>

In a letter to General Porter, dated September 23, 1866, General Longstreet is still more explicit. "My command," he says, "arrived within supporting distance of Jackson's command about nine A. M., 29th of August, near Groveton." He moved a column to meet a threatening force on his right, but does not remember the time that he heard his right was threatened. "My command," he continues, "was deployed in double line for attack between ten A. M. and twelve at noon on the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across the turn-pike and the Manassas Gap railroad." He does not "remember definitely the strength, but all of my [his] command proper was up. R. H. Anderson arrived that night with three or four brigades, and was then assigned to my command." He adds, "My command was ready to receive any attack after eleven o'clock A. M., and we

<sup>1</sup> R. E. Lee, letter to Porter.

<sup>2</sup> See Longstreet's Official Report.

*all were particularly anxious to bring on the battle after twelve M.; General Lee more so than the rest.*"<sup>1</sup> The Confederate cavalry General Stuart, whose modesty seldom caused him to suppress facts which his fancy could clothe in speech, and whose inventive genius quite enabled him to draw impossible and preposterous consequences from immaterial if not impossible causes, — even he, with a portion of Robertson's and of Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry, met the head of Longstreet's column between Haymarket and Gainesville. It was after ten A. M., for it was about ten<sup>2</sup> when Stuart rode forward down the Sudley road towards Groveton, to communicate with Lee. To where Lee was found the distance from Groveton was about five miles. If not delayed, Stuart might have accomplished it in less than an hour; but Stuart was delayed; he was fired upon after leaving the Sudley road from the woods in rear of Jackson's lines. Some Federal skirmishers had got into these woods. Stuart feared for the safety of Jackson's baggage and ambulances. Word was sent Major Patrick to interpose his six companies of cavalry in their defense; Captain Pelham with his horse artillery was ordered to shell the woods, and the enemy was dispersed. Colonel Baylor, of the "Stonewall" brigade, near the railway embankment, was requested by Stuart to leave the place Jackson had assigned him on the right of the Confederate line of battle, and lend himself to the meddlesome details which Stuart had unwarrantably assumed. "I was posted here for a purpose, and I have positive orders to stay here, which I must obey," was Colonel Baylor's reply.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Longstreet to Porter, September 23, 1866.

<sup>2</sup> See Stuart's memoranda, published with his Official Report of operations of 29th of August.

<sup>3</sup> See memoranda of operations and Official Report, J. E. B. Stuart.

When Stuart met Longstreet's column he passed his cavalry through and moved towards Manassas, while Lee kept directly down the pike towards Jackson's right. Stuart now sent for a battery, and placed it in position.<sup>1</sup> Bachman's battery of Hood's division, at eleven A. M., was sent him. The position selected for it by Stuart was near the Manassas Gap railway. Fire was opened immediately upon a column of the enemy moving to the right. The column changed direction, moving to the left. The distance of this column from the battery was so great that but fifteen rounds were fired.<sup>2</sup> Then General Robertson with his cavalry was sent further down the road towards Manassas Junction to reconnoitre. General Robertson was in command of all the cavalry on Lee's right wing. He saw Longstreet beginning to form on the right of the pike, "as near on the prolongation of Jackson's right as the ground would permit;" for the "ground was broken, consisting of a number of small high hills and ravines skirted with timber and undergrowth." It was near ten A. M. When Longstreet was fully formed it was twelve o'clock. At this time Federal forces, "now known to have been yours" (General Porter's), were reported by my videttes as approaching from the direction of Manassas. Longstreet's forces were then extended to and beyond the Manassas Gap railroad. His "right extended beyond your [Porter's] left when formed, and your [Porter's] forces in moving upon Gainesville would have struck ours a little to the right of the centre." "Longstreet's forces to meet yours [Porter's] were mainly posted before your arrival." "Had you continued your march, or attacked at any time, you would have struck

<sup>1</sup> Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of B. W. Fobel, major and chief of artillery, Hood's division.



Longstreet's line of battle, over twenty-five thousand strong."<sup>1</sup> In Stuart's official report he fixes the time that Robertson's videttes had discovered the approach of Porter's corps, and says that at that time the prolongation of Porter's "line of march would have passed through my position, which was a very fine one, and struck Longstreet in flank."<sup>2</sup> And then we have some noisy bluster from Stuart, who looked upon the advancing Federal column, and was satisfied, he reported, that an army corps was approaching. So he bragged that he set his cavalry to tying brush to their horses' tails and dragging it down the road from the direction of Gainesville, to deceive the enemy; and he declares that the enemy was deceived. Then Stuart reported that Longstreet's right and rear were seriously threatened, and Jenkins's, Kemper's, and D. R. Jones's *brigades*, with artillery, were sent him, and, after exchanging shots, the enemy withdrew towards Manassas, leaving their artillery and supports to hold the position till night.<sup>3</sup> Thus does Stuart, as a romancer, endanger Pope's laurels. Not only does he, when he leaves us to infer Porter's fright from brush tied to his horses' tails, contradict all the reports and letters of Lee, Longstreet, and many of the highest officers of Longstreet's command, but he is himself absolutely contradicted by General Longstreet, who, referring to Stuart's report that the enemy was approaching in heavy columns against his extreme right, notes the time of this report as at a "late hour in the day;" and further says that he sent three brigades from his left, under General Wilcox, to support General Jones in case of an attack.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letter of General Beverly H. Robertson, dated June 10, 1870, to General Porter.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General J. E. B. Stuart.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Official Report of Longstreet.

General Wilcox says he moved to this position at about half past four or five P. M.<sup>1</sup> General Stuart, in his memoranda and in his official report, mentions but one approach of a Federal column from the direction of Manassas Station or Bristoe, and that in a course which would have threatened the right and rear of Longstreet. He claims to have reported the approach of such a column but once, and Longstreet says that Stuart but once reported it. As there was but one column and but a single approach, it is difficult to see how even Stuart could account for more. Stuart claims to have made that report between eleven and twelve A. M.; but Longstreet officially declares that it was made about four P. M.

Stuart relates that Kemper's, Jenkins's, and D. R. Jones's brigades and several batteries were sent *him*. Longstreet asserts that General Wilcox with three brigades was sent to his right to support Jones's division and Kemper's division (not brigades, as Stuart says) in case of an attack. If, therefore, Stuart raised a dust with brush in the road between the head of Porter's corps and Gainesville, at any time on the 29th of August, he did it — if Longstreet is entitled to more credence than Stuart, and who will deny that? — between four and five in the afternoon, several hours after the whole of Lee's army was in line, awaiting an attack. But if Longstreet is mistaken, and if Stuart did raise a dust, and if Porter was very much frightened at it, and if Pope was convinced that nothing but Stuart's brush interposed at twelve o'clock between Porter and the right of Stonewall Jackson's corps, then General Robertson is mistaken and General Lee is in error,<sup>2</sup> and all

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General C. M. Wilcox.

<sup>2</sup> Stuart reported the approach of a column of troops which threatened our right, and Wilcox with three brigades was sent to reinforce it. It

the testimony which we have adduced is merely romance. Stuart's stories in his reports are absurd displays of egotism, and are of value only when corroborated by reliable witnesses.

In preceding pages we have alluded to the testimony of General Early as to where Jackson formed his line of battle, and why he so formed it. At an early hour in the morning Jackson was apprehensive of an attack upon his right flank from the direction of Manassas. Longstreet was not then up; so Early was sent, in command of two brigades of infantry, one mile to the rear of Jackson's right. He was in position at eight o'clock in the morning. At eleven, he says, the head of Longstreet's column appeared on the Warrenton pike, coming from the direction of Gainesville. His troops followed continuously. "At twelve m., at farthest, a body of our [Confederate] troops was interposed between my command and the Federal troops, that were in the direction of Manassas, so large that it was entirely unnecessary for me to remain where I was."<sup>1</sup>

General J. B. Hood, commanding a division in Longstreet's corps, both in his official report and by letter confirms the testimony of Lee and Longstreet. Writing of the incidents of that day about the time of their occurrence, and with no motive but to state the truth, he reports that at "daylight" Longstreet resumed his march, with Hood's division in advance; that early in the day Longstreet came up with the main body of the enemy, who were engaging Jackson's forces.

was after twelve at noon. (Official Report of General Lee.) See also Longstreet's Report, that when he sent Jones and Kemper to the right, Stuart had made no report of the approach of an enemy, and that when Stuart did report such an approach Wilcox was sent, *late in the afternoon*, to the right.

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Early. Letter from same to General Porter, February 23, 1874.

Hood formed in line of battle, moved forward until he was on the prolongation of Jackson's line, and then halted.<sup>1</sup> In a letter of later date he confirms his report, but is more specific: at ten A. M. he formed his line of battle, and at eleven he had prolonged Jackson's line on the right and left of the turnpike. The division of General D. R. Jones and other troops were extended on Hood's right to the Manassas Gap railroad, to meet the troops advancing from Manassas Junction. "At any time after eleven o'clock A. M., our forces were prepared to meet yours." By about two P. M., the remainder of Longstreet's forces had all arrived.<sup>2</sup>

General D. R. Jones, in position on the extreme right of Longstreet's line, in his official report, made soon after the battle, and with no other motive than to reveal the truth, records that he arrived on the ground about noon.<sup>3</sup>

General Wilcox, whose three brigades attempted to turn the right of Ricketts's division by Hopeville Gap on the 28th, makes his official statement that by half past nine A. M. on the 29th he had rejoined the column; that he moved with it by Gainesville, and to three and three fourths miles beyond.<sup>4</sup> At a later period he writes of the dangers of an attack from the direction of Manassas at eleven A. M., of the certainty of a Federal repulse at twelve, and of the Federals being destroyed at two P. M.<sup>5</sup>

To official records prepared at the time and on the spot when and where the transactions occurred, to letters written by those who were actors in the scenes they describe, and who write without bias, prejudice,

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General J. B. Hood.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Hood to Porter, February 9, 1874.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report, General D. R. Jones.

<sup>4</sup> Official Report, General C. M. Wilcox.

<sup>5</sup> See Letter of General C. M. Wilcox to General Porter, June 7, 1870.

or interest, notes made on the field in a private diary may be added to confirm the general testimony.

The adjutant of a battalion of the Washington Artillery, attached to Longstreet's corps, preserved his diary of events that transpired on the 29th of August. "My diary, written on the field," he writes to General Porter, "reads as follows: 'August 29th, reached the battle-field near Groveton 11.30 A. M. Jackson holding the enemy at bay at Sudley Mills. Infantry line forming to right and left of road. One o'clock P. M., ordered by Longstreet to send two batteries forward. . . . Corps all up; our troops in line.'"<sup>1</sup>

The hour when Longstreet arrived and when his line of battle was formed is stated with precision by those who have made a calm and diligent research for the truth. In the *Life of General Lee*,<sup>2</sup> it is stated that Longstreet was coming into position on the right of Jackson all the morning. "By noon Longstreet's line was formed." "The hour of Longstreet's arrival," continues the historian, "has been strangely a subject of discussion. The truth is stated in the reports of Lee, Longstreet, Jones, and other officers. But Pope was ignorant of Lee's presence *at five in the evening*, and General Porter, his subordinate, was dismissed from the army for not at that hour attacking Jackson's right, declared by Pope to be undefended. Longstreet was in line of battle by noon. Lee's army was once more united."

Further evidence upon this point is merely cumulative, and perhaps therefore superfluous. But so direct and positive is the evidence of Colonel Charles Marshall, an officer of General Lee's staff, on the 29th

<sup>1</sup> Letter of W. M. Owen, late adjutant, Washington Artillery, to General Porter, dated 7th of September, 1868.

<sup>2</sup> By J. E. Cooke, pages 120-122.

of August, that it should not be omitted. From official records prepared under the authority and direction of General Lee; as an eye-witness of movements made in pursuance of orders emanating from General Lee, and conveyed by Colonel Marshall; and from confirmations of the facts thus elicited by many Confederate officers present on the 29th of August, this officer, on the staff of the commanding general of the Confederate forces, does not hesitate to declare that "Longstreet's troops had reached the turnpike on the right of Jackson, and within supporting distance, as early as ten A. M.;" that "as they came up they were formed on the right of Jackson;" and that troops which Colonel Marshall afterwards found to be those commanded by General Porter made their appearance from the direction of Manassas Junction after Longstreet had arrived. "Most of these troops [Longstreet's] were in position, or about moving into position, when Stuart, whose cavalry was on our extreme right, reported the approach of a Federal force by a road passing by our right; and thereupon General Lee directed Jones's division to be disposed so as to meet this advance, and Wilcox with his three brigades was transferred from Longstreet's left to support Jones."<sup>1</sup>

With this we return to the formation of Lee's line of battle, which began when the head of Longstreet's corps arrived on the field, and was extended in the best order to cover Jackson's right near Groveton.

The Texan brigade of Hood's division was deployed midway between Gainesville and the stone house, on the right of the Warrenton pike, and Colonel Law's bri-

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Fitz-John Porter from Colonel Marshall, in which he states facts "positively from personal observation as well as on the authority of the official reports of the officers commanding on that part of our line" (the right), dated February 12, 1874.

gade of the same division on the left, and an advance was made until Hood's front was on a line with Jackson's and within three fourths of a mile of the Dogan house. General Evans followed Hood and supported him, and felt the heavy fire of Federal artillery which greeted Hood's advance, and saw the Confederate batteries hurry up and open from commanding positions on either side of the pike upon the Federal right and rear, until the infantry fell back.<sup>1</sup> Three brigades of infantry, under command of General Wilcox, pursued their way about three miles beyond Gainesville. There, formed in line of battle on the left and at right angles to the turnpike, a further advance of three fourths of a mile was made. Wilcox now halted within one mile of Groveton. On a hill toward his left, near this little hamlet, several Confederate batteries maintained an artillery duel for an hour or two. Until between four and five P. M., Wilcox remained in support of Hood. Then, as we have seen, he moved south to the Manassas Gap railway, to the rear of General D. R. Jones's division, upon which an attack was threatened. There Wilcox remained till sunset, when he resumed his first position.<sup>2</sup>

On the right of the turnpike General Kemper, with three brigades, extended towards the Manassas Gap railroad. Crossing the railroad and reaching beyond it was the division of General D. R. Jones, formed in echelon in rear of Kemper's brigades.<sup>3</sup> In the distance of a mile and three fourths south of the turnpike two divisions of the Confederate infantry, of three brigades

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Generals Longstreet, Hood, and E. M. Law, third brigade, Hood's division, who maintain that their fire of artillery and skirmishers was kept up almost without intermission until nearly four o'clock P. M. on this front of the line.

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports of Longstreet and Wilcox.

<sup>3</sup> Longstreet's Official Report.

each, were in line of battle after twelve at noon. From four P. M. to sunset, this force was strengthened by three additional brigades.

Longstreet sent much of his artillery with his brigades; General Pickett had four pieces, and General Toombs four; while seven, left in reserve near the village of Gainesville, were, about noon, pushed forward near the village of Groveton.<sup>1</sup> Confederate batteries near Groveton engaged the Federal batteries, but their achievements were not remarkable.<sup>2</sup>

The numbers of the opposing forces on the field on the 29th of August, by twelve at noon, were, on the Federal side, sixty-six thousand six hundred men of all arms; the numbers of the Confederate army remained nearly the same as heretofore given.<sup>3</sup>

Though General R. H. Anderson was near enough to Longstreet's corps to aid him in case of necessity, he did not arrive *on the field*, from Thoroughfare Gap, till the night of the 29th.

<sup>1</sup> These four batteries composed the battalion of Washington Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Colonel J. B. Walton, commanding battalion Washington Artillery. The first company, with three three-inch rifles, Captain Squier, our old antagonist on the Rappahannock, accomplished as little here as there. Hood also sent two batteries to the left of the pike. In two and one half hours they fired one hundred rounds. (Official Report, B. W. Fobel, major and chief of artillery, Hood's division.)

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, page 7.

In Pope's Official Report, he says that the following troops joined him from the Army of the Potomac at the following dates: Reynolds's division, 2,500 strong, August 23d, at Rappahannock Station; corps of Heintzelman and Porter, 18,000 (about), August 26th, 27th, Warrenton Junction; Pope's original command, 42,000, with Reno's divisions added (see page 6), making 62,500 men of all arms. If to this number we add 2,000 to Reynolds's division, which it is estimated on good authority should be added to give him his proper strength, we shall have the whole number of the Federal army as 64,500 men.



## CHAPTER XI.

### GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER.

WE are now prepared to turn to the movements of the corps commanded by Generals McDowell and Porter, in their attempted execution of the joint order<sup>1</sup> which was received while they were on their march towards Gainesville.

On this march, the head of Porter's corps at thirty minutes past eleven o'clock was at Dawkin's Branch, a little more than three miles from Gainesville, and about the same distance from the head of McDowell's corps, which was near the junction of the Sudley Springs and Manassas roads.

On his arrival at Dawkin's Branch, Porter had deployed Morell's division, closed up those of Sykes and King, sent out skirmishers across the branch, and was preparing to follow with Butterfield's brigade to seize in advance, of the enemy an eminence about a mile distant, when McDowell arrived in person on the ground where Porter stood. It was then between half past eleven and twelve o'clock at noon.<sup>2</sup>

McDowell found Porter at the head of his corps; he was standing on slightly rising ground. In his front was an open field, and beyond it the woods, and beyond the woods, less than two miles distant, in an air-line, the Warrenton road to Centreville. A conference

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, page 249.

<sup>2</sup> Confirmed; see report of Army Board.

immediately followed. What course should be pursued? Was literal obedience to Pope's order practicable? — "Move forward towards Gainesville." They were doing so. But could they go further towards Gainesville? This was a question requiring earnest consideration. McDowell was anxious to do everything that Pope had ordered; Porter was none the less anxious. "Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville," the joint order informed the joint commanders. But Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno were very far from Gainesville, and there was evidence enough before the joint commanders that they were likely so to continue. "We could see," wrote McDowell in his official report of this period, "from the dust above the trees, the enemy was moving from Gainesville upon Groveton, where the battle was now going on." But McDowell had other information of the advance of the enemy. General Buford with his cavalry was on the then left and front of this Federal column. He had seen the Confederates under Longstreet pouring through Gainesville and passing down the road towards Groveton, and he had reported to McDowell that this force consisted of seventeen regiments of infantry, one battery, and five hundred cavalry;<sup>1</sup> and McDowell believed that the dust clouds over beyond the open field and the wood skirting the Warrenton pike were raised by seventeen regiments of infantry, one battery, and five hundred cavalry, — and no more. Two grave mistakes thus occurred. Buford had doubtless reported what he had seen; but either he had seen long before he reported, or he had reported but a small portion of the force that had passed through Gainesville. While these two joint command-

<sup>1</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

ers stood there conferring and doubting and appealing to Pope's order to know what to do, what was discretionary and what was mandatory, the whole of Longstreet's corps, numbering from thirty-five to forty thousand strong, had passed through Gainesville and barred the way.<sup>1</sup> But this was not positively known to either of the joint commanders. From what we have revealed in preceding pages of the adventures of Ricketts and King, then present with this column, — adventures now known to both McDowell and Porter, — neither could have doubted that Pope's plan of establishing communication by going towards Gainesville was futile, and that it was mere senseless prating to write to them that Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno were now — between ten and eleven A.M. — near there. But there is no evidence that either of the joint commanders uttered to the other his thoughts. Before them was the order, — what could they find there to relieve their doubts? The next sentence afforded but little comfort, — "I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force [Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno] and your own the whole command shall halt."<sup>2</sup> And then follows, "It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run to-night," with the added words, "I presume it will be so on account of our supplies." Thus far in the order but one conclusion was possible. Porter and McDowell were to move together towards Gainesville until communication was established with another force moving on another road towards Gainesville. This must have been Pope's meaning. But was this imperative? No; for further on the joint commanders read, "If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's Official Report.

strictly carried out." It was certain to both McDowell and Porter that the order could not be carried out without fighting and overpowering a portion of Longstreet's corps. This was as certain and as well known then to the joint commanders as it is known now by the whole country that they would have had to fight not a part, but the whole, of Longstreet's corps, — infantry, artillery, and cavalry, — in position, ready and eager for an attack. Did Pope contemplate a fight with Longstreet's corps, or any portion of it, in order to establish communication between the forces on the Warrenton and on the Manassas roads? If anything in the order was free from doubt, it was that Pope did not believe it possible that establishing the communication would bring on a fight with any portion of Longstreet's corps; for Pope did not, when he penned that order, believe that Lee could get up with the remainder of his army for thirty-six hours at least. "The indications are," he wrote, "that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night, or the next day." Was there any other ground for thinking that Pope did not wish the joint commanders, in "establishing the communication," to fight Longstreet's corps or any portion of it? So it would appear; for again, at the close of the order, the injunction of caution and falling back was repeated: "One thing must be held in view, — that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night, or by morning;" and this limitation upon "establishing the communication" immediately preceded the one of the approach of Longstreet, and it was as significant of its meaning as if it had read in words, "Before Longstreet arrives your troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or to-morrow morning." Whatever Pope did

afterwards, or however he may have changed his plans, to those joint commanders standing there on the Manassas road to Gainesville, with the dust rising over the tree-tops and the constant boom of artillery coming to their ears from the lines north of Warrenton turnpike, there could have been but one fair interpretation of the order that sent them where they were. To establish communication with the rest of Pope's army near Gainesville, Pope hoped; to do this by at least twenty-four hours before Longstreet could unite his corps with Jackson's, Pope believed; but, in any event, not to move where the troops could fail to reach Bull Run to-night or by morning, Pope commanded. Now what should be done? Hold where they were, and report to Pope, "We can go no further towards Gainesville without fighting a part at least of Longstreet's corps. He is in front of us. We have not united with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno; nor can we, if we press on from here, without a fight. If we give battle we may not be able to reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. What shall we do?" This course would have been wise; it would have been prudent; but it did not seem to commend itself to the joint commanders, and they undertook to solve their doubts in another way.

McDowell was the senior officer present, and was by right the commanding officer, unless by the very terms of Pope's order each corps commander was to be left in command of his own corps. The service to be performed was not a detached service; it was simply the moving up of two corps, by order of the general in command, to take a position on the left of his line of battle. The words used in the order were not such as are almost universally employed to unite two distinct commands under the orders of the senior officer present with them; they were not such as Pope himself had

used but a few days previously when Sigel's corps was turned over to McDowell, when Porter himself, and Reno, and Banks, and all the troops McDowell could find in or around Warrenton were placed by Pope under his command. If this order, addressed to each corps commander, had been sent to McDowell and to Porter, to each a different copy, would it have been affirmed that in proceeding together from one part of the field of Pope's operations upon the 29th of August, to take up a position, the two corps were merged into a single command under the ranking officer present? Nor was it supposed that any duty would devolve upon the joint commanders until they had extended their line of communication to unite with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno. If doubts arose as to who was in command of Porter and Porter's corps, it was hard to dispel them. Pope has testified that he did not intend by this order to place Porter under McDowell's command. He declared that "his intention was that they should act independently of each other, and each in direct subordination to himself."<sup>1</sup>

McDowell took a different view of the matter. He seems to have thought the situation one contemplated by the sixty-second Article of War, and he assumed the right of giving orders in this emergency. He adopted, moreover, a course which Pope had not authorized. He acted as if he were an independent commander with an independent command. "As this force," he officially reports,<sup>2</sup> "was inferior to General Porter's, *I decided for him* to throw himself at once on the enemy's flank."<sup>3</sup> "I decided for him," not "I *ordered* him," the usual expression. McDowell was an educated soldier; he was

<sup>1</sup> See Court-Martial Record, page 306.

<sup>2</sup> The one Buford had reported.

<sup>3</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

not accustomed to decide for his subordinates; rather was he noted for deciding for himself, and ordering his subordinates to obey his decisions. But here, as if more than doubtful whether the sixty-second Article of War had any application in the constructive if not actual presence of the commander-in-chief, he limited his doubtful power over Porter to advice. But for himself he decided that "he would move his own corps directly north on the Sudley Springs road, where the battle," he reports, "was then at its height." This license he justifies as a mode of obeying Pope's order. The discretionary clause in the order gave him this license for himself.<sup>1</sup> Porter, with a force reduced to some nine thousand six hundred men, was thus left alone, to decide how he could best obey an order that left with him a wise discretion.

As to the real truth of what McDowell did advise, or decide, or order, before he left Porter, there is much doubt. While McDowell swears<sup>2</sup> that he said to Porter, "You put your forces in here," two witnesses, Lieutenant-Colonel Locke<sup>3</sup> and Captain C. P. Martin,<sup>4</sup> swear that while Porter was forming his corps in line of battle McDowell said, "Porter, you are out too far already; this is no place to fight a battle;" or, "Porter, this is no place to fight a battle; you are out too far."<sup>5</sup> And these witnesses were not impeached as to character or otherwise; and General McDowell, in his rebutting testimony, could not recollect what he said to Porter.<sup>6</sup>

General Porter has never been accused of disobeying McDowell's order at this time or on this occasion.

<sup>1</sup> See McDowell's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> See Court-Martial Record, page 307.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of General Porter's staff.

<sup>4</sup> Commanding artillery in General Morell's division.

<sup>5</sup> See Court-Martial Record, pages 135, 144.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, pages 217, 218.

Nor could he have been so accused, if he was not subject to McDowell's orders; and Pope, as general-in-chief, swears that he was not,—that it was not his intention to place him under McDowell's command.<sup>1</sup> Then, if not disobeying McDowell, did he disobey the spirit of Pope's order in not attempting to make his way through or around the opposing forces in his front, to establish his line with Pope's left, as was charged against him at the time?<sup>2</sup>

And in this the whole question is in fact involved.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., page 306. Confirmed by the Board of Army Officers, who report that "between 11.30 and twelve o'clock McDowell, in person, arrived on the field, and arrested the movement Porter was making, saying to him in the hearing of several officers, 'Porter, you are too far out; this is no place to fight a battle,' or words to that effect." And again, "After this brief consultation, the two generals rode together through the woods to the right, about three quarters of a mile towards Groveton, and made a personal examination of the ground. As soon as this was done McDowell decided not to take the troops through these woods, but to separate his own corps from Porter's, take King's division (Ricketts following) around the woods by the Sudley Springs road, and thus put them in beyond the woods and on the left of Reynolds. McDowell then left Porter very hurriedly, announcing his decision, as he testified (before the Army Board), by the words, 'You put your force in here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that point against the enemy,' or words to that effect. Even these few words we are satisfied Porter did not hear, or did not understand; for he called, as McDowell rode away, 'What shall I do?' And McDowell gave no audible answer, but only a wave of the hand. In this state of uncertainty, according to the testimony of one of General Porter's staff officers, Porter sent a message to King's division to ascertain positively if that division was ordered away by McDowell, and if not, to give proper orders for its action with his corps; and a reply was returned by McDowell himself that he was going to the right, and should take that division with him; that Porter had better stay where he was, and if necessary to fall back he could do so on McDowell's left." And further on, "Whether that message was or was not sent is unimportant. If sent it did not differ in substance from the instructions which General McDowell testifies he had previously given to General Porter. 'You put your force in here.' Neither could be construed as directing what Porter's action should be, but only as deciding that he should continue on that line, while McDowell would take his troops to another part of the field." (Report of Army Board, March 19, 1879.)

<sup>2</sup> See Court-Martial Record.



Whether Porter was or was not under McDowell's orders, or whether he did or did not disobey McDowell, is immaterial in the consideration of this question.

In his departure from the order of his superior, no blame can be imputed to McDowell. Like a good soldier, he turned the head of his column towards the sound of the enemy's cannon. And in this manner, though over a different route, he sought to unite with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno. McDowell tried, doubtless, to do his whole duty. But how did his effort constrain Porter? How was Porter's duty to unite with the left of Pope's army on the Warrenton road, or at least to make an effort so to do, changed or modified by the removal of the whole of McDowell's command from Porter's front? Can it be said that although Pope's order did not contemplate the presence of Longstreet's corps in front of the joint Federal column, yet if it turned out otherwise, and he was there, it was the duty of a good soldier to make an effort to break through that command and come forward to the field where a battle was raging? Even Pope himself did not claim this in his *official report*. Assuming the existence of a condition of things which did not exist, he does, however, in his report, make against Porter most serious accusations. But they are all founded upon the assumption that Longstreet's corps was not in Porter's front. "Nothing was heard," he says, "up to eight o'clock in the evening, of General Porter, and his forces took no part whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle, during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders, nor to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had

made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time *up to eight o'clock*<sup>1</sup> that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been by any possibility *sufficiently reënforced*<sup>1</sup> to have made any effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given General Porter an order to march towards the enemy in a particular direction, to send him in addition specific orders to attack, it being his clear duty and in accordance with every military precept to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. *I believe, in fact I am positive, that at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces under Longstreet, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character. I speak thus freely,"* continues Pope, "of the strange failure of General Porter, not because I am more convinced of its unfortunate results now than I was at the time, but because a full investigation of the whole subject made by a court-martial has fully justified and confirmed that opinion."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The italics are mine. — *Author.*

<sup>2</sup> A report by Pope of his operations had been made before this to the

That these accusations are mere shadows if the real condition of things under which Pope made them were not founded in fact, and that they were not founded in fact, every one knows now; even Pope acknowledges it. But their assertion in Pope's official report, and the testimony of many of Pope's witnesses before the court-martial tending to maintain Pope's accusations, had their effect and did their cruel work.

General Porter was unable at his trial to bring before the court the fact of the presence of Longstreet's corps. If he could have done so, who will deny that he would have been triumphantly acquitted? And all the world would have believed Porter innocent,—all save Pope. He never could have forgiven certain contemptuous dispatches sent to Burnside by Porter, and he would still have clamored that Porter was guilty of disobedience. He would? He has! In 1867, long after the close of the war, upon an application by General Porter for a rehearing, General Pope submitted a paper in reply in which he declared that whether there "were five or fifty thousand of the enemy confronting Porter is a matter not at all affecting the question of his conduct."<sup>1</sup>

Then it may be affirmed that, whatever the court-martial might have found, Pope is still of opinion that whether Longstreet confronted Porter or not, whether he was present before Porter's corps of nine thousand six hundred men with five or fifty thousand men, a soldier's duty required that Porter should attack Long-

war department, in all respects like the one from which we have quoted, before the court-martial was contemplated, and while Porter was fighting with his corps at the battle of Antietam in the ensuing September. The Official Report subsequently published was simply a revision of the first. It enabled Pope, however, to refer to the court-martial in confirmation.

<sup>1</sup> Letter from General Pope to General U. S. Grant, dated Atlanta, Georgia, September 16, 1867.

street, and endeavor to push forward on the road towards Gainesville to unite with Heintzelman and Sigel and Reno. If General McDowell had taken this view of his duty, if he had announced his intention of pushing forward through all obstacles in his front, and if Porter had refused his aid, Pope might find justification in his assertions. But when McDowell left the whole task to Porter, and only half of the force to accomplish it, what then should Porter do in the exercise of his best judgment of his duties as a soldier?<sup>1</sup> Should he follow McDowell? Who could blame him if he had? And yet had he done so the flanks of these two columns would have been exposed to the Confederate front, and there would have been no force on the Confederate flank to menace or to hold it. Should he remain where he was, and for a time disable Longstreet's right; and would he, under the circumstances, as a soldier find justification? If in so doing he performed what he sincerely believed to be for the best, he must be justified; for his conduct is to be interpreted in the light of a soldier's duty, and not in the light of a positive order. That what we know now fully justifies Porter for what he did then is firmly established by the testimony of those who were there as his opponents on his front. That with his corps of less than ten thousand men he would have been repulsed if he had, after twelve at noon of the 29th, attacked Longstreet, General Lee in command of the Confederate army, and Longstreet in command of a corps, Hood and Wilcox in command of divisions, Early and Robertson in command of brigades, have established beyond question.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We are not now speaking of the positive order to attack received at a later hour; we shall refer to that hereafter.

<sup>2</sup> Letters, before quoted, as to time of the arrival of Longstreet's corps also contain the following opinions. From Lee: "The probable result of an attack on Longstreet after twelve m. with less than twelve thousand men

But General Porter's sincerity was, in the absence of any positive knowledge of the force of the enemy in his front, seriously questioned by the judge-advocate at the trial. So insurmountable is popular prejudice that, though all doubt of Longstreet's presence where Porter affirmed it to be has been removed, false suspicions and false accusations against Porter have not been silenced.

It is said by many, it is claimed by Pope, that the fact of Longstreet's presence is brought forward now to break the force of an exhibition on the field of trea-

would have been a repulse. The result of an attack with twenty-five thousand men before twelve ought to have been a repulse if made after Longstreet's corps was formed." From Longstreet: "My command was deployed in double line between ten and twelve A. M., extending from Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap railroad. My command was ready to receive any attack after eleven o'clock A. M., and we all were particularly anxious to bring on the battle after twelve M., General Lee more so than the rest. If you had attacked at any time after twelve M., it seems to me that we surely would have destroyed your army; that is, if you had attacked with less than twenty-five thousand men." From Hood: "Our forces were prepared to meet yours any time after eleven o'clock; an attack made by you with about eleven thousand men it seems to me would have been attended by a repulse, and perhaps great disaster, had time permitted it to have been followed up." From Wilcox: "I should think it almost certain, had you attacked at eleven A. M. with your command, such as I suppose it to have been, you would have been repulsed. Had you attacked any time after two P. M., I have no doubt you would have been easily and thoroughly repulsed, and had it been at or near two o'clock you would have been used up, and those on your right might have and probably would have been overwhelmed too." From Early: "I feel very confident that if you had made an attack after the beginning of the arrival of Longstreet's troops it would have proved most disastrous to you, and probably would have resulted in a greater disaster to Pope's army than that which befell it at that battle." From Robertson, in command of all the Confederate cavalry in front of General Porter: "My videttes had reported your approach, and Longstreet's forces, to meet yours, were mainly posted before your arrival. Had you continued your march, or attacked at any time, you would have struck Longstreet's line of battle, over twenty-five thousand strong. After twelve o'clock and throughout the day, I believe an attack with ten thousand men would have been utterly disastrous to the Federal forces."

sonable conduct. Not the presence of the enemy before him, but a traitor's heart within his breast, was the real reason pressed upon the court, and then and since affirmed by Pope and his friends, why General Porter made no effort to come forward after twelve o'clock and unite with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno.

And Pope, in his reply to Porter's application for a rehearing by reason of this new evidence of Longstreet's presence, goes the whole length of affirming that Porter's corps ought to have whipped the half of Lee's army, and "that to say at this day that Longstreet's wearied and almost broken-down corps was able to overpower the fifth corps of our army is the bitterest commentary upon that corps its worst enemy could make, and I have no doubt is utterly groundless;"<sup>1</sup> and again, "Porter's corps was nearly, if not quite, of equal strength with Longstreet's."<sup>2</sup> When Pope wrote that letter he knew that Porter's corps numbered less than ten thousand men,<sup>3</sup> and that Longstreet had under his command in line of battle thirty-five thousand nine hundred men, with seven thousand more coming up.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Pope to General Grant, dated September 16, 1867, opposing General Porter's application for a review of his case upon the new testimony of Longstreet's presence.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Morell's and Sykes's divisions 8,500, and Piatt's (Sturgis's) 1,100.

<sup>4</sup> Lee brought to Jackson's aid in Longstreet's corps 30,000 infantry and 4,000 in his artillery battalion, made up of the Washington, Walton, and reserve batteries, and 1,900 cavalry under Robertson and Rosser. General Anderson's corps of 7,000 men did not arrive from Thoroughfare Gap until night, and is not here reckoned in totals. (Official Reports of Generals Longstreet, R. H. Anderson, and S. D. Lee.)

See Report of President Hayes's Army Board, in which it is said, "The fact is that Longstreet with four divisions of full 25,000 men was then on the field before Porter arrived with his two divisions of 9,000 men; that the Confederate general-in-chief was there in person at least two or three hours before the commander of the Army of Virginia himself arrived on the field; and that Porter with his two divisions saved the Army of Virginia

It is said of the Duke of Marlborough that he concealed from common observers, under a gracious presence, noble manners, and a gentle smile, a seared conscience and a remorseless heart. In our time one may possess Marlborough's vices, but be unable to clothe them with Marlborough's accomplishments, and thus he may make a sorry figure in the world.

Whatever Pope may say now, however he may bluster of what Porter ought to have done with his own corps alone, Pope himself, with two whole corps and a division, and Porter in addition to hold Longstreet inactive, failed in a sanguinary conflict to drive the single corps of Jackson from his position. The case against Porter, so far as his disobedience on the 29th is concerned, was made and the sentence was pronounced solely and simply upon the ground that Longstreet was not where he was on the 29th of August. Pope's report alleges it, and the witnesses for the prosecution testify to it.

But Porter's accusers sought evidence in Porter's conduct of a treasonable state of mind, and they brought forward therefor everything that would make for them in establishing this theory of guilt.

While alone with his corps, and while acting solely under the instructions contained in the joint order, and after satisfying himself that he could not make any connection on the road towards Gainesville with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, he became convinced, from the steady advance of the enemy along the Warrenton road,<sup>1</sup> that the Federal forces were retiring. Bearing in mind his instructions to fall back behind Bull Run by night, or at farthest in the morning, he declared in

that day from the disasters naturally incident to the enemy's earlier preparation for battle."

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, advance of Hood's division supported by Wilcox.

a note to McDowell and King his own intention of falling back to Manassas.<sup>1</sup>

For a moment Porter entertained the thought of exercising that discretion which Pope had undeniably given him. It was only, however, for a moment. He went to the front, where Morell's division was in position. When there he made up his mind that he would not withdraw, that he would remain where he was. Is it an immaterial fact that he treated his own communication as a nullity, that he dismissed the intention of withdrawing to Manassas as soon as formed? We are searching for the motive, the animus, the treasonable disobedience. Is not that manifested by what he did rather than by what he did not do? If Jackson had beaten Pope, Porter's decision, under the circumstances now known and then by him believed, would have been wise. He could reach Pope, it was most probable, as quickly that way as by taking McDowell's course. If he could not, at least he thought he could, and in this there was no disobedience, no treason. Porter did not fall back, and this is all there is of that accusation. But even if to fall back were disobedience, which it was not, the court could have found General Porter guilty of retreating on the 29th only upon the "hypothesis that an unexecuted purpose is the exact equivalent of an executed one, and not because he did disobey, but

<sup>1</sup> "GENERALS McDOWELL AND KING, — I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the roads to Groveton. The enemy are in strong force, are on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the firing of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going. Had you not better send your trains back? I will communicate with you. F. J. PORTER, *Major-General*." (Court-Martial, page 31.)



because he for a moment contemplated disobedience.”<sup>1</sup> Morell's division remained at the front, where Porter had placed it in position upon his arrival, during the whole day of the 29th, and until four A. M. of the 30th, ready at any time to repel an attack. The remainder of his corps, consisting mainly of Sykes's division, was held further to the rear, in the vicinity of Bethlehem Church, near enough to support Morell. Porter himself was at the front until half past two P. M., at which hour he made his headquarters with Sykes, near the church, where he could communicate with Pope or the head of his own column, as occasion might require. But Porter was undoubtedly agitated with conflicting opinions of what he could do and what he might be expected to do. It was his strong desire to perform all that lay in his power. The heavy fire of artillery was heard miles away on his right, and the smoke of battle hung heavy over the field where Pope's right was engaged with Jackson. Either because misinformed, or because he thought he would at all events develop the real strength of the forces before him, or for all or any of the reasons that move a commander in the presence of the enemy, he determined to feel them with Morell's division, and he notified Pope of his intentions. “There is,” he said in a verbal and a written message sent about four o'clock P. M. to Pope,<sup>2</sup> “a large force in front of us. General Morell will soon be strongly engaged.”

For reasons which seemed judicious and wise, Porter, after sending this dispatch to Pope, thought best to moderate his own spontaneous plans. He resolved to act with caution, and to move with only a small force

<sup>1</sup> Review of Fitz-John Porter's Trial, by Reverdy Johnson, pamphlet, page 58.

<sup>2</sup> Sent by Lieutenant Weld, of his staff.

against a detached body of the enemy. Therefore he sent orders to Morell to attack the section of the enemy's battery in his front.<sup>1</sup>

When General Morell received this order he remonstrated. He said that it was founded on a misconception of facts; the enemy were not retiring; they were forming in masses on his front. Nevertheless, Morell made arrangements to attack. Before he moved forward, however, Porter became satisfied that no good thing could be accomplished by the movement. It was near sunset. He ordered its stay, and sent instructions for a careful disposition for the night.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "GENERAL MORELL, — I wish you to push up two regiments supported by two others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the party with the section of a battery opposed to you. The battle looks well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling when our troops advance. F. J. PORTER, *Major-General*."

<sup>2</sup> "Put your men in position to remain during the night, and have out your pickets. Put them so that they will be in line, and on rising will be in position to resist any attack. I am about a mile from you. McDowell says all goes well and we are getting the best of the fight. I wish you would send me a dozen men from the cavalry. Keep me informed. Troops are passing up to Gainesville, pushing the enemy. Ricketts has gone, also King. F. J. PORTER, *Major-General*."

The statements of, and the conclusions upon, the course pursued by General Porter after McDowell left him, as given in preceding pages, have been fully confirmed by the Army Board in its report. In this report it is said that there was an understanding between McDowell and Porter that when King's division had united with Reynolds on the right Morell should push through the woods (though no one knew how wide the belt was, nor what was its character, nor whether the ground beyond was in possession of the enemy), and unite with King. It is found that after McDowell left and took with him King's division, Porter arrested a movement he had made towards the enemy, in which Griffin had crossed the Manassas Gap railroad; that Morell's division was put in defensive order to hold the ground then occupied; that Porter's scouts were sent from time to time during the whole afternoon through the woods on Morell's right to find the enemy or King's division; that in every instance they ran upon the enemy's pickets, and were driven back or captured; that this arose because King's division did not get up on the right of the woods at all, but about 4.30 P. M. it reached a point some distance in rear of that position, when after some

This message had hardly been forwarded to General Morell, when Lieutenant Weld returned. The hour was after sunset; it was about quarter to seven. Weld brought to Porter two dispatches, one of them from Pope, and one from General Hatch, who had taken command of King's division. King had left the field. He was sick. "Tell General Porter," said Pope, "we are having a hard fight;" then added, "That is all I have to send to General Porter." General Hatch said, "Tell General Porter that we have whipped the enemy, and are driving them;" then added, "Don't deliver that answer, but this: Tell General Porter we have driven the enemy into the woods." Hardly had Porter received this information, when a new order from Pope, dated at half past four in the afternoon, was handed him. That the hour when Porter received this order was between half past six and seven o'clock in the evening was established beyond controversy by sworn testimony at Porter's trial. The best evidence of exact

marching and counter-marching it was sent northward to the Warrenton pike; and thus "the gap in the line which McDowell's troops were to occupy remained open all the afternoon, and the margin of the timber remained in possession of the enemy's pickets." The Board further finds that Porter reported these failures to McDowell by way of Sudley Springs road in at least four different written dispatches, in only one of which the hour was named, the last, sent at six o'clock in the evening; and that he sent two reports to Pope, one at four o'clock and the other at 6.30 P. M., both of which Pope received, and neither of which he preserved. Porter in these dispatches informed McDowell that he could not get through the woods to Groveton; that the enemy was in the woods, and that he appeared to have driven our forces back, for his fire was advancing and ours retiring; that the enemy seemed to be in heavy force and coming forward, as shown by advancing masses of dust; that if left alone he should have to retire for food and water, for he could not get them there; that his scouts had been captured; that every scout that had returned to him "found the enemy between us." And he asked at 6.30 P. M. of McDowell what his designs were: "Please to let me know your designs, whether to retire or not;" for he could get neither water nor provisions where he was.

Although in these communications he announced his intention for reasons given of retiring to Manassas, he did not retire there, as has been shown.

time would have been found, of course, in the written receipt containing the exact hour of its reception. Such receipts generally specify with precision this important fact. It is more than probable that Porter's signature<sup>1</sup> would have been conclusive. Porter called for but was unable to obtain it on his trial.<sup>2</sup>

The order was in the following words: —

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, *August 29, 1862, 4.30 P. M.*

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER, — Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in

<sup>1</sup> Captain Pope testified that General Porter gave him a written reply to the order. (Court-Martial Record, page 58.)

<sup>2</sup> Record, pages 31, 32.

The government attempted to show that the order came into Porter's hands at five o'clock P. M., giving daylight enough for its attempted execution at least. Captain Pope, of General Pope's staff, swore that he delivered it at five o'clock; that the distance traveled was three miles from Pope's headquarters; but his evidence was very much shaken on cross-examination. He did not return to Pope with Porter's reply till eight o'clock P. M., — three hours in going from Porter to Pope, and only half an hour from Pope to Porter over the same road. (See Record, page 57.) Charles Duffey, the orderly who accompanied Pope, swore that the distance was five miles; General Pope swore that an aid-de-camp at speed could go from the field of battle to Manassas Junction, or to any point west of Manassas Junction, within an hour. General Roberts, of Pope's staff, swore that it "should have been delivered in half an hour or less," and McDowell did not know when the order was delivered, as he was not with Porter; and yet Generals Pope, Roberts, and McDowell, argued the judge-advocate, corroborate Captain Pope, whose testimony as to the road by which he returned to General Pope, and by whom the road was pointed out to him, was most successfully contradicted. To this trifling testimony of a vital fact, General Porter opposed the testimony of his staff officer, Lieutenant Weld, who swore that Pope's messenger came after sundown; of Lieutenant Ingham, aid-de-camp to General Sykes, who saw the order delivered after sunset; of Major-General Sykes, who swore that it was near sunset; of Colonel Locke, chief of Porter's staff, that it was between sundown and dark; and of Captain Monteith, that it was about sundown. See Court-Martial Record.

the woods in front of us, but he can be shelled out as soon as you engage his flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep in close communication with the right wing.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General commanding.*<sup>1</sup>

General Porter had now received a positive order to attack the enemy, and he sent without hesitation an order to General Morell to attack with his whole force, adding to it "that he would be right up himself."<sup>2</sup> He then went immediately to the front. When he arrived it was dark. On the right, before Jackson, night had brought to a close the battle that had raged at intervals since daylight. That contest had ended. Fierce charges had been made by the Federal troops at different times and on different parts of the field, but there was no coöperation, and they failed.<sup>3</sup> Kearny's brill-

<sup>1</sup> Up to this period all the important facts connected with the joint order received from Pope at noon have been examined. To assert, either considered alone or in connection with anything that had previously transpired, that willful disobedience to Pope's orders or treasonable purposes rest upon a shadow of proof is to disparage the intelligence of those who affirm it. The matters thus far considered were set forth in specifications of a charge of violation of the ninth Article of War: "Any officer or soldier who disobeys the lawful command of his superior officer shall suffer death or such punishment as a court-martial may direct," and upon these specifications General Porter was found guilty.

<sup>2</sup> See Colonel Locke, chief of staff, Court-Martial Record, pages 130, 136; and General Morell confirms Locke by his testimony, that "soon after sunset Locke came to me with an order from General Porter to make the attack." (Ibid., page 147.)

<sup>3</sup> If all these forces, instead of being frittered away in isolated efforts, had coöperated with each other at any one moment after a common plan, the results of the day would have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the ground we had already taken and occupied in the morning, and which in the afternoon was for a short time, at least, lost again. See Official Report, General Carl Schurz.

iant but futile effort on Pope's right we have described. The order which Porter had received was solely for promoting the end to be gained by that effort. It was the final assault to be made upon both of Jackson's flanks, with a belief that thus Jackson could be crushed. Pope's order was sent in time, as Pope believed, for such coöperation.<sup>1</sup> It was sent solely for this purpose and with no intent that any other forces than those of Jackson's should be assaulted by Porter.<sup>2</sup>

Not only does this appear from Pope's confessions of the fact in his official report as quoted, but it stands forth conspicuously in the order itself. Of course Porter was ignorant of Pope's purposes or plans only so far as they appeared in the written words before him. He did not know what he certainly ought to have been told, that he was to coöperate in an assault. And if he had, knowing that that assault was expected to be made by his corps upon Jackson's right, it would have been immaterial. Porter could have attacked the force in his front, but it would not have been the force he was ordered to attack ; it would not have been the co-operation that was expected from him. Nor could he, because of the darkness, if superior numbers had not

<sup>1</sup> " At half past four o'clock I sent a peremptory order to General Porter to push forward at once into action on the enemy's right, and if possible to turn his rear, stating to him generally the condition of things in front of me."

<sup>2</sup> " About half past five o'clock, when General Porter should have been coming into action, in compliance with this order, I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to assault the left of the enemy. . . . Attack was made with great gallantry. . . . Grover particularly distinguished himself." (Pope's Official Report.) Pope's incorrectness of statement or want of acquaintance with the facts is here painfully apparent. Grover made his charge at three o'clock P. M., and took no part whatever in this final assault. (See *ante*.) " After sharp conflict of one hour and a half we occupied the field of battle with dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands." (Pope's Official Report. See General Kearny, who made the Federal charge, and Official Reports of Confederates, who deny Pope's statement.)

opposed him, have made an effective attack upon Longstreet, or coöperated in an assault upon Jackson.<sup>1</sup>

But Porter did not rest content with supine conclusions. Pope had misapprehended the situation; but Porter would not therefore find justification in inaction. Pope had supposed there would be daylight to guide Porter's movements; but even this condition was wanting. He was justified in believing that if there in that fading twilight Pope could stand by his side, could see all that could be seen, could know all that could be known; could know that to push "forward into action at once" upon Jackson's right flank would, in a flank march of three miles in the darkness, over a trackless and difficult country, impassable for artillery, expose him to almost inevitable ruin from Longstreet's corps, — even Pope would not have issued, or, having issued, would countermand the order. Yet even this conviction, and the stronger conviction of what his duty required under the changed circumstances, could not free him from perplexity. He made all possible investigations to confirm his belief as to the obstacles in his path; he counseled with his officers; he neglected nothing that could inform, and then he made up his mind that compliance was practically impossible. The grounds upon which he so decided have all been made known in sworn testimony before the court which tried him for this disobedience and for this so-called "misbehavior before the enemy;" and although this testimony could not then be corroborated by the evidence here given of Confederate officers, that what Porter so strongly suspected was more than true, yet it should

<sup>1</sup> General Porter went immediately to the front; it was dark when he arrived. The only sounds of battle, artillery at long range, as well as the few reports of infantry firing heard during the day had ceased to the right. (Court-Martial Record, page 47.)

have been enough in the judgment of impartial men to shatter the accusations that were presented and prosecuted before the court.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following is a summary of the facts which influenced Porter's conduct. In Morell's division, in the immediate presence of Longstreet's corps, was the thirteenth New York volunteers. Its colonel (E. G. Marshall) was a captain in the regular army. For his ability and gallantry in the field he had been promoted to the command of this regiment. As early as one o'clock P. M., General Porter had ordered him to take his regiment to some timber across the open country and a ravine, in front of Porter's battle-line, on a reconnaissance. He went, and "found a very large force drawn up in line of battle as they came down." About dusk he came back in person, unwilling to trust his orderlies, and reported "concerning the enemy" to General Morell. He was then informed that Porter had sent Morell orders to attack the enemy. Colonel Marshall was much troubled. He told Morell "by all means not to attack; that it was certain destruction for us to do so; that he for one did not wish to go into that timber and attack the enemy; that their position was a very strong one, and they were certainly in force at that time twice as large as all of General Porter's corps." He said he felt that it was "certain destruction" to attack. At dark General Porter sent for Colonel Marshall. He questioned him closely about the enemy, and Colonel Marshall repeated what he had said to Morell. (See Colonel Marshall's testimony, Court-Martial Record, pages 189, 190.) Major Hyland was with his regiment on the skirmish line, in front of Morell's division, from one o'clock of the afternoon of the 29th until daylight of the 30th. Hyland testified that he saw the enemy forming "between two and three o'clock in his front;" that he could hear commands and "movements of artillery coming into position;" that there was "a very large force indeed, sufficient," he thought, "to have made a successful resistance to General Porter's entire corps." (Court-Martial Record, pages 174, 176.) The testimony of Lieutenant Stevenson, of the same regiment, was to the same effect, and as confidently expressed. But the opinion of General Morell, from his rank, his experience, and his position as the commander of the division before the enemy, is important. From what he saw of Porter's whole command "between sundown and the gray of the evening" on the 29th of August, and from "all he saw and all he believed of the position of the enemy," he swore that "the only attack we could have made at that time would have been *directly in front*." And that was of course upon Longstreet. The enemy, he said, "was under cover in the woods." (Court-Martial Record, page 147.) It is unnecessary to refer to the judge-advocate's ingenuity in his effort to break down the testimony of these witnesses, and to fortify those who tended to support the theory of General Roberts, Pope's inspector-general and Porter's nominal accuser, that it was "his opinion that there was only a cavalry force with some light artillery in Porter's front" (Record, page 215), for it is



But Porter's enemies have averred that he can find no justification in Longstreet's presence on his front for his disobedience of Pope's orders of the 29th to attack

now established by the after-acquired evidence of the Confederate officers that Morell was right; that Marshall, Hyland, and Stevenson did not know the half of the strength of the enemy in their front; and that Porter was, even in the extremest view of his duty, more than justified in his course under the orders he had received. Porter could not have taken his artillery at night across the country in the direction indicated in Pope's order. There were no roads, and there were many wooded ravines, hills, and hollows. The distance to Pope's right would have been three miles. In this region there are many streams that pour their waters through Broad Run and the Occoquan into the Potomac. Even by daylight, with no enemy to oppose, Reynolds had failed on the morning of the 28th to move his division through this inaccessible space from Gainesville to Manassas Junction. So had Sigel failed with his corps. And yet then Pope's call and order were most urgent. To sweep with the right of these commands resting upon the Manassas Gap railway, and swoop up Jackson, whom Pope supposed then, and had ever since supposed, to be in flight, was certainly a duty as imperative and as exacting as this now imposed upon Porter; and yet, deterred by the barriers in their path, both Reynolds and Sigel, after a feeble trial, abandoned the effort, and took the road upon which Porter had marched from Manassas towards Gainesville. And thereby they would have allowed Jackson to escape, but for the important fact that Jackson was not where Pope sought him, and he did not wish to escape from where he was at the time. See *ante*.

General Reynolds bore testimony as a witness to what he had reported officially. He had passed, he said, over the country on the 28th, with his command; he found it "so broken, wooded, and obstructed that he [I] had to turn into a road leading along the railroad from Gainesville to Manassas Junction, and finally marched on that road in one column around to Bethlehem Church, towards the old battle-field of Bull Run, late in the evening." (Court-Martial Record, pages 170, 173.) Though constantly pressed by the judge-advocate to make some admission that General Porter could have made his way across the country to Groveton, General Reynolds, in the strongest terms, declared his belief in its impossibility, if Porter had been obliged to move in the immediate presence of the enemy. No command could have done it with artillery, he said. But, asked the judge-advocate, "if the enemy could take position there, why could not General Porter's troops have taken position against them?" General Reynolds replied to the crafty civilian as a soldier who knew his profession. "It was impossible," he said, "to manœuvre troops over that country." The enemy could take position there, of course, and they could be attacked in position by troops, "but it would have been very difficult to have got artillery up through that broken country, and a very disadvantageous attack would have been made." With still less advantage to the cause he so ardently

Jackson's corps only. They declare with much virtuous indignation that if Porter had wished to perform his duty he would have interpreted his orders to include any and all forces between himself and General Jackson, and that even his absolute knowledge of the certainty of disaster to his own corps should not have deterred him from an assault.

That such an assertion, in the light of facts heretofore revealed, is utterly indefensible is unworthy of argument. But General Pope affirms it.

In the face of his official report, where Porter's condemnation is made to rest solely upon the ground of the absence in Porter's front of any considerable body of Longstreet's corps, Pope, fortified by the findings

espoused did the judge-advocate press the witness upon the actual movements of Longstreet's force on the succeeding day, in the battle of the 30th of August. Did not the enemy then pass with artillery and infantry, in attacking the left and rear of Pope's army, over much of the country that Porter would have had to pass on the 29th to attack the Confederate left? And he was informed that the use of the Warrenton turnpike enabled the Confederates to avoid that broken region in taking a position on the ridge to the east of it. (Court-Martial Record, pages 170, 173.)

General Morell's belief was stronger even than that of Reynolds. His division would have borne the brunt of the effort. His men would have been uselessly sacrificed, had not General Porter taken upon himself the responsibility of inaction. Morell bore testimony to his belief in the impossibility of "getting artillery through" that region "*even by daylight,*" and that infantry could not have got through "in any fighting order at all." (Court-Martial Record, page 147.)

To add the weight of his testimony to that of Generals Reynolds and Morell, Colonel Marshall, who had passed much of the day in the examination of the country within and around the region inquired of, whose regiment was further advanced than any other of Morell's division, stated unhesitatingly to the court that it was "impossible for Porter to have made a movement to his right to attempt to reach and attack Jackson on his right;" that it was impracticable to cross the country with artillery; and that the very large force in front of Porter would have attacked his flank. This force Porter must first whip. Porter's route to reach the right flank of Jackson, he said, would have led through a broken and rocky country, very heavily timbered. Colonel Marshall believed that the only mode open to Porter to reach Jackson's flank was to go back to the Sudley Springs road, and thence to Groveton. (Court-Martial Record, pages 191, 193.)

and sentence of a court-martial, has gone the whole length of this declaration, and he has published it in his reply to Porter's appeal for a new hearing upon evidence newly discovered. In that reply he declared that "in the face of a positive order to attack he did not move." Then, further discoursing, he delivered himself of certain general truths which had not the most remote application to his text. "If, in a general battle," he argued, "a corps or a division commander receiving a positive order to attack a portion of the enemy's line has the right to disobey this order on the ground that he does not believe the attack would be successful, I cannot see how any combinations can be made by the commanding general, or how he can expect that any of his orders will be obeyed. How can a corps commander know that the general-in-chief expects his attack to be successful? How can he know that he is not ordered to attack a particular point of the enemy's line in order that sufficient force to resist his attack may be withdrawn from other points to render an assault elsewhere successful? How can he know that his attack is not intended to prevent the enemy's troops in front of him from reënforcing other parts of their line upon which an attack is being made? The effect of an attack by Porter, even had he been repulsed, at any time from midday to eight o'clock on the evening of the 29th of August, 1862, is clearly set forth in General McDowell's testimony in this case."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Pope to General Grant, September 16, 1867, opposing a rehearing in General Porter's case.

That under these circumstances General Porter was justified in the use of a proper discretion President Hayes's Army Board has found and given as an opinion in very decided language. "If the 4.30 order," the board says, "had been promptly delivered, a very grave responsibility would have devolved upon General Porter. The order was based upon conditions which were essentially erroneous, and upon expectations which could not possibly be realized.

The court-martial in Porter's case took Pope's view of Porter's duty under that order.<sup>1</sup> "Out of the moral

"It required an attack upon the enemy's flank or rear, which could not be made, and that the attacking force keep closed on Reynolds, who was far to the right, and beyond reach. Yet it would have been too late to correct the error, and have the order modified. That order appeared to be a part of a general plan. It must be executed promptly, or not at all. If Porter had made not the impossible attack which was ordered, but a direct attack upon the enemy's right wing, would he have been blameless for the fruitless sacrifice of his troops? *We believe not.* It is a well-established military maxim that a corps commander is not justifiable in making an apparently hopeless attack in obedience to an order from a superior who is not on the spot, and who is evidently in error in respect to the essential conditions upon which the order is based. The duty of the corps commander in such a case is to make not a real attack, but a strong demonstration, so as to prevent the enemy on his front from sending reinforcements to other parts of his line.

"This is all that Porter would have been justifiable in doing even if he had received the 4.30 order at five o'clock; and such a demonstration, or even a real attack, made *after* five o'clock by Porter alone could have had no beneficial effect whatever upon the general result. It would not have diminished in the least the resistance offered to the attacks made at other points that afternoon. The display of troops made by Porter earlier in the afternoon had all the desired and all possible beneficial effect. It caused Longstreet's reserved division to be sent to his extreme right, in front of Porter's position. There that division remained until about six o'clock, — too late for it to take any effective part in the operations at other points of the line. A powerful and well-sustained attack by the combined forces of Porter's corps and King's division upon the enemy's right wing, if it had been commenced early in the afternoon, might have drawn to that part of the field so large a part of Longstreet's force as to have given Pope some chance of success against Jackson. But an attack by Porter alone could have been but an ineffective blow, destructive only to the force that made it, and followed by a counter attack disastrous to the Union army. Such an attack, under such circumstances, would have been not only a great blunder, but, on the part of an intelligent officer, it would have been a great crime.

"What General Porter actually did do, although his situation was by no means free from embarrassment and anxiety at the time, now seems to have been the only simple, necessary action which an intelligent soldier had no choice but to take.

"It is not possible that any court-martial could have condemned such conduct, if it had been correctly understood. On the contrary that conduct

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<sup>1</sup> A Reply to the Review of Judge-Advocate-General Holt.

chemistry," says a distinguished reviewer of this trial,<sup>1</sup> "compounded of a garbled construction of this order and certain spontaneous acts by Porter before he received it, a question of fact was raised in the court's mental view, not legitimately arising out of the charges as preferred in writing, and which alone the court-martial had power to try."

And there is reason to believe that the President of the United States was, most unhappily for Porter, influenced by the judge-advocate-general to adopt Pope's view of Porter's duty under that order. General Porter was convicted of disobedience of the order of half past four. Guilty of that too, said the findings of the court. But the President's approval of the proceedings of that court was essential to its validity. The record was forwarded to Abraham Lincoln. It was voluminous, vast in proportions.<sup>2</sup> The court had been in session more than forty days; many witnesses had been examined, some of them at great length. Testimony had been received against the accused that in the judgment of the accused ought to have been ruled out, and testimony had been ruled out that in the opinion of the accused ought to have been received; and there were protests against the decision of the court upon matters in which, subject to the approval of the President, its decision was final. To be sure, the case had not been closed with tedious arguments. Only one had been submitted, and that by General Porter. It was brief; it was bold in the assertion of innocence; it

was *obedient, subordinate, faithful, and judicious*. It saved the Union army from disaster on the 29th of August."

Thus ends the transaction upon which were based the charges of which General Porter was pronounced guilty. See Report of Army Board appointed by President Hayes, March 19, 1879.

<sup>1</sup> Charles O'Connor.

<sup>2</sup> Two hundred and ninety-eight closely printed octavo pages, as published by Congress.

was without a suspicion of any other result than an acquittal. It contained no nice discriminating views of testimony; it pressed no constrained conclusions of law. Conscious of entire, absolute innocence of any intent to disobey or of disobeying Pope's orders of the 27th and the 29th of August, Porter could not believe that the facts testified to before that court could convince either its members or the President that he was guilty of disobedience or of misbehavior before the enemy. He could not believe that the truth could be so distorted, even by men blind with the prejudices of passion and of party. In military tribunals, the prosecuting officer sits with the court while, in their capacity as jurors, the members deliberate upon the weight, the reliability, or the relevancy of the testimony. This affords an opportunity for the most effective reply by a not over-sensitive advocate to the summing up by the accused. It offers the most fitting occasion for robbing the accused of his right to the final reply.<sup>1</sup> The Judge-Advocate-General Holt made use of this device. He declined to answer the argument of the accused in open court. The court was closed, the accused was banished, but the judge-advocate remained in consultation with the jurors upon the guilt or innocence of his antagonist. When the proceedings came before the President, written instructions were issued to the judge-advocate to "revise the proceedings of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to report fully upon any legal questions that may have arisen, and upon the bearing of the testimony in reference to the charges and specifications exhibited against the accused and upon which he was tried." On the 12th of January, 1863, the record was transmitted to the President; on the 13th the judge-advocate was

<sup>1</sup> See Benét, *Courts-Martial*, pages 123, 124.

ordered to revise it; and on the 19th an elaborate paper was brought forth, in which not a revision, but a conviction, so far as in the power of the judge-advocate it was possible to convict, was laid before the President, and the President approved the findings and sentence of the court. It is to this paper we would look, for in it we shall find the same views put forth to govern Porter in his duty under the written order that we have found expressed by Pope. It was as immaterial to Judge Holt as it was to General Pope that Porter was not charged with the violation of an order to attack Longstreet. Both Pope and Holt waxed eloquent over the infinite glory to a soldier of attacking something, and the infinite disgrace of not attacking at any time and under all circumstances any enemy that is in his front. It is thus the judge-advocate discourses of the difficulties and dangers Porter would have encountered. "It may be admitted," he says, "and perhaps the testimony requires the admission to be made, that falling upon the enemy on the afternoon of the 29th, Porter would have encountered both difficulty and danger;" but he adds, "difficulty and danger in time of war are daily and hourly in the category of the soldier's life. Their presence should be for him, not a discouragement, but an inspiration. To grapple with them should be his ambition, to overcome them his glory."<sup>1</sup> Inspired by his imagination, the judge-advocate lost the composure of a reviewer. His soul burned with a warrior's spirit. Now he was at Hohenlinden, holding up to the President's view the fires of death on that fatal field; now there passed before him a vision of historic names, all warriors in their time: Richepanse, brave and untiring; Ney, sublime in his onsets; and Moreau, whose deeds inspired by genius Napier loved

<sup>1</sup> Holt's Review of Proceedings of the Court-Martial, page 312.

to record. Such were the views and such the agencies brought to bear to turn attention from the real question that was presented at twilight of the 29th of August for Porter's consideration, — the only question that ought to have been held up to the court and to the President himself.

We have now given the facts concerning the order to General Porter to march to Bristoe Station on the 28th, the joint order to McDowell and Porter, and the order at half past four P. M. on the 29th. In establishing the facts which surround these periods, reference has been freely made to contemporaneous and subsequent events. From official reports made at the time or not remote, from sworn testimony of witnesses at Porter's trial, from letters of Confederate officers, and from appeals to the department against a rehearing in Porter's case, we have endeavored simply to extract the truth. And here, in tracing Pope's campaign against the enemy, perhaps, we should pause. But it may be doubted if this history would be complete if we did not pursue it further, and show that although Pope's campaign against Lee terminated in defeat and disaster, his subsequent campaign against Porter was rewarded by a complete and overwhelming victory. Porter had come to Pope with an enviable reputation. His services under McClellan in the Army of the Potomac had won for him most honorable mention "for skill and for gallantry." So conspicuous and distinguished had been his services at Malvern Hill that he was commissioned as brevet brigadier-general in the regular army, and as major-general of volunteers. In May, 1861, Porter had been commissioned by the President a colonel in the regular army, and in August of the same year a brigadier-general of volunteers. Without a blemish on his record as a soldier, without a spot



upon his reputation as a gentleman or a man of honor, with not a breath of suspicion against his unswerving and devoted loyalty to his cause, General Porter had, first of all, from the Army of the Potomac hurried forward to reënforce Pope. As a cadet at the Military Academy, as a subaltern in the old or as a general in the new army, Porter was the peer of his companions. From the date of his report to Pope of his arrival near the Rappahannock, until night of the 29th of August, we have minutely traced his footsteps. It is sufficient to state here that on the next day he led his corps into action with a skill and determined bravery that left no room for his keen-eyed enemies to criticise. As vehement as was their desire to defame him, their effort—for they made one—failed. After Pope sought safety within the fortifications that surrounded Alexandria, Porter was intrusted by the President with the command of all the troops gathered for the defense of Washington. In command of his old corps, to which a new division was added, he formed part of the newly organized army, which, with McClellan at its head, met the victorious Confederates under Lee at South Mountain and at Antietam in Maryland. Porter bore his part to the entire satisfaction of the President and of McClellan in that action, in which Lee and his army were hurled backward across the Potomac into Virginia. The Confederate campaign ended ere one month had flown since Pope's defeat. But in that month Pope had made his first report. Severely accused, Porter very properly asked for a court of inquiry. The government thought best to bring him before a court-martial. But before this determination, and before his report was prepared, Pope had been shown certain private dispatches sent by Porter to Burnside, then at Acquia Creek. These dispatches were written while

Porter was under Pope's command. When Porter marched away towards Pope, General Burnside requested to be informed from time to time of events. Porter's messages severely and justly criticised Pope.

Here are three of the worst: "All that talk about bagging Jackson, etc., was bosh!" "That enormous gap Manassas was left open, and the enemy jumped through, and the story of McDowell having cut off Longstreet had no good foundation." "The enemy destroyed an immense amount of property at Manassas, — cars and supplies. I expect the next thing will be a raid on our rear by Longstreet, *who was cut off.*"

General Burnside forwarded these dispatches to the President; they were sent solely to inform the government; and the President expressed much gratification that through this source he could learn something, for he failed to get anything through direct channels. It never occurred to the President that Porter's expressions of contempt for Pope's blundering strategy evinced a treasonable purpose. Porter's opinions were shared and expressed by very many of the officers under Pope's command. But they did not publish them to the President; fortunately for themselves, perhaps. Nor did Porter publish his. Solely as private dispatches from one friend to another, and only at Burnside's request, were they sent. With confidence in Porter's judgment, Burnside laid Porter's private words before the President just as they were received. They were filed away in the War Department, and in due time exhibited to Pope. Pope was furious. His eyes were now opened, he said. He would be even with him. Though he had masked his crafty purposes, formed long before, under a friendly cloak, though he had received Porter's assurances and explanations with expressions justifying Porter's failure to

obey his orders, under the sting of Porter's contempt he threw off his disguise, and laid his own shameful failure to the treasonable doings of his subordinate. Smarting under Porter's dispatches, writhing under the humiliation of being held up to the President as a commander whose eagle glance was all bosh, Pope, supported by his position, and taking advantage of the hour, instigated proceedings the most indefensible and the most indecent ever submitted by our Government to the judgment of a court. So manifest is it that not Porter's disobedience of Pope's orders, not his misbehavior before the enemy, but rather his expressed contempt for Pope's generalship was the inducing cause of bringing Porter to trial under trivial accusations, that Pope, in his letter to General Grant, protesting against Porter's application for a rehearing, does not hesitate while revealing Porter's animus to openly avow his own. "Dispatches sent from him" (Porter), he writes, "to Burnside, sent before and after he joined me, and intended, as he says himself, for McClellan, are to be found on the records of the court-martial. They indicate a state of mind and a hostility and bitterness, I will venture to say, unparalleled under such circumstances. They present the grossest and most outrageous violation of discipline and military propriety, to say nothing of ordinary good manners, which can be found in any official record in this country. That a subordinate officer . . . could write such dispatches almost surpasses belief. As I said, it *indicates a state of mind capable of anything, and these dispatches themselves furnish the completest explanation of Porter's conduct which can ever be given.*"<sup>1</sup>

Unconfirmed statements of fact in this letter we dis-

<sup>1</sup> The italics are mine. Letter, Pope to General Grant, from Atlanta, Georgia, September 16, 1867.

miss ; but the opinions, we may avow, strongly confirm the motive attributed to Pope. In his own belief, even if he is sincere, he has few sympathizers. General Burnside was a witness at Porter's trial. He testified that he was quite satisfied that all the telegrams sent him by Porter were correct, and that from all or any of the dispatches that came to him between the 26th and the 29th of August he received no such impression as that General Porter might not be inclined to do his whole duty as a subordinate under General Pope. "*I saw,*" he continued, "*in General Porter's dispatches exactly what I heard expressed by a large portion of the officers with whom I happened to be in communication at the time, a very great lack of confidence in the management of the campaign. It was not confined to General Porter. I saw in his dispatches, and I told General Porter himself so, what may have been indiscreet language, but nothing that led me for one moment to feel that he would not do his whole duty.*"<sup>1</sup>

After a trial extending over forty days, before a court-martial assembled at Washington, General Porter was found guilty of disobeying Pope's orders of the 27th and 29th of August, and guilty of misbehavior before the enemy on the later date ; and he was sentenced to be cashiered and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the government of the United States. This sentence was approved, confirmed, and ordered to be carried out by the then President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln.<sup>2</sup>

The court-martial was then dissolved. Almost simul-

<sup>1</sup> Court-Martial Record, pages 181, 184.

<sup>2</sup> For the charges and specifications, findings and sentence, in case of General Porter, see Appendix.

taneously with the publication of the sentence three of the members of that court were promoted to be major-generals. The president of the court was returned to a command from which he had previously been removed by the administration, only to be again removed for cause. General Pope and his most obsequious Inspector-General Roberts were both invested with larger powers and more important trusts. Where the motive could be concealed under a pretense of merit, members and prominent witnesses of that court whose testimony and whose vote secured the conviction of General Porter were rewarded. One shameless act of the many that surround that trial stands out preëminent. A member of the court, sworn to impartiality, sworn to give the benefit of all doubts to the accused, descended from the bench to the witness-box to contradict a principal witness for the defense. If the court believed the testimony of this general officer, the testimony of that witness was most effectually impeached. As a bare majority in courts-martial convict, it may be that this individual witness turned the scale. With the *impartiality* that member judged, may he not in his extremest needs be judged.

In conclusion, we may claim that but for the element of treason covertly introduced in the charges as lurking under Porter's disobedience and his misbehavior before the enemy, General Porter would, if not acquitted, have been visited with hardly an official censure; for now no doubt remains that in the first case exact obedience was perfectly immaterial to the public interests, and in the others an attempt to obey would have resulted in disaster.

It is now more than sixteen years since General Porter was publicly accused and condemned for a crime he never committed. For sixteen years he has suffered

under a sentence which will fester to his death. It has been ably said that the effect of the foulest of all treasons is not generally to raise the traitor in the public estimation. And this would have been as true of General Porter. He could not to-day stand vindicated before the public, had he been guilty of the charges that have been brought against him.

The effect of his conviction and sentence has been slowly but surely to convince the public mind that every rule and principle of the whole law of evidence, in accordance with which men for ages have been tried for offenses against life and property, were outraged at his trial. Sovereign States of this Union<sup>1</sup> have through their legislatures petitioned Congress for a rehearing in his behalf. Prominent members of both branches of the national legislature have added the weight of their names in a request to the President of the United States for a rehearing.<sup>2</sup> Distinguished citizens have swelled the list.<sup>3</sup> Distinguished judges and eminent lawyers, after a long and patient review of the whole published record of the trial, have with singular unanimity declared as their opinion that in Porter's conviction and sentence justice was outraged.<sup>4</sup> While a long list of names of those who fought in the Army of the Potomac under General Porter as their chief, and many military societies and associations, have added the weight of their names in petitions for a review. And yet this foul act of national injustice still stands in full force to-day. There is no longer a pretense even of expediency to excuse the shameful wrong. For the

<sup>1</sup> Pennsylvania and New Hampshire.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Wilson, John Sherman, Ira Harris, N. P. Banks.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Everett, Robert C. Winthrop, Amos A. Lawrence, Gardner Howland Shaw, Horace Greeley, L. S. Foster, A. G. Curtin.

<sup>4</sup> Judge B. R. Curtis, Reverdy Johnson, Charles O'Connor, Daniel Lord, Sidney Bartlett, J. G. Abbott, Wm. D. Shipman.

suffering, for the humiliation, for the irreparable injury inflicted, General Porter asks only that he may lay newly discovered testimony before any board of skilled and competent officers that the President may appoint.<sup>1</sup>

With a narrative of McDowell's movements after he left Porter at noon and marched with the divisions of Ricketts and King along the Sudley Springs road to its intersection with the Warrenton turnpike, we may close the history of this day of misfortunes.

The roads McDowell pursued were filled with ambulances and with ammunition wagons; while in the valleys there were small, compact trains with larger supplies of ammunition. Scattered farm-houses along the route were converted into hospitals, from which red flags were displayed. The earth and sky were covered with a lurid smoke, out of which there came the sound of cannon and of musketry, and into which long columns of infantry were seen advancing. So destitute of human love or human sympathy are all the sights and sounds that surround a battle-field, that a heart must indeed be hard that does not at such a time long for some token that all this human passion, hate, and devilish rage could have an end. But no! there is nothing on earth so hopelessly, remorselessly pitiless as the battle-field. There is no shriek so savage

<sup>1</sup> With this we close that part of the history of Pope's campaign relating to and bearing upon those proceedings which have been so ably reviewed by the Army Board since these pages were written. See Appendix.

Although Porter has been fully exonerated, the sentence still remains, and so far as such a sentence can degrade, it degrades him before the world. How long shall such injustice continue? The President of the United States has sent to Congress the whole of the proceedings that came before the Board, with its recommendations in behalf of General Porter. It is to be hoped that a consideration of this cause there will result in the enactment of a law by which the full recommendations of the Board may be carried out, and that speedily.

as the fiendish scream of shell or hiss of bullet. As one moves within the edge of this war-cloud, it seems as if all the avenues of hope, of life, were choked. All is unreal, and so remains until the exciting plunge is over. Through such scenes, about four P. M., McDowell's column advanced to Pope's main battle-line, halted, formed to the front, and went forward half-way up a gentle hill, whose summit was crowned with batteries, supported by some thousands of infantry. A short rest followed, and even sleep came to those who were most overcome with fatigue. During a brief period of inaction some of the officers of Doubleday's brigade went forward to the brow of a hill, below which were Reynolds's and Schenck's divisions covered with the smoke that filled the valleys and hung like clouds about the forests.

To unite with Reynolds, McDowell had moved along the pike towards Groveton. To strengthen the right of his line Pope ordered it to return, and cross the fields to the right and east of the Sudley Springs road. But hardly had this forward and backward movement ended, when Pope again ordered the division forward to *pursue* the enemy. On the same road where Reynolds, with Meade, Seymour, and Jackson, where Schenck and McLean and Stahl and Reno, had passed the entire day in futile efforts to advance even against Jackson's right alone, — on this road, barred by two Confederate brigades under Hood, one under Evans and three under Wilcox, and Hunter's brigade of Kemper's division,<sup>1</sup> the Federal General Hatch, with Doubleday's brigade, his own, and Patrick's, with a single battery of howitzers, was ordered forward to pursue what he was told was a defeated, a retiring foe.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General Longstreet.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, General Hatch, commanding division.



It was about six o'clock when General Hatch received from McDowell the order for a pursuit. Hatch moved his command from the road-side out upon the Warrenton turnpike. Doubleday's brigade led off; then came Hatch's brigade in support; then Patrick's to the rear. There were eight regiments in the two advanced brigades, and these in number were not over twenty-five hundred fighting men. Hardly had the advance begun when the troops were pressed into a run. What did this mean? The enemy is retreating, flew from mouth to mouth. Fatigues of the past days and nights were dispelled in a moment. McDowell and his staff were on the road-side. The good news came from him; men cheered, and officers waved their swords. Excitedly the doomed command pressed on: on by batteries lining the road-way on either side; on by the troops of Pope's main battle-line, formed in masses behind their guns; on, madly on, with the hoarse cheers of Meade's men, and Seymour's, and Jackson's, and Schenck's, and Stahl's, and Milroy's, who had been beaten back; on, three quarters of a mile beyond them all. It was sunset. The day's conflict had ended. Of the living, right, centre, and left were at rest. The stillness was suspicious. In fields and in woods there were no signs of life. Where were the stragglers? where any evidence of a retreating foe? Be cautious. Skirmishers were thrown out,<sup>1</sup> who advanced warily and slowly; then halted on the face of a quiet rise covered with wood. The column too had halted, and every ear was strained to catch the first sharp rifle-crack. Was it a delusion — this flight of the enemy? Fire from the line of sharp-shooters breaks out and runs all along the front. The horses drag the guns forward on a run to a near eminence, while the infantry deploy in line of battle in

<sup>1</sup> Second United States Sharp-Shooters.

fields and woods on either side of the road. Slowly the line advances to the crest. It halts, and opens fire on the Confederate brigades beyond. The Federal attack was made near Groveton. It anticipated by a few moments the advance of Hood's division to attack the Federal force.<sup>1</sup> Hood's line at sunset prolonged Jackson's south from Groveton. First came Law's brigade on the left, then Hood's Texans on the right.<sup>2</sup> Into the arms of this force, with the supporting bodies in their rear, General Hatch had rushed. The contest was brief; it was bloody. Hardly had the Federal line opened fire when Hood's advancing division moved onward, firing as they moved. The storm of Confederate bullets swept through the Federal ranks, and the men bent and swayed beneath its rage, though they breasted it well for a time. The officers urged their men to renewed effort. Field officers and generals set them examples. At one period General Hatch sat complacently on his horse, while every man who approached him pitched and fell headlong before he could deliver his message. There was death in the aim of those Texan marksmen. The dead soon dotted the hill-side; the wounded streamed to the rear. Still the awful storm swept on. Away on the left, where there was a thick wood, fire began to break out on the Federal flank. It was painfully apparent that it was now time to retire.<sup>3</sup> The order was given, and darkness alone saved any considerable number of the Federal force from capture or from annihilation. The action had

<sup>1</sup> See Hood's Official Report. "At sunset an order came to me from General Lee to move forward and attack the enemy. Before, however, the division could come to attention, they were attacked, and I instantly ordered two brigades to charge the enemy."

<sup>2</sup> Official Reports, General Hood and Colonel E. M. Law.

<sup>3</sup> A charge of Federal cavalry had been made and repulsed, with loss on our left. (Bayard.)

lasted three quarters of an hour. It was desperate.<sup>1</sup> The conduct of the Federal battery was intrepid. As the Confederate lines approached at a run, three of the guns were driven rapidly to the rear, but a fourth remained, and continued its fire until the enemy came so near that the faces of the assailants were burned by its discharge. The piece was captured, and with it the commander of the battery, Captain Gerrish.<sup>2</sup> The Confederates halted half a mile in advance of the position they held when attacked. One hundred Federal prisoners and three stands of colors were taken.<sup>3</sup> At one o'clock at night Hood's division returned to Groveton (which they had occupied in the morning).<sup>4</sup> Darkness alone put an end to the Confederate pursuit. The weary and the wounded had sunk down to rest. The Federal camp-fires were seen by the enemy extending far away to their left, front, and right. Pope seized this hour to dispatch to Washington the glad tidings that he had won a great victory; and he claimed it.<sup>5</sup> The Federal losses in this day's battle were heavy. Pope estimated that the killed and wounded would amount to eight thousand. The Confederate loss he placed as high as three to one of his own.<sup>6</sup>

The movement of Hill's division of Confederate infantry on the 28th to Centreville,<sup>7</sup> the raid of General Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry along the Little River turnpike to Fairfax Court House,<sup>8</sup> and an official report from

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General Hatch.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Confederate Colonel Law.

<sup>3</sup> Hood's Official Report.

<sup>4</sup> Law's Official Report; Longstreet's Official Report.

<sup>5</sup> The enemy seized that opportunity to claim a victory, and the Federal commander was so impudent as to dispatch his government by telegraph tidings to that effect. (Official Report, General Longstreet.)

<sup>6</sup> Official Report.

<sup>7</sup> See *ante*.

<sup>8</sup> See Stuart's Official Report.

Halleck to McClellan that the enemy, leaving a strong force in Vienna, was moving through there in the direction of Chain Bridge with a large force,<sup>1</sup> together with a dispatch from Halleck that Sumner's and Cox's corps and Tyler's brigade had better be placed as they arrived near the guns, and particularly at the Chain Bridge,<sup>2</sup>—these all confirmed and demonstrated both Halleck's fears for Pope's safety and his apprehensions that an invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland was imminent. On the 29th nothing was heard from Pope. McClellan was painfully perplexed. The duty of pushing forward all his available force to sustain Pope was in conflict with his duty to hold a strong position within and around the defenses of Alexandria. His forces were not organized to take the field. Franklin was too weak. But two squadrons of cavalry could be given him. McClellan had only three; no more had arrived. Franklin had but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. If he met with serious resistance he was in no condition to accomplish much. His corps was in motion: it started at six o'clock in the morning. But for Halleck's pressing orders of last night, McClellan would not have moved him. This, at half past ten A. M., was the information dispatched to the general-in-chief from Alexandria concerning the march of troops to strengthen Pope. How the forts around Alexandria were to be held Halleck was also at the same time advised. General Cox would hold Upton Hill with its works, and push cavalry scouts to Vienna. Woodbury with the engineer brigade would hold Fort Lyon. Sumner had detached two regiments last night to the vicin-

<sup>1</sup> See McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 333.

<sup>2</sup> For the thing Halleck "principally feared now" was a cavalry raid into the city of Washington, especially in the night-time. (Ibid., page 329.)

ity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. If Sumner moved in support of Franklin, no reliable troops would be left in and near Washington; and Franklin was too weak to move alone.<sup>1</sup> At twelve o'clock Halleck approved the defense at Upton Hill, ordered wagons and ammunition to be sent to Franklin "as fast as they arrive," and furnished the pleasing information that the Confederate General Fitz-Hugh Lee was in Alexandria for three hours on the 24th of August.<sup>2</sup>

As Halleck had maintained silence upon the most important question of Franklin's advance, McClellan plied him again. "How far do you wish Franklin to advance?" he asked. He "has only between ten and eleven thousand men." The remainder of this dispatch was filled with suggestions for precautionary movements. If Halleck apprehended a cavalry raid on his side of the Potomac, a brigade or two of Sumner's corps should be ordered "to near Tenallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, the town and the Chain Bridge could be watched." As for the rest of Sumner's corps, "would it not meet your views," McClellan asked Halleck, "to post them between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they could support Cox, Franklin, Chain Bridge, or Tenallytown?"<sup>3</sup> To this dispatch there was no reply. McClellan waited with impatience till one P. M.; then he once more informed Halleck of his anxiety. He was anxious in regard to Sumner; he wished to give him orders. He was anxious about Franklin; he did not think, "under present circumstances," he ought to advance beyond Annandale. Might he, he asked, do as

<sup>1</sup> McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, dispatch from McClellan to Halleck, August 29th, camp near Alexandria, 10.30 A. M.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to McClellan, twelve M., August 29th.

<sup>3</sup> McClellan to Halleck, twelve M., August 29th, from camp near Alexandria, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 333.

seemed to him best with all the troops in this vicinity? Might he attach new regiments permanently to his old brigades, and thus benefit both? He should endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy with strong advanced guards. To have timely warning, he wished to hold the line through Prospect Hill, McKall's, Minor's, and Hall's hills. Thus did McClellan plead with Halleck for permission to carry out what he earnestly believed to be the best plan to meet the disasters which were feared by Halleck, by the President, and by himself.<sup>1</sup> But to this dispatch there came no reply.

If Halleck considered that Franklin ought to move beyond Annandale, he should have so telegraphed to McClellan, for he knew that McClellan believed that Franklin ought not to move beyond Annandale. Was not McClellan justified in stopping Franklin there? Was he to treat all the rumors and reports of the enemy at Vienna, at Chain Bridge, at the fords of the Potomac, as unfounded; or was he rather to send reconnoitring parties to Vienna and towards Manassas? If the enemy were in force at Vienna and towards Lewinsville, it would not have been judicious to push Franklin with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery beyond Annandale. Franklin was therefore ordered to halt at this place. It is about twelve miles from Centreville, to the east. General Cox was ordered to send a small cavalry force from Upton's Hill towards Vienna and Drainsville and Fairfax Court House, while Franklin was directed to reconnoitre as far towards Manassas as possible.<sup>2</sup>

At half past two P. M., the President, by telegraph, asked for news. What "from the direction of Manas-

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, one P. M., camp near Alexandria, August 29th.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 333.

sas Junction? What generally?"<sup>1</sup> McClellan replied that he had information from stragglers, "by no means reliable," that the enemy was evacuating Centreville, and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap.<sup>2</sup> The President's question was answered; but McClellan did not pause with an answer. He sent assurances of his zealous coöperation in any plan of action the President might propose. In vain had he sought definite orders from Halleck; in vain pleaded that his own command might be defined, or his own views in this critical situation adopted. The day was fast waning. Delay was dangerous. The President's message had opened the way, and McClellan would lay the matter before him. "I am clear," his reply continued, "that one of two courses should be adopted: first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." "No middle ground," he said, "will answer." If the President would tell him, he added, what he wished him to do, he would do all in his power to accomplish it. What were, he asked, his orders and his authority? For himself, he asked for nothing; he would obey whatever orders the President might give. "I only ask," he said, "a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders." "It will not do to delay any longer," were the warning and the closing words of McClellan.<sup>3</sup> The President's reply was, at this juncture, all the President was prepared to make. It left McClellan pretty much where Halleck had left him, — a subordinate on Halleck's staff. It defined noth-

<sup>1</sup> Abraham Lincoln to General McClellan, Washington, 2.30 P. M., August 29th.

<sup>2</sup> This was Hill's division on the 28th.

<sup>3</sup> McClellan, camp near Alexandria, 2.45 P. M., August 29th, dispatch to Abraham Lincoln, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 331.

ing ; it ordered nothing. It was vague, non-committal, and prudent. "I think your first alternative," wrote the President, "to wit, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope, is the right one ; but I wish not to control ; that I now leave to Halleck, aided by your counsels."<sup>1</sup>

The horizon was not much brighter after these dispatches. All that McClellan could do he did. There was nothing yet from Pope to guide him ; all was doubt and darkness. But as the day wore on, there came a curt dispatch from Halleck, — a peevish, rude, and reproachful dispatch, — in which he charged McClellan with disobedience of his orders. Why was Franklin halted at Annandale, he asked ? In a firm but respectful manner General McClellan replied, calling Halleck's attention to the various dispatches in the day's discussion of this matter (his own and Halleck's). He referred to the rumors of the enemy in position in force to attack Franklin's flank if he advanced to Vienna ; he spoke of the necessity of reconnaissances, and informed Halleck that Franklin remained at Alexandria until one P. M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. McClellan avowed his responsibility for Franklin's movements, but he saw no disobedience in this. Would Halleck please give distinct orders about Franklin for the morrow, and definite instructions for to-morrow's movements ; for he did not find it agreeable, when exercising the discretion committed to him, to be accused of disobeying orders. How the work was going on was also revealed in this dispatch. Construction and supply trains were to be pushed out as soon as possible, and Banks's supply trains were to start out that night with an escort at least as far as Annandale.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Abraham Lincoln, Washington, 4.10 P. M., August 29th, to McClellan at Alexandria, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 332.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan to Halleck, eight P. M., August 29th, *ibid.*, page 334.



The hour of ten at night closed all communication between Washington and Alexandria. At this time McClellan informed Halleck that, as he had not heard from him in reply, he had ordered Franklin to place himself in communication with Pope as soon as he could; assured him that supplies should go forward to Pope as fast as possible, and that the works around Alexandria were being inspected. A reply from Halleck was received, to which McClellan sent a further dispatch, that Franklin's corps would march at six o'clock in the morning; that Sumner, with about fourteen thousand infantry, but with no cavalry or artillery, and Cox, with a brigade of four regiments (two of them had arrived to-day, much fatigued), would hold themselves in readiness to march to-morrow morning. Should any of them move towards Manassas? he asked. Now there was an arrival from the front, a colonel,<sup>1</sup> who reported a strong force of Confederate infantry and cavalry near Fairfax Court House, and who brought rumors from various sources that the enemy, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, contemplated a movement on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with an eye upon Washington and Baltimore. And now came a dispatch from General Barnard, of the engineers. The line of fortifications of the Alexandria side of the Potomac was too long, unless two thousand more artillerymen were added. An old regiment should be sent to Chain Bridge, and new troops everywhere strengthened by a sprinkling of old and disciplined ones. All this was sent to Halleck, and with it McClellan's indorsement of Barnard's views; for, wrote McClellan, the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon these works.<sup>2</sup> That

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Wagner, of the Second New York Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan to Halleck, ten P. M., August 29th, McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 335.

an attack upon Washington and Baltimore was entirely within the scope of the enemy's plans McClellan soon found. That the works around Alexandria must be secured for the safety of the Federal army McClellan soon demonstrated ; for they enabled him to renew and refresh the same army that Lee was now driving into the Potomac for the work that army performed at Antietam, where it hurled the now victorious Confederates vanquished into Virginia.

That Franklin's march must be a short one was a necessary consequence of the opinions and beliefs which governed McClellan. To make but six miles in a whole day to reënforce an army is *prima facie* a treasonable purpose not to reënforce that army, said malignant critics, who were so ignorant that they found in Franklin's movements not only proof of McClellan's treachery, but a vein of treason, an artery of treason, in his friends and in his supporters. Porter was his friend. He had desired the Burnside dispatches to be shown to McClellan, and how important it was that they should be shown to McClellan we know now. But both the ignorant and the malicious were persuaded that Porter was as guilty in the field as was McClellan at Alexandria. Indeed, Pope in that letter to General Grant, objecting to Porter's request for a rehearing, urges that Porter's suggestion to Burnside to show his dispatches to McClellan manifests a fearful condition of sinfulness. But this was not all, nor was there a single pair of sinners only. Franklin was a traitor. Pope's army was suffering for supplies, and supplies were abundant at Alexandria. But McClellan did not dare forward them without a guard of cavalry, and there was no cavalry under McClellan to guard them. This fact Franklin communicated to Pope ; said he was told to do so by McClellan. Pope could have all the supplies he wanted

if he would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to guard the trains.<sup>1</sup> Pope received this dispatch on the 30th, and was in despair for the first time, quite. Here was a new display of treason. It might seem even possible that the condition of his own cavalry might have made him despair. It was indeed piteous. The horses were completely worn out; they were starving. From White Plains to Warrenton, from Warrenton to Bull Run, they dropped dying by the road-side. Before a rider could dismount his horse was breathing his last. When a certain cavalry brigade reported to a corps commander for duty on the morning of the 29th, most of his horses were unable to carry their riders. Although most of the troopers led their horses up for action, some of them were still able to stagger a few miles further on with their riders.<sup>2</sup>

Ignorant of the condition of McClellan's troops, indifferent to McClellan's plans to arrest impending disaster, Pope saw only treason and treachery in everything that was done under the eye or the command of McClellan. It should not have been thus; for, however suspicious Pope's supporters and sympathizers may have been, and most of them were politicians, Pope was a soldier. He at least should have judged frankly. His conscience should have taught him that men judge of the conduct of others by their own standard. If that is base, then every man has his price.

Among the records of the 29th there remains a dispatch to Banks urging him to work night and day to forward his wagons through Manassas to Centreville, and to send back working parties, that the railway

<sup>1</sup> Major-General W. B. Franklin, commanding sixth corps, to commanding officer at Centreville, eight P. M., August 29th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 243.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, colonel Ninth New York Cavalry, commanding brigade.

trains might be pushed to Bull Run.<sup>1</sup> Within sound of the battle, within sight of the clouds of smoke hanging over the field to the north, the long trains drawn by wearied animals had made their way to Kettle Run on the night of the 28th, and had there remained until the night of the 29th, when a force from Banks's corps was pushed forward to guard Bristoe Station.<sup>2</sup> When all was silent on the battle-field, General Porter was summoned from the Manassas Gainesville road. His orders, dated at ten minutes before nine p. m., from "Pope's headquarters in the field near Bull Run," were very precise and very exacting; but they were obeyed to the letter. He was directed to march his command "to the field of battle of to-day," and to report in person to Pope for orders; he was to march "immediately" upon the receipt of the order, and he was commanded to acknowledge the precise hour of receiving it; and he was to understand that he was expected to comply strictly with "this order" and to be present in the field within three hours after its reception, "or after daybreak to-morrow morning."<sup>3</sup>

Thus and in these terms did Pope display his suspicions of Porter's treasonable purposes.

<sup>1</sup> Pope to Banks, five o'clock p. m., 29th.

<sup>2</sup> Gordon's brigade.

<sup>3</sup> Pope to Porter, 8.50 p. m., August 28th, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 242, 243.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE THIRTIETH OF AUGUST.

ON the morning of the 30th of August, McDowell, with his own corps and those of Heintzelman and Fitz-John Porter, was ordered by Pope to hold his centre and left in position and throw his right against the Confederate left.

That General Pope, in this movement, was hopeless of success, though determined to strike for it, he officially informed the country many days after the battle as a fact well known to and as a resolution firmly taken by himself on the morning of the day of that battle. He knew, he says, that the Federal army was "exhausted by continuous marching and fighting for many days; that for two days the soldiers had been without food; that the artillery and cavalry horses, constantly in harness and under saddle, had been for two days without forage," and that there was no hope either for supplies or for reinforcements from Alexandria;<sup>1</sup> but that despite such adverse circumstances, and though nearly hopeless of any successful issue to his operations, he determined "to give battle to the enemy, and at least lay on such blows as would cripple him as much

<sup>1</sup> Pope's dispatches to the commander-in-chief, begging for supplies and reinforcements, had resulted in a note from General Franklin, sent by order of McClellan and received on the morning of the 30th, that cars and wagons laden with supplies awaited at Alexandria such cavalry escort as Pope might choose to furnish. (Pope's Official Report.)

as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance towards the capital."<sup>1</sup>

The attack which Pope had ordered McDowell to make would seem, therefore, to have involved a hopeless struggle, born of the heroic resolution to suffer heroic sacrifices. But events which we are now about to relate suddenly changed the whole aspect of affairs, and brought to the mind of the whilom despairing Pope a conviction that the Confederates were retreating before him, and that his forward movement was to be a pursuit instead of an assault.<sup>2</sup>

How this came about will appear, if we follow the advancing Federal column as it pushed warily forward from the main line towards the right, in a reconnaissance which resulted in the discovery, as McDowell believed and reported, that the whole Confederate army was in flight.

It was well known that the Confederates had occupied, on the 29th, a few detached posts to the north of Bull Run and to the eastward of the Sudley Springs road, that is, within the intersection of that road with the Warrenton Centreville turnpike. To the amazement of McDowell, and of Heintzelman who accompanied him, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn from these positions. The reconnaissance was pushed still further, even to the Sudley Springs road and a trifle west, south of the springs. Here no evidences of the enemy in force were seen, though skirmishers and detached posts of rear guards were found. McDowell and Heintzelman, now convinced that the Confederates were retreating,<sup>3</sup> turned towards Pope's headquarters to report their conclusions. On the way

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> And this change in Pope's belief as a motive for his action he does not allude to in his report.

<sup>3</sup> Official Reports of McDowell and Heintzelman.

they met Sigel, who from his own observations agreed with them. General Pope was now found in a very different state of mind from that described in his official report. On a bit of rising ground near the intersection of the main pike to Centreville with the road to Sudley Springs, he had located his headquarters. The day was bright and clear; the sunlight fell upon the hills, the valleys, and the woods with unusual splendor. Surrounded by many general officers, a brilliant staff, and a small army of orderlies, the Federal commander was in uncommon spirits; his conversation was animated; he was evidently overflowing with good humor. An eager movement of staff officers, some going and some returning, betokened a general movement of the Federal army; but it was to be the movement of a conqueror in pursuit of his foe. For while once again McDowell was misinterpreting the plans and purposes of the enemy, word had been sent from the front by other officers, on other portions of the Federal line, that the enemy was moving back on the main road to Gainesville, that he was retreating.<sup>1</sup> The report of McDowell, confirming reports from the front, carried to the mind of Pope a conviction that his furious battle of the 29th, as he called it, had terminated in victory; and he dispatched to his chief tidings that once more thrilled the North with a brief hour of joy.

At twelve o'clock at noon Pope issued his final orders for a pursuit of the retreating Confederates.

The right of the advance was intrusted to Heintzelman, who (strengthened by Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps) was ordered to move on the enemy along the road leading from Sudley Springs to Haymarket. Upon Porter (who was to be strengthened by King's and Reynolds's divisions of McDowell's corps)

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of McDowell and Heintzelman.

devolved the command along the Warrenton pike. The general direction of the movement was intrusted to McDowell.<sup>1</sup>

The line occupied by the Federal army at nine o'clock was in front of the unfinished railway and the hamlet of Groveton.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The orders to McDowell, and McDowell's orders to General Porter, are here given: —

HEADQUARTERS NEAR GROVETON, }  
August 30, 1862, twelve o'clock M. }

Special Orders No. 1. The following forces will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit. Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Generals King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman. The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL POPE.

G. D. RUGGLES,  
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, }  
August 30, 1862. }

Major-General McDowell, being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds. Heintzelman, with his corps, preceded by Ricketts's division, will move on your right on the road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the head of General Reynolds's division on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade of cavalry will be ordered to report to you. Push at once to the left as you advance. Very respectfully your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

To MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER, commanding corps.

<sup>2</sup> This does not apply to Banks's corps, which was still protecting the sick, the wounded, and all the stores of Pope's army in its slow passage along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railway towards Manassas.



The right was still held by Heintzelman, with the divisions of Generals Kearny and Ricketts; next came General Reno's divisions of Burnside's corps; then King's division of McDowell's, commanded by General Hatch; then the whole of Porter's corps (under the division commanders Morell and Sykes), with his left resting on the Warrenton Centreville pike about half a mile to the east of Groveton.<sup>1</sup> Reynolds's division was on the extreme left, south of the Centreville pike. The whole of Sigel's corps was in rear of Dogan's farm, opposite the centre of the Federal line.

The Confederate army, upon which Pope was about to move as upon a body of demoralized fugitives, was well in hand on the same vantage ground held by it on the preceding day. At early dawn it was under arms. General Jackson had placed his troops in two lines, — the first covered by the cuts and embankments of the railroad, and the second on the wooded heights above Groveton. The ground occupied and the relative positions of Jackson's divisions to each other and to the field were the same that his command had held on the preceding day. This was the left wing of Lee's army; Longstreet's command, stretching away obliquely towards the Manassas Gap railway, formed the right wing. Between the wings rose a commanding ridge over a quarter of a mile in length, which generally overlooked the ground in front for some two thousand yards, and exposed open fields varied with hills and valleys, cut up into farms, and divided by fences which inclosed corn-fields and orchards. The ridge was lit-

<sup>1</sup> On the 30th the Federal line had been strengthened by the arrival at nine A. M. of the whole of General Fitz-John Porter's corps, which had marched, as ordered, on the Sudley Springs road from near Bethlehem Church to the Warrenton Centreville pike, where it had turned to the left and followed the route pursued by King's division in its abortive attempt to pursue the enemy the night before.

erally covered with Confederate batteries. On the left, General S. D. Lee, commanding a battalion of light artillery, planted four batteries. On Lee's left, Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery of Jackson's corps, established eight batteries, numbering in all eighteen guns.<sup>1</sup> Longstreet's infantry was posted to the right of the central ridge. First came Featherstone's brigade, near a fence about half a mile west of the road from Sudley Springs to Groveton, with his left in contact with the extreme right of Jackson's corps at the railroad embankment. Pryor's brigade was on his right, at right angles to the turnpike and in rear of a fence in the woods. Wilcox was in the woods to the rear of the centre of the line of the other two brigades. Hood's division had come up at twelve o'clock of the preceding night to retake its position on Jackson's right, and prolong the Confederate line. Law's brigade<sup>2</sup> was drawn up in an open field to the left of the Centreville turnpike in front of Pryor. On the right of the road, in the woods, was Hood's old brigade of Texans.<sup>3</sup> The troops immediately on the right of the turnpike had been placed under the command of General Evans of South Carolina. In addition to his own brigade, Evans found himself in charge of the brigades commanded by General George E. Pickett of Virginia,<sup>4</sup> and those of Hood and Law. Evans placed the left of his own brigade<sup>5</sup> on the turnpike, and Hood's brigade on his right. Kemper prolonged the line first with his own brigade

<sup>1</sup> Commanded by Captains Johnson, D'Aquin, Rice, Wooding, Poague, Carpenter, Brockenbrogh, and Latimer.

<sup>2</sup> Hood's division.

<sup>3</sup> From Whiting's old division. See Official Report of General N. G. Evans.

<sup>4</sup> Commanded by Colonel Eppa Hunt, and ordered before the action commenced to the support of General Kemper, who was formed on Evans's right.

<sup>5</sup> Commanded by Colonel P. F. Stevens.

on Hood's right, then with Pickett's, and lastly with Jenkins's, whose right was in contact with the division of D. R. Jones, who, thrown more forward and to the right than on the preceding day, formed the right of Longstreet's line with the brigades of Toombs, Anderson, and Drayton.<sup>1</sup>

Besides Robertson's brigade, the Fifth Virginia Cavalry on the morning of the 30th was placed on the extreme right of the Confederate lines. This regiment,<sup>2</sup> thrown out in the direction of Bristoe Station, was supported by two batteries<sup>3</sup> under the direction of Colonel Rosser.<sup>4</sup> The whole was under the immediate command of General Stuart.

On the extreme left, near Sudley Ford, a small force of cavalry<sup>5</sup> was supported by five guns of Cutshaw's battery. To the rear of the Confederate infantry, on the left, the batteries of Braxton, Pegram, Latham, Davidson, and McIntosh opened at intervals, whenever any demonstration was made by the Federal infantry or artillery.<sup>6</sup> In front of, and about thirteen hundred yards from, Jackson's extreme right there was a strip of timber, behind which the ground fell off perceptibly and covered the movements of the Federal infantry in Porter's corps. Between this timber and Jackson's position the field was open. From the old railroad excavation and embankment in and behind which, at this point, Jackson's columns were massed, the ground was level and so continued for one hundred and fifty yards, when it rose sharply for a short distance.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The last on the extreme right.

<sup>2</sup> Under command of Major Douglas.

<sup>3</sup> Stribbling's and Rodgers's.

<sup>4</sup> Fifth Virginia Cavalry.

<sup>5</sup> Under Major Patrick.

<sup>6</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, commanding artillery battalion, General Hill's division, Jackson's corps.

<sup>7</sup> This field was about five hundred yards in width. (Official Reports,

The preliminary movements of the Federal troops in reconnoitring the enemy, and in taking positions for a more effective pursuit, had been closely observed both by General Lee and by many of his officers.

General Stuart thought he could forecast Pope's purposes. In a reconnaissance from the right he had advanced under cover of a company of mounted sharpshooters to a tall walnut tree, from whose top he had discovered that Pope had materially retired his left wing from the position held by it on the evening of the 29th, and that he was massing his troops in three lines in front of General Jackson's command.

On the left of Lee's battle-line General Early's opinions of a hostile movement were derived from actual contact with the enemy.

The men of Ewell's division were in line along the old railroad cut, where they had remained since the fight ceased on the preceding night. As the day dawned the wearied soldiers looked out over the corn-field towards the woods, just visible in the morning glow, to speculate upon the movements of their foe. And they were not long in doubt, for the Federal sharpshooters had crept unobserved along the railroad cut until they had uncovered the left flank of Early's brigade, when, with skirmishers thrown forward, they had crossed the railroad track, and moved rapidly through the corn-field.

Before the Federal advance had acquired much momentum, one or more brigades of General A. P. Hill's division had been hurried to Early's left. Heintzelman's reconnaissance was thus checked, and the belief that the Confederates were retreating was utterly destroyed.<sup>1</sup> Bradley T. Johnson, commanding the second

Brigadier-General Cadmus Wilcox, and Colonel S. D. Lee, commanding artillery battalion, Longstreet's corps.)

<sup>1</sup> From this time forth General A. P. Hill again occupied the left, Gen-

brigade of Taliaferro's division, was posted in front of the skirmishers of Sykes's division. At the outset of the rebellion Johnson was a citizen of Maryland, and might well have refrained from open hostilities to his government, and would have done so had his intellect equaled his self-conceit; but he believed himself to be a chief whose valuable services ought not to be lost to the South, and he offered them to the State of Virginia as a commander of one of her regiments. His offer was accepted. Johnson served with General Jackson first as a colonel, and then as a brigadier-general in General Taliaferro's division. In this capacity the main forces found him, as they were advancing upon the Confederate lines. Throughout his service this officer's stilted reports of his own achievements were filled with expressions of contempt for Northern troops. There is a kind of serene impertinence, which excites so much contempt that it is hard to define one's feelings when he perceives that a conceited person derives satisfaction to himself from his own feeble denunciations of others. Johnson reports that he found himself, in the order of brigades in line of battle from the left, on the same ground that he had occupied the preceding day; that he saw the movements of Pope's army on the plain in front of the old railroad line, over the hills and vales, the forest and farms; and that he interpreted them to be the acts of an enemy "suddenly feeling along our line at long range," and making feints

eral Early the centre, and General Taliaferro, of Jackson's old division, the right. Early disposed his troops with Trimble's brigade, Captain Brown commanding, on the right, next to it Lawton's brigade, Colonel Douglas commanding, and on the left General Early's own brigade; but as there was room enough in the front line for three regiments only, the forty-fourth, forty-ninth, and fifty-second Virginia were placed in front, and in the rear — withdrawn a short distance — the third, twenty-fifth, thirty-first, and fifty-eighth Virginia. General Hays's brigade had gone to the rear for ammunition, and did not return. (Early's Official Report.)

with his infantry. But so unintelligible did the Federal movements seem to him that he officially reported of those who mercifully gave him his life at Appomattox "that it was difficult to understand whether they were whipped or not." The Federal movement in the early morning was so little like the movement of a defeated foe that Johnson disposed his troops to defend his position. He saw Porter taking possession of Groveton and the skirt of woods which, he reported, Hood had carried on the preceding evening; and he threw his forty-second Virginia into the railroad cut, and his forty-eighth into the copse which ran at right angles to it, and held his twenty-first Virginia and the Irish battalion in reserve on the hill in the woods.

There he awaited the opening thunders of the battle which occurred later in the afternoon. But something more than this was taking place on the extreme left of Jackson's front, where Generals Archer and Thomas were engaged. Skirmishing was very lively at times. General Archer thought his troops were wasting their ammunition, and he sent orders to arrest the firing, but was informed that his men could not otherwise hold their ground in the woods in front of the railroad. That such was in fact the case was apparent when Archer endeavored to withdraw and move to the support of Jackson's right, in peril from the determined stand taken by Porter's corps. For then the Federal soldiers rushed upon his pickets, drove them in, and attacked his brigade. Archer returned the fire for fifteen minutes, then, charging across the railroad cut, claims to have driven the Federals back into the woods, to have replenished his ammunition from the cartridge boxes of "dead Yankees," and to have resumed his place in line.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General A. P. Hill, commanding this division, speaks more seriously

Pender was also ordered to march with Archer to support Jackson's right. He moved across the railroad embankment, — gaining ground to his left, — until he came to the large field bounded by the skirt of wood within which Butterfield was forming his men for the attack which followed. Not liking the aspect before him, which he thought threatening, and not pleased with a heavy fire of grape and shells which the Federal artillery poured into him, the Confederate general withdrew in safety to the railroad cut at about the point where he found himself the evening before.<sup>1</sup>

On Longstreet's front, next to Jackson's corps, General Featherstone's troops of Wilcox's division were on the edge of a field, from a half mile to a mile in width, and extending a considerable distance to their right. Before sunrise they heard the fire of opposing pickets, at times increasing in rapidity, then dying away; and they saw plainly the Federal infantry and artillery passing down the turnpike from Stone bridge, and filing to the right and left of the road. Federal wagons, too, moving in the direction of Bull Run, and clouds of dust beyond, were seen. The fire of skirmishers and the roar of artillery, with but little intermission, continued most of the day. At one period the Confederate troops suffered from a heavy fire of artillery delivered from the skirt of woods on the opposite side of the field which held Porter's corps. This fire was, however, returned by two Confederate batteries from a hill near the centre of Featherstone's brigade.

of this matter, thus: "About two o'clock the enemy again made an attack along our whole line. The attack on my part of the line was gallantly resisted by Generals Archer and Thomas, Gregg still holding the extreme left. This onset was so fierce and in such force that at first some headway was made, but throwing in Pender and Brockenbrough their advance was again checked and eventually repulsed." (Official Report, A. P. Hill.)

<sup>1</sup> Pender's Official Report.

From the ridge on which the Confederate artillery was stationed, in the centre of their line of battle west of Groveton, a constant fire was maintained from long-range guns, whenever the Federal infantry showed itself. In one instance, about seven o'clock in the morning, an infantry regiment within Pope's lines was seen about two thousand yards distant, and fired upon until it moved away. About twelve at noon there was a spirited movement of skirmishers from Porter's corps, which drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and resulted in the Federal occupation of an orchard in front of the artillery battalion commanded by S. D. Lee of the light artillery. When this movement of the Federal troops brought them within reach of Lee's howitzers, a hot fire of spherical case stopped the Federal advance, and enabled the Confederate skirmishers to resume their position; but the masses of Federal troops behind the timber, which bounded the open field to the east, still went on, and this was supposed to be the beginning of a movement to turn the Confederate flank.<sup>1</sup>

That the movements of the Federal army were misunderstood by General Lee is manifest from the construction placed upon them by his generals, who reported what they saw, and by Southern historians, who have recorded the opinions and beliefs entertained in the Confederate army. McDowell's armed reconnaissance to discover whether Lee was in retreat, the movements of Porter and of Reynolds, who were taking the most advantageous positions for a pursuit, were interpreted as feints to induce an attack, or as made in the execution of a well-considered plan of giving battle.

Confident in their strength, behind the old railway cut and embankment, and upon the high ground of

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report of S. D. Lee, commanding battalion of light artillery.



Groveton heights, from which an uninterrupted communication could be held with the rear, the Southern troops are reported to have watched across the wide fields and through the forests the marchings and counter-marchings, the evolutions and advances, of the Federal army with little anxiety. Indeed, until the very moment when the roar of thirty pieces of artillery shook the ground and filled the air with reverberation, the great body of the Confederate army was lying down upon the ground, some in sleep, and others breaking out in loud laughter at the jests or jeers of their comrades.<sup>1</sup>

It was Pope's intention to make Reynolds's division the pivot of the attack on the enemy's right. For this purpose, Reynolds, who was near the Henry house hill, opened with his rifled batteries, and threw forward his skirmishers to drive the enemy from the first ridge in his front. The Union skirmishers advanced to the thick woods opposite Groveton without meeting serious opposition; but here such resistance was found that Reynolds was compelled to deploy two more regiments to support his first, and to throw a fourth regiment into and through the woods to protect the flank of the advancing line. All along the front and on his left thick woods veiled the enemy's real strength. Though Reynolds could not see, he strongly suspected that the Confederates were moving in force to turn his line; and he pushed forward on his left through the woods until he came to the open ground beyond. He advanced until he found Confederate skirmishers, nearly parallel to his own, covering his left flank. Behind the enemy's front were cavalry. The lines were stationary. There they remained, silent, immovable. In a moment a conviction flashed through Reynolds's mind that this force was

<sup>1</sup> Life of Jackson, by Cooke, pages 295-302.

only a mask to cover an attacking column, when he had advanced sufficiently to make his destruction sure. Hardly had the enemy been discovered when he opened fire. Reynolds himself, untouched, ran the gauntlet, and gained the rear of his division, with the loss of a daring orderly who had followed his perilous movement. Perceiving in an instant that the Confederates were not falling back, but were advancing, and even then were passing troops to the south of the Warrenton turnpike, where they were massing them to turn the Federal left, Reynolds hastened at a gallop to McDowell, revealed what he had seen, and commented emphatically upon the grave blunder that had been committed in the assumption of the enemy's flight.

With a strong suspicion that his report to Pope might have been a mistake, McDowell gave hasty orders to Reynolds to take his division to a strong position on the Henry house hill.<sup>1</sup>

General Pope had witnessed Reynolds's discomfiture, with some doubt, perhaps, whether the retreating Confederates were not showing more vigorous resistance than was consistent with demoralization, and had sent a division of Sigel's corps, commanded by General Schenck, to the Bald hill to assist him. At the same time McDowell dispatched a hasty note to Porter, directing him to use his discretion as to the employment of King's division in the proposed combined pursuit of the enemy, and informing him that he had been compelled to take Reynolds's division to guard the left of Pope's line; also, that he was obliged to go to the left in person to see about matters there; and adding that

<sup>1</sup> Which he ultimately obeyed. This hill is in the southeast angle formed by the intersection of the Sudley Springs road with the Warrenton Centreville turnpike. It overlooks both roads and the country to the front as far as the crest of a hill, called the Bald hill or ridge, opposite Groveton. Beyond, the woods shut out the view.

Pope would send Sigel's corps to him if he needed more force.<sup>1</sup>

Nor was this the only change made by Pope at this time in the disposition of his command. A portion of General Ricketts's division was withdrawn from Heintzelman's corps on the right, and thus two brigades and two batteries of artillery, under the command of General Tower, were dispatched to the left of Pope's line and established on the Henry house hill.

While the troops of Reynolds and Schenck were taking position on the Bald hill, Reynolds and McDowell advanced in person to where the main woods stretched out to the west beyond the ridge, to see in plain view the Confederates on the heights, and Porter, with his splendid corps of regulars and volunteers, all veterans, moving in a fearless and magnificent but hopeless sweep against the solid columns of Jackson's infantry, concealed behind the railroad embankment, and against the more than half a hundred guns on the hill behind the hamlet of Groveton. From this outlook McDowell and Reynolds, Warren, Schenck, Seymour, and Tower, before the heavy thunder rolled over *them*, saw Porter's men struggle in vain with overwhelming odds, — saw them borne back, ghastly, bleeding, defiant, but hopeless of success.

To describe the movements which caused this sad reverse, it will be necessary to turn back to the hour when Porter first moved to the front. His time had not been wasted. Doubts which filled the minds of Pope and McDowell with apprehension were unquestionably shared by Porter, who, under instructions

<sup>1</sup> "The enemy having shown indications of advancing by the right, Reynolds has been withdrawn from your column and put over on our left. It is still thought you will be strong enough to effect your purpose with King; if not, Pope will send you Sigel." (McDowell to General Porter.)

which we have already given, had formed his divisions with Colonel Robert C. Buchanan of the Fourth United States Infantry, commanding the first brigade of Sykes's division, on the extreme left of the corps and in front of the Dogan farm-house.<sup>1</sup>

A skirmish line comprising the whole of the third infantry was thrown into a wood, about one thousand yards to the right front; the first and second battalions of the fourteenth infantry were deployed in the field; while the first battalion of the twelfth and the fourth regiment of infantry in columns, with their left resting on the Warrenton turnpike, covered the deployed line. The second brigade of Sykes's division was formed in columns as a reserve to the first. Like the first, this brigade was composed of regulars, and commanded by an officer of the regular army.<sup>2</sup> It was made up of the second, tenth, sixth, eleventh, and seventeenth regiments of infantry. The third brigade, commanded by Colonel Warren, formed the reserve.

To the right of Sykes's division and in advance of it two brigades of Morell's division<sup>3</sup> had moved up to the roads in their front, and were forming to attack the enemy.

In front of Sykes was the hamlet of Groveton, and behind it, on a hilly crest, the Confederates had posted numerous and formidable batteries, with a clear sweep across an open plain to a forest, which not only covered the Federal front, but masked the movements of the

<sup>1</sup> This brigade was composed of the third and fourth regiments, the first battalion of the twelfth, and the first and second battalions of the fourteenth regiment of infantry. There was no better material or more highly disciplined command or commander in the service.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Chapman of the third infantry.

<sup>3</sup> The third brigade (General Butterfield's) was commanded first by Colonel Lansing, and then by Colonel Weeks; and the first (General Barnes's) by Colonel Roberts. General Morell was absent. General Butterfield had assumed command of his division.

Confederates. On Sykes's left, south of the Warrenton turnpike, still another forest covered the country and concealed the movements of Lee's right wing. Near the most advanced position taken by General Sykes the forests were half a mile apart.

When Porter's corps first took its position in front of the Dogan house, and until three P. M., there was a sharp cannonade and some practice among the skirmishers. The enemy's light troops were forced back into the woods to the left of the Warrenton pike, while some houses and fences that had previously been occupied by him were held by the third Federal infantry. But no masses of the enemy's infantry nor of his cavalry were seen; nothing but the muzzles of his cannon over the crest of the hill which has been described. Porter was ignorant both of the enemy's strength and of his designs. At four o'clock in the afternoon Sykes was directed to support an attack to be made by Butterfield, with Morell's division. Porter's corps was to form the pivot in a grand rush upon the supposed retreating Confederates,<sup>1</sup> who were to be hurried up in a retrograde movement. It was while Butterfield was making his dispositions to assault, that General Reynolds withdrew his troops from his first position, and moved them further to his left, to oppose a threatened advance of the enemy. Thus not only was the whole of Porter's corps left uncovered, but one of his rifled batteries, moving into the position from which one of Reynolds's had been taken, was left without support.<sup>2</sup>

General Warren,<sup>3</sup> from his position in rear of Dogan's

<sup>1</sup> See Sykes's Official Report, in which he says that the retreat of the enemy was announced by Pope in general orders.

<sup>2</sup> Hazlett's battery.

<sup>3</sup> An officer of the United States Engineer Corps, then colonel of the Fifth New York Infantry, and commanding the third brigade of Sykes's division.

farm, saw at a glance that Reynolds's division should be replaced; and he assumed the responsibility of moving his own brigade to the place just vacated, to make with his small command all the show he could. This position gained, Warren saw Butterfield emerging from the wood, and moving his division forward up the hill to the assault in a manner which elicited most enthusiastic praise from all who witnessed his brave men engaged in their hopeless struggle. As Butterfield advanced, the whole side of the hill and the edges of the woods swarmed with an enemy hitherto unseen.<sup>1</sup> Before Butterfield's determined onset the Confederates gave way, only, however, to fall back behind the crest of the embankments of the railroad cut. Here and behind the heavy fringes of timber to the rear there was found a vantage-ground, which it would have been madness to neglect; and it was not disregarded. There the Confederates retired, and Butterfield followed to the brow of the hill in front of a formidable Confederate line. Here, halting, he opened upon the enemy. The Confederates returned the fire with vigor. From the resistance in front alone it would have been impossible to make headway. Nothing but a movement to the right or left, which should turn the enemy's flank, could drive him from his intrenched position. Not only was there no supporting movement ordered by Pope, but an assault by the Confederates on the flank of Butterfield's troops soon put an end to a struggle which was hopeless enough from the first, even without this new Confederate movement. An enfilading fire of spherical case was opened from a battery which came rapidly into position south of the Warrenton turnpike, while the Federal troops were barely holding their own against

<sup>1</sup> "The effect," says Warren, "was not unlike flushing a covey of quails."

the muskets in their front. It now became evident to all who saw this unequal contest that Butterfield must be sustained. The only assistance received was from two of Porter's batteries,<sup>1</sup> which Warren was supporting, and which could accomplish nothing against the enemy. Butterfield fell back, and the enemy followed. Now came Warren's opportunity. His whole command consisted of two batteries of artillery<sup>2</sup> and two regiments of infantry; the fifth and the tenth New York, numbering only one thousand men.<sup>3</sup> The forward movement of the Confederates gave Hazlett a chance. He opened with vigor, and not only checked the enemy's infantry, but compelled one column that advanced beyond the woods to retire to its shelter. So vital did it seem to Warren to continue his fire and to protect the flanks of the retiring Federals, that he felt obliged to hold his advanced position with a force so diminutive in numbers that the position was an extremely perilous one. Well knowing that he could not retreat in the face of a superior force, but hoping that fresh troops would be thrown forward to meet the masses of Confederates that he now saw advancing towards him through the open fields, Warren, with a daring intrepidity, stood fast where he was. The enemy moved as if with the view of capturing Hazlett's battery and ending this serious annoyance. The tenth New York was compelled to fall back; but so rapid was the advance of the enemy that it reached the position of the fifth scarcely in advance of the enemy. Nor was this the worst of it. The tenth arrived in such manner that it masked the fire of the fifth. In-

<sup>1</sup> Hazlett's and Weed's.

<sup>2</sup> United States batteries, commanded by Captains Weed and Hazlett, United States Army.

<sup>3</sup> Fifth New York, 490 men; tenth New York, 510.

deed, had it otherwise happened, the advance of the enemy would have been unbroken. Against his superior numbers, which embraced the whole of Longstreet's corps, there was but little to oppose. On the left, where Reynolds should have remained, his troops had been ordered by McDowell — as soon as he saw Porter's repulse — to withdraw, and form across the field to the rear of Porter's corps, as a line behind which his troops might be rallied. It was a fatal blunder. There were troops enough behind Porter, even of his own, who had not taken part in Butterfield's assault, to arrest any panic among Butterfield's men. There was the whole of Sykes's splendid division of regulars, holding the ground until they wheeled into columns and marched to the rear, as if under orders on parade. There was the half, at least, of Sigel's corps, and there were Reno's and Ricketts's divisions coming up. But the atmosphere was full of madness that day; and so, until it was too late, no proper precautions were taken to foil the Confederates in an attempt to flank the Federal line at the only point where they put forth their most energetic efforts and achieved their grandest success.

But Pope was convinced that the enemy was in retreat. When Reynolds received the order to form in Porter's rear, he hastened to execute it. Those splendid brigades of Meade's and Seymour's had hardly uncovered their front when the storm which had struck Warren fell furiously upon the rear brigade of Reynolds's division<sup>1</sup> and three batteries of artillery that accompanied it. This portion of Reynolds's command was obliged to form in confusion on the ground on which they found themselves. The effect of this Confederate assault upon the Federal line held by War-

<sup>1</sup> Commanded by Colonel Anderson.



ren and Anderson was most disastrous. One battery of four guns was captured entire, and its commander<sup>1</sup> left wounded on the field. Anderson's brigade, with a heavy loss of field, line officers, and privates, was pushed from position to position, vainly struggling to resist the impetuous onset of the enemy. While Warren attempted to clear the front of his fifth New York, the enemy opened fire upon him from a wood which he had gained on his left flank and rear. It was a fearful fire, and fearful were its consequences. Colonel Warren immediately ordered his command to face to the rear, with a view of moving to a position where he could place the enemy in his front; but in the roar of musketry his orders were unheard. A captain<sup>2</sup> — near his commander — heard and repeated the order; but it was only partially obeyed, and the captain was wounded while trying to execute it. The adjutant<sup>3</sup> was sent along the line to communicate with the company commanders, but he was killed on his mission. Two captains<sup>4</sup> down with wounds; four lieutenants<sup>5</sup> disabled; both color-bearers shot down; all but four of the sergeants killed or wounded; two hundred and ninety-eight men of the fifth New York, and one hundred and thirty-three men and five officers<sup>6</sup> of the tenth New York, killed or wounded, were casualties which befell this command before it could be extricated. Well did these brave men deserve the praise for brave deeds which their commander bestowed. But, while assenting to Colonel Warren's conclusion that they did all they could, we ought not to withhold our censure that a false disposition, made in complete ignorance of the

<sup>1</sup> Captain Kernes.

<sup>2</sup> Boyd.

<sup>3</sup> Sovereign.

<sup>4</sup> McConnel and Montgomery.

<sup>5</sup> Raymond, Hoffman, Keyser, and Wright.

<sup>6</sup> Lieutenant Hadden, Captain Dimmick, Lieutenants Deneyeck, Norcross, and Cothran.

plans, purposes, and numbers of the enemy, caused this unnecessary sacrifice.<sup>1</sup>

In the midst of this confusion, General Reynolds had made his way towards the Warrenton pike — with by far the best part of his command — to a place of much greater disorder. With Ransom's battery and the brigades of Meade and Seymour, he was trying to push onward to a position behind Butterfield's troops, when he found himself inextricably mingled with Heintzelman's corps formed in line, and with retreating masses and broken columns of the repulsed Federal troops. The enemy took advantage of this turmoil to sweep up so near the pike that Reynolds's communication with the remainder of Pope's army on the right was in peril. It was a position in which the troops were useless, and so by Pope's order they were sent to the right of the Henry house.<sup>2</sup>

Turn now to the fortunes that followed the detail from General Sigel's corps, which Pope ordered to the south of the Warrenton turnpike to sustain General Reynolds. This command, consisting of a battery of four pieces and a brigade of Schenck's division under Colonel N. C. McLean,<sup>3</sup> was ordered by Sigel to occupy Bald hill, when, but little after four o'clock, Porter's troops were seen retiring in the direction of the place occupied by Schurz. Hardly had McLean gained a position with his left touching Reynolds's right, when he saw Reynolds withdraw his troops, march them deliberately across his front, and disappear, leaving not only a gap in front of the most powerful columns of the

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report of G. K. Warren, colonel fifth New York volunteers, commanding third brigade, Sykes's division, Porter's (fifth) army corps.

<sup>2</sup> Reynolds's Report.

<sup>3</sup> Made up of the fifty-fifth, twenty-fifth, seventy-third, and seventy-fifth Ohio.

enemy, but his own left so much exposed that he was obliged to face his line to the west, and establish his battery in the centre.<sup>1</sup>

The attack upon Warren followed closely upon the withdrawal of Reynolds, and was resisted not only by Warren himself as described, but by Colonel McLean with his artillery, first with shells, then with canister, and at the last with infantry, with such effect that the enemy was compelled hastily to retreat.<sup>2</sup>

But suddenly new forces appeared on the right and rear of this afflicted command. Were they friends? Some one who professed to know assured McLean that the troops were Federals; and he believed it, for their clothing was dark, and the position toward which they were moving was the one that reënforcements ought to take, to occupy the place on his left vacated by Reynolds. But soon this doubtful force was increased by a large body of the enemy, which marched out of the woods opposite the Federal left, swept around to its rear, and opened fire upon the Federal troops with both artillery and infantry, and with such vigor that all further doubts were dispelled. Against this united body McLean struggled in vain. He ordered his command to retreat.<sup>3</sup>

McLean's fight had drawn other troops of Sigel's corps into the mêlée. The division commanded by Gen-

<sup>1</sup> This movement, the one ordered by McDowell to the rear of Porter's corps, was a surprise to McLean.

<sup>2</sup> "I could by this time see the enemy advancing on my front and a little to the right, driving before them a regiment of Zouaves. They came on rapidly, when some troops advanced to meet them from behind a hill on my right. These troops were also driven back in confusion, and when they got out of the way I opened upon them with the four pieces of artillery." (Official Report of N. C. McLean, commanding second brigade of first division of Sigel's corps.)

<sup>3</sup> McLean's Official Report. See Official Reports, Colonel J. C. Lee, commanding fifty-fifth Ohio; Colonel Orlando Smith, of the seventy-third Ohio.

eral Schurz had been early in the morning strengthened by a brigade of infantry under Colonel Koltes,<sup>1</sup> and ordered to a position behind Schenck's division on the open ground, not far from Dogan's farm-house, and fronting towards Groveton.<sup>2</sup> Until three o'clock P. M. these troops remained quietly resting on their arms. For several hours thick clouds of dust had indicated a movement of heavy forces of the enemy from the front towards the left of the Federal line. In front of Schurz's right centre, and right, in the woods, was the corps of Fitz-John Porter, while on the heights before his centre and left was Reynolds, as we have described. When at three o'clock P. M. the fire commenced in the woods where Porter was, and on the hill to the left where Reynolds had gone, Sigel ordered Schenck forward towards Dogan's farm, and warned Schurz to be ready at a moment's notice. At four o'clock P. M. the notice came, and Schurz moved his division forward nearer to Dogan's farm and immediately in rear of Stahl's brigade.<sup>3</sup> On his right was Schimmelfening, on his left was Koltes, and behind the interval was Krzyzanowski. Each brigade had formed in a column of regimental divisions right in front. Dilger's battery, following the right, was on the crest of the hill, not far from Schurz's infantry. The troops of Sigel's corps, formed in dense masses upon the open ground behind Dogan's farm, suffered great annoyance from the shot and shell incident to the severe artillery fire delivered at this hour by the enemy.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Composed of the sixty-eighth and twenty-ninth New York and the seventy-third Pennsylvania regiments of infantry, and Colonel Dilger's battery.

<sup>2</sup> It was about six or seven hundred yards to the rear and left of the woods General Schurz had occupied the preceding night.

<sup>3</sup> Schenck's division.

<sup>4</sup> If, wrote Schurz, our corps was really intended to be a general re-

The general Confederate advance had involved that portion of Stahl's brigade which had been sent forward to support the retiring troops of Porter's corps at about the time they began to press through the intervals of Schurz's division, to form again in his rear.

Up to one o'clock P. M. this brigade was in its camp, about four hundred paces behind Dogan's farm. At this hour Sigel ordered it forward to the top of the hill, where two batteries were already stationed. Stahl established his troops on the right and left of Dogan's house, and posted a battery.<sup>1</sup> From here the beginning of the battle was seen breaking out near Groveton, and to its left. The troops of McLean's and Warren's brigades were perceived, as they fell back before the advance of the Confederates, who swept from hill to hill, until they reached the road that leads from New Market to the stone house. Some faint resistance was interposed, first by Stahl's forty-first regiment, which was borne back by the enemy on the left of the pike, and then by Koltes's brigade of Schurz's division, which Sigel had ordered forward to the left to reënforce Reynolds.

In a few minutes General Schurz sent Colonel Krzyzanowski, with his brigade, up the wooded slopes on his left, to prevent Koltes, who was hard pressed, from being turned on that side. Soon both of these brigades found themselves severely handled in front, and turned by their left and rear. They were outnumbered by

serve, its position was too far advanced, for it found itself from the beginning within range of the enemy's artillery; and it was evident that if the corps in front met with any repulse, we would be entangled in the fight, one brigade after another, thus losing our liberty of action and the possibility of throwing our whole force upon the decisive point. (Schurz's Official Report.)

<sup>1</sup> Adjoining the farm was the forty-fifth, to the right of it the twenty-seventh, on its right the eighth, while the forty-first was posted on the left of the wood.

the enemy, and they were exposed to a galling fire of artillery. Near the border of a wood to the southwest, suddenly two sections of artillery opened upon the left flank of Koltes's brigade, and caused some confusion by the accuracy of their fire. Colonel Koltes ordered his men to "take that rebel battery." Inspired by the bravery of their commander, whose impulsive gestures moved them to instant action, the men rushed towards the enemy's cannon. But few went far enough to be captured. Among these, however, were some of the men and an officer of the seventy-third Pennsylvania.<sup>1</sup> The brave Colonel Koltes<sup>2</sup> lost his life while waving his sword to encourage his men. A fragment of shell killed him and the horse that bore him. The Federal troops at this point were soon driven from the field. The enemy in immense numbers pressed forward through the woods in splendid order and with desperate daring. The men of Colonel Koltes's brigade saw to their left an abandoned Federal battery,<sup>3</sup> and they made an effort to bring it off, but, pressed too hard in front and in flank, they abandoned the guns. Beside, the ground on which they stood was most unfavorable. It was a clearing in the woods of scarcely more than two acres, with a deep ravine in their rear. On a rude litter of muskets the soldiers bore with them the body of their late commander, as they fell back to the second line, which Pope was now striving to hold against Lee.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Kennedy.

<sup>2</sup> This term is applied to him by all who reported officially the doings of his command on this day.

<sup>3</sup> Kernes's four guns and Cooper's caissons of Anderson's brigade, Reynolds's division.

<sup>4</sup> "When it had become evident that we on that spot were fighting alone and unsupported against immensely superior numbers, you [Sigel] ordered me to withdraw my division, and to take a position facing towards the left and front on the next range of hills behind the stone house, which was the

In the order of events as they transpired on this day, we now turn to the two brigades of Ricketts's division commanded by General Tower,<sup>1</sup> and the two batteries of Hall and Leppien that accompanied them. With a belief that this force might stem the flood of Confederates that had surged over or dashed back the forces of Reynolds, Schenck, Schurz, and Warren, McDowell went rapidly back to the Henry house hill,<sup>2</sup> and, with the approval of Pope, whom he met there, dispatched General Tower, with his infantry and batteries, to the Bald hill ridge on the right of Schenck's division of Sigel's corps. We have seen through what causes Schenck's division and Schurz's brigades and Warren's troops were driven from the ridge, and it now only remains to tell that Tower put forth his efforts in vain. Little by little, he too was compelled to fall back, despite heroic efforts to hold his ground, in which, severely wounded in the knee, he was borne bleeding from the field. Among the regiments engaged under Tower was the twelfth Massachusetts, led onward in this fight by its colonel, Fletcher Webster, who here received a mortal wound from which he died upon the field. Colonel Webster was conspicuous for his bravery, and considerate for the honor of his regiment and the welfare of his men. The survivors of the twelfth remember him with pride and with tenderness.<sup>3</sup>

The disasters surrounding the Bald hill ridge, all of which were witnessed by McDowell, induced this officer

natural second position on the battle-field. Regiments of Koltes and Krzyzanowski came out of fight in very shattered condition; losses were enormous." (Official Report, General Schurz.)

<sup>1</sup> Tower's and Hartsuff's.

<sup>2</sup> Where, it will be remembered, this command had been stationed when first withdrawn to the south side of the Warrenton turnpike.

<sup>3</sup> Among other officers of note at this time killed and disabled may be mentioned General Schenck, wounded in the arm, and Captain Fessenden, aid to General Tower, who was mortally hurt.

to take instant measures to hold the Henry house hill in its rear. How and by what troops its slopes were defended belongs to the history of this action; but, before entering upon this, the last scene of the conflict, we should tell of the part taken in the first hours of the fight by the troops on Porter's right, as well as describe the Confederate movement which gave the enemy possession of the ridge on Bald hill.

"You must use your discretion," wrote McDowell to Porter, "in reference to the employment of King's division in connection with the service you are to perform." This advice to Porter was given when McDowell began to perceive that the Confederates were turning towards, not fleeing from, Pope. Porter used his discretion by sending King's division to assault the Confederates on his right, when he advanced with his own corps. General J. P. Hatch, as the ranking brigadier-general, had, as we have seen, fallen heir to the command of General King's division, when, on the night of the 29th, he led it in the wild effort we have described.

On the afternoon of the 30th when King's division was placed under Porter's orders, General Hatch, the commander, reported for instructions. In rear of a forest, about half a mile to the right of where this division was engaged the preceding night, Hatch received from Porter directions to put his command on Porter's right, and to make the attack simultaneously with himself.

General Hatch drew up his division in seven lines, with an interval of fifty yards between the lines. The first and second were formed of troops of Hatch's own brigade, the third and fourth of Patrick's, the fifth and sixth of Gibbon's, and in the seventh was Doubleday. The United States sharpshooters were deployed in the



woods as skirmishers. When Porter gave the word, Hatch advanced. The Confederates were found strongly posted behind the old disused railroad embankment.<sup>1</sup> To reach them, the Federal division moved through the woods in their front, expecting to find the enemy's embankment parallel to its line of advance. But in this the troops were mistaken. It was parallel to the edge of the woods where the right wing entered, but opposite the left it bore away to the rear through the open ground. When, therefore, the open space was reached, the Federal left wing was obliged to make a partial wheel to the right to allow the men to approach the enemy. This movement was executed under a heavy fire of Confederate artillery on the Federal left, and of musketry from the woods in front. To avoid such disadvantages and consequent confusion, the rear lines were ordered to oblique more to the right as they came up. This would enable them to attack the troops with better advantage behind the railroad embankment, and perhaps to bring a flank fire to bear upon that part of the enemy's line which crossed the open field. The struggle for the embankment was begun in terrible earnest. Neither assailed nor assailants would yield.<sup>2</sup> And yet some one must give way. The failure of Porter's troops on the left, and the feeble effort on this day further to the right by the commands of Kearny and of Hooker and of all that remained to Ricketts, made it apparent to the survivors of King's division that it would be worse than folly to sacrifice more men in a doubtful effort to capture a

<sup>1</sup> Of which mention has been so often made in describing the operations of the 29th.

<sup>2</sup> "The contest for the possession of this embankment was most desperate. The troops on both sides fought with the most determined courage. I doubt not the conflict at this point was one of the most bloody of the whole war." (General J. P. Hatch, Official Report.)

line which, if taken, could not be held. General Hatch was wounded, disabled, and borne from the field. Commanders of brigades had manifested a reckless daring; their men had all been kept up to their work. But it had been all in vain. When the main attack failed, King's division retired.<sup>1</sup>

Turning now to the history of Heintzelman's movements in this action, we find that the tide of battle ebbing and flowing on Pope's left moved sullenly and feebly on the right, where Heintzelman attempted about noon to press the supposed fugitive Confederate army.

Hardly had his command made a forward step on the Sudley Springs road towards Haymarket, when the monstrous illusion under which Pope labored was dispelled. First, the Confederate skirmishers disputed the Federal advance; and although these were driven out of the woods, there was no gain, for the way was cleared for a heavy fire of Confederate artillery, which convinced Heintzelman that the enemy was still in force in his front. Content with this demonstration, the Federal commander remained inactive until after four o'clock in the afternoon, when Hooker's division advanced into the woods near the right of Heintzelman's corps, and drove the enemy back a short distance.<sup>2</sup> The official reports of brigade and regimental commanders make no claim, however, to feats of prowess during the short but bloody encounter which finally took place on the

<sup>1</sup> See Official Report, General J. P. Hatch, commanding King's division.

To the Confederates under cover of their railway defenses the attack of this division seemed to indicate a general attack along the whole line. As the fire ran from right to left a Federal column advanced against three regiments on Early's front, which was met by a severe fire from his brigade, from Trimble, and from Lawton, and it retreated, followed, as Early reported, by his regiments, while others were moved up to fill their places. See Early's Report.

<sup>2</sup> Such, at least, is the report made by Heintzelman.

Federal left. Indeed, there is little room to doubt that, with the exception of supporting a battery, the whole of Hooker's division, until seven P. M., when it marched to Centreville, passed much of its time one mile from the Federal struggle on the left, watching the combat from such elevations as fences and gun carriages afforded, with an eager interest which the steady and onward advance of the enemy could not subdue. Some there were, too, so impressed by the magnificence of the spectacle that they dwelt with enthusiasm upon the scene. The river behind their backs, the faint blue of the mountains in the west, melting into the blue of the sky over their summits, the green of the forests, and the swell of the landscape arrested the attention of those who saw the mangled bodies of their comrades upon the plain, or heard the ceaseless roll of musketry and the endless boom of cannon mingled with Confederate yells of triumph, as the Federal lines fell back before the resistless advance of the enemy on our left. Some there were, too, whose coarser natures, untouched by this savage splendor, in seeming indifference to the result, boiled their rations of beef while yet the contest was undecided on the right.<sup>1</sup> With such diversions, yet always in motion from battery to battery or from one threatened point to another, Hooker's division, drawing steadily to the left, at seven o'clock in the evening turned with the remainder of Pope's army in its retreat towards Centreville.

Nor were the services of Kearny's division of this corps on this day found worthy of mention either by its gallant commander or by his brave subordinates. This division took no part in the fighting on the morning of the 30th of August; although men were killed by an

<sup>1</sup> See *Three Years in the Army*, by Captain Blake, Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry.

enfilading fire from the enemy's batteries. About five o'clock in the afternoon there occurred what Kearny called "an unaccountable evacuation of the field by the left and centre;" and then the brigades were massed at a point indicated by Pope, after which, with Birney's brigade supported by Robinson's, this division occupied a very advanced block of woods, the key point of which rested near the Brown house, towards the creek. This line was also held by other regiments of other brigades,<sup>1</sup> who fell back when attacked, leaving Kearny there alone until ten o'clock at night, at which time, in connection with Generals Reno and Gibbon, — the latter of whom was ordered to guard the rear, — the division retired to Centreville.<sup>2</sup>

If we turn now from the Federal to the Confederate lines, and follow the battle as we have described it from the Union side, we shall find that when the first lines of Porter's corps emerged from the woods and moved forward upon the enemy they were met by a terrible fire of artillery from Confederate batteries on the heights of Groveton.

It was about thirty minutes past three in the afternoon. The Confederate General Wilcox was standing at this time between Pryor's and Featherstone's brigades, where he had an unobstructed view of Butterfield's assault. He saw the Federals emerge from the wood in line of battle into the open field, whose edge was not more than four hundred yards from where he stood; and he felt a glow of admiration at the coolness with which the Northern soldiers advanced. The Confederate pickets and skirmishers fired upon them; but they fired in vain. Onward they bent their course; up-

<sup>1</sup> Ricketts's division.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General Kearny by Birney after Kearny's death; also see Official Report of Brigadier-General John C. Robinson.

ward they rose to the plateau, until they came within full view of the double lines of infantry which formed the right of Jackson's line. Here at short range the brave men received full in their faces a "terrific fire of musketry." A moment's hesitation, a slight, a shuddering recoil, and the troops went on, even up to the embankment itself. Here they met a very carnival of death. For a moment the Federals fell back; but it was only for a moment; again they advanced, open and uncovered, to meet a close and deadly fire from a thick mass of the enemy protected by the steep cut of the railroad. This splendid charge made against Jackson's old division extorted from even the grandiloquent Johnson<sup>1</sup> an unwilling tribute of praise. He saw before him the sudden and decided development of sweeping lines of Federal soldiers, deploying in the woods in brigade front, and charging at a run, line after line, brigade after brigade,<sup>2</sup> up the hill into the thicket and towards the cut where he had stationed his troops.<sup>3</sup> Here one single Federal line was met by the whole of Taliaferro's division.<sup>4</sup> The valor shown by the Federal troops has been established by unwilling witnesses. Johnson saw a "Federal flag hold its position for half an hour within ten yards of a flag of a Confederate regiment in the cut," though during that time it fell and was raised again from six to eight times. He saw and counted after the fight one hundred dead Federal soldiers lying twenty yards from the cut,—some of them within twenty feet of it. Men fought until their ammunition was exhausted, and then continued the fight with stones.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bradley T. Johnson.

<sup>2</sup> As he supposed and officially reported.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*.

<sup>4</sup> Except the third brigade, commanded by Colonel Taliaferro.

<sup>5</sup> "Lieutenant Lewis Randolph of the battalion killed one [Northern sol-

So fierce and determined was the Federal advance that Jackson himself was alarmed. How long he could hold his men steady was doubtful. He had seen that the solid Federal lines, advancing from the wood and attacking his right, had extended that attack, and engaged his centre and left, in a fierce and sanguinary struggle. As he saw his brave men repulse one line only to meet an impetuous and resolute onset by another, General Jackson made up his mind that the Federals were determined to drive him from his position, and he felt obliged to send to Lee for reënforcements.<sup>1</sup> But before his message was received by General Longstreet there came an unexpected and for the Confederates a most favorable turn in events. When Jackson's appeal for aid reached him, Longstreet had gone to the front to complete his arrangements for a flank attack, which Lee perceived could be made with advantage.

From an eminence near by, Longstreet saw that the Federal supporting columns were within such easy range of his artillery that a renewed attack upon Jackson could not last ten minutes under the fire of his guns. So he made no movement with his troops, but ordered forward two batteries, placed one in position, and opened fire immediately on the Federal flank.

Even before the second battery could be brought into action, it was too evident that the attack had failed.

dier] with a stone. I saw him afterward with his skull fractured. Dr. Richard P. Johnson, on my staff, bearing no arms of any kind, was obliged to have recourse to this means of defense from the beginning." (Official Report, Bradley T. Johnson.)

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General T. J. Jackson. The batteries from Groveton Heights poured a hot fire into the two lines of Federal troops that had emerged from the woods and made their way across the field to the position still held by the first line. Advancing to within forty or fifty yards of the Confederate infantry, the Federal lines halted, and returned, for thirty minutes, the fire that opposed them. (Official Report of General W. S. Featherstone, commanding brigade, Longstreet's corps.)

Twice out of the woods moved the Federal troops to the support of the assaulting Federal columns, and twice were they repulsed by the Confederate artillery and driven back to the woods, — a fate which befell the assaulting columns themselves after a futile effort to rally unsupported in the open field.

Pierced and broken by the united fire of the batteries on Groveton Heights and on their flank, the shattered columns of brave Federal troops gave way.<sup>1</sup>

The opportunity for a real attack was now seized; Longstreet rushed his whole line forward at a charge.<sup>2</sup> Hood's brigade led off; Evans's followed; and the division of General Anderson, coming up from the rear at the same time that Lee reached the ground to order the movement which Longstreet had anticipated, reënforced these two brigades. To this force, which was on the left of the right wing of the Confederate line, Wilcox added his own brigade. On Hood's right Kemper moved forward with three brigades; while on the right of Kemper, General D. R. Jones with his division formed the extreme right of the battle line of infantry. This forward movement gave instant relief to the pressure upon Jackson's front, who then advanced his whole wing, in which the brigades of Featherstone and Pryor of Wilcox's division moved with Jackson's troops. Animated by that spirit which General Jackson had infused into his corps, his men pressed forward eagerly

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the fire delivered by Longstreet on the flank of the assaulting lines, General Jackson's chief of artillery opened on them from Groveton Heights with eighteen pieces of artillery. Captain Garber's four-gun battery was rapidly thrown forward to reach the flanks of the Federals as they broke; and eighteen guns of Longstreet's corps were moved from the right of the ridge to a position where they could reach the Federal flank and rear, and the woods containing the Federal reserves. See Official Reports of Colonel Crutchfield, chief of Jackson's artillery, and S. D. Lee, commanding battalion light artillery, Longstreet's corps.

<sup>2</sup> See Longstreet's Official Report.

and fiercely, exhibiting, as he declares, "in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle." With grim satisfaction Jackson recorded the dismay with which the Federals gave way and fell back before his troops in disorder, while the Confederate artillery, opening upon the fugitive masses, added to the work of destruction.<sup>1</sup>

The brigades of Hill's division, on the extreme left of Jackson's line, were ordered to move forward in echelon. Branch's brigade, forming Hill's left, was thrown back considerably, and met no opposition; but those of Pender, Archer, and Thomas held together in their forward movement. The brigades of Gregg and Strong were maintained in position to meet a threatened Federal movement on the Confederate left. The brigade of Brockenbrogh of this division had been moved to the right, and was separated from its corps by some of Taliaferro's brigades, with which it advanced. Hill's main line captured two batteries and many prisoners. It advanced that night to Bull Run. The men "slept among the dead and dying enemy."<sup>2</sup>

On the right of Jackson's corps and the left of Longstreet's, four brigades of Confederate infantry were in position for an active and united pursuit. These were commanded by Colonel Taliaferro, by Pryor, Featherstone, and Wilcox. Wilcox had closely observed the effect of Longstreet's flank fire, and the fire from the batteries on the hill near Groveton. He had seen shells and spherical case burst over in front and near the Federals, until regiment after regiment was broken up by this fire alone, and driven back into the woods.

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of General A. P. Hill, commanding light division, who gives his own losses on the 29th and 30th as 199 killed and 1,308 wounded, of which Gregg's brigade lost 619. Total, 1,507.



He had seen the Federal supports dispersed, and the main body, unsupported and unaided, quite close upon Jackson's front and more than six hundred yards from their comrades, and he had attempted a flank movement for its capture ; but his orders to General Featherstone, thrice repeated, were disobeyed. And so the sadly thinned and wasted Federal line had fallen back into the woods.

When Jackson moved forward, these four brigades went with him in pursuit. Let us follow them. In front was the wood within which the Federals had disappeared. Running, yelling, firing, the Confederates pursued. The Federals continued their flight. In some six or seven hundred yards the wood was passed, and a second field, near three fourths of a mile in width, opened to the front. A slight ascent led to a ridge, which fell away again to rise higher than at first. Here Wilcox halted, and sought such shelter as the rolling ground afforded from a severe fire of Federal batteries about twelve hundred yards distant, which swept the field. Here also the Federal infantry were found, drawn up in line of battle. A heavy and destructive fire of artillery was now opened upon both flanks of the Confederate line. At this moment Hood's advance on the right of the turnpike was vigorously disputed. Wilcox was sent to Hood's assistance, and Colonel Thomas, of General A. P. Hill's division, came up to replace him. Thither also were Generals Pender and Archer directed.<sup>1</sup> Then Featherstone moved to the left of the new line, to extend beyond the Federal right before him ; next came Pender, and Archer, and Pryor.<sup>2</sup> As soon as formed, the command "Forward !"

<sup>1</sup> They had been moving forward by brigades in echelon. See Pender's Report.

<sup>2</sup> All save one regiment of his brigade, which, with Thomas's brigade, formed the reserve.

was given. Rapidly and in gallant style the order was obeyed. A rush, a tremendous volley from the Confederates, and the Federal line turned and fled through the woods in the direction of the stone house. A Federal battery of six guns had been posted about three hundred yards from the point where the Confederate brigade, commanded by Archer, entered the open field, and a little to the left of the direction in which he was advancing. When one hundred and fifty yards had been gained, Archer swung around to his left and moved forward upon the battery. The Confederate infantry met this fire in their teeth; but they did not falter. On they went. It was yet seventy-five yards to the guns, when the Federal gunners broke, and abandoned three of the pieces. Over them rushed the Confederate infantry, in hot pursuit of the guns and the flying infantry. Soon the remaining three were abandoned. They were captured by General Pender.

The wood in which the Federals had made their stand was reached and passed, when another field, some three quarters of a mile wide, with the Federal infantry again in line of battle on the farther side, was disclosed. Once more the Confederate line was formed in the edge of a wood. Colonel Thomas, with his brigade, was sent to the left; there was a road there, — to be guarded against a flank attack, — which extended in front to the turnpike, near the stone house. Behind the Federal line there was an eminence, and on it several pieces of artillery. In the face of its fire the Confederates advanced, but with heavy loss; for although the Federal infantry fell back precipitately, doing no injury to the Confederates, the loss from the artillery was so great that, while regarding it with lamentation, the sufferers bestowed praises upon the skill of the Federal gunners. In the wood the Confederate

line was halted and re-formed. There had been some confusion. Archer, who had crossed Pender's line, now found himself on Pender's right. The forward movement was continued. It became dark. The Lewis house was reached. To its left a body of Federal infantry was encountered. In the darkness their numbers could not be ascertained. The Confederates challenged. The Federals replied, "For the Union," and the Confederates retorted with a volley. The Federals fell back. At this point a large hospital filled with Federal wounded was found.

The darkness now forbade any further movement. The battle on this front had ended.<sup>1</sup> The loss in General Archer's brigade was seventeen killed and one hundred and ninety-six wounded. Pryor's loss in killed, wounded, and missing had not exceeded one hundred and fifty.<sup>2</sup>

The next body of Confederate infantry which we should follow, in Longstreet's forward movement, we shall find on the right of those whose advance we have described.

Hood's brigade of Texans was on the right of the pike and near it, while Law's brigade was on the left of the road and on Hood's left, where it had been exposed to a terrific fire of artillery while supporting a battery.

When Longstreet gave the word Hood sprang forward; so did Law and Evans, who also was on Hood's left. In an advance of one hundred and fifty yards the Texans became warmly engaged with a large force of Federals; but they progressed successfully for a mile and one half, capturing a battery of four guns, and

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports, Generals Pryor and Featherstone.

<sup>2</sup> The Federals were driven back one mile and one half. See Official Report of General Thomas.

crowning the heights near the Chinn house, where they halted and held their ground. Soon after the advance commenced, Law's brigade crossed to the right of the turnpike and moved to the front. A few hundred yards of rapid marching, when a hill was gained, and a clear view of the field exposed. To the right, in immense numbers, the Confederate troops were pressing forward towards the Blackburn Ford road. Directly in front and just below Dogan's farm-house the Federals were pushing columns of infantry into a ravine and pine thicket to support a formidable battery, posted there. Law disposed his troops to attack this battery; but before he moved, the guns were withdrawn. This brigade went forward to and beyond Dogan's farm, when it became too dark to move further, and the command halted for the night, with a loss of fifty-six killed and two hundred and sixty-four wounded.<sup>1</sup> Evans's brigade,<sup>2</sup> in motion on Hood's left, advanced more than a mile under a heavy fire of artillery to the heights held by Hood's brigade, where it maintained the line against a strong Federal attack, until relieved by Anderson's division. The loss in Evans's brigade was very severe. Fourteen officers and ninety-eight men were killed, forty-eight officers and four hundred and sixty-three men were wounded, and eight were missing.<sup>3</sup> Hood's command slept at night near the road to Sudley Ford.

It will be remembered that while the troops upon Hood's left were advancing, Wilcox with his brigade was sent to Hood's assistance. We should now follow his movements. Wilcox had crossed the turnpike, as he

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Colonel E. M. Law, commanding third brigade, Jones's division.

<sup>2</sup> Commanded by Colonel P. F. Stevens.

<sup>3</sup> Official Report of General N. G. Evans, commanding division, Longstreet's corps.

had been ordered to do ; but he had been unable to find Hood. Before him the musketry firing was rapid and continuous, and towards that he advanced. It was in close proximity to a deep ravine, which Wilcox crossed, then clambered up a rise towards the Federal side, where he saw, not three hundred yards distant, a skirt of woods bordering a small stream. The way to it was over a level and open field, swept by the fire of Federal artillery. Into it Wilcox entered, moving for a hilly crest ; but before it was reached, two brigades of the enemy gained the hill. Thus was Wilcox exposed. The distance between the hostile forces was not more than five hundred yards. The leading Federal brigade opened fire ; then fell back through the intervals of the second, which came up and continued the fire. Wilcox moved forward. It was nearly sundown. The fight was raging near the little stream. Wilcox crossed, passed through the woods that skirted it, changed direction to the left, and came up on the ground occupied by the Confederate troops. The firing on this line continued for half an hour after dark, and then ceased. The line was near where the Confederate Generals Wright and Toombs had been engaged. The fire of artillery was prolonged until half past eight o'clock at night, and then it ceased.<sup>1</sup>

The Confederate infantry on the extreme right of Lee's line was commanded by General D. R. Jones, and consisted of Toombs's, Anderson's, and Drayton's brigades.<sup>2</sup> At four P. M. Toombs's brigade on the left of

<sup>1</sup> This position was near the hill where Bee and Barton were killed at the first battle of Manassas, 1861. In this battle, August 30, 1862, Wilcox lost, in the three brigades under his command, in killed, wounded, and missing, 330. (Official Report, General Wilcox.)

<sup>2</sup> Toombs's brigade was commanded by Colonel Banning. General Toombs had been under arrest since the 18th. He came upon the field shortly after his brigade went under fire, and, having been released from arrest, accompanied it into action.

Jones's line was formed, with its right resting on the road from Gainesville to Manassas, and its left stretching towards the right of General Kemper's command. On Toombs's right was Anderson, and on Anderson's right Drayton's brigade was placed. At five o'clock Jones was ordered forward. Colonel Banning moved Toombs's brigade in line of battle, keeping his distance from Kemper. The first objective point was the Chinn house, about two miles to the front. The way led through fields, and was much exposed to both an infantry and an artillery fire from the Federal lines. Anderson met with losses in his brigade; his adjutant-general<sup>1</sup> was severely wounded in the thigh, and compelled to leave the field; his own horse was shot under him, leaving him afoot and without an aid. Drayton's brigade did not come up to the Chinn house then, for Captain Rosser, of the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, on the extreme right, became convinced that the Federals were attempting to turn the Confederate flank; and thus this brigade was detained by that report. Arrived at the Chinn house, General Jones, seeing great results within his reach, and anticipating the orders which Longstreet would send him, pushed forward upon his enemy, designing at the time to use Drayton's brigade in a turning movement which should sweep the field on his right. Hardly had Toombs's brigade begun its advance when its line was broken, and so continued for some time. The twentieth Georgia passed to the left of the Chinn house, and thus became separated from the second, fifteenth, and seventeenth Georgia, which passed to the right. Then the gap was still further widened by a cry from some officers, "Come this way; your aid is needed; the enemy is close by." The brigade commander, Banning, moved by this ap-

<sup>1</sup> C. C. Hardwick.

peal, followed in person the advancing twentieth, which gained ground towards the enemy, and thus pursued a course which took it further from the remaining regiments of the brigade. The twentieth Georgia had proceeded but a short distance when the men saw before them Federal infantry a few hundred yards distant, a little to the left of their front. The Federals were under such cover as a dense second growth of thick pines could afford. Colonel Anderson ordered a charge. The Federal infantry opened a heavy fire, and the Confederates returned it while advancing. The Federals fell back through the pines to where they terminated. The Confederates advanced, and opened fire again upon what seemed to Colonel Anderson to be a huddled mass of men. With this fire in their rear the Federal infantry disappeared. The twentieth Georgia moved on, emerged into open ground, and saw before them a dry bed of a brook, and on its further side a Federal battery, not more than four hundred yards away. It was now the Federals' turn in the game. The battery opened its fire upon the exultant Confederates. Colonel Banning says this caused him to reflect a moment, after which he ordered the twentieth to charge the battery. The men went forward at a run; they yelled; they passed the dry bottom of the brook; they began the ascent of the hill whose crest was crowned by the guns. The hill was steep, and the men had exhausted their breath with yelling instead of saving it for fighting. The place, too, was inviting: it furnished a complete cover from a terrific storm which the Federals poured over their heads. The Confederates stopped here, therefore, for five minutes, — to get their breath. Then Colonel Banning ordered the charge to be renewed; but, alas! the Federals had not been idle. While the Confederates rested, more Federal batteries

had come into position, and heavy infantry supports, unseen in the pines, were now plainly visible near the battery on Banning's front. The men of the twentieth Georgia had moved forward under a renewed Federal fire in their teeth and on their right flank, until some few had gained the crest of the hill, when Banning, again reflecting, ordered his men to retreat; which they did, huddling like sheep, face downward, in the dry bed of the very creek where they had performed such gallant exploits but a few minutes before.

Banning reports that he was moved to this extremity by the thought that if he took the Federal battery he could not hold it, and if he advanced he would be exterminated.<sup>1</sup> Leaving his men thus secure in their burrow, Colonel Banning turned his attention to the remaining regiments of his brigade. He left the twentieth Georgia, and saw it no more during that day. In concluding his official tribute to the brilliant services of this single regiment, Colonel Banning claims for it still greater results. In the pine thicket were seen two or three abandoned pieces of Federal artillery. Why abandoned, or when, Banning did not know; but he claimed to have captured them.<sup>2</sup> Unable to find the three regiments of Toombs's brigade, Colonel Banning offered his services to General Kemper as an aid.<sup>3</sup>

Colonel Anderson records the services of his brigade in more modest terms. He moved forward from the Chinn house on Banning's right, gaining ground to his

<sup>1</sup> See his Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> Loss, excluding officers, is given as twenty-two killed, one hundred and seven wounded, and six missing.

<sup>3</sup> The Official Reports of Captain Lewis of the second, Major Shannon of the fifteenth, and Captain French of the seventeenth Georgia contain the record of the doings of these regiments. It is said the losses were severe. In the seventeenth they were one hundred and one out of not more than two hundred present. (Banning's Official Report.)



left, and soon found himself in front of his enemy, under a heavy fire of artillery. It is affirmed that one Federal brigade fell back before his steady advance, and that a second confronted him, while a third turned his flank; but that fresh Confederate troops came up, and the Federal columns retired. Colonel Anderson then moved back a short distance to rest his men, and finally bivouacked for the night in front of the Chinn house.<sup>1</sup>

The remaining brigade of Jones's division failed to get up until night had closed in and the battle was over. General Drayton had been detained on the right, to find that the report of Colonel Rosser—upon which he acted—was unfounded. Then he hurried forward, but too late to be of service.

The part taken by the Confederate cavalry in this advance, mainly on the right of General Lee's line, was of great advantage. The cavalry brigade of General Robertson and the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Rosser, with all the available artillery that Stuart could gather, were pushed forward to enfilade if possible the Federal lines.<sup>2</sup> As the Confederates advanced, Rosser saw the high wooded ground before him occupied by Federal infantry. Four batteries were sent to the front.<sup>3</sup> The extreme left was occupied by Captain Richardson, who was posted on the left of the Chinn house. Rosser advanced in line, firing upon the Federal batteries, until he came near the Wheeler house, at which point he found himself at least half a mile in front of the main Federal position. During the remainder of the contest

<sup>1</sup> Losses recorded are seven out of eight of the field officers of the regiments, and over fifty company officers killed or wounded. (Official Report of Colonel Anderson, commanding brigade.)

<sup>2</sup> The command of the artillery was given to Rosser.

<sup>3</sup> Captains Eshleman, Stirling, Rogers, and Richardson, Washington Artillery.

Rosser drew up his batteries in echelon, and continued his fire until night. He had advanced so far that he had come up within range of Federal sharp-shooters lying over the hill in a thick undergrowth of pines. Beyond this he did not go, and here he ceased firing.<sup>1</sup> The hour had now come for the cavalry, and General Robertson threw his entire brigade rapidly forward to press the Federal left, and intercept if possible, by way of Stone Bridge, a retreat to Centreville. Before reaching the Lewis house, near a ridge overlooking Bull Run, a body of Federal horsemen was seen approaching from the direction of Manassas. Colonel Munford, commanding the Second Virginia Cavalry of Robertson's brigade, found himself upon the same ground where he had stood for four hours in the first battle of Manassas, on the 21st of July, 1861. There he saw before him but a single company of Federal cavalry,<sup>2</sup> and he attacked it with a squadron of his regiment under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Watts. The company fell back upon Buford's command, which was concealed under the hill near Lewis Ford.<sup>3</sup>

Colonel Watts now halted, and the remainder of Munford's regiment moved to the rear.<sup>4</sup> Seeing this, the Federal cavalry advanced. The two opposing forces

<sup>1</sup> It is claimed that Richardson's second battery, following Toombs's brigade, moved forward from Chinn's house; captured a battery of four Napoleons, and turned the captured guns on the enemy, firing nearly twenty-five rounds, and at night brought them from the field with horses and harnesses. Also that Eshleman, with his fourth battery, following Pickett, moved a section of his battery to the hills in front of the Conrad house, fired into the enemy until Stuart ordered him to cease. Eshleman was again brought forward to the Conrad house, and fired in the direction of Centreville until nine o'clock. See Colonel J. B. Walton, commanding Washington Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> It occupied a hill to the right of the Lewis house.

<sup>3</sup> This force consisted of the first Virginia, a New York regiment, and the first Michigan.

<sup>4</sup> For a better position. (Munford's Official Report.)

were so near that orders could be distinctly heard. The Federal command, "Forward trot!" was given. Buford came up in column of regiments. Munford, who was moving to the rear, ordered his command to the right about by fours, and dashed at the Federal command in line of battle at a gallop. The first Federal line was broken; but the second was firm. The fight raged for a moment hand to hand; then the Confederates were overpowered and fled. A running fight ensued, in which friend and foe were promiscuously intermingled. Seeing the rough treatment Munford was receiving, Robertson with his seventh and twelfth regiments advanced to the rescue. The sixth, Colonel Flournoy, was held in reserve. The seventh formed the third regiment in column; the twelfth preceded it.<sup>1</sup> As the Confederates advanced, they saw the Federals about four hundred yards distant in line of battle, extending beyond the Confederate left. The seventh charged against Buford's right flank, while the twelfth and seventh engaged him in front. Against this force Buford no longer contended; he withdrew beyond Bull Run. Colonel Munford suffered severely; more so than he ought, had he been promptly reënforced.<sup>2</sup> His horse was killed, and himself dismounted by a blow. Lieutenant-Colonel Watts and two officers of rank, with twenty-one privates, were severely, and twelve others slightly, wounded; but three privates were killed. In the pursuit, which was continued nearly three fourths of a mile beyond Bull Run, some three hundred Federals were picked up. The Union loss was not severe. A few were killed. But among them was Colonel

<sup>1</sup> The cavalry had moved about two miles towards Centreville, on the right of the infantry, when the second, then in advance, became engaged with Buford.

<sup>2</sup> Munford's Official Report.

Broadhead,<sup>1</sup> of the First Michigan Cavalry. He was mortally wounded in a hand-to-hand encounter with Lieutenant Harman, adjutant of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry.<sup>2</sup>

Before Buford left the field he twice turned upon the enemy. He re-formed a portion of his command some eight hundred yards in rear of his first line, and again he formed on a bluff opposite Bull Run, where he opened upon his pursuers with artillery.<sup>3</sup>

And here ends the story of that Confederate advance which forced the Federal army from the field. With a description of the further struggles encountered in its resistance, we conclude our narrative of the battle.

The locality which will engage our attention is around and in the vicinity of the Henry house hill.

When General Morell's division fell back after its fruitless effort to advance against the enemy, stationed along the railroad cut, Sykes's division followed. Buchanan withdrew his brigade from the woods, through which Butterfield had advanced, and from which he had retired, and uniting with Warren halted for a moment in rear of Weed's battery on a line with Dogan's farm-house; then proceeded, as ordered, to a position on the plateau south of the turnpike between the Henry and Robinson houses. With his right resting on the Henry house, Buchanan deployed his brigade in line of battle. Colonel Chapman, commanding the

<sup>1</sup> He was taken prisoner, and died the next day.

<sup>2</sup> The whole loss in the Confederate brigade is given as five killed and forty wounded. (Robertson's Official Report.)

<sup>3</sup> See Official Report of Captain Myers, commanding Seventh Virginia Cavalry, Robertson's brigade. Stuart speaks of Armistead's brigade as taking a position after dark; that he (Stuart) was anxious that Armistead should attack the enemy's flank, and that he urged it; but that Armistead doubted the policy of a night attack, especially as there was danger of collision with the Confederate infantry, and the attack was not made. See Stuart's Report.

second brigade of Sykes's division, had formed a battle line of regimental columns in rear of the woods into which Buchanan had entered, and in his support. When the rapid advance of Longstreet's corps against Pope's left, after the disaster in the Federal centre overwhelmed Pope and McDowell with the conviction that Lee was not in retreat and that it was from the Confederate right that the Federal left was in peril, all available brigades, regiments, and batteries were hurried to the plateau of the Henry house hill. Colonel Chapman moved by the left flank to the turnpike, marched down the same under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, and reached the summit of the hill, where he found Pope and McDowell, by whom he was ordered to the left of the position occupied by the Federal forces. His arrival at this time was most fortunate, for he alone of the immense reserves held on that field was thus thrown upon the point of most needed resistance.<sup>1</sup> A heavy force of Confederates was advancing through the woods to the south of the Henry house. Chapman threw his sixth infantry into the woods, and formed the eleventh, second, and tenth in line behind it. Underbrush covered the ground, and concealed both the approach of the enemy and the effect of a terrific volley which he suddenly poured into the most advanced of this Federal brigade. By a fire as terrific Chapman's men answered the Confederate challenge, and stood there in defiant action for three quarters of an hour.<sup>2</sup> The enemy's advance was checked in front; so he moved further to his own right,

<sup>1</sup> "My arrival was most opportune. Not a regiment or brigade of the immense reserve held on that field were in effective proximity to repel the enemy at the point of their approach." (Official Report, William Chapman, Lieutenant-Colonel Third United States Infantry, commanding second brigade, Sykes's division, Porter's army corps.)

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman.

and thus threatened with both infantry and artillery the left and rear of this brigade. But little, if any, aid seems at this time to have been received by Colonel Chapman from any of the Federal troops. A New York battery was posted on a hill to his right and rear, but it left its position at the very moment when it was most needed.<sup>1</sup> A New York cavalry regiment was on his left; but that soon retired, exclaiming, "It is too hot!"<sup>2</sup> Thus the left of the third brigade was exposed, and the right was unprotected.<sup>3</sup> For three quarters of an hour Chapman had fought with desperation and in despair. Outnumbered and overpowered by the enemy in his front, he could accomplish nothing, and he was recalled some six hundred yards to the rear, to the plateau about the Henry house, to which place he was followed by a rapid fire of grape and canister from Confederate batteries. Not, however, until the first brigade of Sykes's division moved up within his view did Colonel Chapman leave his position to be held by fresher troops. Colonel Buchanan came in to the right of the ground held by Sykes. He moved from his position on the plateau about six o'clock in the afternoon under an order to take a battalion of the twelfth and fourteenth infantry to a wood to his left and front, to support General Meade's brigade, which with Seymour's was manfully breasting the Confederate advance in the wood we have described. Hardly had Buchanan placed this battalion in position, when he observed his third and fourth infantry coming up about one hundred yards to his right, and with them General Milroy, evidently assuming to be their commander.

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> "Another volunteer regiment left our right after being engaged but a few minutes." (*Ibid.*)

Seeing with surprise that Milroy was attempting to control that portion of his own brigade which McDowell had sent forward, Colonel Buchanan hastened to his side, and told him that these battalions belonged to his own command of regulars, and that he could not consent to any interference with it. Milroy replied that he did not know whose men they were, but only wished to place them in the best position. "I am responsible for the position of my command, and do not wish any assistance either in posting or fighting it," was Buchanan's retort.<sup>1</sup>

For distinguished services on this day, for astounding feats of valor in the presence of both armies, with characteristic effrontery, Milroy again makes claim in his official report. At four P. M., he left the reserve to throw his men across the Centreville pike to stop the "retreating masses" of Porter's corps; then, turning to the left, he formed in line of battle along a sunken road in time to hold back the enemy, who had driven the Federal troops on the Federal left "panic-stricken" from the woods. Amidst "hurricanes of balls," fired from constantly increasing masses of the enemy, this salamander of a Milroy held his road intrenchments, and with the help of "a splendid brass battery" in his rear, firing over the heads of his "boys," he inflicted punishment with such "withering effect" that the rebel columns "melted away" and "fast recoiled" from repeated efforts to advance upon him from the wood. But alas that any power should so remorseless be as this which now assailed Milroy. To hold to most effective work, this battery, required from him a "watchful effort." Indeed, it would appear that he invoked the aid of his horse to encourage the Federal artiller-

<sup>1</sup> Official correspondence between Colonel R. C. Buchanan and General I. McDowell, October 20, 1862.

ists, for he adds, "My horse was shot in the head by a musket ball, while in the midst of the battery cheering on the men." But even this did not avail; for while this ostentatious general was attempting to rally Federal troops giving way on his left, the battery "took advantage of his absence" to withdraw.

It often happens in this world that he who clamors most for a recognition of heroic services is the most deceived as to the quality of his heroism. Milroy's achievements as he officially reported them were grandly heroic, while as they were seen by others they were the furious frenzies of an excited madman.<sup>1</sup>

To Buchanan, a calm, cool, and well-disciplined officer of the regular service, Milroy "seemed to be rushing about the field without any especial aim or object, unless it was to assist in the performance of other officers' duties, wherever he could find one to listen to him."<sup>2</sup>

Probably on that field of general confusion, no one Federal officer was more confused than Milroy himself. But upon one point, the fate of the Federal army, his mind was clear. Victory or defeat depended on his personal exertions; and his exertions depended entirely upon his own will, freed from every trammel of subordination. He does not hesitate in his report to censure the "brass battery" — which he did not order to its station, and had no authority to command it to remain or to depart, to fight or cease fighting — for "taking advantage of his absence" to withdraw. He does not hesitate to affirm that Buchanan's brigade came forward to the assistance of Chapman, Meade, and Seymour because he sent a message, through his aid, of the

<sup>1</sup> "Milroy's manner was very much excited, so much so as to attract attention of all present, and induce many to inquire who that was that was rushing about so wildly, and what he wanted." (Buchanan's correspondence with McDowell.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



approach of the "rebels coming around the forest in columns to our right and front;" nor that, under his direction, the "splendid firing of the regulars" and that of his own brigade drove back the enemy in confusion on "that most sanguine field," on which, until eight o'clock at night, he "brought regiments, brigades, and batteries into action," and "rallied them when driven back before the furious fire of the enemy." Nor did he withhold his censure from his superiors when, in his judgment, he deemed his superiors censurable. At one period of the fight he had sent his own brigade for a new supply of ammunition. Remaining on the field with a single staff officer, he saw that the continued attacks of the enemy "upon our left" required most energetic efforts. Not receiving that assistance from the rear which he modestly claims he "had a right to expect, after having sent for it," he "*flew* back" to where he understood General McDowell, with a large portion of his corps, was to be found, and appealed to him in the most urgent manner to "send forward a brigade at once to save the day, or all would be lost." That McDowell turned a deaf ear to this impassioned appeal; that "he answered coldly, in substance, that it was not his business to help everybody; that he was not going to help General Sigel," is Milroy's solemn accusation.<sup>1</sup> And more and worse even than this; for when Milroy replied that he "was not fighting with General Sigel's corps," that his own brigade had gone to the rear for a new supply of ammunition; that he, its commander, had been fighting with a half dozen different brigades, and had not asked where or to what particular corps they belonged, McDowell, inquiring of one of his aids if General — was fighting over there on his left, announced his inten-

<sup>1</sup> Milroy, Official Report.

tion to send him help, "for he was a good fellow."<sup>1</sup> This reflection upon his social standing with his comrades did not appear to touch Milroy's feelings in the least. All he wanted, he claimed, was a brigade to start; and in this he was satisfied. McDowell gave his order for the movement of the troops, and then, says Milroy, "I dashed in front, waved my sword, cheered, and led them where they were most needed." This irrepressible brigadier claims to have turned the tide of battle. But again the wave overwhelmed the Federals, and, as floridly described by Milroy, was turned again "by one of Burnside's veteran brigades," which, with a battery, "dashed back the tide of armed treason, and sent such a tempest of shot, shell, and leaden death into the dark forest after the rebels that they did not again renew the attack." It would seem that we had quoted too largely from the official papers of General Milroy, and yet there are views of this historic day which his achievements, real or fanciful, serve to present in stronger colors. The mental confusion of the progress of the battle, of the resistance to be opposed, of the right thing to do, and of the right time to do it, which prevailed with this enthusiastic officer, may well be contrasted with the cool and methodical conduct of those whose professional education fitted them to rely for success upon the arts of war rather than upon such meretricious practices as that "mighty cheering" which Milroy "got our boys to send up," the effect of which "perhaps," he wrote, "induced the rebels to believe that we had received such reënforcements as to make any further meddling with our lines a rather unhealthy business."<sup>2</sup>

With such experiences and such reflections, Milroy at

<sup>1</sup> See Milroy's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report.

eight o'clock left the field "in possession" "of our gallant boys," feeling "certain that the rebels had been checked and defeated; that we could hold the field until morning," by which time we might rally our scattered forces and bring up reënforcements enough to enable us to gain a victory. With what surprise Milroy came in the darkness to where he expected to see his brigade "and thousands of others," and found no troops, how he kept on, and with what agony he learned from Sigel that our whole army had been ordered to retreat across Bull Run to Centreville, may be appreciated from the wail of sorrow which he pours forth as he concludes his fictitious narrative, with a feeling "that all the blood, treasure, and labor of our government and people for the last year had been thrown away by that unfortunate order" to retreat, and that "probably the death-knell of our glorious government had been sounded by it."<sup>1</sup>

In this narrative we have anticipated the final Federal struggle on the 30th of August. It seemed essential, in giving the history of Buchanan's brigade, and the part taken by McDowell in sending it into action, to give also the account as it has come to us from Milroy. That McDowell utterly denies Milroy's statement, and that McDowell's denial is entitled to credence, it would seem unnecessary to affirm. Both Chapman and McDowell concur in this Milroy episode of the battle, and both have been sustained by a military investigation which acquitted McDowell of these unfounded and foolish accusations. That any man in his senses could, in that storm of battle, refuse to do all in his power to aid a corps commander in the field, because he was not as good a fellow as another commander requiring aid,

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, Brigadier-General R. H. Milroy, independent brigade, Sigel's corps.

is incredible. Accusations like these belong to that class of baseless sensations which, unfortunately for the country, were originated and repeated by the weak-minded and the wicked.<sup>1</sup>

It was to provide for the defense of the Henry house hill, after the Federal troops had been driven from the Bald hill, that McDowell sent the few battalions of regulars under Chapman to occupy the woods on the left; and it was to strengthen this advanced line that the brigades of Buchanan, of Meade, and of Seymour, and Reno's division were sent into those woods, while the division of Sykes formed another line to the east, in rear of the Henry house hill. And it was while the Federal troops were falling back on the right of the Federal line to the north of the turnpike, some of them forming in line as a reserve along the road, that McDowell, finding himself alone in command, was compelled alone to solve the important question whether he would hold the hill even if he could, which he doubted, or whether he would break the line of reserve which he believed had been established by Pope himself, and send forward troops to the aid of the advanced line, fighting under the gallant Meade, Seymour, Buchanan, and Reno. It was a question of im-

<sup>1</sup> See McDowell's Official Report, in which he says that he "went to the left, when the corps of General Porter, or the larger part of it that came out of the fight in front, had been formed in double line; and when near Sykes's division of regulars, Brigadier-General Milroy, a gallant officer of General Sigel's corps, came riding up in a state of absolute frenzy, with his sword drawn and gesticulating at some distance off, shouting to send forward reinforcements to save the day, to save the country, etc. His manner, his dealing in generalities, which gave no information whatever, and which, in the way he uttered them, only showed him as being in a state of mind as unfit to judge of events as to command men, and as being away from his command, caused me to receive him coldly. . . . I regret to have to refer to Milroy's report to say that his statement that I refused to send reinforcements to General Sigel is without foundation in anything I said or thought."

portance, wrote McDowell, "in which I should have liked to consult you, the general-in-chief, before deciding; but you were further over to the left, and the case had to be decided at once."<sup>1</sup>

In this perplexity, which neither Milroy's manner nor his matter tended to remove, a message was received from General Meade. If he could be reënforced in the woods on the Henry house hill, he could not only hold them, but he could drive out the enemy, who were not there in great force. Relieved from all doubt, McDowell exclaimed, "Meade shall have reënforcements!" And they were sent, not because Meade was a "good fellow," better than Sigel, but because he had a clear idea of why he wanted troops, knew what he ought to do with them, and would make as determined and intelligent an effort to act as could any of the best officers in the field.

Drawing near the close of the battle of the 30th of August, we shall conclude the description of the Federal struggle by again referring to the part taken in it by those troops who occupied the woods in front and to the east of the Henry house hill.

Buchanan had wrested his command from the grasp of Milroy, and with his brigade united had moved into the woods, from which Chapman had been compelled to withdraw. A very severe engagement with a strong force of the enemy followed. For nearly an hour the Federal brigade maintained this unequal contest. Once the third and fourth battalions found themselves within thirty yards of a Confederate brigade. Captain Dryer, commanding the fourth, ordered his men to fire by battalion. The order was obeyed, and three most destructive volleys were poured into the enemy. At length, Colonel Buchanan discerned that large masses of Con-

<sup>1</sup> McDowell's Official Report.

federates were turning his flank, and he gained ground to his left, and for a time checked the hostile movement. But soon the Federal commander saw that he must give way; his men were being cut to pieces, his ammunition was exhausted, and superior numbers of the enemy were pouring into the wood in his front. He gave the order to retire. His men marched steadily and slowly as Colonel Buchanan resumed his place on the plateau. The whole loss of this division in this engagement was nine hundred and seventeen, of which one hundred and fifty-two were killed, and five hundred and eighty-five were wounded.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after Buchanan returned to the plateau he retired with his brigade to Centreville, where he arrived at one o'clock in the morning of the 31st. Chapman had preceded him, and reached the same place at an earlier hour. It was here that Sykes's command was united. The story we have told of Sykes's division well describes what befell those brigades of Meade and Seymour which, with Ransom's battery of artillery, had marched under Reynolds's personal command from the confusion of the retreating Federal columns, retiring from Bald hill, to the hill and woods of the Henry house. With a brigade from Reno's division, they gallantly maintained their ground until the sweep of the Confederate right threatened their rear and made imminent their capture, when they too withdrew first to the plateau, and there, uniting with Sykes's division, halted for a time on the east bank of Cub Run. Thus the Confederates gained the woods that opened to them the Centreville turnpike to the north. But they did not profit by this great advantage. The Federals were allowed to remain without molestation on the hill, until complete arrangements were made to withdraw in

<sup>1</sup> Sykes's Official Report.

order and without further loss of men or of material. It was seven o'clock in the evening when McDowell received orders to take such portions of his corps as he might find intact and proceed with them to cover the bridges over Bull Run and Cub Run. By eight o'clock the whole of Pope's army was in retreat for Centreville.

At ten o'clock at night the pursuit was at an end. The Confederates were successful. As much as they had gained, they regretted that anything had escaped them. To the fire of a Federal battery enfilading Longstreet's left as he advanced, this commander attributed a retardation of his progress and the escape of many Federal batteries, which otherwise, Longstreet affirms, should have fallen into his hands. The darkness alone stopped the progress of the enemy. Under its blessed mantle Pope escaped before daylight across Bull Run to Centreville.

Three batteries, a large number of prisoners, many stands of regimental colors, twelve thousand stands of arms, many wagons and ambulances, fell into the hands of the victors.<sup>1</sup>

The claims of Lieutenant-General Jackson were more modest, and his admissions of loss more frank. He appealed to the fatal evidence of the battle-field to show that, though the Confederate loss was heavy, the loss on the Federal side was much greater. Eight pieces of Federal artillery he claims to have captured, with their caissons, and six thousand five hundred and twenty small arms he asserts to have been collected from the field.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-General Longstreet.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson. The services of General D. H. Hill were not available to Lee. This person arrived with his division after the battle of Chantilly. See D. H. Hill's Report.

The general movement of the Federal army to the rear cannot be faithfully described without following the fortunes of that division of Sigel's corps which was commanded by General Schurz. The withdrawal of this division from the Bald hill by Sigel's order, after the general repulse of the Federals, to the range of hills behind the stone house has been described. There yet remained one brigade of Schurz's division that on this day had not been pushed forward into the conflict with the enemy's infantry. Schimmelfening's command had suffered very severely by an enfilading fire of artillery delivered from two guns that the enemy had placed on his left; but his men stood firm near the battery they were supporting,<sup>1</sup> until they followed the general movement of Sigel's corps. As Schurz passed over the ground, he found, to his surprise, that the Federal troops, who had been rallied behind him after the first repulse, had given way, and that the enemy was rolling heavy masses of infantry after the retreating columns, unchecked save by the action of a single battery in his rear,<sup>2</sup> which received them in two different positions, at short range, with a fire which obliged them for the moment to fall back and allow the battery to pursue its course unmolested. Indeed, to Schurz it seemed that the enemy commanded with his artillery the whole battle-field. Naturally looking forward to this covering ridge as the line along which would be collected all the troops that could be gathered as a general reserve, ready "to pounce upon the enemy as he was attempting to ascend the slopes," Schurz was surprised and dismayed as he found only troops of different corps and of all arms in retreat.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dilger's.

<sup>2</sup> Dilger's.

<sup>3</sup> In his Official Report, General Schurz says: "I found Major-General McDowell with his staff, and around him troops of several different corps,



The commands appeared to be somewhat disorganized; there were many stragglers. Nevertheless Schurz made an effort to form a compact body of men. In this he was unsuccessful. During this time troops of Sykes's division and Reno's were in front; and Milroy was somewhere, but Schurz could not find him. Sigel ordered a brigade to be sent to his support. Schimmelfening went to the left; Sykes and Reno were found near the place indicated for Milroy, whom Schimmelfening could not find, and he formed on the right of Sykes. It was six o'clock in the evening. The brigades of Koltes and Krzyzanowski had gone exhausted to the rear. Darkness came on. The infantry fire on the extreme left and the fire of the enemy's artillery suddenly ceased. Now and then a projectile dropped among the Federal troops. It was evident the fighting had come to a stand. Such were the reflections of General Schurz as he conferred with Sigel, on the hill near the stone house, upon the meaning of the sudden cessation of hostilities. Was the enemy ex-

and of all arms, in full retreat." When McDowell read Schurz's report, this language nettled him. He desired to know which of the two constructions such language might admit, Schurz intended, and addressed to Schurz a note requesting an explanation. A staff officer carried the message, and awaited a reply. General Schurz answered that he did not mean that McDowell was in retreat, though the troops were, and that he saw "you [McDowell] for about half an hour near the place where I found my division." Then Schurz saw him go to the little farm-house south of the road, then used as a hospital, where Pope was said to be in consultation with several generals. This answer satisfied McDowell, and he requested Schurz to publish it, who replied that he would first talk it over with his aids and his commanders of brigades. To this McDowell objected. "Don't," he answered. "Only make public what you have written me privately." "Have no objections," answered Schurz, "to publishing. Please send to New York Tribune." And thus what seemed to some of McDowell's friends a design to make McDowell appear in a discreditable manner was satisfactorily settled. See official correspondence between Schurz and McDowell on the 6th, 8th, 12th, and 20th of October, 1862, in Pope's Virginia Campaign.

hausted? It was probable that his forces, when arriving at the foot of the heights occupied by the Federals, were so spent that a vigorous offensive would have had an excellent chance of success.<sup>1</sup> But Pope's order to retreat was imperative; and the main body of Pope's army was already in motion towards Centreville. The question was settled. About eight o'clock in the evening Sigel ordered Schurz to withdraw with his whole command across Young's Branch; at nine o'clock Schurz crossed the bridge and occupied the hilly ground between the stream and Bull Run, where, throwing out the necessary guards and outposts, he remained over two hours, and until all other troops had passed Bull Run and the road was clear of wagons; then he resumed his march towards Centreville, crossing the run at Stone Bridge between eleven and twelve o'clock at night. On its left bank he halted, with Stahl's brigade on the right, and himself with two pieces of Dilger's battery on the left, of the road. From here this command made its way to Centreville.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Such was the opinion of Sigel and Schurz.

<sup>2</sup> McDowell claims that Gibbon's brigade remained in rear of Pope's army on the Henry house hill until the whole Federal army had withdrawn (some two hours after dark), and that he placed a guard of the Pennsylvania Buck Tail battalion, with two officers of his staff and some pieces of artillery that were passing, on the left bank of Bull Run; and that "this brave little battalion, under the gallant Colonel Kane," remained there until everybody had passed, when they destroyed the bridge and brought up the rear. But Schurz denies this statement of McDowell. He says Gibbon's brigade about night-fall occupied the ground where his (Schurz's) first and second brigade had been; but that at that time his troops had not retired to Bull Run, as McDowell had supposed, but had gone to the left and front, where the battle was still going on, and where they remained a considerable time; that the firing had ceased, and it was long after dark when, by Sigel's order, he withdrew; that there were no troops near them when "we marched across Young's Branch, and took position between it and Bull Run;" that General Sykes told Colonel Schimmelfening, commanding the rear brigade of Sigel's column, that he was to form the rear guard of the army; that all the troops had left that part of the field; that after this, while Schurz had halted between Young's Branch and Bull Run for

Pope at forty-five minutes past nine at night, at Centreville, sent to Halleck, at Washington, his account of the battle. "We have had a terrible battle again to-day," he began, with the enemy, who, "largely reënforced, assaulted our position." He had held his ground firmly, he wrote, until six P. M., when heavy masses of the enemy on his left had forced back that wing about half a mile. But yet Pope deemed it best to retire to Centreville, giving as a reason that the enemy greatly outnumbered his army,<sup>1</sup> and that his men and horses had been two days without food. These considerations controlled him. Notwithstanding his de-

two hours, General Sykes's whole command passed "us there." Therefore, Schurz concluded that the statement that McDowell posted Gibbon's brigade on that ground after Schurz had retired from it to Bull Run rested "on a mistake." Schurz further informs McDowell that two of his aids and the colonel commanding his second brigade reported to him that about dark they saw him (McDowell) crossing the bridge over Young's Branch at the head of his staff, some of his officers crying out to the retreating soldiers who obstructed the road, "Make room for the general!" Hence he infers that McDowell is possibly mistaken as to what transpired subsequently in that vicinity. See Official Report of McDowell, and letter of October 20, 1862, Schurz to McDowell.

<sup>1</sup> General Pope officially reported the numbers of his army on the 30th of August as follows: McDowell's corps, 12,000; Sigel's corps, 7,000; Reno's division, 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, 7,000; Porter's corps, 12,000; Banks's corps, 5,000; total, 50,000. But he claims that this number should be reduced 10,000, because of the absence of Banks at Bristoe Station, and Griffin's and Piatt's brigades of 5,000 men, who had innocently marched to Centreville, while attempting to follow Porter's corps to the front.

On the other hand, General Porter, who places the strength of his corps at 8,500 men, Griffin and Piatt (Sturgis) included, reduces this number by 2,000 men of Griffin's command at Centreville, and adds to the result 800 men of Sturgis's brigade who did get up and were with him in the battle.

Thus the final result arrived at by Pope and Porter is about the same.

Porter had about 7,000 men on the field.

Pope could have called both Banks and Griffin to his aid, had he wished so to do.

On the side of the Confederates there were in action the whole number of Lee's army, as before reported (see *ante*, page 6), less the killed, wounded, and missing of the day before. See Appendix.

## EXPLANATORY TABLE OF PLATE III.

*The battle of Bull Run, or Manassas, fought on the 30th of August, 1862.*

### DISPOSITION AND ATTACK OF THE FEDERAL ARMY.

- V' V' V' V' Fitz-John Porter's corps between three and five A. M., August 30th, before marching to join Pope.
- v' v' v' v' Porter's corps between five and eight o'clock A. M. en route to report to Pope.
- T<sup>1</sup> T<sup>2</sup> T<sup>3</sup> T<sup>4</sup> Brigades of Butterfield, Barnes, Buchanan, and Chapman coming into action in front of Dogan's farm.
- T<sup>5</sup> General Warren's brigade with Hazlett's battery advancing to the front, from behind Dogan's farm, to fill a gap in the Federal line, caused by a movement of Reynolds's division further to the left.
- 11 General Warren's brigade, Sykes's division, in his first position.
- m m Smead's and Randol's batteries in road near Warren.
- d e f General Reynolds's second position, to which he advanced from behind the Chinn house.
- d Represents Seymour's brigade.
- e Represents Mead's brigade.
- g Three regiments of Reynolds's command deployed as skirmishers to the front in wood, with the enemy's skirmishers before them.
- h h Position of McLean of Schenck's division, Stahl on his right joining Reynolds's right, with Wiedrich's and Buell's batteries, at four P. M., moved there in column behind Dogan's farm.
- d' e' f' General Reynolds's third position, to which he moved to resist the enemy after Porter's repulse.
- V V V V Position to which Butterfield and Lansing (commanding Barnes's brigade) of Porter's corps, Morell's division, advanced and assaulted the Confederate line at five o'clock P. M., with second and third line of reserves in rear.
- n n n Position to which Porter's corps retired after its repulse.
- K K Ricketts's division of Tower's and Hartsuff's brigades with Hall's and Leppien's batteries in second position when sent to aid Reynolds, Warren, and Schenck south of pike.

- W W King's division of four brigades, commanded by General Hatch, formed in seven lines, attacking simultaneously with Porter, on his right. The lines were fifty yards apart. The first and second lines were made up of Hatch's brigade, the third and fourth Patrick's, the fifth and sixth Gibbon's, and the seventh Doubleday's. The Second United States Sharp-Shooters were deployed in front in the woods.
- X Hooker's division.
- X' Colonel Carr's brigade with lines of retreat across Bull Run.
- Y' Robinson's brigade of Kearny's division.
- Y'' His second position.
- Y''' His third position.
- Z Ricketts's division detached temporarily from McDowell's corps and attached to Heintzelman's.
- a General Reno's first position.
- b Graham's battery.
- r r r Buchanan's, Chapman's, and Warren's brigades on the plateau between the Robinson and Henry houses, after five o'clock P. M.
- s Buchanan's brigade in the woods to the left of the Henry house after 6.30 P. M. This position was held for one hour, and then Colonel Buchanan fell back to the place from whence he started.
- t t t Last position of Seymour and Meade before the Henry house.
- v v v Graham's battery of First United States Artillery, supported by three regiments of Reno's infantry.
- S S Federal Cavalry under Buford.
- S' S' S' First Michigan, first (Union) Virginia, and others.
- S'' Fourth New York Cavalry.
- Q Position held by Sigel's corps near Dogan's farm, where Schurz formed his three brigades in columns, with Schimmelfening on the right, Koltes on the left, and Krzyzanowski behind the centre; and from whence Koltes went forward, but too late to support the left, and was himself supported by Krzyzanowski. From here Stahl moved forward with McLean to support Reynolds.
- p Weed's battery holding back the enemy, while Sykes retired after his repulse. Dilger's battery of Schurz's division was here also in position.
- a' a' Milroy's brigade at close of action, moved here from Dogan's farm.
- b' McLean's brigade falling back.
- e' e' Position to which Schurz fell back.
- c' Stahl's brigade falling back before the enemy's forward movement.
- g' Sixth New Jersey Infantry falling back and being rallied on the hill near Butterfield.
- h' Graham's battery, in same position, held by Schirmer's battery.

- K' K'** Cavalry of Sigel's corps stopping stragglers. Also where McLean halted after he had retired from b'.
- j' j' j'** Brigades of Warren and Buchanan retiring in regimental columns to plateau between Robinson and Henry houses.
- m' m' m'** Divisions of Stevens and Ricketts retiring after dark towards Centreville.
- n' n'** Sigel's corps, between eleven and twelve at night, in bivouac for two hours.
- l' l'** Guard from Colonel Kane's battalion.
- p'** McDowell's corps en route towards Centreville.
- q'** Reno's division en route towards Centreville.
- r'** Kearny's division en route towards Centreville.
- W' W' W'** Banks's corps from the night of the 29th of August to the morning of the 31st. General Greene's division returning from Manassas Junction.

**CONFEDERATE ARMY.**

- A A A** Jackson's command in position August 30th, in the morning, with A. P. Hill's division on the left; then Ewell's with Taliaferro's on the right.
- B** Batteries of Braxton, Pegram, Latham, Davidson, and McIntosh on the left of Jackson's position.
- C C' C''** Pryor's, Featherstone's, and Wilcox's brigades.
- D** R. H. Anderson's division.
- E E' E''** Law's, Evans's, and Hood's brigades.
- F** Kemper's division.
- F'** Pickett's brigade.
- G G' G''** Toombs's, Anderson's, and Drayton's brigades.
- H** Eighteen guns of Eubank's, Parker's, Rhett's, Jordan's, Reilly's, Bachman's, and Garden's batteries of Longstreet's corps, and eighteen guns from batteries of Johnson, D'Aquin, Rice, Wooding, Poague, Carpenter, Brockenbrogh, and Latimer of Jackson's.
- I** J. C. Richardson's battery.
- J** Eshleman's battery.
- K** Rosser's Fifth Virginia Cavalry. K' and K'', positions to which it moved with guns of Richardson and Eshleman.
- L** Cavalry commanded by General Robertson.
- L'** Seventh Virginia Cavalry.
- L''** Twelfth Virginia Cavalry.
- M** Position to which Sixth, Seventh, Twelfth, and Second Virginia Cavalry moved, with Sixth in reserve.
- M'** Colonel Harman, Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, supporting Second Virginia Cavalry.
- H' H'' H'''** Evans's, Law's, and Hood's brigades advancing.
- N N' N'' N'''** Hood's division. Hood's, Law's, and Pickett's brigades.
- O** Kemper's division.
- O'** Jenkins's brigade.

**P' P'' P'''** Toombs's, Anderson's, and Armistead's brigades, of Jones's division.

**R** Drayton.

**R'** Confederate cavalry.

**R''** General Robertson's command.







feat, he declared that his men were in good heart, not downcast, nor dismayed. "The movement to Centreville," he wrote, "has been made in perfect order and without loss;" his troops marched off the field, he reported, without the least hurry or confusion; "their conduct was very fine; the battle was most furious, for hours without cessation; the losses on both sides were very heavy," and "the enemy is badly crippled." That Halleck might remember Pope's dispatch of yesterday, announcing his victory over the same army that today had compelled him to fall back to Centreville, even Pope thought possible. Halleck might have lost confidence in his lieutenant's performances. Therefore, Pope would relieve his apprehension. "We shall do well enough," he wrote; "do not be uneasy; we will hold our own here." No longer claiming victories, Pope set forth his assumption of retarding the victorious marches of the enemy. "We have delayed the enemy as long as possible," he wrote, "without losing the army. We have damaged him heavily. The labor and hardships of this army for two or three weeks have been beyond description. Be easy; everything will go well." "We have lost nothing, neither guns nor wagons."<sup>1</sup>

That Pope took the offensive in the battle of the 30th of August firmly convinced that he was moving forward on a retreating foe, from whom he had won a victory on the 29th, appears beyond contradiction, not only in Pope's order for a pursuit, but in the official reports of all the corps and many of the division commanders of Pope's army.<sup>2</sup> Says Heintzelman, "Appearances were that the enemy were retreating." Gen-

<sup>1</sup> See Pope to Halleck, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 245, 246.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's order to McDowell, and McDowell's order to Porter, and his reconnaissance with Heintzelman have already been given in these pages.

eral Sigel expressed the same opinion. Therefore Ricketts was thrown forward on the road to Haymarket. Says General Reynolds, I was ordered by Pope to form on Porter's left, as a pivot in the attack Porter was to make on the enemy, then supposed to be on the pike and in retreat. Says General Sykes, commanding the division of regulars of Porter's corps, "In fighting an offensive battle, we left behind us a position that offered reasonable hopes of success, and in the pursuit of a supposed retreating foe we encountered a well-posted army, flushed by victory, confident, calmly awaiting the attack he most desired."<sup>1</sup> General Warren, commanding the third brigade of Sykes's division, strengthens the testimony of those who aver that Pope assaulted the enemy, and was not himself first assaulted. He speaks of General Butterfield "making his dispositions to attack the enemy" before the opening of the fight. General Ricketts was ordered to send his division "from the right on the road leading from Sudley Springs to Haymarket, and follow along that road in pursuit of the enemy." General Hatch was ordered to "hold his division as a reserve to support Porter's attack on the enemy's centre," and afterwards he was ordered by Porter to "make the attack simultaneously with himself." A very interesting account, by an intelligent officer on General Doubleday's staff, of what he saw on the 30th of August has been given in corroboration of the general belief that the Federals were victors, and that the Confederates were in retreat. He saw Pope on the morning of the 30th "walking from group to group of general officers, evidently overflowing with good humor." The belief was general that the enemy was in full retreat. As the writer stood conversing

<sup>1</sup> Official Report, General George Sykes, commanding division, fifth army corps.

with other officers, he saw General Pope's adjutant-general writing that famous dispatch "which announced the glad tidings of victory to the country, and gave it twenty-four hours of real joy." Then this officer proceeded to Centreville to order forward supplies. He went regretfully, for he "had a fancy" that he "should enjoy the pursuit of a flying enemy, and picking up stragglers;" but he went "grateful, as perhaps never before, for this victory, which seemed" to him "the salvation of this afflicted country." Last night's disaster was forgotten; hunger no longer preyed upon him; nor was he heavy from want of sleep. As he journeyed on to Centreville he saw the red flag of our hospitals, and the wounded that filled them; and he felt that in our victory they could find compensation for their sufferings. He met many officers, all of whom had a word of hearty congratulation. "Jocund was every countenance; for the good news had flown through the entire army," and faces "were full of hope and joy." At noon Centreville was reached. The concourse of wagons was immense, — acres of them, parked by divisions under the charge of their respective quartermasters. The good news of victory had preceded him here.

Soon the supplies were ready, and the wagons were moving out towards Pope's army. As with a companion he rode through Centreville, a "foreigner on General Sigel's staff, fiery red with haste," and "boiling over with enthusiasm, accosted" and "almost embraced him," as he dashed onward, exclaiming, "I go to Washington wiz ze news!" Centreville was passed, and the division of General Franklin, halting by the road-side, was encountered. In two miles from the town, occasional squads of two or three soldiers, heading towards the rear, were met, many without muskets or knapsacks. These were followed by a "rush of men

singly and in detachments, mingled with sutlers' wagons, artillery caissons, and supply wagons." The aspect was now fearfully ominous. Every one seemed to be pushing on, in too much haste to volunteer the information which the staff officer was now too much agitated to ask. For some minutes he rode on with his companion in silence; but silence was unendurable. "Really; this begins to look a good deal like a retreat;" and "I have been thinking so for the last quarter of an hour, but didn't like to speak of it," was the remark and the reply which destroyed the last ray of hope in those despondent hearts. Fugitives were questioned. There was but one answer. Their regiments "were fearfully cut up." Stronger and stronger grew the retreating tide; darker and darker came the story of disaster. Heavier resounded the roll of ammunition trains and batteries; more compact and orderly the rearward march of battalions. From intelligent officers the news of a general defeat, and that our whole army was falling back to Centreville, was received. It was useless to attempt to stem the tide. Doubleday's wagon train was turned back and headed for Centreville. It was night when the town was reached. Franklin's division was drawn up in front. The place was crowded with soldiers; the houses were filled with wounded; and a strong guard was placed across the road to arrest stragglers or fugitives. In shame, in sorrow, and in despair, the officer who heard the morning's congratulations of victory, and had ridden to Centreville with such unbounded faith, lay down at night with not a single star of hope above the black horizon.<sup>1</sup> It was probably in a somewhat similar state of mind that Pope framed his then forthcoming official report of the battle of the 30th of August. If he con-

<sup>1</sup> See Bivouac and Battlefield.

vinced himself that he had foreseen the inevitable, and that he had met it with heroism, he did not, he cannot, impose that conviction upon his countrymen. He looked forward to victory over a defeated and a retreating army, and he encountered a defeat which dispelled delusions he denied that he had ever entertained.

The Federal army moved under perfect control from the field of its defeat. There was no break-neck racing by wagoners, nor were animals cut loose to enable teamsters to escape; there were no headlong rushes of troops. "The current set one way," said an intelligent observer, "very rapidly, but with little foam." It was a retreat; it was not a rout. It is true that the enemy made no pursuit; but if he had, it may with confidence be asserted that a pursuit would not have caused a panic. The scenes of 1861 could not have been repeated in 1862.

In 1861 a mob of terror-stricken men in uniform, preceded by a mob of terror-stricken members of Congress, had sought, under the appalling impulses of fear, safety in flight along the same road to Centreville, and thence to Washington city itself. But in 1862, the Federal army that fell back before the advance of the Confederates was composed mainly of veterans led by officers distinguished for courage and for leadership. There never was a moment in that retreat when the troops would have failed to respond to an order to form into a strong and determined line of battle.

Whether there was any help for Pope in this struggle is a question that has often been asked in connection with Pope's serious accusations against General Porter. The inquiry, limited to a discussion of what is known as the Porter controversy, has been sufficiently noticed in this history. No one now, not even Pope himself, has the effrontery to vilify or reproach

Porter for any want of ardor on the 30th of August. But was there no other command that could have been brought into action, with promise of success? On the day of this battle General Banks with his whole corps lay inactive in and around Bristoe Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His two divisions were considerably stronger on the 30th of August, when he did not engage the enemy, than on the 9th of August at Cedar Mountain, when he did; for although there had been serious losses at Cedar Mountain, a number of detached regiments had joined this corps immediately after that action.<sup>1</sup> At thirty minutes past six o'clock in the afternoon of the 30th, a message was dispatched from Pope near Centreville to Banks at Bristoe Station, to destroy all the public property and all the railroad property there, and to fall back upon Centreville.<sup>2</sup>

This dispatch did not reach Banks until after daylight on the morning of the 31st; and thus until then his corps remained quietly in camp, in ignorance of the great peril which threatened it. The public property and supplies which Banks destroyed on the morning of the 31st might as well have been sacrificed on the morning of the 30th, and thus this command set free to move on that day upon that right wing of the enemy which delivered its final assault with Pope's

<sup>1</sup> There were two divisions of three brigades each, commanded, the first by General Williams, and the second by General Greene. The total effective infantry force could not have been less than eight thousand men. There were also with it one regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery.

<sup>2</sup> "August 30th, 6.30 P. M. Destroy the public property at Bristoe, and fall back upon Centreville at once. Destroy all the railroad property. Your troops at Bristoe will withdraw through Brentsville. Your troops at Manassas and between there and Bristoe will withdraw to Centreville.

"By command of MAJOR-GENERAL POPE.

"TO GENERAL BANKS."

army before it and Banks's corps at its back. If Banks had moved from Bristoe Station on the morning of the 30th towards Pope's left at the Henry house hill, abandoning the property that he destroyed on the morning of the 31st of August, it may well be doubted whether Longstreet would have dared to expose his rear to this new danger, or, exposing it, whether the Confederates would not thereby have suffered defeat. In either event, there would have been, as it turned out, no resulting sacrifice of public property. It would have been saved had we gained the battle; it was lost when we lost it. Indeed, one half of Banks's corps did move to Manassas, thus shortening the distance to the battlefield. Between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning General Greene marched his whole division<sup>1</sup> to Manassas Junction, and remained there until about two P. M., when he returned to Bristoe, to make a hurried march on the morning of the 31st, with the remainder of Banks's corps, in a *détour* to the south of some three miles, via Brentsville.<sup>2</sup> But Banks obeyed his orders, and in this obedience the services of his corps were practically lost to the country.

That troops from the Army of the Potomac at Alexandria were not sent forward to Pope with all the haste the emergency demanded has been often charged against McClellan. It was easy for base men to find, both in what General McClellan did and in what he did not do, a base motive. The results of Halleck's campaign from his office in Washington and Pope's mismanagement in the field were said to be due to the envy and hatred for both Pope and Halleck which rankled in the bosoms of the prominent officers of the Army of the Potomac. It was this envy and this ha-

<sup>1</sup> General Auger's.

<sup>2</sup> See history of movements of 31st, *post*.



tred, it was charged, which made Franklin dawdle on his march, and McClellan plead want of transportation as a cause of his delay. It is not from the publication of the vague rumors of that day, nor from histories so called, made up from such compilations, that the truth is to be found. Rather should we look in the messages and replies that passed between McClellan and Halleck on the 30th of August itself, when the sound of Lee's artillery was borne to the ears of the despairing commander of the Army of the Potomac, for facts, the truth of which have never been disproved.

To Halleck's urgent dispatches in the morning to send forward troops and subsistence to Pope, McClellan replied that, with the exception of one brigade of Sumner's corps, left as a guard in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, both Sumner and Franklin had been ordered to join Pope as speedily as possible; the former moving via Columbia Bridge, on Annandale and Fairfax Court House; that Franklin had been obliged to march without wagons; and that the quartermaster had uniformly answered his application that there were no wagons disposable. Only, said McClellan, by unloading Banks's supply train was Franklin enabled, after his departure, to get twenty wagons to carry extra ammunition. General Sumner was not so fortunate, and was obliged to march with such ammunition as he could carry in his cartridge-boxes, and not a single extra round beside. All that McClellan could do in exhortation had failed to procure the necessary trains; he could only inform Pope that he had "this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are landed be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and for Franklin, though that would not go far towards supplying the deficiency," and that eighty-five wagons, got together by the quartermaster's department, were last night loaded with sub-

sistence, and sent forward at one A. M., with an escort, via Annandale.<sup>1</sup>

In the early afternoon, when Halleck was perhaps troubled with misgivings as to whether General Lee had been utterly crushed on the 29th, he directed that artillery ammunition be forwarded with all possible haste to Centreville for General Pope. General McClellan dispatched an immediate reply. He would load up every wagon sent him with ammunition, although he did not know the calibres of Pope's guns, but the wagons must be sent from Washington; and as for men, he would order the company of sharp-shooters, that were guarding his own camp, to move with the train, and his only remaining squadron of cavalry he would send to General Sumner. He could do no more, he added, for "now you have every man of the Army of the Potomac that is within my reach."<sup>2</sup>

Early in the morning McClellan had been informed, and had reported it to Halleck, that heavy artillery firing had been heard in the direction of Fairfax Court House. Towards night the reports became heavier and more threatening. General McClellan was moved with grave apprehensions; he suffered, too, in anguish, as he dwelt upon the cruel fate that denied him the opportunity to share the fortunes of the army his genius had created. Unable longer to bear this dreadful suspense, he appealed, at last, in an urgent though pathetic spirit, to Halleck. He could not express to him "the pain and mortification he had experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my [his] men." "I respectfully ask," he continued, "if there

<sup>1</sup> McClellan to Halleck, dispatches eleven and 11.30 A. M., August 30, 1862.

<sup>2</sup> Official record of dispatches between McClellan and Halleck, dated August 30, 1862, at 1.45 and 2.10 P. M.

is a probability of the conflict being resumed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command, even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate. Please reply to this to-night. I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I can to make arrangements for the wounded."<sup>1</sup>

To this pleading application no answer was made, and of it no notice was taken until the next morning, when, with a frivolous impertinence and a curt apology which was an insult, Halleck dismissed the whole subject. He had, he telegraphed McClellan, just seen his dispatch of last night, but he could not answer without seeing the President, as General Pope was in command by his orders. The substance of McClellan's dispatch had been stated to him, he said, last night; but until he saw the telegram himself, this morning, he did not know that an immediate reply was asked for.

As for General Couch, Halleck thought he had better go out and *find the battle-field*.<sup>2</sup>

We may contrast this simple record of McClellan's purpose and efforts at this critical period with but one of the many falsehoods published by lying pamphleteers of the day.

General McClellan had offended a noted scribbler whose paper had been used to vilify and abuse those who treated with becoming contempt his absurd pretensions to instruct our generals in military affairs. This adventurer only awaited McClellan's fall to be revenged. Now he found his opportunity. He attacked

<sup>1</sup> General McClellan to Halleck, August 30, 1862, 10.30 P. M.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to McClellan, Washington, August 31, 9.18 A. M.

McClellan in a pamphlet. He accused him of withholding reënforcements under Sumner and Franklin until too late to be of service to Pope. He affirmed that soldiers of the Army of the Potomac with Pope did not hesitate to d—— Pope to h——; that they fought moodily and disgustedly, and threw down their arms. And he did not falter in saying that the men who did this were tampered with by officers who adored General McClellan.

This shameless libeler then charged McClellan with enjoying this "shuddering spectacle," as he called it. He represented him as sitting, on the 30th of August, upon a hill-side, in the midst of his beloved staff, quietly smoking his cigar, cool and collected, prophesying, while the booming cannon sounded in his ears, that Pope was attacked, that he would be defeated, and that his own noble men whom he loved as children would be slaughtered as cattle, to no good purpose; but that he would yet and in a few days lead the army to victory. "That this was the gigantic horror," that it was the sale and betrayal of Pope, was hurled as a final blow, by this avenging pamphleteer, at the head of General McClellan.<sup>1</sup>

And the charges of delay in reënforcing Pope leveled against Franklin and against Sumner are as false as those preferred against McClellan. At five o'clock in the afternoon of the 30th, General Franklin, with his command, reached Centreville. Here halting for two hours, he pushed on towards Bull Run. But two miles had been gained when Pope's army was encountered in retreat. It was dark then, and nothing could be accomplished; so, together with the retiring troops, Franklin fell back on Centreville. This command had

<sup>1</sup> See McClellan from Ball's Bluff to Antietam, by John M. Wilkes, pages 20, 21.

marched twenty-three miles since it left Alexandria,<sup>1</sup> from whence it moved with all possible dispatch. It has been charged that Franklin delayed on his route, that he rested too often,<sup>2</sup> and it has been affirmed that if he had wished he could have reached Pope in time to have taken part in the battle of the 30th. The same has been said of Sumner, who moved on the 30th from Chain Bridge to make his twenty-one miles to Centreville, which was at least five miles from where the battle was fought.

There is no proof to sustain such accusations ; there never was any. The administration, too much given to listening to the suspicions of meddlesome men, never even made charges against General Franklin or General Sumner. These officers were well known for their loyalty. They were veterans, well tried, and honored by those who had served with them in the field. They distrusted Pope ; and this, at that time, was in Halleck's eyes and in Stanton's mind an unpardonable offense. Hence there came forth creatures who made scurrilous accusations against those who fell under the displeasure of the war secretary, in the hope, sometimes realized, that thrift might follow fawning.

<sup>1</sup> It is twenty-one miles from Centreville to Alexandria.

<sup>2</sup> Stopped an hour in the suburbs of Fairfax Court House. (Behind the Scenes, by Alfred L. Castleman, page 209.)

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE THIRTY-FIRST OF AUGUST.

EARLY in the morning of the 31st of August, General Jackson crossed Bull Run at Sudley Ford, and pushed onward by a country road to the Little River turnpike. Detachments of the Confederate cavalry under Stuart followed the retiring Federal army, and picked up stragglers and ambulances on the road to Centreville. Still another cavalry command extended its pursuit to Manassas Junction, where it arrived, however, too late to interfere with the movement of Banks's column, though in time to gaze upon the ashes of trains, engines, and supplies, and to capture more ambulances, surgical instruments, horses, and stragglers.

With the exception of Pryor's brigade of Jones's division, which, about noon, was thrown across Bull Run to occupy the heights between that and Cub Run, the whole of Longstreet's corps was engaged until two o'clock in the afternoon in caring for the wounded, burying the dead, and gathering arms and supplies.

Heavy clouds hung over the dismal field, and a cold, drenching rain fell alike upon the ghastly dead, the wounded, and the dying. It was Sunday, — a day of rest and peace to millions of human beings. To us it was a day of cheerless gloom. It was remembered by General Longstreet that on such a day as this, in 1861, the Confederate army was engaged in a similar work

on the same field. It was the day following the first battle of Bull Run.

Now Longstreet was preparing to follow Jackson, who had marched as usual without loss of time, and had halted late at night on the Little River turnpike, down which he had proceeded in the direction of Fairfax Court House, until he was obliged to allow his men to bivouac by the road-side.<sup>1</sup>

In anticipation of a hostile movement, Pope at Centreville disposed his troops within that powerful line of works which General Joseph E. Johnston constructed in the winter of 1861 and 1862 to protect the Confederacy against a second Federal advance, along the pike towards Warrenton. These works were so nearly inclosed that they could be defended from any approach, and hence they were available to cover the Federals against the attack of those who erected them to protect themselves against a Federal attack, unless, indeed, the latter ignored Centreville altogether in marching towards Bull Run, as now the Confederates were ignoring it in marching towards Washington, — a thing which General Johnston evidently thought the Federal army, one year before, would not dream of doing, or he would not have spent so much useless labor upon the works which Pope was now filling with Federal troops.

Porter's corps arrived at Centreville at about two o'clock in the morning of the 31st, and was thrown into the works on their northerly side. On his left, fronting the enemy and covered by intrenchments, to which he had retired at half past two A. M., was Franklin.

<sup>1</sup> See Official Reports of Generals Jackson and Early; and of General McGowan, who says that he reached Pleasant Valley that night. Also of General Hood, who reports that his division marched to Sudley Ford and thence to Hagerstown.

Sigel, who had reached Centreville at day-break, held the works on the south side of the town, with Reno on his left and rear. Heintzelman reached Centreville between one and two o'clock in the morning, and was posted in rear of the place, in readiness to furnish any required support. McDowell, with his corps again united, was held in reserve two miles in rear of the town, with his cavalry under Bayard operating towards the north. General Sumner joined Pope here, and was ordered to post his troops between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy the latter place in force.

The Confederate cavalry had advanced as far as Cub Run, not quite two miles from Centreville, and General Reynolds's division was thrown forward in the afternoon to that stream to relieve General Stevens, who with his brigade rejoined Reno's command.

About three miles to the south of Centreville, the direct roads from Manassas Junction to the town cross Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, and at a bridge a little more than half a mile further up the stream. General Banks, in the execution of his orders of the evening before, was met by instructions to post his command on the north side of Bull Run, and cover the bridge leading to Centreville. The directions given by Pope for unloading all the army wagons, that they might proceed to Fairfax Station and bring up forage and rations, show conclusively that he meant to stay where he was, and that, as yet, Jackson's proclivity for flank movements had made no impression upon him.<sup>1</sup>

And yet the urgency of Pope's order to Banks at

<sup>1</sup> See circular to the corps commanders, issued from headquarters Army of Virginia at Centreville, August 31, 1862, 8.30 A. M., and later in the day. Also an order to Carroll's brigade of Ricketts's division to report to Colonel Beckwith at Fairfax Station, to guard commissary stores there. (Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 246-248.)



half past six in the afternoon of the 30th of August to destroy all the railroad property and fall back on Centreville by a *détour* which carried him to Brentsville, far south of his direct march to Manassas, and many miles further than his nearest route to the crossing of Bull Run, showed that Pope believed Banks's corps to be in imminent peril from a forward movement of the enemy. Had Pope known that his order would not reach Banks until daylight of the 31st, he might perhaps have foreseen something of the apprehension which that general experienced when the dispatch<sup>1</sup> was received. We were at this time near Bristoe Station, on the north bank of Broad Run. The rain had fallen in torrents; the men had passed the night without shelter. The troops of Banks's corps were both dismal and hungry, but until the verbal order came for the destruction of everything around us, even to the ambulances, and for a precipitate flight, we were not dejected. Then we knew that we were again defeated, again falling back on the fortifications of Alexandria. There was no delay. On the west bank of Broad Run, on the track of the Orange and Alexandria Railway, were long trains of cars laden with the public property that we had transferred from the depots at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction.

It seemed but a moment until these trains were wrapped in flames. Saddles, stationery, clothing, muskets, cars, and engines, all were destroyed. Something might have been saved and carried away; indeed, some recruits without arms made efforts to arm themselves from the sacrifice, but orders for a precipitate movement were peremptory; nothing was rescued.<sup>2</sup> But

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*.

<sup>2</sup> See Record of the Second Massachusetts Infantry, by Rev. Alonzo H. Quint, page 125.

the ambulances and wagons of one division and one brigade of Banks's corps were not destroyed. In Greene's division and in Gordon's brigade, upon assurances given that the march should not thereby be delayed, they were saved.

The troops were urged onward in a headlong manner, without rest or refreshment, to the banks of the Broad Run at Brentsville. The river was rising rapidly, and there was no bridge. The column forded the stream, climbed the eastern bank, and hastened on. At every turn we looked for the appearance of the victors, or listened every moment for the sound of the opening cannon in pursuit. The road ran through a narrow cut in which men, animals, and artillery trains were crowded confusedly together. With men falling from exhaustion, to rise and plod on; with famished horses falling never to rise again, the corps of General Banks crossed Bull Run at noon at Blackburn's Ford, having made a circuit of twenty miles to accomplish the little more than four, via Manassas Junction, and to find at the end of our journey that some of those military *misérables* that never obey orders and never suffer through disobedience had marched without molestation straight forward through Manassas to our night's encampment. Across the run we formed, as directed, in order of battle, and awaited further events.

At forty-five minutes after ten in the morning, Pope announced to Halleck, at Washington, his arrival at Centreville, and his determination, though his army was much used up and worn out, to give the enemy as desperate a fight as he could force his men to stand up to. He should fight it, he said, "as long as a man would stand up to the work." But in thus announcing his purpose to immolate the whole army if necessary, Pope would like to know whether in such event Halleck felt

that Washington would be secure. Pope would fight to the bitter end, but he would put the responsibility upon Halleck. "You must judge," he wrote, "what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital."<sup>1</sup>

It is believed that we do no injustice to Pope if we affirm that he hoped to draw from Halleck an order to retire, without more fighting, within the forts around Alexandria. And in this we think he was justified, and that he had not exaggerated when he declared that his army was much used up and worn out. Indeed, this was apparent to an ordinary observer, even. For the depressing sights and scenes within the lines of a defeated army were more marked than usual in ours, because of the toils and privations and battles which we have recorded. Then the gloom of the morning, cold and rainy, added to the gloom of defeat. All along, from Cub Run to Centreville, there were stragglers, who had passed the night without shelter by the road-side or in the fields, dragging themselves wearily through muddy roads in search of their regiments. An officer of General Doubleday's staff has presented, in a history of those days, a vivid picture of the wagons, wrecked and forlorn; of the long lines of carriages to serve as ambulances for the wounded; of the sour and surly drivers, enraged at being seized by the provost-marshal at Washington, and sent forth at night, — and on such a night; of the half-formed regiments, and half-armed too, gathered as wanderers, and driven in by the patrols; of the unwashed, sleepy, and downcast aspect of men, as if they would like to hide their heads somewhere from all the world. And he has contrasted these with the divisions and brigades, well formed and

<sup>1</sup> Official correspondence, Pope to Halleck, from Centreville, at 10.45 A. M., August 31, 1862.

compact, that had moved back in good order, and were in position within and around the fortifications of Centreville.<sup>1</sup>

At eleven o'clock in the morning Halleck answered Pope's dispatch. In a gushing outburst of thanksgiving, he called Pope his dear general; told him he had done nobly; begged him not to yield another inch; and requested him to renew the attack. Reënforcements should be his;<sup>2</sup> all that Halleck could find it in his power to do should be done for him and his noble army; and God's blessing on him, and it was, by the commander-in-chief, piously invoked.<sup>3</sup>

Pope's reply to Halleck's dispatch was characteristic. It was even more Popish than his first of that day. He thanked his "dear general" for his considerate commendation, which, by the way, he would like "in such shape that the army might be acquainted with it." "The whole secession army," wrote Pope, "engaged us yesterday." "I received a letter from Lee," he continued, "this morning. Ewell is killed.<sup>4</sup> Jackson is badly wounded,<sup>5</sup> and other generals of less note wounded." Pope then revealed the plans of the enemy. He would undoubtedly attempt to turn his (Pope's) flank. If he did so, he would have his hands full. With an assurance that he should fight to the last and that his troops were in good heart, he closed his dispatches for the day.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bivouac and Battlefield, pages 141-144.

<sup>2</sup> General Couch would move to-day; part of his command went to Sangster's Station last night.

<sup>3</sup> Official correspondence, Halleck, from Washington, to Pope, eleven A. M., August 31, 1862.

<sup>4</sup> He was not, nor was he in the battle, nor did Lee write that he was killed.

<sup>5</sup> He was not wounded, nor was there the least authority in Lee's letter for such a report.

<sup>6</sup> Official correspondence, Pope to Halleck, Centreville, August 31, 1862.

But Halleck was on this day also engaged in an animated correspondence with McClellan. At fifteen minutes before one o'clock P. M., McClellan had received Halleck's second dispatch. His first, dated at eighteen minutes after nine in the morning, had, as we have seen, noticed McClellan's impressive and moving appeal of the 30th, to be permitted to go with his troops into action. This second dispatch was, if possible, more exasperating than the first. It did not even allude to McClellan's earnest application to go to the front.

That the subsistence department were making Fairfax Station their principal depot; that the officer in command there should secure it against cavalry by abattis; that new regiments should be prepared to take the field, and perhaps some of them be sent to Chain Bridge, was reeled off with official indifference and official disregard of that vital subject concerning which Halleck knew McClellan awaited a reply.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding this, however, McClellan, at half past two, without a manifestation of feeling, pointed out that, by the terms of the order issued from the War Department on the 30th,<sup>2</sup> he had no control over anything except his staff, about one hundred men in his

<sup>1</sup> See official correspondence, Halleck to McClellan, 12.45 P. M., August 31, 1862.

<sup>2</sup>

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 30, 1862.

The following are the commanders of the armies operating in Virginia: General Burnside commands his own corps, except those that have been temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope; General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command; General Pope commands the Army of Virginia and all the forces temporarily attached to it.

All the forces are under the command of Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief.

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

This order, which came to McClellan's notice on the 31st of August, was, so Colonel Townsend informed McClellan, published by order of the Secretary of War. See McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 340.

camp, and the few troops remaining near Fortress Monroe. He had no control over the new regiments, and did not know where they were, except that there were some near him, whose commanding officers, as well as those commanding works, were not under him. Where evils existed — and he had seen them — they had been corrected, but as to ordering new troops to Chain Bridge, or preparing them for the field, it was a matter to be directed by Generals Burnside and Casey; for by the order of the War Department he had no right to give orders to these officers.<sup>1</sup>

This view of the matter seemed to impress even Halleck that that vague impersonality, the War Department, had shown more zeal in attempting to degrade McClellan than judgment in fighting the Confederates; and he therefore hastened to write that McClellan would retain the command of everything "in this vicinity," and not temporarily with Pope in the field. Halleck had "not seen the order," he wrote, "as published."<sup>2</sup> Then, as if overwhelmed by the consciousness of his great need, in piteous words he appealed to McClellan "to assist me [him] in this crisis with your [his] ability and experience." "I am," he closed, "entirely worn out."<sup>3</sup>

General McClellan took Halleck at his word. At half past eleven o'clock at night he gave him frankly and fully his opinion both of the crisis and of the actors therein. He told him that it was clear from accounts received that we were badly beaten on the 30th, and

<sup>1</sup> Official correspondence, General McClellan to Halleck, 2.30 P. M., August 31, 1862, from Alexandria. (McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 339.)

<sup>2</sup> And yet he was commander-in-chief! Was he not consulted by Stanton?

<sup>3</sup> Official correspondence, General Halleck to McClellan, seven minutes past ten P. M., August 31, 1862. (McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, pages 340, 341.)

he advised that Burnside and Couch and everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, for he apprehended that unless Pope fell back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax Station he would be cut off entirely. He wrote that he had no confidence in Pope's dispositions; that there "appeared to be a total absence of brains," and he feared a total destruction of Pope's army. The occasion, he said, was grave, and grave measures were demanded. The question was one of the country's salvation. He had learned that our losses yesterday amounted to fifteen thousand men. Not one moment should be lost in the withdrawal of Pope to Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The squadron of regular second cavalry that I sent with General Sumner was captured to-day, about two P. M., some three miles from Fairfax Court House, beyond it, on the Little River turnpike, by Fitz-Hugh Lee with three thousand cavalry and three light batteries. I have conversed with the first sergeant, who says that when he last saw them they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that road, this squadron getting there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centreville but Sumner's corps. There was much artillery firing during the day. A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming towards Alexandria.

"It is clear from the sergeant's account that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. I recommend that no more of Couch's division be sent to the front; that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including the mass of troops on the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will or have, by this time, occupied Fairfax Court House, and cut off Pope entirely unless he falls back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax Station. I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made, as I gather them. To speak frankly, and the occasion requires it, there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you may have to send. The occasion is grave and demands grave measures. The question is the salvation of the country. I learn that our loss yesterday amounted to fifteen thousand. We cannot afford such losses without an object.

"It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost. I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. Please an-

At half past one in the morning of the 1st of September General Halleck replied to this dispatch. He could not order, he said, a retreat on the line of works at Alexandria. This must necessarily be done in case of a serious disaster; but until he had more definite information, he could not do it. He had heard from Pope up to four P. M. of the 31st; then he was all right. He should be up all night, and ready to act as circumstances might require. He was fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and he had been for many weeks. General McClellan was informed that Burnside had been (very early yesterday morning) ordered up to Washington, and he was directed to retain a portion of General Couch's division, and stop all retreating troops in line of works, or where he could best establish an outer line of defense.<sup>1</sup>

This correspondence led to an interview between Halleck and McClellan in Washington, in the afternoon of the first day of September, in which plans for strengthening the army and saving it from disaster were discussed. McClellan's best efforts were invoked in the mode indicated by Halleck in his correspondence. Pope's greatest need had been one of supplies and of reënforcements. For the want of them a fatal termination to his campaign might be expected. But now there came from Pope a demand more pressing than for supplies, a need more urgent than for reënforcements. His efforts, he declared, were paralyzed by traitors in his army. This revelation was made in a letter dated at Centreville, at ten minutes before nine

swer at once. I feel confident you can rely upon the information I give you. I shall be up all night and ready to obey any orders you give me." (Official correspondence, McClellan to Halleck, 11.30 P. M., August 31, 1862; McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, page 341.)

<sup>1</sup> General Halleck at Washington, 1.30 A. M., September 1, 1862, to General McClellan. (McClellan's Reports and Campaigns.)



A. M., and addressed to Halleck at Washington, whom it reached while McClellan was at the capital. The letter was filled with meanly artful complaints against his generals, with charges of lukewarmness against his troops, and with bluster in behalf of himself.

It was a tissue of misrepresentations. It was written to turn public censure towards worthy and brave men, that the real offender might escape.

In the recent vindication of General Fitz-John Porter, Pope has been condemned. In the rapidity with which he sought safety in flight, the insincerity of his bragging letter was revealed.

Pope began his communication by a reference to his army. Things were quiet; his men were resting, and they needed rest. He was obliged to keep considerable infantry along the road. His cavalry was completely broken down; there were not five horses to a company that could raise a trot. He should attack again to-morrow if he could; the next day certainly. Then he assailed his own troops. "I think it my duty," he continued, "to call your attention to the dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula. Every word and act and intention is discouraging, and calculated to break down the spirits of the men and produce disaster. One commander of a corps who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all, — worse still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, and in plain hearing at less than three miles' distance of a furious battle which raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he joined me next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier-general of which professed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville in

plain view of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the matter worse, these are both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is that the Army of the Potomac will not fight, that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsula, etc. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the influence is very bad amongst those of subordinate stations. You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief, and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you — I give it with perfect freedom, as I know you will not misunderstand it — is that, in view of any satisfactory results, you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work, in that secure place, to reorganize and rearrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough and grave enough to make some action very necessary. When there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men. Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me, under strong escort. I need them badly, — worse than I can tell you.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Official correspondence, Pope at Centreville, 8.50 A. M., September 1, 1862, to Halleck at Washington, Pope's Virginia Campaign, pages 250, 251.

This composition, so plainly acknowledging the incompetency of John Pope, and so plainly attempting to shirk responsibility for that incompetency, was shown to the President of the United States. Abraham Lincoln feared that these base accusations against Porter, and the baser insinuations against McClellan, as the fountain source of insubordination, — for these were the officers to whom Pope alluded, — might not be wholly false, and he hastened to plead with General McClellan in an interview which that officer has given in substance to the world. The interview was held at the house used by Halleck for his headquarters. McClellan was directed to come there to meet the President. We can bring before us at this hour the grave, almost sad, earnestness with which Abraham Lincoln informed General McClellan that he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully cooperating with and supporting Pope. And we can hear the President's affectionate entreaty when, as McClellan reports him, he said "he had always been a friend of mine," and asked me as a special favor to use my influence in correcting this state of things. Then followed at this interview McClellan's earnest reply that he was confident the President had been misinformed; for "whatever sentiment," he urged, "the army might entertain towards Pope, they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty." But the President desired McClellan to telegraph to "Fitz-John Porter, or some other of my [his] friends," and try to do away with any feelings that might exist. That McClellan could rectify the evil, and that no one else could, the President believed and said. Upon which General McClellan replied that he would telegraph to General Porter, or do anything else in his power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety. Abraham

Lincoln then thanked McClellan very warmly, assured him that he could never forget his action in the matter, and departed. McClellan immediately sent the following telegram. It was forwarded by General Halleck: —

“I ask, for my sake, and that of the country, and that of the old Army of the Potomac, that you [General Porter] and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial coöperation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our army, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful coöperation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that, for their country’s sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they have ever to me.” “I am in charge,” continued McClellan, “of the defenses of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe should that become necessary.”<sup>1</sup>

Pope’s letter of accusation had been potent for evil. The President was prejudiced against Porter; and this prejudice was manifest in his approval of the findings and sentence of that court-martial before which General Porter was arraigned for those grave offenses which were set forth in Pope’s letter. But the attempt to poison his mind against McClellan failed. Abraham Lincoln believed in General McClellan’s patriotism and in his ability. He was his friend; and he showed his great friendship by promoting him from the expressly limited jurisdiction of the works and garrison before Alexandria, and from the expressly prohibited exercise

<sup>1</sup> See McClellan’s report of his interview with Abraham Lincoln and telegram to General Porter, McClellan’s Reports and Campaigns, pages 341–344.

of any authority or control over the troops actively engaged in front under Pope, to both of which he had been verbally condemned by Halleck in his personal interview at Washington, to the sole and entire command of all the combined forces which met and vanquished, on the 15th and 17th of September, the victorious Confederate army at South Mountain and at Antietam.<sup>1</sup> This promotion was due to the President's own act and judgment. It was made in the face of, and in despite of, the evil counsels and mischievous interferences of his war secretary, Stanton, and his war secretary's abettor, Halleck.<sup>2</sup>

It is hardly necessary to say that General Porter, in replying to McClellan's telegram, indignantly disclaimed the need of any appeal to his loyalty. He denied with much feeling that his own men required such an appeal. "You may rest assured," he wrote, "that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have ever given, to General Pope their cordial coöperation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty."<sup>3</sup>

The concluding incidents of Pope's campaign were rapidly drawing to a close. At daybreak on the morning of the 1st of September, the Confederate troops moved rapidly forward to gain the rear of the Union army before it passed Fairfax Court House. Longstreet crossed the ford at Sudley and struck out for the Little River turnpike; while Jackson, who had bivouacked in the vicinity of Pleasant Valley, marched on Chantilly

<sup>1</sup> See McClellan's Reports and Campaigns, pages 341-344.

<sup>2</sup> See McClellan from Ball's Bluff to Antietam, Wilkes, page 21.

<sup>3</sup> General Fitz-John Porter, from Fairfax Court House, at ten A. M., September 2, 1862, to General George B. McClellan.

and Germantown, leaving Colonel Bradley T. Johnson to watch Centreville. Johnson took a position within two and one half miles of the place, and skirmished during the day with Federal cavalry.<sup>1</sup> Pope knew that the Confederates were moving to turn his right at Fairfax Court House, and he hurried his troops from Centreville in that direction; but he did not believe a battle would be fought until the next morning. He prepared to meet the enemy near Germantown, where the roads intersected along which the hostile forces were marching. Therefore Hooker was ordered to go in person to Fairfax Court House, and push forward with all the troops he could find to Germantown. McDowell was directed to march back as far as Difficult Creek, and there uniting with Hooker's left prolong Hooker's line.

Franklin was posted on the left and rear of McDowell. The remaining troops of Pope's army were disposed at right angles to Hooker's front. Thus Reno went to the north of the Centreville Fairfax road, in the direction of Chantilly. Heintzelman's corps formed on the road in rear of Reno. Sumner established his corps to the rear of Heintzelman's left; and Sigel and Porter united with Sumner's right. Banks, with the wagon trains of Pope's army, made his way along the old Brad-dock road, intending to debouch into the Little River turnpike to the eastward of Fairfax Court House.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See official report.

<sup>2</sup> HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA, FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE.

General Orders, No. —. The army corps of Heintzelman, Sigel, Sumner, Porter, and Reno, as soon after daylight as possible, will begin to draw slowly to their right, in the direction of Fairfax Court House, until they come closely in contact with each other. Major-General Reno will follow as closely as possible the line of the old railroad now occupied by him; the others along the pike. He will notify those in his rear of his exact position and every step of his movements, and will ask support if he needs it. They will not be more than half a mile in rear of him. If any severe

At eleven o'clock in the morning Pope wrote Halleck of the movements of the enemy on the Little River turnpike, avowed his purpose to attack him, and declared his belief that the battle would necessarily be desperate. Pope assured Halleck that he had nothing like the force Halleck undoubtedly supposed, and hoped all preparations would be made for a vigorous defense of the intrenchments around Washington.<sup>1</sup>

At twelve at noon Pope became convinced that Jackson would take the initiative and attack him before night-fall. The necessity for clearing the road of the miles upon miles of wagons that choked it became, therefore, both apparent and urgent. Until noon the trains had rolled onward leisurely. Army wagons laden with supplies, and captured carts for soldiers' use laden with knapsacks, with now and then an ancient Old Dominion vehicle with a load of equipments, followed by a slow-moving ox team or two, were plodding onward with deliberation to Fairfax Court House. Officers were stationed along the road to clear it; even

engagement should occur at any point of the line, the army corps commanders nearest on the right and left will immediately send forward a staff officer to report to the general commanding the troops of the attack, and to notify him that they are ready to support him if he needs it. For the present general headquarters will be at Fairfax Court House.

By command of GENERAL POPE.

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of General Pope from Centreville to Halleck at Washington, September 1, 1862, eleven A. M.

Pope's whole force at Centreville, as reported by him on the morning of September 1, 1862, was 62,000 men, as follows:—

In McDowell's corps . . . . .	10,000
" Sigel's " . . . . .	(about) 7,000
" Heintzelman's " . . . . .	6,000
" Reno's divisions . . . . .	6,000
" Banks's corps . . . . .	5,000
" Porter's " . . . . .	9,000
" Franklin's " . . . . .	8,000
" Sumner's " . . . . .	11,000
	<hr/>
	62,000

McDowell gave his personal attention to this work. Double lines of teams were formed, the broken-down animals were urged into a trot or something like it, the oxen and asses were crowded off the road, and all possible speed was made to shelter this immense caravan behind the fortifications of Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

Pope hastened to bring his troops into action. McDowell was hurried forward to occupy Germantown with his whole corps and two brigades, that had been sent to Fairfax Court House. On his right Hooker's division had formed, and on his left was Reno. At Difficult Creek on the Aldie road, one mile and one quarter in advance, Ricketts's division was drawn up, and a battery thrown over the valley to the west side. Major-General Hooker was specially assigned to this force.<sup>2</sup>

The command of Hooker's division in Heintzelman's corps fell to General Grover. This division and Kearny's were dispatched at four p. m. from Centreville for a point two and one half miles distant on the road to Fairfax Court House. Such were the dispositions which Pope hurriedly made, when late in the afternoon General Jackson found himself in presence of the Federal army at Ox Hill.<sup>3</sup> The Confederate troops had been pushed forward rapidly in single columns until Chantilly had been left behind, when the columns were doubled; and now, when the skirmishers became engaged on the Confederate right, the two brigades of Trimble and Hays, in Ewell's division, were on the right of the road, while Lawton's and Early's were on the left, with the artillery in the centre.

It has been said that at this time the main body of

<sup>1</sup> See Bivouac and Battlefield, pages 144-147.

<sup>2</sup> See McDowell's Official Report.

<sup>3</sup> A point between three and four miles from Fairfax Court House.



General Jackson's men were resting, hungry and exhausted, by the road-way; that on every side were bleak fields and forests; that scarce a roof was visible in the landscape; and that even the green corn and unripe apples which had furnished the sole subsistence of those half-famished troops for many days were wanting in this desolate region. But yet it was observed that the soldiers were not depressed or in ill humor, and that jest and laughter greeted even the slightest subject of merriment that arose along the lines.

And of the great commander himself a picture has been handed down for preservation. It is said of him that he was seated at the foot of a tree, but a step beyond the head of his column. Like many of his men he was asleep. With his chin drawn down upon his breast, his cap pulled over his eyes, and his hands crossed on his breast, he slept as peacefully as a child until aroused by the sound of his skirmishers, when he sprang to his feet, mounted his horse, and gave the order for an advance.<sup>1</sup>

Ox Hill is a ridge which extends obliquely across the turnpike, and is heavily wooded on either side. A road from Frying Pan past Milan's house runs along this ridge and into the Warrenton road between Centreville and Fairfax Court House. The Federals seemed to Jackson to be in line of battle with their right near Germantown and their left near Milan's house.

He determined to attack immediately. A Confederate line of battle was instantly formed, wholly to the south of the turnpike. General Hill, the most reliable and persistent and judicious fighter of Jackson's lieutenants, was thrown to the right; Ewell's division, on Hill's left,<sup>2</sup> formed the centre; and Jackson's old divis-

<sup>1</sup> Life of General Stonewall Jackson, by Cooke, pages 304, 306.

<sup>2</sup> Lawton commanded it.

ion<sup>1</sup> was drawn up on the left. To the north of the pike, upon an eminence, Jackson posted his artillery. The principal part of the fighting fell to Hill's division. The skirmishers in Gregg's brigade commenced firing while on the march, and line of battle was formed under a heavy fire. Two regiments in front, two supporting and one in reserve, with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets, made a rush to a fence. Here the whole command was formed in line.<sup>2</sup>

Branch's brigade<sup>3</sup> also pressed eagerly forward over an open field and through a piece of woods, up to the edge of a second field, where they were met in front and in flank by a hot Federal fire which they were unable to return. A Confederate regiment was ordered to the right. It was unsupported but held its ground. When Branch's brigade went forward, Field's brigade, led by Colonel Brockenbrough, accompanied it on its left. In a short time Brockenbrough sent word to Jackson that he was hard pressed. Pender was directed to aid him. Pender moved forward several hundred yards, and found himself in rear of Brockenbrough, in a thick wood. There was some confusion. Two of Pender's regiments passed to the right of Brockenbrough, and the remainder to his left. The left regiments strengthened Branch, and the right ones aided Thomas, whose brigade had been thrown in, to the left of Brockenbrough's, and there was an interval between the wings of Pender's command. The severe Federal fire which afflicted Branch spared not Pender's two regiments. In front and in flank it scourged them severely. Colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and captains went down before it like trees in a tornado. And

<sup>1</sup> Commanded by Starke.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, S. McGowan, commanding Gregg's brigade; 15 men killed, 89 wounded.

<sup>3</sup> Hill's division.

then there arose among the Confederates a cry — not unknown to the Federals, when they were getting the worst of a fight — that they were out of ammunition ; and General Branch, whose men had so far been most actively engaged, reported this want. He was ordered to hold on with the bayonet. With this weapon only Branch held his ground until dark, and then with the remainder of the division fell back to the field in rear of the woods. It has been officially reported that the men of Branch's brigade never enjoyed in so short a time more severe fighting,<sup>1</sup> or encountered a resistance which was more persuasive. At all events, under the influence of Federal pressure, no attempt was made by the Confederates to advance further than the open field which held the Federal troops.<sup>2</sup>

The movements made and the part taken by the Union troops in this attack have been so far described as may be found in the positions taken by the various corps and divisions when they were thrown squarely across the path and on the flanks of the Confederates.

Reno, among others, found himself at ten minutes before six o'clock in the evening between the Little River and Warrenton turnpikes, and about half a mile from the latter, when the left flank of Hill's division passed before him and within his range. It was then that the first outbreak took place ; then that the battle, into which the Confederates hurried, began.<sup>3</sup>

The fire from Reno's division had hardly rung out

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Brigadier-General James H. Lane, commanding Branch's brigade, who placed his loss at 14 killed, 92 wounded, and 2 missing.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, Brigadier-General W. D. Pender, who stated that his sixteenth and thirty-fourth North Carolina regiments suffered the most. Thomas's brigade was ordered to support Gregg, which it did with but little fighting, and Archer was held in reserve to support Gregg and Thomas.

<sup>3</sup> It was here that Branch, Pender, and Brockenbrough were so severely punished.

along his lines, when the march of Heintzelman's corps was arrested, and his troops faced rapidly to the left. Kearny too was promptly on the move in Reno's support, with Birney's brigade,—and not a moment too soon, for Stevens's division, which formed the left of Reno's command, was retiring in some disorder before very large bodies of the enemy. Stevens had fallen while gallantly fighting, and the regimental commanders were complaining that their men were without ammunition. Birney threw his troops at once into action. The fourth Maine became first engaged, then the one hundred and first, the fortieth and first New York, and lastly the third Maine. The fire poured into this command was "most murderous;"<sup>1</sup> and the force encountered was superior in numbers to Birney's own.

At this period Kearny came upon the field. He brought with him Randolph's battery and placed it in position on a knoll in rear of Birney's line. Randolph fired one hundred rounds of solid shot. But Birney's men were between him and the woods which held the Confederates, and his fire was therefore less effective.<sup>2</sup> When Stevens's division retired, a gap left on Birney's right was pointed out to Kearny, and a request made that Birney's brigade be thrown in to fill it. Kearny, in his usual gallant, "not to say reckless, manner,"<sup>3</sup> dashed past his lines to examine the ground. It was

<sup>1</sup> See Birney's Report. And General Jackson, for the Confederates, says that "the contest now raged with great fury, the enemy obstinately and desperately contesting the ground, until their Generals Kearny and Stevens fell in front of Thomas's brigade." General A. P. Hill says it was an obstinate contest, and General Branch, of the same service, adds to his report that the engagement was regarded by his brigade as one of its severest. See Official Reports of Generals Jackson, Hill, and Branch. Hill gives as the total loss in his division, 39 killed and 267 wounded.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report, Captain George E. Randolph, commanding Battery E, First Rhode Island Artillery.

<sup>3</sup> Heintzelman's official report of the death of General Kearny.

growing dark: A terrific thunder-storm had broken over the two armies. The rain fell in torrents, and the lightning overpowered with its splendor the flashes of musketry and of artillery. The thunder claps were deafening. The roaring storm "lashed the woods into a fury which drowned the noise of the guns."<sup>1</sup> The fearless Kearny galloped into the woods before him. In the indistinct light the forest was filled with gloom. Unconsciously he plunged into the edge of the enemy's line. He confronted a private soldier, but in the half darkness he did not know that that soldier was an enemy. Kearny had hardly inquired for the position of one of Reno's regiments when he discovered his mistake. In an instant he turned his horse's head towards the Federal lines. Bending low in his saddle he plunged his spurs into his horse; but alas, in vain! It was the last moment in the earthly career of this gallant soldier. The Confederate leveled his musket and fired. The aim was unerring. Kearny was pierced through the body. He fell mortally wounded from his horse. In that merciless storm that beat upon it, in that dark forest that enfolded it, the lifeless body of the brilliant and dashing Kearny was found by the enemy and returned the next morning under a flag of truce to his comrades. He died as he had wished to die, fearlessly charging alone upon the enemy. It was but the repetition of that heroic charge before the gates of the Mexican capital, for which he had offered his right arm as a compensation.<sup>2</sup>

General Birney waited in vain for Kearny's return. Had he been captured? Time was precious. Two fresh regiments<sup>3</sup> were thrown forward, and Birney's

<sup>1</sup> Cooke's Life of "Stonewall" Jackson, pages 304-306.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*.

<sup>3</sup> The thirty-eighth New York and fifty-seventh Pennsylvania.

command remained in undisputed possession of that portion of the battle-field on which the Union forces had been engaged. Later at night the brigades of Robinson and Berry relieved the wearied regiments of Birney.<sup>1</sup> Until three o'clock in the morning of the 2d of September, the Union forces held their line; then they were withdrawn to resume with the whole of Pope's army the march to Fairfax Court House.

In this brief but savage conflict only a small number of troops were engaged on either side. The whole of Hooker's division, commanded by Grover, had made but about two miles from Centreville,<sup>2</sup> when the troops heard the firing in Reno's division and were ordered up to support Kearny's left. They advanced to the front and remained there until two o'clock of September 2d, when with the whole army they fell back.<sup>3</sup>

The Union cavalry was utterly broken down and worn out. There were not five horses to a company that could be forced into a trot. To reconnoitre with such a force, or to cover the front of his army with it, Pope found absolutely impossible.<sup>4</sup> Buford moved with his gaunt and exhausted animals along the Centreville road under protection of the infantry. In a manner which appeals strongly to our sympathies for these poor

<sup>1</sup> Robinson on the left of Kearny's division, with Graham's battery and Berry's brigade, commanded by Colonel Poe of the Second Michigan Infantry, advanced one half mile from the Centreville road, where after relieving Birney's brigade they held the advanced picket line, and, formed in regimental columns, remained on the battle-field unmolested until the march of the Union army was resumed at an early hour next morning. The loss in Berry's brigade from picket firing was two killed, one wounded, and one missing. (Official Reports of Brigadier-General John C. Robinson, and Colonel Orlando M. Poe, second Michigan regiment, commanders of brigades.)

<sup>2</sup> They left Centreville at four o'clock in the afternoon.

<sup>3</sup> See Official Reports of General Grover and Colonel J. B. Carr, commanding third brigade, Hooker's division.

<sup>4</sup> Pope's Official Report.

animals, Colonel Lloyd, commanding a cavalry regiment, relates that with his regiment and the Ninth New York and two companies of the First Connecticut Cavalry he was ordered to join Buford, then on the road leading from Centreville to Fairfax Court House. Buford's trail led northward from the main road up to the rear of Reno's line. Colonel Lloyd heard both the fire of the Confederate skirmishers and the reply of the Union troops, but he made no effort to move beyond Reno's left, none to examine the country and the approach of the hostile forces coming from that direction. Following the course taken by Buford, the right of Reno's line was passed at a time when the battle seemed to be hottest, and loudest the roar of that terrible storm, to overtake Buford at night, who was only one hundred yards from the Centreville pike on a road that ran northward towards Leesburg. The Federal cavalry was practically surrounded by Federal infantry.<sup>1</sup>

The corps commanded by General Banks was summoned to take part in this battle. From the position to which it had been assigned near Centreville it had pursued the old Braddock road towards Washington. The sound of Reno's musketry brought it to the front. Williams's division was drawn up in line in the edge of the woods in rear of Reno's troops. Bullets flew over our heads, and through the forest, as we kept watch in the cold and cheerless hours of that night of lightning and of storm, waiting for the summons that should send us forward into the more deadly arena of the battle. We were to be held in constant readiness; men must not slumber; we were to conceal our position from the enemy; the bivouac must be fireless. Crouching under

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Colonel W. R. Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel Westchky, commanding First Maryland Cavalry; Major C. McLean Knox, commanding Ninth New York Cavalry.

blankets in the dismal hours of that night of horrors, we passed in cold, in flood, and in hunger through such bodily torture that even the battle-field would have been a relief.

On the side of the Confederates neither in the old Stonewall division nor in Ewell's was there much fighting. In the latter, the two brigades of Trimble and Hays were thrown into the edge of the field in which the Federals were posted. They were on the right of the Stonewall division. In their rear, in the woods, were Early and Lawton. Hays's brigade was attacked by the Federals and fell back into the woods in confusion. Three regiments of Early's brigade advanced and replaced it. When darkness came on, in conjunction with all of General Jackson's corps, they fell back to the woods and fields in rear. This was the last effort made that night to retard Pope's march, and it had failed. The Confederates were fairly defeated. Branch had suffered severely from the front and flank fire which Reno had poured into him, and much complaint was made, both from him and from all of Jackson's troops, of the heavy and blinding rain storm that beat directly into their faces.<sup>1</sup>

It is said that during this contest Jackson received a message from one of his generals of brigade that he would have to fall back as his men could not, on account of the rain, use their muskets. "Tell him to hold his ground," Jackson replied; "if his guns will not go off, neither will the enemies'."<sup>2</sup>

In this combat no service worth recording was rendered on either side by the artillery, for the ground on

<sup>1</sup> So severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch's brigade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back. The brigades of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender were then thrown into the fight. (Official Report, General Jackson.)

<sup>2</sup> Life of Jackson, by Cooke, page 304.



which the combatants met and the darkness of the night precluded its efficient use. Nor were Longstreet's troops brought into action. Before they had advanced beyond Chantilly, Jackson's attack had ended, and Longstreet did not think it wise to advance and renew it.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps he was influenced by the thickness of the night and the tempest. But Union soldiers also labored heavily under these disadvantages. Nor were sufferings from this cause confined altogether to those who were directly engaged on the field. About four in the afternoon General Doubleday was ordered to proceed to Fairfax Station to protect the public property sent there by rail from Alexandria for the use of Pope's army. . Hardly had the troops marched through Fairfax Court House, when the storm almost swept them from the road. The men staggered on through a roadway of water, striving in vain to protect their drenched bodies with soaked blankets and their arms from the flood. Even the footing of the horses was unsteady. Fairfax Station was reached at night. It was very dark, the fields had become marshes, and in them it was necessary for the wearied troops of Doubleday's brigade to make their cheerless bivouac, while in the pitiless storm the outlying sentinels shivered on their watch.<sup>2</sup>

It was on such a day, closing in with such a night, that Halleck replied to Pope's request for a complimentary order to his army, that he would like to issue such an order, but owing to daily fighting it could hardly be distributed. Then turning from compliments, which in this bitter hour of threatened annihilation Pope had found time and inclination to supplicate,

<sup>1</sup> Longstreet's Official Report. General D. R. Jones sent Toombs's and Anderson's brigades into the woods to find the Federals, but they did not advance far enough to find them. (Official Report, General D. R. Jones.)

<sup>2</sup> See Bivouac and Battlefield, pages 144, 147.





## EXPLANATORY TABLE OF PLATE IV.

*The battle of Chantilly, fought in the evening and night of September 1, 1862.*

### DISPOSITION AND ATTACK OF THE FEDERAL ARMY.

- A A** Grover's brigade, two miles from Centreville.
- B B B B** Kearny's division.
- C C C** Reno's divisions.
- D** Buford's cavalry.
- E E E** Reynolds's division.
- F F F** McDowell with King's division of his own corps and other troops gathered on the road and about Fairfax Court House.
- G G G G** Hooker thrown forward to Difficult Creek with Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps and a battery beyond the creek.
- O O** Doubleday's brigade en route to Fairfax Station.
- P P P** Banks's corps in position in woods behind the pike, where it was ordered while en route to Fairfax Court House. Here it remained during the night of September 1st and until the morning of the 2d.

### CONFEDERATE ARMY.

- H H H** Four brigades of the old "Stonewall" division under Starke.
- K K** Ewell's division, with brigades of Hays and Trimble in front, Early and Lawton in the rear.
- L L L L** A. P. Hill's division, with Branch's brigade on the right, then Brockenbrough, Pender, Thomas, Gregg, and Archer.
- M M M** Batteries on hill on left of road.
- N N N** Bradley T. Johnson's brigade, watching Centreville.



Halleck grimly advised his lieutenant to look out that the enemy did not get between him and the forts around Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

To avert, if he could, the fatal consequences of such a movement Pope turned his eyes anxiously, in the early dawn of the 2d of September, towards the position of the enemy, to discover if possible whether there was to be another conflict before the worn and wasted Federals were to be permitted to fall back to the strong intrenchments in their rear.

That the Confederate troops were in motion towards the Potomac was plainly to be seen; but whether for the invasion of Maryland, or to turn Pope's right flank once more in this campaign, was a question of doubt. The Federal commander assumed that Lee's intents were hostile, and made preparations to meet him east of Difficult Creek, on the road from Flint Hill to Fairfax Court House.

Since three o'clock in the morning the troops that had been engaged with the head of Jackson's column had been coming into Fairfax Court House, until at daylight the whole of Pope's army was there, and in readiness to move to any desired position.<sup>2</sup> But no defensive line was in fact taken; for before the two and one half miles to Flint Hill, which Pope intended to hold, was occupied by his troops, he became aware not only that the enemy would molest him no further, but that Halleck had approved his application and ordered him to fall back to the forts before Alexandria.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Halleck to Pope, September 1, 1862.

<sup>2</sup> Kearny's division under General Birney followed at three A. M. the divisions of General Reno to Fairfax Court House. Hooker's division arrived at the same place about sunrise. See Official Reports of General Birney, commanding Kearny's division, and Colonel Carr, commanding third brigade, Hooker's division.

<sup>3</sup> See Heintzelman's Official Report that at 9.30 he was told that he

About noon of the 2d of September Pope received Halleck's order to draw back his army to the intrenchments in front of Washington,<sup>1</sup> and the last march of the army commenced.<sup>2</sup> The route to be taken by each corps, and its objective point, was announced.

Banks was to move by the Braddock road and Anandale for Fort Worth, Franklin and Hooker to pursue the Little River turnpike towards Alexandria, Heintzelman to follow the Braddock road to Fort Lyon, McDowell the route by Fall's Church, Little River, and Columbia pikes towards Fort Craig and Tillinghast, the corps of Porter, Sumner, and Sigel, with Sumner in rear, to march by Vienna towards Chain Bridge. This was the most exposed line; it was nearer to the enemy, and the troops were therefore cautioned to hold themselves prepared for a conflict. Banks was to guard the rear along the Braddock road and Hooker to perform a similar service on the Little River turnpike.

Buford, with his cavalry, was ordered to cover the exposed corps moving on Vienna, and Bayard those marching on the road south of it. General Banks was further ordered to call in the forces from Sangster's and Fairfax Station, to break up the depot at the latter place and ship all the stores by rail to Alexandria. The wagon trains, the sick, and the wounded were to follow the Little River turnpike, along which Reno was ordered to move immediately for Alexandria. Staff officers were directed to inform McClellan of the approach of corps to points designated.<sup>3</sup>

would occupy the road beyond Flint Hill to Vienna, and that Sumner would occupy Flint Hill.

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Official Report.

<sup>2</sup> In the circular published from Pope's headquarters at Fairfax Court House it was carefully stated that the movement was made "in accordance with instructions from the War Department."

<sup>3</sup> See Pope's Official Report in his *Virginia Campaign*, pages 254, 255.

Thus it came about that McClellan's command was enlarged to embrace the whole Army of Virginia. But few hours since Halleck had notified McClellan that not a man serving with that army in the field should be commanded by him. Now a change had come. Early in the morning Halleck sent an officer of his staff<sup>1</sup> to the Army of Virginia to report upon its condition. The report was alarming. That the army was in full retreat for the defenses of Washington, and that the roads were filled with stragglers, was communicated to President Lincoln, and it startled him. With Halleck, the President met McClellan at the latter's headquarters in Washington. There, imparting the information he had received, the President expressed the opinion "that our affairs were in a bad condition." He then ordered McClellan to "take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers, to place the works in a proper state of defense, to go out, meet and take command of the army when it approached the vicinity of the works, and put the troops in the best position for defense." Everything was committed to McClellan's care. The only published order to this effect ever issued emanated from the War Department, on the 2d of September, 1862. It reads as follows:—

"Major-General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defenses of the capital.

"By order MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK.

"E. D. TOWNSEND,

"*Assistant Adjutant-General.*"

Not a moment was lost in carrying out the orders of the President. A letter was dispatched by McClellan to Pope containing Halleck's order of the morning to

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Kelton, Assistant Adjutant-General.



withdraw the Army of Virginia to Washington without unnecessary delay. This double precaution was taken at Halleck's request.

The forts towards which Pope's troops should be directed were pointed out. Those corps which from a previous knowledge of the grounds were familiar with them determined the selection of the different garrisons. In the afternoon McClellan crossed the Potomac, and rode to the front. At Upham's hill he met the advance of McDowell's corps. At its head were Pope and McDowell.

While making important inquiries concerning the approaching columns, heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of the road leading from Vienna to Langley on the Leesburg and Georgetown turnpike, which Pope said was probably General Sumner engaging the enemy. If so, it was an attempt to break the passage of Porter's, Sigel's, and Sumner's corps in their march for Chain Bridge. Attended by a single aid and three orderlies, McClellan galloped rapidly towards this command, joined it after dark, and continued with it as far as Lewinsville. Enough was now seen to satisfy McClellan that Sumner was in no danger, and he sent to him, and gave in person to Porter and Sigel, instructions as to the positions they were to occupy; then he returned late at night to Washington city, the commander-in-chief once more of the old Army of the Potomac.

The march of the other corps of the army was executed without delay or adventure. Doubleday, with his brigade, returned from Fairfax Station to Fairfax Court House at eight in the morning, to halt at sunset with McDowell's corps in the vicinity of Hall's and Munson's hills and Arlington.

At twenty minutes of twelve at noon, General Heint-

zelman left Fairfax Court House to pursue, unmolested, the old Braddock road as far as Fort Lyon.<sup>1</sup>

Banks brought up the rear. For hours his corps remained listlessly by the road-side. Whether the delay in its march was due to the duties required of it at Sangster's and Fairfax Station, or to the slow movements of Heintzelman's corps, General Banks has not revealed. It is fair to presume, however, that Banks had fully obeyed Pope's instructions before he gave the order to march.<sup>2</sup> The column moved rapidly forward over the narrow and broken road that led by Annandale into the Little River turnpike towards Fort Worth. Late in the afternoon, near sunset, we had halted. The troops were very tired, the artillery and baggage horses were almost used up. Gordon's brigade was resting near a running stream. The overpowering fatigues of this campaign of misfortunes were drawing to a close. We may have indulged in brighter hopes for the future; we certainly did in congratulations that we were nearing the end of the present. But our musings were interrupted by the approach of Major Perkins of Banks's staff, who, inquiring for General Gordon, delivered a verbal order from Banks to withdraw his brigade and a battery from the column, and, as soon as the road was relieved from the march of troops, to return to *Fairfax*, and load government stores in wagons for conveyance to Alexandria. This order was more amazing than any order ever before received from Banks. Perkins was perplexed. I requested him to repeat his instructions,

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Carr, commanding the third brigade of Hooker's division, went into camp about twelve miles from Fairfax Station. General Grover's command seems to have been somewhat spread out along the road. The twenty-sixth Pennsylvania came into Fort Lyon at night; the eleventh and sixteenth Massachusetts reached a bivouac near there.

<sup>2</sup> Dispatch received from Banks on this day that wagon trains in his charge had all been brought in safely, — nothing lost. (Pope's Virginia Campaign, page 265.)

and to inform me to which Fairfax, the station or the court house, the order applied, and he confessed that he did not know.<sup>1</sup> Did he think a brigade could make its way alone with a battery to Fairfax Station, from whence our army had withdrawn many hours since, — a station even now occupied by the enemy, where the sounds of artillery, firing upon our rear guard, could be heard and the enemy's movements seen?<sup>2</sup> And if Fairfax Station<sup>3</sup> was intended, was the return there at that time more feasible? Perkins hastened to disclaim any responsibility either for the order or for the selection of my command. Nor did he know from whom the order to Banks had emanated, nor when, this morning or yesterday; when Doubleday was at Fairfax Station at daylight, or when Pope's army was at Fairfax Court House at noon. He had but repeated what he had received, and it was so absurd that he apologized: he "could n't help it." Banks was near; he was reclining in an ambulance. Since the battle of Cedar Mountain he had in this manner followed his corps.<sup>4</sup>

He had sent me an order! Did he wish me to attempt at that hour to return with a single brigade and a battery far to the rear of the whole Army of Virginia, and there attempt to recover stores which, if not before removed, must inevitably have fallen by this time into the hands of the enemy?

He did!

Might I ask him when he received the order for this service?

<sup>1</sup> The road that connects these places is from three to three and a half miles long. The Braddock road intersects this road midway.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson, and Life of "Stonewall" Jackson, by Cooke, page 307.

<sup>3</sup> On the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

<sup>4</sup> General Banks had been disabled by an accident after that battle. See Gordon's History of the Second Massachusetts Regiment, part iii., page 199.

This afternoon !

But when was it issued ?

He did not know !

When dated ?

It bore none !

Was it not manifest, then, that General Pope, from whom this mythical order purported to have emanated, had sent it or caused it to be sent at some remote period, probably yesterday, when the Fairfaxes, station or court house, were in our possession ; when there were stores there, and when our whole army was there to protect them ?

He did not know !

Could he not account for the reception of this order at this time by the delay arising from a wandering orderly, who in the present confusion had passed last night and much of to-day in a fruitless effort to find him ?

He " did not know, sir " !

Was the orderly here now ?

He was not !

Expressing my opinion of the matter as here denoted by my interrogations, and not withholding my judgment that Banks would be entirely justified in passing this order by, without attempting its execution, I asked him if he would not relieve me from an attempt to execute it.

He " could not do so, sir " !

Would he allow me to take the responsibility of failure to obey it ?

He could not !

Did he then insist upon my return to Fairfax ?

He did !

To which then of the two Fairfaxes would he advise me to return ?

He "did not know" !

But they were at the opposite ends of a north and south road five miles long ; and under the circumstances it was very material to know which Fairfax the order contemplated ! What would he do ?

"I would go, sir," said Banks, "first to Fairfax Court House, and if I found there were no provisions there to load, I would then go to Fairfax Station."<sup>1</sup>

With a feeling of contempt, which possibly found some form of silent expression, I turned from the recumbent general. Although obedience to these instructions would have taken me far in rear of our whole army at night, alone and unsupported, I made haste to obey. The march of Banks's column had been resumed. With the consciousness that every step carried them nearer the night's bivouac at Fort Worth, my poor fellows were bravely plodding on when I ordered the head of the column to halt, and form in the thick woods that lined the way. Thus the narrow road was cleared for the passage of troops in our rear, and until this was accomplished my return was impossible. The feelings which were predominant in my brigade when the orders I had received became known, it would have been difficult to describe.

Some colonels asked questions in tones which precluded the necessity for a reply. One colonel, especially brave and soldierly, shrugged his shoulders above his ears, and — held his tongue.

The men could only look dejected, and when the way at last was cleared, with faces turned towards the spot where in the storm they had passed a sleepless night,

<sup>1</sup> This would have involved, first, a return over the Braddock road to the road connecting the station and court house; thence near two miles to Fairfax Court House, where, if this was not the Fairfax contemplated in the order, I should have been yet four miles from the other Fairfax.

they planted their feet heavily and raised them wearily in the march. We had not proceeded far, when in the waning light the rear guard of Banks's corps stood in our pathway. Its commander viewed my approach with an astonishment which found voice in a moment in the emphatic question, —

“Pray, where are you going?”

“To Fairfax!”

“To Fairfax!” (Satirical.) “And how will you get there?”

“Why do you ask?”

“Can you whip the whole rebel army?”

“Is the whole rebel army at Fairfax?”

“Look there, and judge for yourself,” replied the commander of the rear guard.

Over towards Fairfax Court House, and to the eastward, the air was filled with smoke. Stuart's horse artillery, supported by all his cavalry, pursued our columns along the Little River turnpike and on the road towards Vienna.<sup>1</sup>

Listening for some time to the roar of the artillery, and watching the constantly rising clouds of smoke that seemed slowly to advance along our parallel road towards Alexandria, I resolved at length that it would not be practicable to make a further attempt to reach either of the Fairfaxes until I had in person reported what I had discovered, to Banks. I instructed Colonel Ruger, my senior colonel, to remain where we were until my return, if he could hold himself in that position without serious resistance; but in no event to withdraw before the rear guard.

<sup>1</sup> “General Stuart pushed to Fairfax Court House about noon, and reported that they [Federals] were in full retreat. The cavalry and Stuart's horse artillery continued to follow up the retreat for many miles.” (Life of “Stonewall” Jackson, by Cooke, page 307.)

While we were moving to the front, General Banks had moved to the rear, and could not be overtaken until his ambulance had passed over some miles of the turnpike from Annandale to Alexandria; and then it was quite dark. I informed him of the situation, as I have here recorded it. In my judgment, I said, obedience to your order is impossible. Will you relieve me from its execution? I cannot do so, sir! was the formal and stereotyped reply.

Returning to my brigade I found that Colonel Ruger had followed with the rear guard to near where the Braddock road unites with the Alexandria turnpike, and here I joined him. Groping in the darkness, the column at a late hour in the night rested near its destination at Fort Worth.

It was not true, as reported to me by the commander of the rear guard of Banks's corps, that the whole rebel army was in pursuit. Early's brigade of Ewell's division had moved forward four hundred yards from the lines taken by it, when it fell back at the close of the last night's battle at Chantilly, and two divisions of General Longstreet's corps and Johnson's brigade of Taliaferro's division had marched northward towards Drainsville.<sup>1</sup>

With this exception, the whole command of Lieutenant-General Jackson and the division of General Jones of Longstreet's corps remained at Ox Hill. General D. H. Hill had also arrived at Chantilly with a fresh division of troops. He left Hanover Junction on the 26th of August, and joined Lee on the 2d of September. This large force was quite near enough to the Fairfaxes to have destroyed my brigade.

But little, if any, assistance could I have received

<sup>1</sup> Official Reports of Generals Early, Longstreet, and Bradley Johnson, of operations, September 2, 1862.

from our own cavalry. A portion of one brigade, detailed under Colonel Beardsley to cover the three corps moving by Vienna and Langley to Chain Bridge, was pursued and fired upon with two pieces of artillery when only a short distance from Fairfax Court House ; and this pursuit was continued until midnight, to the cross roads near Vienna, where, in a thick wood, a volley of musketry from the dismounted Confederate cavalry, that killed several and wounded about twenty of Colonel Beardsley's command, was delivered as a parting Confederate compliment.<sup>1</sup>

The remaining cavalry under General Bayard followed after and covered General Hooker's march along the Little River turnpike to Alexandria.<sup>2</sup>

At ten minutes after seven in the evening, Pope arrived in person at Ball's Cross Roads. From there he announced to Halleck that he had arrived in safety, that all his troops would be in camp within the intrenchments in half an hour, except the three corps on the Vienna and Chain Bridge road, and that these would be in by to-morrow morning. His troops were very weary, he said, but otherwise in good condition. He did not himself believe that any attack upon the intrenchments was contemplated. The enemy still continued, he wrote, to beat around to the north. He awaited Halleck's orders.<sup>3</sup> And this brings us to the close of General Pope's command of the Army of Virginia. He was relieved, as he informed the public, at his own urgent application, and sent at his own request to the Department of the Northwest. He went complaining that his campaign had been misunderstood to

<sup>1</sup> Official Report of Colonel Beardsley, Ninth New York Cavalry, commanding cavalry brigade, and Major Knox, Ninth New York Cavalry.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Report, Colonel W. R. Lloyd, Sixth Ohio Cavalry.

<sup>3</sup> Pope's Official Report.



an extent unparalleled in the history of warfare, and that when he entered upon it he expected that it would be. His anticipations, therefore, were as clear as his convictions. But neither his anticipations nor his convictions are justified by history. For when he officially avows that never in his campaign could he have hoped to fight a successful battle, and that the utmost of his expectation was that he could gain a partial victory, and that once he did have this opportunity, but that through others' offenses even that was lost to him,<sup>1</sup> we have but to refer, not to what Pope officially reported after his campaign, but to what he did during his campaign, to refute him.

It may be said of his expectations, that he hoped to win victories either by solid fighting or by furious proclamations which should frighten General Lee, who knew him, or General Jackson, who was a serious man, trusted in God, and hated the father of liars.

Southern writers affirm that Pope's blunders in his short campaign were as numerous as it was possible to make them. Is this an exaggeration, or is Pope's campaign open to severe criticism?

<sup>1</sup> General Pope closed his official report by declaring that he was expected "to confront with a small army vastly superior forces; to fight battles without hope of victory; to gain time; to embarrass and delay forward movements of the enemy;" that with the immensely superior forces of the enemy he could "*at no time*" have hoped to fight a successful battle; that the enemy was able to outflank him and bear him to the dust, and it was only through watchfulness, hazardous skirmishes, and battles that his forces were not overwhelmed, while the enemy was embarrassed and delayed until forces from the Peninsula were assembled. A faint hope he had, however, that by some opening or imprudence he could gain a partial victory; and this hope became strong when the long-looked-for imprudence was committed by Jackson when he detached himself from Lee and struck the Federal depots at Manassas Junction.

But, alas! Pope was doomed to disappointment even here; for although he declares his military dispositions to have been the best possible under the circumstances, everything was frustrated "by causes well understood." See Pope's Official Report.

The conclusions to which I have come, and which I will here again repeat, fully justified that severity of Southern criticism which Pope did not anticipate, and which his defenders will not accept.

Pope began his campaign at Cedar Mountain with a blunder. He sent such a general as Banks to fight such a general as Jackson, and this too with an insufficient force, while reserves resting tranquilly within supporting distance were not ordered forward because Banks did not ask for reënforcements. Had all the Federal forces on the field been engaged at Cedar Mountain, Jackson would have been whipped. That we were defeated was due to the confidence which a good commander would not have reposed in a mere politician.

Pope repeated his blunder when he allowed Jackson to turn his right and gain Bristoe Station, without any knowledge of this hostile movement. And he continued it when he trailed his whole army to Manassas Junction on a vain pursuit of a small detachment of the enemy.

That Pope's whole force could have whipped Jackson's whole force when detached from the main Confederate army is undeniable. An opportunity was given to thrust the whole Federal army between the commands of Longstreet and Jackson, and this too when the former was struggling in the narrow passes of the Bull Run Mountains, where a small well supported Federal force could have kept at bay a large Confederate one.

But of this advantage Pope was seemingly ignorant. He allowed an insufficient and an undecided command to occupy a vantage ground from which, when Longstreet threatened, it turned in flight. Deprived of all support what else was left for it to do? At the same

time that Longstreet was thus pressing rapidly forward, the demented Federal commander dragged his whole army through Manassas Junction to the east of Jackson's front, leaving Longstreet, unopposed, to unite with Jackson. After this union, Pope gave battle, denying that Lee's two wings were united, and though whipped claimed a victory. On the 30th Pope thought that Lee was running away, and he started to run after him. Thus Porter became engaged and a heavy battle followed, and Pope officially declared that what he did, he did only to embarrass and delay *forward* movements of the enemy. He now claimed the reward of a martyr. Pope impaired, if he did not destroy, the efficiency of his cavalry. He sent it in every direction for useless purposes or for unimportant discoveries. What he should not have done he did with frightful energy, and what he should have done he culpably neglected to do.

In no action in Pope's campaign were the troops properly handled. Attacking lines or columns were never properly supported. There was no want of troops. They lay idly around until the crisis had passed, when they were pressed forward to a useless sacrifice. Thus the bravest were cruelly slaughtered.

Whipped in detail should be Pope's epitaph.

Neither in manœuvring nor in fighting had Pope any strategy. He made no flanking movements; he displayed no threatening force to divert the enemy's attention from a real attack. It was all groping and murder in driblets.

Pope has declared that he stood between Lee and the capital; that he averted the blow that was aimed at the city of Washington itself. But history says that General Lee marched from Richmond to arrest Pope's forward movement threatening Gordonsville; that un-

*expectedly* he had moved from victory to victory, easily brushing away all opposition until an open path-way into Maryland lay before him, and that an invasion of the North seemed *then* for the first time possible ; that it was when the pieces on the great chess-board of war so suddenly changed that General Lee determined on movements not before contemplated.<sup>1</sup> But there remains Pope's cry of his desperate situation from the smallness of his command, and his false accusation that, even of this, Porter's corps, "from unnecessary and unusual delays, and frequent and flagrant disregard of his orders," took no part whatever except in the action of the 30th of August.<sup>2</sup>

Pope's attempt to justify himself by condemning others fails as signally as does his effort at vindication from the cry of smallness of his command. For not only did his numbers equal those of his antagonist,<sup>3</sup> but there is nothing to show that Pope required any larger force than he had, to perform the duty demanded of him ; while there is abundant evidence that he had force enough, if it had been properly used, to successfully accomplish all that he ought to have attempted. He complains of much straggling in his army, and that he suffered thereby ; and he waxes indignant over this evil, while shutting his eyes to the forced marches by night as well as by day until there was scarcely a half day's intermission for rest beginning with Cedar Mountain and ending at Alexandria. But weariness and want of sleep were not all. The troops were separated from their supplies, and many generals as well as privates had nothing but what could be picked up in orchards

<sup>1</sup> See Cooke's *Life of General R. E. Lee*, pages 124, 125.

<sup>2</sup> "Only this small fraction (20,500 men) of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing ever drew trigger under my command or in any way took part in that campaign." (Pope's Official Report.)

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*.

or corn-fields. And in addition to all that Pope's campaign inflicted through daily and nightly marching and fighting for fifteen days, the troops that joined him from the Army of the Potomac were hurried off from Alexandria without artillery or wagons, and many of the field officers without horses. These men had been hard marched and had suffered with hard fare before they had been crowded on transports and shipped to Pope. At Fairfax Station, on the 2d of September, in Heintzelman's two divisions there were but five thousand men left to draw rations; Hooker's division of this corps was ten thousand strong when it landed near Yorktown, in April, 1862. After the battle of Fair Oaks it was reënforced by three thousand. But at Fairfax Station, on September 2d, the whole division drew rations for only two thousand six hundred men. A like reduction and for the same reasons was suffered in Kearny's division.<sup>1</sup>

In the cavalry regiments the losses of horses were excessive. Constantly over-worked and hardly ever fed, not a day passed but from one to ten died from exhaustion. In the Sixth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, numbering but five hundred and ninety-six men, there was an absolute need of four hundred and forty-eight horses, to render the regiment effective.<sup>2</sup>

But we must turn from a review of the causes which led to the disasters of Pope's campaign to the events which followed in the wake of Lee's forward movement from Richmond to save Gordonsville from Federal occupation. These events determined an invasion of the Northern States.

<sup>1</sup> This apparent discrepancy between the killed, wounded, and missing of Heintzelman's corps, as given in the Appendix, and the absentees at Fairfax Station, can only be accounted for by the large number of sick, detached, and stragglers.

<sup>2</sup> Official Report of Colonel Lloyd, commanding regiment.

Pope had been crowded back until Lee could, without molestation, move over the shortest line to Frederick City in Maryland. For this invasion both the time and the temper of his army seemed most fortunate. The Southern troops were elated at the successes they had won, and they were confident that future victories would crown their efforts. The fair fields of Virginia were to be relieved from the horrors of war, and the woe and the desolation that the Northern troops had inflicted were hereafter to be felt by those who had caused such suffering. It was believed, too, that the Federal forces were so much disorganized that they would be unable to resist the Confederates before they could gain a foothold in Maryland; and this foothold once gained, Lee thought he could hold it against any force that the Union generals could lead against him.

So the command "Onward to Maryland!" was given. Filled with his usual conviction that the Lord was especially pleased with his work, General Jackson seized a moment of the precious hours to write to his wife that "God was with us and gave us the victory" which he had just won over Pope; and to confess that it greatly encouraged him "to feel that so many of God's people are praying for that part of our forces under my command." "The Lord," he wrote, "had answered their prayers" and his trust was in Him that He would still continue to do so. God in his providence had again placed us across Bull Run, and he prayed that "He would make the Confederate arms entirely successful," and that "all the glory would be given to his holy name and none of it to man."<sup>1</sup>

In this spirit Jackson put his troops in motion towards Leesburg. The invasion contemplated had been a favored one with him. Long before, he had written

<sup>1</sup> Letter of General Jackson to his wife, September 1, 1862.

to a friend, "I am cordially with you in carrying the war north of the Potomac."<sup>1</sup> On the 3d of September he moved from Ox Hill, and followed Longstreet's route, who on the 2d had marched via Drainsville, Leesburg, and White's Pond, to a crossing of the Potomac.<sup>2</sup>

While McClellan was giving his personal attention to the location and subsistence of his troops he became aware of the disappearance of the enemy from his front, and he was convinced that Lee intended to cross the upper Potomac. It was clearly manifest that the operations of the Federal army must be enlarged. The invasion of Pennsylvania, the occupation of Baltimore and Washington, would assuredly follow a successful stand by the Confederates in Maryland.

With a full conviction of the grave responsibilities of his position General McClellan hastened with his wearied and half-famished troops upon an aggressive campaign. The corps which Banks had commanded, numbered anew as the twelfth of the Army of the Potomac, was, with the second corps of that army, sent on the 3d of September to Tenallytown; and the two corps thus united were placed under the temporary command of General Sumner. The ninth corps was sent to a point on the Seventh Street road near Washington, and all the available cavalry was pushed forward to the fords near Poolsville to impede the enemy in any effort he might make to cross the Potomac in that vicinity.

The march of Banks's corps led by the Long Bridge to a crossing of the Potomac at Georgetown. It chanced that at that time, there were distinguished men in Washington, who availed themselves of the

<sup>1</sup> Cooke's Life of Jackson, page 308.

<sup>2</sup> Longstreet arrived at Frederick City, Maryland, September 7th.

near approach of the troops to gaze upon them as they passed.

Earnestly and prayerfully, senators, governors, and representatives beheld the wasted battalions, the worn and wearied men, who were resolutely hurrying forward, again to meet the foe on the deadly field of Antietam. And it may be hoped that then there came to those who ruled the destinies of this nation a sacred resolve that such devotion and such sacrifices should not, in the hour of the soldiers' need, be forgotten or unrewarded.

NOTE. For tables in detail and in aggregate of the strength of each army and the losses suffered by each in the campaign, see Appendix.





## APPENDIX.



## APPENDIX.

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### ORDERS OF GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE.

SPECIAL ORDERS, NO. 186.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, }  
August 19, 1862.

I. General Longstreet's command, constituting the right wing of the army, will cross the Rapidan at Racoon Ford and move in the direction of Culpepper Court House. General Jackson's command, constituting the left wing, will cross at Sommerville's Ford and move in the same direction, keeping on the left of General Longstreet.

General Anderson's division will cross at Sommerville's Ford, follow the route of General Jackson, and act in reserve.

The battalion of light artillery under Colonel S. D. Lee will take the same route. The cavalry under General Stuart will cross at Morton's Ford, pursue the route by Stevensburg to Rappahannock Station, destroy the railroad bridge, cut the enemy's communications and telegraph line, and operating towards Culpepper Court House will take position on General Longstreet's right.

II. The commanders of each wing will designate the reserve for their commands.

Medical and ammunition wagons will alone follow the troops across the Rapidan. The baggage and staff trains will be parked under their respective officers in secure positions on the south side, so as not to embarrass the different roads.

III. Cooked rations for three days will be carried in the haversacks of the men, and provision must be made for foraging the animals. Straggling from the ranks is strictly prohibited, and commanders will make arrangements to secure and punish the offenders.

IV. The movements herein directed will commence to-morrow, 20th inst., at dawn of day.

By command of GENERAL R. E. LEE.

A. P. MASON, A. A. G.

## INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE TO GENERAL STUART.

HEADQUARTERS, CRENSHAW'S FARM, }  
August 19, 1862.

GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, *commanding cavalry* :

GENERAL, — I desire you to rest your men to-day, refresh your horses, prepare rations and everything for the march to-morrow.

Get what information you can of fords, roads, and position of the enemy, so that your march can be made understandingly and with vigor.

I send to you Captain Mason, an experienced bridge builder, etc., who I think will be able to aid you in the destruction of the bridge, etc. When this is accomplished or in train of execution, as circumstances permit, I wish you to operate back towards Culpepper Court House, creating such confusion and consternation as you can without unnecessarily exposing your men, till you feel Longstreet's right. Take position there on his right and hold yourself in reserve, and act as circumstances may require.

I wish to know during the day how you proceed in your preparations. They will require the personal attention of all your officers.

The last reports from the signal stations yesterday evening were that the enemy was breaking up his principal encampment, and moving in direction of Culpepper Court House.

Very respectfully,

R. E. LEE.

CHARGES, SPECIFICATIONS, AND FINDINGS IN THE FITZ-  
JOHN PORTER COURT-MARTIAL.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 18.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
 WASHINGTON, January 22, 1863. }

I. Before a general court-martial which convened in the city of Washington, D. C., November 27, 1862, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 362, dated Headquarters of the Army, November 25, 1862, and of which Major-General D. Hunter, United States Volunteers, is president, was arraigned and tried Major-General Fitz-John Porter, United States Volunteers.

CHARGE I. — Violation of the 9th Article of War.

SPECIFICATION FIRST: —

In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the volunteers of the United States, having received a lawful order, on or about the 27th August, 1862, while at or near Warrenton Junction, in Virginia, from Major-General John Pope, his superior commanding officer, in the following figures and letters, to wit: —

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
 BRISTOE STATION, August 27, 1862, 6.30 P. M. }

MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. PORTER, *Warrenton Junction*:

GENERAL, — The major-general commanding directs that you start at one o'clock to-night and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back; but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately; also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Bealton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad train to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that effect.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL POPE.

(Signed)

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

P. S. If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately. If Banks is not at the Junction instruct Colonel Clary to run the train back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL POPE.

(Signed)

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Did then and there disobey the said order, being at the time in the face of the enemy. This at or near Warrenton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of August, 1862.

SPECIFICATION SECOND : —

In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being in front of the enemy, at Manassas, Virginia, on or about the morning of August 29, 1862, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to wit : —

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA. {  
August 29, 1862.

GENERALS McDOWELL AND PORTER :

You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aid-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts's position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts and instruct him to join the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be held in view: that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this

direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day. My own headquarters will for the present be with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place.

(Signed)

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General commanding.*

Which order the said Major-General Porter did then and there disobey. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862.

SPECIFICATION THIRD : —

In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, having been in front of the enemy during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th of August, 1862, did on that day receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to wit : —

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, }  
August 29, 1862, 4.30 P. M. }

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER:

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

(Signed)

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General commanding.*

Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there disobey, and did fail to push forward his forces into action either on the enemy's flank or rear, and in all other respects did fail to obey said order. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862.

SPECIFICATION FOURTH : —

In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near Manassas Junction, on the night of 29th August, 1862, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order in figures and words as follows, to wit : —



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, }  
 IN THE FIELD, NEAR BULL RUN, }  
 August 29, 1862, 8.50 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. PORTER :

GENERAL, — Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.

(Signed)

JOHN POPE,

*Major-General commanding.*

And the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter did then and there disobey the said order, and did permit one of the brigades of his command to march to Centreville, — out of the way of the field of battle, — and there to remain during the entire day of Saturday, the 30th of August. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th and 30th days of August, 1862.

SPECIFICATION FIFTH : —

In this : That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the night of the 29th August, 1862, and having received from his superior commanding officer, Major-General John Pope, the lawful order set forth in specification fourth to this charge, did then and there disobey the same, and did permit one other brigade attached to his command — being the brigade commanded by Brigadier-General A. S. Piatt — to march to Centreville, and did thereby greatly delay the arrival of the said General Piatt's brigade on the field of the battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 30th August, 1862. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th day of August, 1862.

CHARGE II. — Violation of the 52d Article of War.

SPECIFICATION FIRST : —

In this : That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, and while within sight of the field, and in full hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order to attack the enemy, in the following figures and letters, to wit : —

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, }  
 August 29, 1862, 4.30 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER :

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank,

and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

(Signed)

JOHN POPE,

*Major-General commanding.*

Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there shamefully disobey, and did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops who were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying on the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to secure a decisive victory and to capture the enemy's army, a result which must have followed from said flank attack had it been made by the said General Porter in compliance with the said order which he so shamefully disobeyed. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862.

SPECIFICATION SECOND :—

In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being with his army corps on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, between Manassas Station and the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and within sound of the guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action of great consequence was being fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on to the field, and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them battle, and without knowing the forces from which he shamefully retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862.

SPECIFICATION THIRD :—

In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being with his army corps near the field of battle near Manassas on the 29th of August, 1862, while a severe action was being fought by the troops of Major-General Pope's command, and being in the belief that the troops of the said General Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and general, and did shamefully retreat away, and did fall back with his army to the Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army; and did fail by any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would

have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th day of August, 1862.

**SPECIFICATION FOURTH:—**

In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, on the field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday the 30th August, 1862, having received a lawful order from his superior officer and commanding general, Major-General John Pope, to engage the enemy's lines, and to carry a position near their centre, and to take an annoying battery there posted, did proceed in the execution of that order with unnecessary slowness, and by delays give the enemy opportunities to watch and know his movements, and to prepare to meet his attack; and did finally so feebly fall upon the enemy's lines as to make little or no impression on the same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops, or to keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his position and the momentous consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a juncture of the day.

To which charges and specifications the accused, Major-General Fitz-John Porter, United States Volunteers, pleaded "Not Guilty."

**FINDING.**

The court, having maturely considered the evidence adduced, finds the accused, Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the United States Volunteers, as follows: "Guilty of the first, second, and third specifications," and "Of the charge, Guilty."

**CHARGE II.** Of the first specification, "Guilty, except so much of the specification as implies that he, the accused, 'did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy,' after the receipt of the order set forth in said specification." Of the second specification, "Guilty." Of the third specification, "Guilty, except the words 'to the Manassas Junction.'" Of the charge, "Guilty."

**SENTENCE.**

And the court does therefore sentence him, Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the United States Volunteers, "To be cashiered, and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.

II. In compliance with the sixty-fifth of the Rules and Articles of War, the whole proceedings of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been transmitted to the Secretary of War, and by him laid before the President of the United States.

The following are the orders of the President : —

"The foregoing proceedings, findings, and sentence in the foregoing case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter are approved and confirmed; and it is ordered that the said Fitz-John Porter be, and he hereby is, cashiered and dismissed from the service of the United States as a Major-General of Volunteers, and as Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General in the Regular Service of the United States, and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"January 21, 1863."

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS IN THE CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER, LATE MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS.

NEW YORK CITY, {  
March 19, 1879. }

THE HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C. :*

SIR, — We, the Board of Officers appointed by order of the President to examine the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, late Major-General of Volunteers, and to report, with the reasons for our conclusions, what action, if any, should be taken by the President on the application for relief in that case, have the honor to make the following report. . . .

These charges and specifications certainly bear no discernible resemblance to the facts of the case as now established. Yet it has been our duty to carefully compare with these facts the views entertained by the court-martial, as shown in the findings and in the review of the case which was prepared for the information of the President by the judge-advocate-general who had conducted the prosecution, and thus to clearly perceive every error into which the court-martial was led. We trust it is not necessary for us to submit in detail the results of this comparison, and that it will be sufficient for us to point out the fundamental errors, and to say that all the essential facts in every instance stand out in clear and absolute contrast to those supposed facts upon which General Porter was adjudged guilty.

The fundamental errors upon which the conviction of General Porter depended may be summed up in a few words. It was maintained, and apparently established to the satisfaction of the court-martial, that only about one half of the Confederate army was on the field of Manassas on the 29th of August, while General Lee, with the other half, was still beyond the Bull Run Mountains; that General Pope's army, exclusive of Porter's corps, was engaged in a severe and nearly equal contest with the enemy, and only needed the aid of a flank attack

which Porter was expected to make to insure the defeat and destruction or capture of the Confederate force in their front under General Jackson; that McDowell and Porter, with their joint forces, Porter's leading, had advanced toward Gainesville until the head of their column had reached a point near the Warrenton turnpike, where they found a division of Confederate troops, "seventeen regiments," which Buford had counted as they passed through Gainesville, marching along the road across Porter's front, and going toward the field of battle at Groveton; that McDowell ordered Porter to at once attack that column thus moving to join Jackson, or the flank and rear of the line if they had formed in line, while he would take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and throw them upon the enemy's centre near Groveton; that Porter, McDowell having then separated from him, disobeyed that order to attack, allowed that division of the enemy's troops to pass him unmolested, and then fell back and retreated toward Manassas Junction; that Porter then remained in the rear all the afternoon, listening to the sounds of battle and coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades on the centre and right of the field; that this division of the enemy having passed Porter's column and formed on the right of Jackson's line near Groveton, an order was sent to Porter to attack the right flank or rear of the enemy's line, upon which his own line of march must bring him, but that he had willfully disobeyed, and made no attempt to execute that order; that in this way was lost the opportunity to destroy Jackson's detached force before the other wing of General Lee's army could join it, and that this junction having been effected during the night of the 29th, the defeat of General Pope's army on the 30th thus resulted from General Porter's neglect and disobedience.

Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors, the following all-important facts are fully established:—

As Porter was advancing toward Gainesville, and while yet nearly four miles from that place and more than two miles from the nearest point of the Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confederate army, twenty-five thousand strong, which had arrived on the field that morning and was already in line of battle. Not being at that moment quite fully informed of the enemy's movements, and being then under orders from Pope to push rapidly toward Gainesville, Porter was pressing forward to attack the enemy in his front, when McDowell arrived on the field with later information of the enemy and later and very different orders from Pope, assumed the command, and arrested Porter's advance. This later information left no room for doubt that the main body of Lee's army was already on the field and far in advance of Pope's army in preparation for battle. General

McDowell promptly decided not to attempt to go further to the front, but to deploy his column so as to form line in connection with General Pope's right wing, which was then engaged with Jackson. To do this General McDowell separated his corps entirely from General Porter's, and thus relinquished the command and all right to the command of Porter's corps. McDowell did not give Porter any order to attack, nor did he give him any order whatever to govern his action after their separation.

It does not appear from the testimony that he conveyed to General Porter in any way the erroneous view of the military situation which was afterward maintained before the court-martial, nor that he suggested to General Porter any expectation that he would make an attack. On the contrary, the testimony of all the witnesses as to what was actually said and done; the information which McDowell and Porter then had respecting the enemy, and the movement which McDowell decided to make, and did make, with his own troops, prove conclusively that there was left no room for doubt in Porter's mind that his duty was to stand on the defensive and hold his position until McDowell's movement could be completed. It would have indicated a great error of military judgment to have done or ordered the contrary, in the situation as then fully known to both McDowell and Porter.

General Pope appears from his orders and from his testimony to have been at that time wholly ignorant of the true situation. He had disapproved of the sending of Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap to meet Longstreet on the 28th, believing that the main body of Lee's army could not reach the field of Manassas before the night of the 30th. Hence he sent the order to Porter, dated 4.30 P. M., to attack Jackson's right flank or rear. Fortunately that order did not reach Porter until about sunset, — too late for any attack to be made. Any attack which Porter could have made at any time that afternoon must necessarily have been fruitless of any good result. Porter's faithful, subordinate, and intelligent conduct that afternoon saved the Union army from the defeat which would otherwise have resulted that day from the enemy's more speedy concentration. The only seriously critical period of that campaign, namely, between eleven A. M. and sunset of August 29th, was thus safely passed. Porter had understood and appreciated the military situation, and, so far as he had acted upon his own judgment, his action had been wise and judicious. For the disaster of the succeeding day he was in no way responsible. Whoever else may have been responsible, it did not flow from any action or inaction of his.

The judgment of the court-martial upon General Porter's conduct

was evidently based upon greatly erroneous impressions, not only respecting what that conduct really was and the orders under which he was acting, but also respecting all the circumstances under which he acted. Especially was this true in respect to the character of the battle of the 29th of August. That battle consisted of a number of sharp and gallant combats between small portions of the opposing forces. Those combats were of short duration and were separated by long intervals of simple skirmishing and artillery duels. Until after six o'clock only a small part of the troops on either side were engaged at any time during the afternoon. Then, about sunset, one additional division on each side was engaged near Groveton. The musketry of that last contest and the yells of the Confederate troops about dark were distinctly heard by the officers of Porter's corps; but at no other time during all that afternoon was the volume of musketry such that it could be heard at the position of Porter's troops. No sound but that of artillery was heard by them during all those hours when Porter was understood by the court-martial to have been listening to the sounds of a furious battle raging immediately to his right; and those sounds of artillery were by no means such as to indicate a general battle.

The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of August have somehow been strangely confounded with each other. Even the Confederate reports have, since the termination of the war, been similarly misconstrued. Those of the 30th have been misquoted as referring to the 29th, thus to prove that a furious battle was going on while Porter was comparatively inactive on the 29th. The fierce and gallant struggle of his own troops on the 30th has thus been used to sustain the original error under which he was condemned. General Porter was, in effect, condemned for not having taken any part in his own battle. Such was the error upon which General Porter was pronounced guilty of the most shameful crime known among soldiers. We believe not one among all the gallant soldiers on that bloody field was less deserving of such condemnation than he.

The evidence of bad animus in Porter's case ceases to be material in view of the evidence of his soldierly and faithful conduct. But it is our duty to say that the indiscreet and unkind terms in which General Porter expressed his distrust of the capacity of his superior commander cannot be defended; and to that indiscretion was due, in very great measure, the misinterpretation of both his motives and his conduct, and his consequent condemnation.

Having thus given the reasons for our conclusions, we have the honor to report, in accordance with the President's order, that, in our opinion, justice requires at his hands such action as may be necessary

to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which that sentence deprived him,—such restoration to take effect from the date of his dismissal from the service.

Very respectfully your obedient servants,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*Major-General U. S. A.*

ALFRED H. TERRY,

*Brigadier-General U. S. A.*

GEO. W. GETTY,

*Bvt. Maj.-Gen. U. S. A., Col. 3d Art.*



## FEDERAL STRENGTH AND CASUALTIES IN CAMPAIGN OF ARMY OF VIRGINIA, 1862.

Corps.	DIVISION.	STRENGTH.	DATES OF ACTIONS.		CASUALTIES IN DIVISIONS.			TOTAL IN CORPS.
			August.	September.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
McDowell's, Third	King (Hatch) <sup>1</sup>	8,000	28, 29, 30	-	320	1,559	748	2,627
	Ricketts <sup>2</sup>	7,000	28, 29, 30	-	177	725	-	1,752
	Reynolds <sup>3</sup>	4,500	28, 29, 30	-	-	-	-	683
	Bayard's Cavalry	2,000	30	-	9	12	22	43
Sigel's, First <sup>4</sup>	Beardsley	10,000	28, 29, 30	-	-	-	-	1,993
	Stahl							
	Schenck							
Porter's, Fifth (Army of the Potomac)	Morell <sup>5</sup>	8,500	29, 30	-	-	-	-	1,247
	Sykes <sup>7</sup>							
	Platz <sup>8</sup>							
Heintzelman's, Third (Army of the Potomac)	Kearny <sup>10</sup>	5,000	29, 30	-	-	-	-	1,491
	Hooker <sup>11</sup>	5,500	27, 28, 30	1	-	-	-	
	Reno, Second Division <sup>12</sup>	3,000	29, 30	-	-	-	-	
Reno's, Ninth (Burnside's)	Stevens, First Division <sup>13</sup>	4,000	29, 30	1	-	-	-	531
	Balford's Cavalry <sup>14</sup>	8,000	14 to	2	-	-	-	2,500
	Williams	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Banks's, Second	Greene							-
	Augur							-
Franklin's } Sumner's }		19,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
								-
								-
Total		85,800						12,744

<sup>1</sup> Gibbon's loss on 28th of August, killed, 138; wounded, 538; missing, 79; total, 755; on 30th of August, killed, 16; wounded, 88; missing, 36; total, 130. Sixty Wisconsin of Gibbon's brigade lost, on 28th, killed, 8; wounded, 61; missing, 3. <sup>2</sup> In Tower's (second) brigade, loss on 30th, killed and wounded, 118; missing, 52. <sup>3</sup> Meade's loss, 186; Seymour's, 116; Jackson's, 287; Fifth Artillery Battalion, Companies C, A, B, and G, 16. <sup>4</sup> Loss, 42 officers and 1,381 non-commissioned officers and privates. <sup>5</sup> On 29th and 30th exceeded 20 per centum of whole effective force. <sup>6</sup> General Griffin's brigade, 2,000 men, absent at Centreville, August 30th; Butterfield's brigade lost 214, August 30th. <sup>7</sup> Fifth New York, Warren's brigade, lost 249 out of 490 engaged, August 30th; Chapman's brigade lost 217, August 30th; Warren's total strength, August 30th, 1,000 men. <sup>8</sup> In action August 30th. <sup>9</sup> "Imperfect as they are," losses on 29th and 30th aggregated 1,401, killed, wounded, and missing. <sup>10</sup> Kearny's division lost 750 out of total reported in corps, and out of this Robinson's brigade lost 538 on the 29th and 30th August; no report at Chantilly. <sup>11</sup> No report received of second brigade, Hooker's division; third brigade, Hooker's division, Colonel Carr's loss, 397; General Grover lost, on the 29th, 496 men in killed, wounded, and missing; Fifth New Jersey lost 43 out of 380 men on 29th; Colonel Herve's regiment lost 23 out of 240, August 29th. <sup>12</sup> No report of losses in the second and third brigades of this division. <sup>13</sup> Three brigades. <sup>14</sup> No report of losses. <sup>15</sup> Joined Army of Virginia at Centreville.

LIST OF REGIMENTS, BRIGADES, AND DIVISIONS OF THE  
ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

REGIMENT.	BRIGADE.	DIVISION.
2d Wisconsin . . . . .	Gibbon. (Fourth.) .	King. (First.)
19th Indiana . . . . .	Gibbon. (Fourth.) .	King. (First.)
6th Wisconsin . . . . .	Gibbon. (Fourth.) .	King. (First.)
7th Wisconsin . . . . .	Gibbon. (Fourth.) .	King. (First.)
Battery 4th Artil'y (Campbell).	Gibbon. (Fourth.) .	King. (First.)
56th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Doubleday. (Second.)	King. (First.)
76th New York . . . . .	Doubleday. (Second.)	King. (First.)
95th New York . . . . .	Doubleday. (Second.)	King. (First.)
Harris Light Cavalry, 2d N. Y.	Doubleday. (Second.)	King. (First.)
4th New York Artillery . . . .	Doubleday. (Second.)	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Patrick . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Patrick . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Patrick . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Patrick . . . . .	King. (First.)
2d U. S. Sharp-Shooters . . . .	Hatch . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Hatch . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Hatch . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Hatch . . . . .	King. (First.)
— New York . . . . .	Hatch . . . . .	King. (First.)
26th New York . . . . .	Tower. (Second.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
88th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Tower. (Second.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
90th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Tower. (Second.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
94th New York . . . . .	Tower. (Second.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
12th Massachusetts . . . . .	Tower. (Second.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
83d New York . . . . .	Hartsuff. (Third.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
107th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Col. Stiles command'g. Carroll. (Fourth.) .	Ricketts. (Second.)
	Col. Thorburn com'g.	
Hall's, Thompson's, Mathew's, and Leppien's Batteries . . . .	Duryea. (First.) . .	Ricketts. (Second.)
1st Rifles . . . . .	Meade. (First.) . .	Reynolds.
3d Infantry . . . . .	Meade. (First.) . .	Reynolds.
4th Infantry . . . . .	Meade. (First.) . .	Reynolds.
7th Infantry . . . . .	Meade. (First.) . .	Reynolds.
8th Infantry . . . . .	Meade. (First.) . .	Reynolds.
1st Infantry . . . . .	Seymour. (Second.) .	Reynolds.
2d Infantry . . . . .	Seymour. (Second.) .	Reynolds.
5th Infantry . . . . .	Seymour. (Second.) .	Reynolds.
6th Infantry . . . . .	Seymour. (Second.) .	Reynolds.
9th Infantry . . . . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
	Col. Anderson com'g.	
10th Infantry . . . . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
11th Infantry . . . . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
12th Infantry . . . . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
Battery C, 5th Artillery . . . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
Battery A, 1st Pennsylvania . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
Battery G, 1st Pennsylvania . .	Jackson. (Third.) .	Reynolds.
1st Pennsylvania Cavalry . . . .	Bayard . . . . .	King.
N. Y. Battalion . . . . .	Bayard . . . . .	King.
1st Maine . . . . .	Bayard . . . . .	King.
1st Rhode Island . . . . .	Bayard . . . . .	King.

LIST OF REGIMENTS, ETC. (*continued*).

REGIMENT.	BRIGADE.	DIVISION.
8th New York . . . . .	Stahl. (First.) . . .	Schenck. (First.)
27th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Stahl. (First.) . . .	Schenck. (First.)
41st New York . . . . .	Stahl. (First.) . . .	Schenck. (First.)
45th New York . . . . .	Stahl. (First.) . . .	Schenck. (First.)
8th New York . . . . .	Stahl. (First.) . . .	Schenck. (First.)
55th Ohio . . . . .	McLean. (Second.) .	Schenck. (First.)
75th Ohio . . . . .	McLean. (Second.) .	Schenck. (First.)
73d Ohio . . . . .	McLean. (Second.) .	Schenck. (First.)
25th Ohio . . . . .	McLean. (Second.) .	Schenck. (First.)
Battery K, 1st Ohio Artillery .	McLean. (Second.) .	Schenck. (First.)
		Steinwehr. (Second.)
29th New York . . . . .	Koltes. (First.) . . .	Schurz. (Third.)
68th New York . . . . .	Koltes. (First.) . . .	Schurz. (Third.)
73d Pennsylvania . . . . .	Koltes. (First.) . . .	Schurz. (Third.)
8th Virginia . . . . .	Schimmelfening. (3d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
61st Ohio . . . . .	Schimmelfening. (3d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
74th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Schimmelfening. (3d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
54th New York . . . . .	Krzyzanowski. (2d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
75th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Krzyzanowski. (2d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
68th New York . . . . .	Krzyzanowski. (2d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
58th New York . . . . .	Krzyzanowski. (2d.)	Schurz. (Third.)
82d Ohio . . . . .	Milroy . . . . .	
8th Virginia . . . . .	Milroy . . . . .	
5th Virginia . . . . .	Milroy . . . . .	
2d Virginia . . . . .	Milroy . . . . .	
3d Virginia . . . . .	Milroy . . . . .	
Batteries . . . . .	Milroy . . . . .	
9th New York Cavalry . . . . .	Beardsley . . . . .	
4th New York Cavalry . . . . .	Beardsley . . . . .	
6th Ohio Cavalry . . . . .	Beardsley . . . . .	
1st Maryland . . . . .	Beardsley . . . . .	
— Connecticut, 3 companies . .	Beardsley . . . . .	
37th New York . . . . .	Poe. (Second.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
2d Michigan . . . . .	Poe. (Second.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
3d Michigan . . . . .	Poe. (Second.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
5th Michigan . . . . .	Poe. (Second.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
99th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Poe. (Second.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
20th Indiana . . . . .	Robinson. (First.) .	Kearny. (First.)
105th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Robinson. (First.) .	Kearny. (First.)
63d Pennsylvania . . . . .	Robinson. (First.) .	Kearny. (First.)
30th Ohio . . . . .	Robinson. (First.) .	Kearny. (First.)
2d Michigan . . . . .	Robinson. (First.) .	Kearny. (First.)
3d Michigan . . . . .	Robinson. (First.) .	Kearny. (First.)
3d Maine . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
4th Maine . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
57th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
38th New York . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
40th New York . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
101st New York . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
1st New York . . . . .	Birney. (Third.) . . .	Kearny. (First.)
2d New Hampshire . . . . .	Grover. (First.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
1st Massachusetts . . . . .	Grover. (First.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
11th Massachusetts . . . . .	Grover. (First.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
16th Massachusetts . . . . .	Grover. (First.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
26th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Grover. (First.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)

LIST OF REGIMENTS, ETC. (*continued*).

REGIMENT.	BRIGADE.	DIVISION.
6th New Jersey . . . . .	Carr. (Third.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
7th New Jersey . . . . .	Carr. (Third.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
2d New York . . . . .	Carr. (Third.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
8th New Jersey . . . . .	Carr. (Third.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
5th New Jersey . . . . .	Carr. (Third.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
115th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Carr. (Third.) . . .	Hooker. (Second.)
2d Excelsior . . . . .	Taylor. (Second.) . .	Hooker. (Second.)
3d Excelsior . . . . .	Taylor. (Second.) . .	Hooker. (Second.)
4th Excelsior . . . . .	Taylor. (Second.) . .	Hooker. (Second.)
1st Battalion, 12th U. S. Inf. . . . .	Buchanan. (First.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
3d Battalion, 12th U. S. Inf. . . . .	Buchanan. (First.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
4th Battalion, 12th U. S. Inf. . . . .	Buchanan. (First.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
1st Infantry . . . . .	Buchanan. (First.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
2d Infantry . . . . .	Buchanan. (First.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
14th Infantry . . . . .	Buchanan. (First.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
2d Infantry . . . . .	Chapman. (Second.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
10th Infantry . . . . .	Chapman. (Second.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
16th Infantry . . . . .	Chapman. (Second.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
11th Infantry . . . . .	Chapman. (Second.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
17th Infantry . . . . .	Chapman. (Second.) . .	Sykes. (Second.)
5th New York . . . . .	Warren. (Third.) . . .	Sykes. (Second.)
10th New York . . . . .	Warren. (Third.) . . .	Sykes. (Second.)
17th New York . . . . .	Butterfield. (Third.) .	Morell. (First.)
	Col. Lansing com'g, 30th of August . . . .	Gen. Butterfield com'g on the 30th of August
44th New York . . . . .	Butterfield. (Third.) .	Morell. (First.)
12th New York . . . . .	Butterfield. (Third.) .	Morell. (First.)
16th Michigan . . . . .	Butterfield. (Third.) .	Morell. (First.)
83d Pennsylvania . . . . .	Butterfield. (Third.) .	Morell. (First.)
2d Maine . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
	Col. Roberts com'g, 30th of August . . . .	
18th Massachusetts . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
22d Massachusetts . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
25th New York . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
13th New York . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
1st Michigan . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
5th U. S. Artillery, Batteries D, C, R, and I . . . . .	Barnes. (First.) . . .	Morell. (First.)
Battery C, Mass. Artillery, Cap- tain Martin, and command- ing Artillery of Division		
Berdan's U. S. Sharp-Shooters.	Griffin. (Second.) . .	Morell. (First.)
	Piatt. (Sturgis.) . . .	
48th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Nagle. (First.) . . .	Reno. (Second.)
2d Maryland . . . . .	Nagle. (First.) . . .	Reno. (Second.)
9th New Hampshire . . . . .	Nagle. (First.) . . .	Reno. (Second.)
6th New Hampshire . . . . .	Nagle. (First.) . . .	Reno. (Second.)
51st New York . . . . .	Ferrero. (Second.) . .	Reno. (Second.)
51st Pennsylvania . . . . .	Ferrero. (Second.) . .	Reno. (Second.)
21st Massachusetts . . . . .	Ferrero. (Second.) . .	Stevens. (First.)
35th Massachusetts . . . . .	Ferrero. (Second.) . .	Stevens. (First.)
79th New York . . . . .	Farnsworth. (Third.) .	Stevens. (First.)
28th Massachusetts . . . . .	Farnsworth. (Third.) .	Stevens. (First.)
8th Michigan . . . . .	Christ. (First.) . . .	Stevens. (First.)

LIST OF REGIMENTS, ETC. (*continued*).

REGIMENT.	BRIGADE.	DIVISION.
50th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Christ. (First.) . . . .	Stevens. (First.)
46th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Christ. (First.) . . . .	Stevens. (First.)
100th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Leisure. (Second.) . . .	Stevens. (First.)
45th New York . . . . .	Leisure. (Second.) . . .	Stevens. (First.)
Battery E, 2d Artillery . . . .		
Benjamin . . . . .		
2d Massachusetts . . . . .	Gordon. (Third.) . . . .	Williams.
29th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Gordon . . . . .	Williams.
3d Wisconsin . . . . .	Gordon . . . . .	Williams.
27th Indiana . . . . .	Gordon . . . . .	Williams.
Cothran's New York Battery . .	Gordon . . . . .	Williams.
10th Maine . . . . .	Crawford . . . . .	Williams.
46th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Crawford . . . . .	Williams.
28th New York . . . . .	Crawford . . . . .	Williams.
5th Connecticut . . . . .	Crawford . . . . .	Williams.
Knapp's Pennsylvania Battery . .	Crawford . . . . .	Williams.
5th Ohio . . . . .	Geary . . . . .	Augur.
7th Ohio . . . . .	Geary . . . . .	Augur.
66th Ohio . . . . .	Geary . . . . .	Augur.
29th Ohio . . . . .	Geary . . . . .	Augur.
28th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Geary . . . . .	Augur.
111th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Prince . . . . .	Augur.
109th Pennsylvania . . . . .	Prince . . . . .	Augur.
3d Maryland . . . . .	Prince . . . . .	Augur.
102d New York . . . . .	Prince . . . . .	Augur.
8th and 12th U. S. Inf., 8 co's .	Prince . . . . .	Augur.
4th Maine Battery . . . . .	Prince . . . . .	Augur.
1st District of Columbia, 5 co's .	Greene . . . . .	Augur.
78th New York . . . . .	Greene . . . . .	Augur.
60th New York . . . . .	Greene . . . . .	Augur.
Purnell Legion, Maryland Vol- unteers . . . . .	Greene . . . . .	Augur.
1st New Jersey Volunteers . . .	G. W. Taylor . . . . .	
2d New Jersey Volunteers . . .	G. W. Taylor . . . . .	
3d New Jersey Volunteers . . .	G. W. Taylor . . . . .	
11th Ohio . . . . .	E. P. Scammon . . . . .	
12th Ohio . . . . .	E. P. Scammon . . . . .	

## CONFEDERATE STRENGTH AND CASUALTIES IN THE CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, 1862.

Comrs.	Division.	Strength.	Dates of Actions.		Casualties in Actions.			Total in Comrs.
			August.	September.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
T. J. Jackson . . . . .	A. P. Hill <sup>1</sup> . . . . . Breell (Lawton) <sup>2</sup> . . . . . Tallaferrro (Sharke) <sup>3</sup> . . . . .	20,000	27, 28, 29, 30	1	-	-	-	1,780 1,812 1,825 5,000
Longstreet <sup>4</sup> . . . . .	Hood <sup>5</sup> . . . . . Evans <sup>6</sup> . . . . . Kemper <sup>7</sup> . . . . . D. R. Jones <sup>7</sup> . . . . . Wilcox <sup>8</sup> . . . . .	80,000	28 to 30	-	-	-	-	4,725
Walton <sup>9</sup> . . . . .	Washington Artillery . . . . .	4,000	29, 30	-	-	-	-	-
R. D. Lee <sup>9</sup> . . . . .	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	600	29, 30	-	-	-	-	-
F. Lee . . . . .	Cavalry . . . . .	1,900	29, 30	-	-	-	-	124
Stuart <sup>10</sup> . . . . .	Robertson . . . . . Hoover . . . . .	7,000	30	-	-	-	-	-
Longstreet . . . . .	R. H. Anderson <sup>11</sup> . . . . . D. H. Hill <sup>12</sup> . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total . . . . .		68,500			-	-	-	9,849

<sup>1</sup> Total, 1,780: on 28th and 30th August, killed, 199; wounded, 1,898; 28th, 8 wounded; 27th, 6 killed, 15 wounded; 24th, 6 killed, 12 wounded; Archer's brigade, on 30th, 17 killed, 186 wounded; Lane's brigade, on 28th, 29th, 30th August, killed, 30; wounded, 186; Gregg's brigade, on 29th August, wounded, 618; Steuart's brigade, on 28th August, killed, 24; wounded, 41; Branch's brigade, at Chantilly, September 1st, killed, 14; wounded, 22; missing, 2; Gregg's brigade, at Chantilly, September 1st, killed, 15; wounded, 89; August, 28th, killed, 219; wounded, 589; missing, 11; August, 29th, killed, 67; wounded, 229; missing, 5; August, 30th, killed, 13; wounded, 67; missing, 1; September 1st, killed, 24; wounded, 151; missing, 5; total, 1,812. <sup>2</sup> Tallaferrro based on an estimated loss of 5,000 in corps, see Dahney's Life of Jackson. <sup>3</sup> Total in corps, of officers, 68 killed, 881 wounded, 1 missing; total in corps, of men, 945 killed, 3,685 wounded, 45 missing. <sup>4</sup> Lee's see Dahney's Life of Jackson. <sup>5</sup> Evans's brigade, August, 30th, killed, 112; wounded, 611; missing, 8; Pryor's brigade, August, 30th, wounded, 351; missing, 6; a Losses estimated in corps in which they served. <sup>6</sup> Wilcox's brigade, August, 30th, killed, 22; wounded, 107; missing, 8. <sup>7</sup> Pryor's brigade, August, 30th, wounded, 351; missing, 6; a Losses estimated in corps in which they served. <sup>8</sup> Wilcox's brigade, August, 30th, killed, 22; wounded, 107; missing, 8. <sup>9</sup> Pryor's brigade, August, 30th, wounded, 351; missing, 6; a Losses estimated in corps in which they served. <sup>10</sup> Killed, 9; wounded, 56; 11 killed, 78; wounded, 409, counted in Longstreet's aggregate. These numbers include 7 out of 8 field officers and 50 company officers killed at Chantilly.

LIST OF CASUALTIES IN VARIOUS MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AT OR NEAR MANASSAS AND ELSEWHERE, 1862, IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

REGIMENT.	BRIGADE.	DIVISION.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	TOTAL.	NAME AND DATE OF ENGAGEMENT.
Holcomb's Legion . . . . .	Evans's.	Longstreet's.	7	26	33	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Seventeenth South Carolina . . . . .	Evans's.	Longstreet's.	1	8	9	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Eighteenth South Carolina . . . . .	Evans's.	Longstreet's.	4	23	27	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Twenty-second South Carolina . . . . .	Evans's.	Longstreet's.	7	27	34	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Washington Artillery . . . . .	Hood's.	Longstreet's.	8	14	22	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Fifth Texas . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	10	11	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Arkansas Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	5	6	Rappahannock, August 23d.
Sixth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	3	6	9	Brandy Station, August 23d.
Seventh Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	8	9	Brandy Station, August 23d.
Twelfth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	2	3	Brandy Station, August 23d.
Second Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	1	2	Fauquier Springs, August 23d.
Twelfth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	2	3	Fauquier Springs, August 23d.
Sixth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	1	2	Fauquier Springs, August 23d.
Sixth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	1	2	Callett's Station, August 23d.
Second Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	3	4	Waterloo Bridge, August 25th.
Twelfth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	4	5	Brandy Station, August 25th.
Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	1	4	5	Sudley Mills, August 28th.
Second Virginia Cavalry . . . . .	Robertson's.	Stuart's.	8	81	89	Bull Run, August 31st.
						{ Manassas, August 30th.
						{ Leesburg, Va., September 2d.
Total . . . . .			86	149	185	

LIST OF CASUALTIES AT MANASSAS PLAINS IN AUGUST, 1862,  
IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
1st Virginia.	Kemper's.	Pickett's.	4	22	26
7th Virginia.	Kemper's.	Pickett's.	6	58	64
17th Virginia.	Kemper's.	Pickett's.	8	86	94
24th Virginia.	Kemper's.	Pickett's.	11	67	78
11th Virginia.	Kemper's.	Pickett's.	9	54	63
28th Virginia.	Pickett's old.	Pickett's.	12	52	64
9th Virginia.	Pickett's old.	Pickett's.	-	22	22
18th Virginia.	Pickett's old.	Pickett's.	8	88	96
56th Virginia.	Pickett's old.	Pickett's.	-	12	12
6th South Carolina.	Jenkins's.	Pickett's.	18	102	120
Palmetto Sharp-Shooters.	Jenkins's.	Pickett's.	16	52	68
1st South Carolina.	Jenkins's.	Pickett's.	80	94	174
2d South Carolina.	Jenkins's.	Pickett's.	9	49	58
5th South Carolina.	Jenkins's.	Pickett's.	2	87	89
15th South Carolina.	Drayton's.	McLaws's.	3	18	21
51st Georgia.	Drayton's.	McLaws's.	-	9	9
8th Georgia.	Anderson's.	Hood's.	8	54	62
9th Georgia.	Anderson's.	Hood's.	12	116	128
7th Georgia.	Anderson's.	Hood's.	20	100	120
11th Georgia.	Anderson's.	Hood's.	20	178	198
1st Georgia.	Anderson's.	Hood's.	27	77	104
15th Georgia.	Toombs's.	Hood's.	6	48	54
2d Georgia.	Toombs's.	Hood's.	2	51	53
17th Georgia.	Toombs's.	Hood's.	10	82	92
20th Georgia.	Toombs's.	Hood's.	19	118	137
18th Georgia.	Wofford's.	Hood's.	19	114	133
Hampton Legion.	Wofford's.	Hood's.	11	68	79
1st Texas.	Wofford's.	Hood's.	10	18	28
5th Texas.	Wofford's.	Hood's.	15	224	239
4th Texas.	Wofford's.	Hood's.	22	77	99
4th Alabama.	Law's.	Hood's.	18	45	63
11th Mississippi.	Law's.	Hood's.	4	55	59
2d Mississippi.	Law's.	Hood's.	17	80	97
6th North Carolina.	Law's.	Hood's.	6	71	77
Washington Artillery.			1	9	10
6th Virginia.	Mahone's.	Anderson's.	12	49	61
12th Virginia.	Mahone's.	Anderson's.	9	60	69
16th Virginia.	Mahone's.	Anderson's.	8	47	55
41st Virginia.	Mahone's.	Anderson's.	8	34	42
48th Georgia.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	10	51	61
22d Georgia.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	12	60	72
3d Georgia.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	2	29	31
44th Georgia.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	5	22	27
2d Florida.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	-	6	6
8th Florida.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	5	9	14
30th Virginia.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	8	8	16
14th Alabama.	Wright's.	Anderson's.	8	44	52
Holecomb's Legion.	Evans's.		24	131	155
18th South Carolina.	Evans's.		27	86	113
23d South Carolina.	Evans's.		27	122	149
17th South Carolina.	Evans's.		18	161	179
Lee's Battalion Artillery.	Evans's.		-	6	6
2d Virginia.	Winder's.	Jackson's.	4	73	77
4th Virginia.	Winder's.	Jackson's.	19	78	97
5th Virginia.	Winder's.	Jackson's.	14	91	105
27th Virginia.	Winder's.	Jackson's.	4	28	32
33d Virginia.	Winder's.	Jackson's.	24	81	105
Batteries.	Winder's.	Jackson's.	2	2	4
1st Virginia Battalion.	Jones's.	Jackson's.	8	19	27
21st Virginia.	Jones's.	Jackson's.	8	9	17
48th Virginia.	Jones's.	Jackson's.	4	20	24
42d Virginia.	Jones's.	Jackson's.	8	54	62
10th Virginia.	Taliaferro's.	Jackson's.	9	28	37
23d Virginia.	Taliaferro's.	Jackson's.	1	18	19
37th Virginia.	Taliaferro's.	Jackson's.	5	36	41
47th Alabama.	Taliaferro's.	Jackson's.	7	25	32
48th Alabama.	Taliaferro's.	Jackson's.	-	50	50
Batteries.	Taliaferro's.	Jackson's.	2	6	8
2d Louisiana.	Starke's.	Jackson's.	25	86	111



LIST OF CASUALTIES AT MANASSAS PLAINS IN AUGUST, 1862,  
IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY (*continued*).

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
15th Louisiana.	Starke's.	Jackson's.	11	53	64
1st Louisiana.	Starke's.	Jackson's.	4	47	51
10th Louisiana.	Starke's.	Jackson's.	3	81	84
9th Louisiana.	Starke's.	Jackson's.	22	71	93
Batteries.	Starke's.	Jackson's.	4	5	9
18th Georgia.	Lawton's.	Ewell's.	9	19	28
26th Georgia.	Lawton's.	Ewell's.	87	87	124
31st Georgia.	Lawton's.	Ewell's.	7	37	44
38th Georgia.	Lawton's.	Ewell's.	6	68	74
60th Georgia.	Lawton's.	Ewell's.	22	101	123
61st Georgia.	Lawton's.	Ewell's.	11	52	63
8th Louisiana.	Hays's.	Ewell's.	7	46	53
13th Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	6	40	46
26th Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	1	28	29
31st Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	5	20	25
49th Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	-	15	15
44th Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	1	14	15
52d Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	10	51	61
58th Virginia.	Early's.	Ewell's.	4	13	17
21st Georgia.	Trimble's.	Ewell's.	38	146	184
20th North Carolina.	Trimble's.	Ewell's.	24	60	84
15th Alabama.	Trimble's.	Ewell's.	21	91	112
12th Georgia.	Trimble's.	Ewell's.	2	3	5
22d North Carolina.	Pender's.	A. P. Hill's.	6	57	63
16th North Carolina.	Pender's.	A. P. Hill's.	8	44	52
38th North Carolina.	Pender's.	A. P. Hill's.	2	22	24
34th North Carolina.	Pender's.	A. P. Hill's.	2	28	30
55th North Carolina.	Field's.	A. P. Hill's.	8	29	37
47th North Carolina.	Field's.	A. P. Hill's.	8	21	29
2d Virginia Battalion.	Field's.	A. P. Hill's.	-	22	22
Batteries.	Field's.	A. P. Hill's.	4	8	12
33d North Carolina.	Branch's.	A. P. Hill's.	1	7	8
7th North Carolina.	Branch's.	A. P. Hill's.	6	38	44
28th North Carolina.	Branch's.	A. P. Hill's.	5	45	50
37th North Carolina.	Branch's.	A. P. Hill's.	9	72	81
18th North Carolina.	Branch's.	A. P. Hill's.	1	11	12
1st South Carolina.	Gregg's.	A. P. Hill's.	14	174	188
13th South Carolina.	Gregg's.	A. P. Hill's.	19	117	136
14th South Carolina.	Gregg's.	A. P. Hill's.	1	40	41
5th Louisiana.	Hays's.	Ewell's.	7	13	20
6th Louisiana.	Hays's.	Ewell's.	17	36	53
7th Louisiana.	Hays's.	Ewell's.	1	21	22
19th Georgia.	Thomas's.	A. P. Hill's.	1	28	29
14th Georgia.	Thomas's.	A. P. Hill's.	6	46	52
35th Georgia.	Thomas's.	A. P. Hill's.	8	62	70
45th Georgia.	Thomas's.	A. P. Hill's.	7	36	43
49th Georgia.	Thomas's.	A. P. Hill's.	12	56	68
7th Tennessee.	Archer's.	A. P. Hill's.	2	24	26
14th Tennessee.	Archer's.	A. P. Hill's.	8	45	48
5th Alabama Battalion.	Archer's.	A. P. Hill's.	2	17	19
1st Tennessee.	Archer's.	A. P. Hill's.	4	53	57
Total			1,090	6,154	7,244

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